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Forms of power on commercial farms and power relations between white farm owners and 
black farmworkers in Zimbabwe have been explored by scholars such as Clarke (1977), 
Loewenson (1992), Amanor-Wilks (1995), Tandon (2001) and especially Rutherford (2001a). 
While most focus on the capitalist exploitation of farmworkers and forms of structural 
violence, Rutherford has gone beyond political-economy to understand power relations on 
farms in terms of the histories and complex forms of identity formation among both white 
farmers and black workers in pre- and post-independence Zimbabwe. However, the subtle 
and often obscured role of the “farmer’s wife” in farm power relations, determined by the 
dynamics of a system Rutherford (2001a) has called “domestic government”, has not been 
examined much in the literature. In this thesis I address this omission through an examination 
of the role of welfare initiatives and related activities intimately linked to domesticity and 
white “farmer’s wives” within Rhodesian/Zimbabwean white settler society. I show that this 
“maternalistic” role was not only important in the colonial civilising and modernising 
endeavours of white farmers as they “cultivated” African fields, African workers and their 
own identities, but also became an important foundation on which post-independence welfare 
endeavours (linked to a new kind of civilising mission: that of neoliberal “civil society”) were 
built. I then trace the impacts of the radical agrarian shifts introduced in 2000 with the “Fast-
track Land Reform Programme” (FTLRP) on such interventions and on their beneficiaries, 
black farmworkers, as well as on the emergent power relations which farmworkers and 
dwellers now negotiate. Based on nine months of fieldwork, and on archival and library 
research, this multi-sited study takes a historical-ethnographic approach which pays attention 
to the longue durée and the entanglement of political-economic and gendered socio-cultural 
factors shaping power regimes and relations in rural Zimbabwe. The dissertation weaves 
together several strands of argument relating to the changing dynamics of power, welfare, 
modernity and belonging and how these changes are affecting white farmers and their wives, 
NGOs and (former) farmworkers and dwellers in contemporary Zimbabwe. It contributes to a 
fuller, more nuanced and gendered understanding of the (dynamic) nature of labour relations 
and the role of welfare and “improvement” endeavours on (former) commercial farms over 
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Introduction and Methodology: Masculinity, Power and Improvement on Zimbabwe’s 
Highveld  
Expelled from politics, they [white Zimbabweans] concentrated on the imaginative project and on 
bonding themselves to African nature. Many neither feared nor loved blacks but simply tried not to 
think about them. (Hughes 2010: xv) 
 
Original Farm Orphan Support Trust (FOST) fieldworker explaining how their programme was 
started in Mashonaland Central: 
IM: We started with Bindura … Glendale, Concession, Mvurwi, Guruve and Centenary. [Each area 
was arranged into] clusters where we were saying “OK, we want to see whether it’s going to work or 
not” … 
AH: Were these clusters involving [white] farmers’ wives as well? 
IM: Very much. 
AH: Ja, and there were lots involved?  
IM: Very! We used to have nice programmes with them.  
AH: So it was … you know in terms of the number of farms, how many … would you say were 
[involved?] … 
IM: I had 56 in Bindura, 86 in Glendale, 72 Mvurwi … 
AH: So it wasn’t just a small handful?  
IM: No.  
(Taped interview, Harare, 19 November 2013)  
 
Introduction: Photographs, Incomplete Pictures and Questions 
Evidence Chinyanga keeps photographs of his life. He showed them to me one hot March 
afternoon in 2013 in his rented backyard room in Epworth, a sprawling “high density suburb” 
south-east of Harare. There in Evidence’s little room we sat – ourselves and his older twin 
brothers Alois and Spencer – around a kitchen table, squeezed in between a wooden cabinet, 
a wardrobe and his double bed. Amongst the snapshots Evidence showed me was a battered 
picture of four little boys standing outdoors with a man and woman behind them in a parental 
pose. The picture was taken in the workers’ compound of a large-scale white-owned 
commercial farm in Manicaland, eastern Zimbabwe. The boys stare, wide-eyed and 
unsmiling into the camera. Evidence, the youngest, is about five years old, dating the picture 
to around 1994. The twins are wearing matching lime green shirts with blue collars while 
Edmore, the oldest, in an oversized tee-shirt, is a head and shoulders taller than the rest. The 
snapshot is poorly taken, rendering the group off-centre and slightly skew so that Alois has 
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had half of his face cut off. It is not the first time Alois has suffered an amputation: he was 
born with a deformed leg which was amputated below the knee when he was an infant. His 
little wooden crutch has made it into the frame. 
 This was not the first time I had seen a photograph of the brothers. Tucked away in a 
document called Orphans on Farms: Who Cares?1 is an earlier picture of the boys. In this 
one, Evidence is about two years old and the brothers look much more relaxed, playful even, 
as they sit together on a doorstep in the sun. I was given this report some months earlier by 
Dr Sue Parry, on whose farm the Chinyanga brothers grew up. At the same meeting, Parry 
gave me Evidence’s telephone number and suggested I contact him: “him and his brothers 
operate a stall near the bus terminus”, she told me, “they should be happy to speak to you”.  
 Evidence has no memory of his parents. His mother arrived at Parry’s farm when he 
was only a few months old in the company of a man who was probably not the boys’ father. 
They both performed casual work for a few months but she was ill and often went away, 
leaving the brothers in the care of the man. One day, when Evidence was around nine months 
old, his mother did not return from one of her trips. Nobody knows what happened to her, but 
it is thought that she died. A few days later the man also left the farm quietly and the brothers 
were left on their own in the compound. Parry, a medical doctor, and her husband were 
alerted to the boys’ predicament and decided that they must immediately assist. Initially 
sheltering the boys themselves, they came up with a longer-term arrangement, supporting the 
farm health worker and her husband – the couple in Evidence’s photograph – to foster them, 
rather than have them sent to different state institutions. As the 1990s progressed, Parry learnt 
that other farmers were increasingly seeing children becoming orphaned as workers on their 
farms died in the escalating HIV/AIDS epidemic.2  
 Dr Parry, together with others concerned about farm orphans, began to mobilise 
support and initiated the Farm Orphan Support Trust (FOST) in 1995. FOST’s model of 
support to orphaned and vulnerable children on farms, which I describe in Chapter Three, 
was so successful that by the year 2000 it came to be recognised by more than one 
                                                          
1 A 1996 report jointly published by the Southern Africa AIDS Information Dissemination Service (SAfAIDS) 
and the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU). 
2 The prevalence of the Human Immunodefiency Virus (HIV), which causes the acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome (AIDS), increased dramatically in Zimbabwe from an estimated 5 per cent of the adult population in 
1987 to a peak of 26.5 per cent in 1997 (Zimbabwe National AIDS Council n.d.: 1). While AIDS-related deaths 
increased rapidly during the 1990s, peaking in 2003, they have declined since then, while the prevalence of HIV 
in the adult population has dropped to around 14 per cent (ibid.). Populations living on commercial farms were 
some of the worst affected by HIV (see IOM 2003: 58–62), with an estimated 6,000 AIDS-related deaths in 
1990 alone (see The Farmer, 8 November 1990).     
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international agency as a global “best practice” AIDS orphan response for commercial 
agriculture.3 The biographies of these small boys from rural Zimbabwe thus became 
entangled in – and indeed influenced – the discourse and practice of the burgeoning global 
response to HIV. But FOST was just one of a number of other non-governmental 
organisation (NGO)-led developmental interventions – both home-grown and international – 
targeting workers on commercial farms during the 1990s. These included Save the Children 
(UK), the Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ), the CFU Aids Control Project, the 
Kunzwana Women’s Association (KWA) and the Catholic Jesuit development organisation 
Silveira House, among others (see Moyo et al. 2000: 184; Rutherford 1999, 2004a). Like 
FOST, these organisations relied on the farmers, and particularly “farmer’s wives”, not only 
as gatekeepers but very often as key partners in the implementation of their various welfare 
and development agendas for farmworkers and their families residing on privately owned 
commercial farmland. 
 In this thesis I explore the origins, histories and changing dynamics of welfare and 
“improvement” (Li 2007) initiatives aimed at farmworkers and dwellers on largely white-
owned commercial farms on the Zimbabwean highveld. With a particular focus on their role 
in power relations and forms of identity and belonging for both white farmers and black 
farmworkers, I trace such endeavours from the earliest years of commercial agriculture 
around 1900 to the present moment, 15 years after what is officially known as the Fast-track 
Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) commenced.4 The three main kinds of actors involved in 
such initiatives – white farmers/“farmers’ wives”, black farmworkers/former farmworkers 
and their families, and NGOs and their officials – are the central characters of the story 
presented here. As I will show below, the academic literature on both white farmers and on 
these farm-focused NGO initiatives has largely excluded one crucial set of actors – those 
                                                          
3 UNAIDS declared the FOST psychosocial support programme for children affected by HIV a “best practice” 
in the “UNAIDS Best Practice Collection” booklet Investing in our Future (July 2001). Similarly, the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) Background Paper on Children Affected by AIDS in 
Zimbabwe (08/29/2000) notes, under the a section on the “Commercial Farm Model” (of orphan care), that “The 
national response by FOST might well demonstrate globally one of the largest and most comprehensive private 
sector program [sic] in support of children affected by AIDS” (34). 
4 As I will outline in detail in chapters Four, Five and Six, the year 2000 saw the onset of widespread 
occupations of white-owned commercial farmland, led by supporters of the Zimbabwe African National Union – 
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government. The government soon sought to regularise the often violent and illegal 
occupations under what became known officially as the Fast-track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). It is 
important to distinguish between the period of farm occupations and the retrospective attempt by the 
government to bring this largely uncoordinated and extra-legal action under the umbrella of an official 
government programme in the FTLRP. I therefore refer to the initial period of violence as the farm 
takeovers/occupations or, to use the popular colloquial name, the Jambanja, while I use the official name 
(FTLRP) to refer to the post-2000 agrarian dispensation in general.   
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often referred to as “farmers’ wives” – from their assessments of the dynamics of power and 
welfare playing out on white-owned commercial farms over time. The epigraph which 
commences this thesis illustrates the disjuncture between most academic writings, which 
have either totally ignored or trivialised the role of white women on the farms and the 
narratives of those working for NGOs in the 1990s for whom white “farmers’ wives” were 
indispensable partners in their efforts to improve conditions for the estimated two million 
farmworkers and their families.5  
 It is this omission of the history, nature, magnitude and impacts of the involvement of 
white “farmers’ wives” in welfare-related initiatives on commercial farms, from before 
Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 up until the controversial farm occupations of the early 
2000s, that the first half of this thesis seeks to address. There are three major questions 
informing this section. Firstly, what was the nature and extent of the involvement of white 
farmers, and particularly their wives, in “welfare” or “improvement” endeavours for 
farmworkers before independence, and what factors informed such involvement? Secondly, 
what was the nature and extent of initiatives for farmworkers run by NGOs on the highveld 
between 1980 and 2000, and how and to what extent did the previous activity by farm owners 
enable, influence or contradict such work? Thirdly, what role did both the pre- and post-
independence initiatives aimed at farmworkers play in power relations on commercial farms 
and in questions of identity and belonging for white farm owners? This reassessment of the 
historiography and ethnography of commercial farms serves as a foundation for my 
examination of an equally important set of questions about the present that I address in the 
rest of the thesis.  
 A key question I seek to answer in the second half of the thesis is thus: In what ways 
were welfare initiatives run by NGOs (and individual farmers) in the 1990s forced to change, 
adapt to and negotiate the very different spatial, social, political and economic environment 
which emerged with the FTLRP? Beyond this question, which has partially been examined 
by others (e.g. Helliker 2006; Rutherford 2004a), I seek to answer another – hitherto 
unexamined – question: What new forms of welfare or “development” targeting farmworkers 
or former farmworkers and their families emerged, if any; what are the dynamics of such 
initiatives; and what influence do past initiatives have on such endeavours? Furthermore, I 
address another question: What are the current power relations, labour dynamics, living and 
                                                          
5 Consider, for example, Pape’s (1990: 720) sweeping assessment that white women’s activities pre-1980 were 
restricted to “organising their social clubs, tyrannising their domestic servants, and occasionally helping out 
with more productive tasks”.   
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working conditions and the availability of welfare provision, particularly on remaining 
commercially run farms on the highveld, but also on farms taken over under the FTLRP for 
large and medium-scale commercial use?    
 In order to situate these questions more fully within the existing historiography and 
ethnographic canon I first turn to a discussion and critique of relevant literature on white 
farmers, commercial farms and farmworkers. Both what this literature reveals and what it 
obscures are crucial to understanding not only the origins and nature of welfare attempts on 
farms but also how they fitted into and augmented existing power relations on farms as well 
as the nature of the structures that NGOs had to negotiate in implementing their programmes 
for farmworkers after 1980. I then set out the theoretical framework for this study with a 
discussion of various theories of power and power relations and how these relate to white 
commercial farms, farmworkers and welfare initiatives before and after independence.        
 
“Settler Masculinity” and the Figure of the White Zimbabwean Farmer 
Since the onset of the FTLRP, there have been an increasing number of academic works on 
white farmers in Zimbabwe, seeking to understand aspects of their identity, politics and 
practices and the impact that the loss of their farms had on individuals and the community at 
large.6 While there are overlapping approaches and themes among all of these recent 
academic works, they can broadly be divided into those which examine the history, political 
strategies and discourses of white commercial farmers as a group and studies of a more 
ethnographic nature which focus on identity and the nature of their lives and working 
arrangements on their farms, both before and after the farm takeovers.   
 Among the former, Selby (2006) provides a detailed and valuable analysis of the 
history of white commercial farmers between 1890 and 2005 with a particular focus on “how 
they interacted with the state and … competed for access to and control of land and other 
resources” (2006: 7). While Selby is at pains to avoid homogenising white farmers – a central 
aim of his research being to reveal their differentiation – his analysis inevitably focuses on 
the macro-level issues which farmers as an interest group faced and negotiated over a large 
period of time, often led by powerful, male farmer-politicians. These farmer-politicians, 
                                                          
6 White Zimbabweans, including many from a farming background, have also played a significant role in 
producing representations of themselves – in memoirs, journalistic accounts and even novels – during the last 15 
years. For detailed discussion and critique of such writings see Chennells (2005); Hughes (2010); Pilossof 
(2012); and Wylie (2007). 
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along with other predominantly male representatives of the farming community, were Selby’s 
key informants, while his archival research was conducted in the archives of the CFU, where 
he drew mainly on CFU Council minutes and on back issues of the CFU’s mouthpiece, The 
Farmer magazine. Both of these sources are dominated not only by the voices of the men 
whose speech and writing they record, but also the preoccupations, mainly political, 
economic and technical, of male farmers. As such, Selby mentions women, their activities or 
issues specifically facing them only in passing, noting the impact of the 1972–1980 war of 
liberation on “farmers’ wives” (ibid.: 86–7). Farm-welfare initiatives are similarly mentioned 
only briefly in one paragraph (ibid.: 196–7) and in two connected footnotes, but there is no 
mention of the extensive NGO activities on farms, nor of the involvement of many “farmers’ 
wives” in such activities.  
 Pilossof (2012) also explores the history of white commercial farmers in Zimbabwe, 
but his focus is on their discourses, which he argues played an important role in how they 
interpreted important political events and acted before and after independence. Pilossof 
(2012: 3) argues that despite much analytical attention “there has been a remarkable lack of 
critical engagement with the ‘voices’ of white farmers, and how they have framed the events 
that have transpired”. This work, analysing farmer discourses emerging from The Farmer 
magazine, autobiographies written by farmers and material derived from a set of interviews 
conducted with former farmers post-2000 by the Justice for Agriculture Trust (JAG), is thus a 
valuable addition to our understanding of white farmers. Like Selby, Pilossof (ibid.: 3) 
endeavours to acknowledge that “a singular and cohesive white rural identity (or voice) does 
not exist”, but he nevertheless spends most of his time in the book drawing out common 
elements and themes in the “voices” he examines, arguing that at certain crucial stages, these 
have converged into powerful discourses which in turn influenced events.  
 Pilossof does not explore the extent to which his chosen sources represent a 
particularly male voice, and the implications of this for the discourses he identifies. I do not 
disagree that those discourses he has identified were the most audible, cohesive, powerful and 
durable, but I argue that other voices less obvious have been largely excluded from his 
analysis. The Farmer magazine, despite having female editors at two points in its history, 
presented an overwhelmingly male perspective, both in terms of who was interviewed or had 
articles published and also in terms of who constituted the intended readership. A disgruntled 
letter to the Editor of The Farmer published on 31 May 1990 and signed by “A Little 
Woman’s Husband, Lomagundi”, illustrates the point. After a description of the many 
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invaluable roles played by “little women” in the running of their farms he asks: “Why then do 
you Sir, continually refer to only male farmers in your editorials?” Tellingly, the Editor (at 
that point a man) never replied. While Felicity Wood, the second female editor, tried to 
introduce changes to editorial policy, including giving more space to women and activities 
involving women, she herself acknowledged what a thoroughly masculine, if not 
chauvinistic, environment the CFU was, and what pressure there was on her to conform to the 
organisation’s idea of what should go into the magazine.7    
 Pilossof’s fifth chapter, in which he analyses the discursive themes emerging from 
several memoirs written by white Zimbabwean farmers includes some works by women 
(ibid.: 149–86). While aspects of a female “voice” are thus able to come through more clearly 
at this point, these two or three texts – all published since 2000 in the context of loss, trauma 
and nostalgia – present mainly romantic images of the lost farming life and embittered 
assessments of the farm takeovers. As such, they do not represent a broad enough range of 
women’s experiences or views such as, for example, those of the many white farming women 
I interviewed who were involved in farm-welfare endeavours in various capacities and do not 
necessarily share the views of the authors Pilossof has discussed. In Pilossof’s final chapter, 
where he analyses 31 farmer interviews conducted for JAG, the preeminence of the male 
farmer as the representative of the “community” is again evident. Only one of the 31 
interviewees is female, and although several of the “farmers’ wives” were evidently present 
in interviews, and a couple are quoted, their views remain peripheral in Pilossof’s analysis of 
discourse. While he (ibid.: 95) makes passing reference to farm-welfare endeavours, he does 
not find them and the “voices” of those (mainly women) who participated important enough 
to have influenced the discourses of white farmers significantly, or the events in which 
farmers were involved at various points in Zimbabwe’s history. As I will show, however, 
white-farmer narratives around the welfare of farmworkers and their role in the welfare and 
“care” of workers were central to the ways in which they understood themselves, represented 
themselves and acted in pre- and post-independence Zimbabwe (Rutherford 2004b). 
 Of the ethnographic works which focus specifically on white farmers, Hughes’ (2010) 
book is the most comprehensive.8 It is also the most controversial and several authors have 
offered critiques (Hammar 2012; Hartnack 2014; Wylie 2012). Hughes argues that from the 
beginning of white settlement in 1890, the British colonial settlers made attempts to “belong” 
                                                          
7 Interview with Felicity Wood, Harare, 1 June 2012. See also Pilossof (2012: 90–8). 
8 Rutherford’s important book (2001a) and his many other works on black farmworkers and their relationship 
with white farmers will be discussed and drawn on in detail later in this chapter and throughout the thesis.   
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in the country they had conquered not through engagement with the local inhabitants but 
through identification with the landscape, choosing “to invest themselves emotionally and 
artistically in the environment” (2010: xii). White settlers, Hughes argues, did not naturally 
identify with the “arid” landscape but managed to achieve such escapist feelings of belonging 
through the creation of waterscapes, particularly Kariba and through fetishising the “lake” 
and the “natural” unpeopled wilderness scenery through art and poetry, in particular. After 
independence, Hughes (ibid.) argues that this tendency was only strengthened further, with 
farmers in particular practicing environmental escapism, primarily through the building of 
dams on their farms and through their obsession with fishing. While some of Hughes’ ideas 
certainly ring true, particularly for a certain kind of white rural man, Hughes’ mistake is not 
only to suggest too strongly that this tendency applies to most, if not all white Zimbabweans, 
but also to overestimate the extent to which rural white Zimbabweans were practicing such 
forms of escapism. Hughes downplays or discounts any efforts at engagement with black 
Zimbabweans by white farmers prior to the onset of the FTLRP and there is again no mention 
of the involvement of white women in farm-welfare endeavours and the ways in which these 
would have allowed them to engage in different ways with farmworkers and black NGO 
personnel over time.  
 One thing the three works above have in common is that they have mostly allowed the 
strategies, discourses, tastes and habits of male farmers to represent those of “the farming 
community” as a whole. This was not necessarily because these authors deliberately sought to 
valorise the figure of the male farmer but because within southern African settler society a 
particular kind of masculinity has come, over several generations, to be linked to the 
endeavour of farming and the image of “the farmer”. Robert Morrell, who describes the roots 
and construction of this form of masculinity in the KwaZulu-Natal midlands (South Africa), 
refers to it as “settler masculinity” (2001: 13–19). This form of masculinity which, he argues, 
became hegemonic around the turn of the twentieth century in Natal, was perpetuated through 
several hierarchical institutions such as boys’ schools, sports, the military, and professional 
associations, which replaced private domains as “the major sites in which gender 
relationships were worked out” (ibid.: 15). The rise of such institutions in Europe (and the 
colonies) was associated with industrialisation and modernity, and “had the effect of 
converting the power of the male head of household into a social and cultural form which was 
mirrored through and created in a range of organisations which sprang up to regulate, to 
unite, to exclude” (ibid.).   
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 While the work of Hodder-Williams (1983) and Rutherford (2001a) explores 
important aspects of white farmers’ identity, including masculinity, and the role of 
institutions such as farmers’ associations, a detailed social history like Morrell’s, which 
examines white farmers’ constructions of masculinity, their gender relations and the role of 
institutions such as schools, social and sports clubs and the army/police in maintaining these 
forms of masculinity and influencing gender relations has not been conducted on Zimbabwe’s 
farming community. Morrell’s study, however, resonates strongly, particularly with wealthier 
farming districts on the Zimbabwean highveld where many aspired to the English “gentleman 
farmer” ethos, creating remarkably similar and influential institutions to those analysed by 
Morrell (see Chapter Two).9 Along with related Victorian bourgeois sensibilities, late 
nineteenth-century Natalian settler masculinity was highly influential for early settlers in 
Southern Rhodesia, and continued to be so through the close link between Rhodesian settlers 
and Natalian settler institutions such as schools and the agricultural college at 
Pietermaritzburg. Men such as C.G. Tracey (and many others) embodied the modernist 
gentleman farmer ethos in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (see Tracey 2009) while former Prime 
Minister Ian Smith – glorified by some white Rhodesians/Zimbabweans as the rugby captain 
and World War Two fighter pilot farmer-politician – typified a common (albeit extreme) 
form of Rhodesian settler masculinity among his generation.  
 This is not to say that all white Rhodesian/Zimbabwean male farmers have 
constructed their masculinity in the same way or that gender relations were identical in all 
farming households. Settler masculinity is, as Morrell (2001: 17) reminds us, “like all 
masculinities … a dynamic, fluid phenomenon”. It would certainly have been challenged by 
wider radical changes in gender relations and norms during the last century and both men and 
women would have constructed their gender identities and relations in accordance with a 
range of changing influences. Indeed, my interviews and wider experiences of “farmers” in 
Zimbabwe point away from stereotyped images of “the farmer” (burly, red-faced, overly 
macho, strongly opinionated, lover of beer, rugby and fishing, racist) towards a more diverse 
set of characters, influenced by and negotiating settler masculinity in different ways along 
with their wives and families, who themselves do not (always) conform to stereotype.       
                                                          
9 As I will elaborate in Chapter Two, such conceptions of gentility had their roots less in identifications with the 
English aristocracy, and more to do with a middle-class “discourse over the gentleman that was crystallizing at 
mid-[nineteenth]century in the contest between entrepreneurial and professional definitions of Englishness” 
(Goodlad 2000: 159). English farmers on the highveld, I argue, faced a related struggle to reconcile their 
inherently entrepreneurial, capitalist and competitive identities, which had come to be seen as “un-gentlemanly”, 
with their desire to be accepted as professionals with the “exemplary character” of English gentlemen.     
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 If settler masculinity did not act like a cookie cutter, however, it was maintained by a 
powerful set of norms, sustained by institutions which exerted a profound influence on settler 
men and women from their earliest years. Doris Lessing, for instance, recalling her childhood 
on a Southern Rhodesian farm in the early 1930s (1994: 114), noted how her brother changed 
when in the company of his friends from Ruzawi, a private country boarding school: “Dick 
and my brother gave me a bad time, sneering at girls in general, pretending to throw stones or 
throwing stones … They behaved towards me, a girl, just as schools of that kind prescribed, 
and this gang behaviour worsened through the years as they graduated to the older school”. 
Such a description could have come straight out of Morrell’s chapter on the schools of the 
Natal Midlands (2001: 48). These and other settler institutions “in time became the means of 
monitoring settler society, creating and maintaining hierarchy and the gender and class norms 
that went with it, and of excluding others” (ibid.: 24).10  
 What made settler masculinity so influential was that it was able to draw on powerful 
European patriarchal norms, including “the ideology of domesticity which located women in 
the home” (ibid.: 18). Hansen (1992: 1) writes that to define domesticity “is to describe a set 
of ideas that over the course of nineteenth-century Western history have associated women 
with family, domestic values, and home, and took for granted a hierarchical distribution of 
power favouring men”. Whilst white Rhodesian society in general promoted this ideal and 
even women in the professions faced forms of “domestication” (Kufakurinani 2012), white 
farming women in addition shared many characteristics with what have been referred to as 
“incorporated wives”, such as the wives of policemen, soldiers or business executives (Callan 
1984). “Incorporation” in this context refers to “the condition of wifehood in a range of 
settings where the social character ascribed to a woman is an intimate function of her 
husband’s occupational identity and culture” (ibid.: 1, original emphasis).       
 Rutherford (1996: 78), whose arguments are significant to this thesis, shows that 
official (state) discourses in early Rhodesia also played an important part in ensuring that the 
“category ‘European farmer’ was gendered as masculine and … assumed particular 
subordinate relations with his wife and his workers” (emphasis added). Recognising 
“farmers’ wives” as “incorporated wives” (after Callan 1984), he notes that the home and the 
                                                          
10 Bearing in mind the fluid, dynamic nature of gender identities and the fact that different people construct and 
manage their gender identities in various ways, I nevertheless (like Morrell 2001) refer to “settler masculinity” 
in the singular to emphasise the strong institutional and social currency this particular form of masculinity 
(along with related expectations of femininity) held among Rhodesian/Zimbabwean white farming society. This 
is not to suggest, however, that within this context, there were not a range of masculinities being constructed by 
settler men.      
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workplace were closely linked since most farmers lived with their families on the farm. 
Drawing on Kirkwood (1984a) Rutherford argues that “[just] as ‘home’ was portrayed as a 
particular domestic site of nurturing for white men in state and expertise discourses … ‘work’ 
was represented in similar ways for European farmers who, in official discourses, required 
the proper wife for ‘work’ as well as for ‘home’” (1996: 78). As I elaborate in Chapter Two, 
“farmers’ wives” were therefore expected to undertake a number of supporting roles for the 
male farmer, not only in the domestic sphere but also in certain gendered aspects of the farm 
economy, as well as “providing the proper nurturing to his workers’ welfare” (ibid.: 79). I 
would add that the above-mentioned farmer institutions also acted to incorporate “farmers’ 
wives” further and at more than the level of the individual farm household (cf. Morrell 2001: 
233). As with the wives of policemen, colonial officials, soldiers, corporate executives or 
professional scholars (Callan 1984: 1), the “farmer’s wife” faced certain expectations from 
the masculinised institutions (farmers associations, clubs, schools) in which many of their 
husbands played active roles, as well as from the wider farming community in the district. 
For example, “farmers’ wives” were often expected to bake, provide and serve tea for male 
farmers after their association meetings. Failure to meet these expectations could have serious 
consequences for the reputation of a farming family (see Lessing 1950).  
 Language plays an important part in the process of incorporation. As Callan (1984: 2) 
points out “there is no mistaking the power of language itself in setting up the category and 
controlling access to it”. More than simply a description, the term “farmer’s wife” is thus 
imbued with powerful symbolic meanings, and practical limitations, concerning what it 
means to be a white rural woman in the context of settler masculinity and its institutions. 
Callan also points to the fact that incorporated wives “undergo the ‘silencing’ or under-
recognition of the rest of their personhood which allows them to be so designated” (1984: 1). 
This is the (intentional?) irony of the male letter writer, quoted above, who complains that the 
role of the “little woman” has not been given appropriate recognition. As Rutherford notes 
with regard to the “pioneer stories” of his male interlocutors in Karoi north, women were 
absent, “excised from commentary as background, private figures in relation to the more 
public efforts and accomplishments of their husbands” (1996: 228; 2001a: 83). Lessing’s 
observation (1994: 12) that “Women often get dropped from memory, and then history” is 
apposite here.  
 These women, then, these “farmers’ wives”, have suffered such a fate not only in 
“pioneer stories” and folk histories, but also to a large extent in academic histories, as the 
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above works by Selby, Pilossof, Hughes and even Rutherford, at least in his early work, 
demonstrate. Despite outlining the place and mentioning the role of “farmers’ wives” in the 
domestic and work setup of commercial farms, Rutherford (1996: 228) is forced to concede 
that his research duplicates the excision of women “since [he] concentrated on the forms of 
authority between farm operators and farmworkers, the forms that emphasised the importance 
of white men”. Selby, Pilossof and Hughes’ focus on the more public aspects of white farmer 
identity and action led them to privilege the male perspective, while although Rutherford’s 
concern is very much with domestic power relations on farms, he also focuses on the most 
powerful actors in these relations (male white farmers) and on the weakest (black 
farmworkers), largely ignoring the role white women played in such relations, and more 
broadly, in constructing and maintaining important aspects of settler farming identities (see 
Chapter Two) .  
 Despite the power of such gendered ascriptions to silence, Callan (1984: 1) argues 
that an “analytic acquiescence” in the process of designating women “incorporated wives” 
cannot be avoided, but is “a necessary condition for understanding the forces which create 
and sustain it”. Similarly, it seems that use of the term “farmer’s wife” cannot, and perhaps 
should not, be fully avoided. I shall make use of the term, not only mindful of the “baggage” 
which comes with it, but also with the intention of drawing the reader’s attention to the 
hierarchical power relations that such a term implies. By presenting the narratives and 
histories of individual women who are or were “farmer’s wives”, I intend to demonstrate the 
ways in which these individuals adopted, adapted or challenged the roles expected of them, 
often transcending the limitations of these roles and coming to forms of personhood and 
fulfilment within them (cf. Morrell 2001: 222–3).  
 
Domestic Government, Edification and “Farmers’ Wives” 
Rutherford’s detailed ethnographic work provides crucial insights into the power relations 
playing out on commercial farms before and after independence and their effects on the lives 
of farmworkers. Adopting a Foucauldian approach to knowledge/power Rutherford argues 
that to “understand the history of ‘commercial farm workers’ requires an examination of how 
they have been constructed as an object of policy, as a jural category, an academic agent, and 
a political entity in official discourses in Zimbabwe” (1996: 25). Agreeing with the growing 
number of commentators in the 1990s who were pointing to the fact that farmworkers found 
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themselves working at the social, economic and political margins, Rutherford encourages a 
move beyond merely understanding the conditions they faced towards an understanding of 
“the dominant and specific forms of thought and power which enmesh them on the farms and 
in broader policy and administrative structures” (2001a: 2).  
 Drawing a distinction between Foucault’s (1983: 220–1) concept of “government”: 
“the institutional and discursive prescription and restriction of certain fields of action” 
(Rutherford 1996: 18) and “Government” in the political science sense (power in the context 
of liberal political theory and legal discourses around democracy and rights), Rutherford 
traces the genealogy of what he calls “domestic government” (ibid.: 39). He argues that by 
the 1940s in Southern Rhodesia “particular procedures” of both these forms of government 
had been established around the project of administering two kinds of African men and their 
dependents: the rural African cultivator and the urban African worker. While urban space was 
seen as “modern”, rural areas were configured in this nascent official dual-economy 
imagination as consisting of two separate spaces: the “traditional” African “reserves” and the 
areas of “modern” farming owned by white commercial farmers (ibid.). Rural development 
policies sought to “develop” the former space while allowing the latter to continue along its 
pathway of “modern” and “scientific” commercial farming. Rutherford shows how 
farmworkers, living and working in the “modern” areas but viewed as neither full proletarians 
nor “traditional” peasant cultivators, were “betwixt and between” the two African figures 
which the state sought to “develop”, falling instead “into a system of administration that was 
largely outside the scope of the state” (ibid.; 2001a: 8–9). Administered under the 
paternalistic Masters and Servants Act of 1899, farmworkers and their dependents were 
viewed as the domestic responsibility of European farmers. It is important to note that, as I 
will discuss more fully in later chapters, this categorical separation between workers living on 
farms and peasants living in the “reserves” was largely matched by an actual distinction 
between the two, especially in the first half of the twentieth century when most farmworkers 
were migrants from neighbouring countries and local peasants tended to shun farm labour.    
 The racial and gendered hierarchical dynamics of this arrangement is what Rutherford 
understands as “domestic government” – a system in which the “private” is favoured over the 
“public” domain and “proper paternalistic family and family-like relations between male 
workers and their families and between farmers and ‘their’ workers” are valued (Rutherford 
1996: 39). Two aspects were particularly important to this form of domestic administration in 
Southern Rhodesia. Firstly, the mitemo yepurazi, a chiShona expression literally meaning the 
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rules of the farm (ibid.: 231), were paramount “over any existing or possible national 
regulations governing work and non-work activities” (cf. Mbembe 2001: 28). Thus, control, 
through these localised rules, was a major concern of domestic government. Secondly, what 
Rutherford (1996: 233) calls “edification” – the moral upliftment of the lifestyle and 
conditions of black workers – was a core component of the system. Because they lived under 
the paternalistic authority of the white farmer, on “modern” commercial farms, farmworkers 
were supposed to be(come) more “advanced” than black peasants who remained in the 
“reserves”. Thus, edification – linked closely with the civilising mission (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1991, 1997) – became a crucial way of “morally improving the lifestyle and 
conditions of Africans [and] contributed to shaping the domestic government of commercial 
farms in a way that distinguished farmworkers from farmers in the Communal Lands” 
(Rutherford 1996: 233). Despite some changes in its dynamics brought about by Zimbabwe’s 
independence, the system of domestic government – where the authority and rules of the 
farmer took precedence over wider laws – remained largely intact until the 2000 farm 
takeovers, argues Rutherford (1996, 2001a). He points out (2008) that this had important 
consequences for the access of farmworkers to resources such as housing, sanitation, land, 
water, education and healthcare as their provision continued to be dependent largely on the 
individual farmer and the conditions they set for such access, rather than national 
development plans and legislation.11 
 Rutherford’s early conceptualisation (1996, 2001a) of domestic government is self-
admittedly focussed on forms of power which emphasised the authority of white men. It is 
possible, then, that he discounted the more subtle ways in which “farmers’ wives” – 
especially on the 14 farms included in his survey but on which he did not conduct in-depth 
research – were involved in welfare provision and gendered forms of edification which 
directly influenced the domestic government on those farms. Indeed, as far back as 1977, a 
key (and scathingly critical) report on farmworkers in Rhodesia by D.G. Clarke noted the 
following (159):  
 
‘The farmer’s wife’ has become almost an institution on many farms in that it is a role which has clear 
responsibilities and which can much influence farm labour conditions and the welfare of the workers. 
                                                          
11 See Chapter Four for further discussion of factors affecting the access of farmworkers and dwellers to key 
resources and what Rutherford (2008) refers to as the situated “conditional modes of belonging”  which 
determine access to resources.  
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Typically, the farmer’s wife has provided certain rudimentary medical services and also, in some 
cases, educational assistance.  
 
Unfortunately, despite Clarke commenting on the paucity of research on this issue, nobody 
took the opportunity to conduct a detailed analysis and, although he provides a general 
acknowledgment of the traditional role of “farmers’ wives” in rudimentary forms of welfare 
provision, Rutherford also does not elaborate on this role. Nor did he find much evidence of 
attempts by farmers to influence domestic practices, either before or after independence, 
noting that he “came across few examples of attempts by farmers to try to directly change the 
‘domestic’ practices of their workers, in contrast to [colonial] efforts by missionaries, 
government welfare officers, and organizations such as the Federation of African Women’s 
Clubs in the native reserves” (2001a: 172).12 
 In his later research, however, conducted in the late 1990s and early 2000s on 
farmworker-focussed “civil society” organisations, Rutherford’s (2004a) focus on welfare 
initiatives brought him face to face with the role of white women. He consequently goes into 
more detail about the involvement of two “farmers’ wives” in women’s clubs and other 
“development” initiatives then being implemented by NGOs on their farms. A welcome and 
illuminating insertion, this nevertheless just touches upon the wider implications of such 
involvement for the power relations of domestic government on these farms and on 
commercial farms more generally. Rutherford also does not examine such involvement by 
“farmers’ wives” in the late 1990s in the context of previous involvement by an older 
generation of women, stating that during colonial times “the state and European welfare 
societies had no programs for the ‘improvement’ of farm workers” (ibid.: 133).  
 However, as I will discuss in Chapter Two, “farmers’ wives” in many districts, 
especially those who were branch members of the Federation of Women’s Institutes of 
Southern Rhodesia (FWISR), did initiate or become involved with “Homecraft clubs” on 
farms from the late 1940s until at least the early 1970s.13 With their focus on hygiene, 
                                                          
12 Rutherford conducted in-depth research on one commercial farm and surveyed fourteen others in Hurungwe, 
Mashonaland West province.    
13 The Federation of Women’s Institutes of Southern Rhodesia (FWISR) was established in 1925 and sought to 
provide a way for middle-class rural and urban white women to meet and share their experiences and skills – 
particularly those pertaining to domestic and farm life – with each other. By the 1960s, over 50 branches had 
been established and their dual aim was summed up in their motto, “for home and country”. There was also a 
very strong link between the members of FWISR branches and the Anglican and, to a lesser degree, 
Presbyterian churches (see Chapter Two). The FWISR was renamed the National Federation of Women’s 
Institutes of Rhodesia (NFWIR) after 1963.   
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childcare, nutrition, cooking, needlework and even birth control, these clubs were directly 
trying to change the domestic practices of the wives of farmworkers and other black women 
living on the farms and mines. They were run by “farmers’ wives” but very much under the 
auspices of the FWISR Homecraft initiative. Such action was necessitated by the boom in 
agriculture after World War Two, when the supply of male workers became inadequate and 
more women were recruited (Barnes 1999: 37; Rutherford 1996: 88), and a shift occurred 
towards stabilising and reproducing the workforce through attracting entire families to the 
farms and fostering a “modern” family and domestic life among them. It was believed that 
whatever “civilising” or “modernisation” black men may accrue through farm labour or other 
forms of “edification” would be lost if their wives continued to maintain “primitive” 
conditions in their homes, both on and off the farm (see Kirkwood 1984a: 111). It was this 
British middle-class heritage of a particular kind of gendered “do-gooding” (Kirkwood 
1984b: 159)14 that the NGOs were able to build on in the 1990s when many white women 
became an integral part of their implementation strategies. The link between earlier colonial 
welfare efforts and the 1990s activities can thus not be ignored.        
 I do not seek, however, to romanticise or provide a moral assessment of the role 
played by “farmers’ wives”. On the contrary, I seek not only to understand but also to 
problematise or complicate this role and reveal the ways in which these endeavours fed into 
and influenced, augmented, or perhaps amended the highly skewed power relations on the 
farms. Although subjective reasons may certainly have played a role in the involvement of 
individual women (see Ruddick 1989), I trace, rather, how these endeavours – their genesis 
heavily influenced by Victorian British bourgeois identities and perpetuated by middle-class 
settler institutions – were imbricated within the logic of domestic government on the farms, 
and the forms of control over farm labour this system sought to establish through not only 
rules, routines and physical discipline but, also a range of attempts to edify and “civilise” 
farmworkers and their families. Furthermore, I argue (following Rutherford 2004b) that these 
latter “caring” initiatives, more than simply being about power and control, were also an 
important part of how “white farmers” came to constitute their private and public identities 
and claim their belonging in the colony (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: 19).  
 
 
                                                          
14 See Chapter Two for a historical contextualisation of the Victorian British middle class and the bourgeois 
values which informed such “do-gooding”.  
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Sovereignty, Power and the (Mini-)Colony  
To understand the various forms or techniques of power and the changing dynamics of power 
relations on Rhodesian/Zimbabwean commercial farms, as well as how such farms were 
located within the colony/postcolony, I draw on the work of several theorists of power whose 
work has been applied to such contexts. Chief among these is Michel Foucault, as well as 
authors such as Agamben (1998), Fassin (2009, 2010), Ferguson and Gupta (2002), Hansen 
and Stepputat (2005), Li (2007), Mbembe (2001, 2003), Moore (2005) and Rutherford (1996, 
2001a), who have used or engaged with Foucault in their work. Such authors have, in 
different ways, examined the history and nature of sovereign power and its techniques, going 
“against the grain of the conventional canonical definitions of Western political discourse 
where the sovereign state is defined as the bedrock of a ‘civilized’ international order”, 
pointing instead to “the fragility and perpetually violent character of this order” (Hansen and 
Stepputat 2005: 18). I use their theoretical insights about how power operates at the macro-
level to examine how, at the level of the white commercial farms – which Rutherford (2008: 
92–3) has referred to as “mini-colonies” or “mini-sovereignties” – practices of rule 
simultaneously “articulate elements of government, sovereignty and discipline” (Li 2007: 
12).  
 Foucault (1984a, 1997) theorised mechanisms, techniques and technologies of power 
which he saw as developing over several hundred years in Western Europe. He sees 
sovereign power as the most ancient form, with its roots in the right granted to the father of 
the Roman family “to ‘dispose’ of the life of his children and his slaves” (1984a: 258). This 
was a “deductive” power, the right “to take life or let live”, “a right of seizure: of things, 
time, bodies, and ultimately life itself” (ibid.: 259, original emphasis).15 Foucault charts a 
transformation of these mechanisms of power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
spurred on by the age of scientific “discovery” and the industrial revolution, away from 
deductive power (which became simply one element among a number) and towards more 
productive techniques of power (1997: 242). These techniques and technologies of power 
“centred on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the 
extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration 
into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of 
power that characterized the disciplines” (1984a: 261–2, original emphasis). For Foucault, 
institutions such as prisons, hospitals, schools, asylums and factories were important in 
                                                          
15 See Hansen and Stepputat (2005: 5–11) for a good summary of the genealogy of sovereign power in Europe.  
24 
instilling this disciplinary power through holding bodies in place, instilling certain routines 
and habits in them and ensuring continual surveillance over them (1984b).  
 In the move away from sovereign power to more “modern” techniques of power, 
Foucault (1984a, 1997) introduces the concepts of “biopower” and “biopolitics”. Linked to 
the growth in natural and social scientific knowledge (powerful discursive forces in 
themselves), biopolitics, according to Foucault, was “a new nondisciplinary power [which 
was] applied not to man-as-body but to the living man, to man-as-living-being; ultimately … 
to man-as-species” (1997: 242). The emergence of biopolitics means that “Mechanisms of 
power and knowledge have assumed responsibility for the life process in order to optimize, 
control and modify it … the exercise of power over living beings no longer carries the threat 
of death, but implies the taking charge of their life” (Oksala 2013: 321). The “normalisation” 
of behaviour and “calculated management of life through means that are scientific and 
continuous” (ibid.) are important facets of biopolitics, which became a technique of power 
used by the modern state, whose power Foucault calls “government” – “the way in which one 
conducts the conduct of men” (quoted in Oksala 2013: 324). Unlike the absolute power 
commanded by the sovereign, to govern is “to be condemned to seek an authority for one’s 
authority” (Rose 1999: 27); one method through which bureaucratised states seek this 
authority is through enhancing life through various biopolitical technologies of power such as 
town planning, control of social hygiene, and managing rates of fertility, morbidity and 
mortality.       
 Foucault thus offers useful ways of thinking about sovereignty, discipline and 
government, although in his earlier writings he tends to suggest a linear, teleological 
movement away from deductive sovereignty towards “modern”, productive, forms of 
government which make use of biopower. As Stoler (2010: 140–61) points out, Foucault’s 
focus is overwhelmingly on Europe, while the colonial, as well as the colony’s influence on 
“the formation of law, public institutions, cultural identities, and ideologies of rule in Europe” 
(Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 18), is largely absent from his work. In other words, Foucault 
does not really account for the fact that at the very moment when more “modern” and 
productive forms of power were supposedly emerging in Western Europe, these same 
colonial powers were using “archaic” and deductive forms of sovereign power in the colonies 
(Mbembe 2001: 25ff., 2003: 25)16 and that these, in turn, had a profound effect on forms of 
                                                          
16 Mbembe (2001: 25 ff.) argues that colonial sovereignty took the form of what he terms “commandement”, the 
characteristics of which he describes astutely. Commandement  had attributes of both raw power, brutal force, 
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power in the metropole. Colonies were more than sites of exploitation, but also “laboratories 
of modernity” (Stoler 2010: 146).17  
 Indeed, Agamben (1998: 6) disputes Foucault’s argument that sovereignty is an 
“archaic form” of power which was replaced by modern biopolitics. Instead, he argues that 
“the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power”, and that 
“biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception” (ibid.). He thus sees the continuation 
of sovereignty within “modern” forms of power. Agamben concentrates on what he calls 
“bare life”, the life of homo sacer, the person within Roman society “who is expelled and 
banished from the community and who may be killed by members of the community – but 
not sacrificed as he is not worthy of this gesture of honor before the divine” (Hansen and 
Stepputat 2005: 17). Those ascribed this bare, fundamentally biological, life – women, slaves, 
the insane, who were not deemed citizens or full members of the community – were 
nevertheless maintained in a form of “inclusive exclusion” (Agamben 1998: 7), since those 
who “were excluded from the political community … remained internal and crucial to society 
and economy” (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 17). For Agamben (1998), the ancient sovereign 
was he who could exclude those deemed to embody “bare life” and thus decide the “state of 
exception”. Unlike Foucault, he therefore does not see the inclusion of the biological 
(biopolitics) as the hallmark of modern power, but rather argues that “the decisive fact is that, 
together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of 
bare life – which is originally situated at the margins of the political order – gradually begins 
to coincide with the political realm” (ibid.: 8). Modern biopolitical regimes, therefore, have 
the sovereign power to decide “the exception”, or who must occupy a state of “bare life”, be 
they refugees, migrant workers, minorities, political prisoners, poor people or others not 
entitled to full citizenship (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 18).            
                                                                                                                                                                                    
physical violence and punishment over “natives”, who were reduced to an animal-like state; and of “civilising” 
endeavours aimed at “shaping”, “taming” and “grooming” “primitive” and profligate natives, who were the 
“raw material” of government (ibid.: 33). Mbembe’s sophisticated notion of colonial sovereignty as 
commandement is thus very useful for understanding the nature of sovereignty on the “mini-colonies” called 
commercial farms in colonial and postcolonial Zimbabwe.    
17 Goodlad (2000) has also pointed out that the genealogy of bureaucratic state power and its institutions, and of 
subject formation, were radically different in Britain than they were in Continental Europe, on which Foucault 
based his theories. She critiques applications of Foucault which do not take into account the idiosyncrasies of 
the development of the British bureaucratic state, as well as the ways in which members of the middle class 
participated in or resisted this process. While I acknowledge this critique, I find aspects of Foucault’s theories of 
power compelling in the context of British colonial rule (as have others, e.g. Heath 2010) and in the “domestic 
government” of settler agriculture, while “settler institutions” (Morrell 2001) also show many elements of 
Foucauldian institutional power, despite their very British character.                 
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 I do not see the perspectives of Foucault and Agamben as mutually exclusive, but find 
certain elements from each useful for understanding power and power relations on 
commercial farms in Zimbabwe, as well as the position of farmworkers within the nation-
state. There is also considerable convergence between Foucault’s later thoughts on 
biopolitics18 and the ways in which racism became the technology through which modern 
biopower could exercise “that old sovereign right of death” (1997: 214), and Agamben’s 
concept of “bare life”: both make use of the example of the Nazism and the concentration 
camps as the ultimate embodiment of biopolitics’ ability to reduce carefully selected elements 
of human life to abjection while nurturing other members of society (ibid.: 259). Foucault’s 
later ideas on power relations, however, in which he provides room for a range of forms of 
power, and for potential forms of freedom or resistance and struggle (Simons 2013: 308, 
315), are particularly useful. Foucault (1988: 19) distinguishes between relationships of 
power as “strategic games between liberties” (where equals vie to determine each other’s 
conduct) on one hand, and “states of domination” (asymmetrical relationships of power with 
very little room for manoeuvre – ibid.: 12) on the other. Between these extreme forms fall 
technologies of government, including productive biopolitical technologies (see Lemke 2000: 
5). It is therefore possible to see elements of sovereignty, government and discipline, what 
Moore (2005: 7) calls “Foucault’s triangle”, operating simultaneously in regimes of rule from 
the colony or nation-state down to the “mini-colony” of the farm.  
 Like Moore (ibid.), I suggest that, rather than being a “stable tripod” on farms, power 
in the form of sovereignty, government and discipline constituted a dynamic “triad in 
motion”, coexisting “in awkward articulations” (Li 2007: 17) and influenced continually by 
outside political, economic and social factors. In other words, different forms and techniques 
of power existed side by side but continually vied with each other; while one might come to 
dominate in certain conditions which favoured them, their reign was never absolute or stable. 
Furthermore, while commercial farms have been seen as “mini-colonies” – the farmer 
enjoying a high level of autonomous sovereign control over his territory and those living and 
working on it – the perspective offered by Moore in his study of rural Zimbabwe (2005: 7), 
which sees “several modes of sovereignty entangled in [a] single site” (see also Mbembe 
2000, 2001) is crucial. Thus, I will track how farmers had to struggle with competing 
sovereignties especially after independence when the postcolonial state challenged their 
authority, and with new forms of “transnational governmentality” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002) 
                                                          
18 In his 1975–1976 lectures at the Collège de France (Foucault 1997), particularly his lecture of 17 March 1976.   
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which similarly undermined their power and altered power relations in various ways (see 
Chapter Three).  
 Having examined the various and changing regimes of power on commercial farms in 
the first half of the thesis, I turn increasingly to the ways in which (former) farmworkers 
negotiate life in its various forms (biological, social, economic, spiritual) under such regimes 
in Chapters Four, Five and, especially, Six. While the theories proposed by Foucault and 
Agamben are useful in understanding the nature of sovereignty, the technologies through 
which populations are regulated, their conduct governed and the ways in which power 
relations function, they are less useful for understanding everyday life and how people 
negotiate it. Indeed, Fassin (2009: 46) argues that “[issues] of life as such do not interest” 
Foucault, who was more concerned with “disciplines exerted on individuals” and 
“technologies normalizing populations” (ibid.). Moreover, Fassin (2010: 82) points out that 
Agamben’s distinction between the “qualified life” of those nurtured by the sovereign and the 
“bare life” of those who are not has set up a “seductive dualistic framework for the 
humanities and social sciences”. While acknowledging that this has as much to do with the 
ways these theories have been applied as it does to the nature of the theories themselves, he 
nevertheless critiques Agamben’s ideas about “life” in particular, for setting up a 
“reductionist” “hierarchical” framework which “has the effect of disqualifying as inferior the 
lives of individuals or groups that society appears to reduce to their condition of ‘bare life’: 
refugees, excluded, marginalised, sick” (ibid.: 83). While I do find Agamben’s concept of 
“bare life” useful for understanding some aspects of life for Zimbabwean (former) 
farmworkers, I take seriously the ethical and intellectual dangers, highlighted by Fassin 
(2010), of such a dualistic and reductionist paradigm. Like Fassin (2010: 93), I thus strive to 
complicate the “dualistic models that oppose biological and political lives”, by foregrounding 
the complex social and political biographies of my interlocutors, not just their reduced 
“biological” position in society, past or present. To achieve this, I draw on a wider range of 
scholars, including Fassin (2009), Ferguson (2013a) and Rutherford (2008, 2014), among 
others.     
 
White Farmer Power, “Improvement” and Crisis  
Particularly in the colonial era, power relations on white-owned farms largely took on the 
character of “states of domination”, often making use of brute force and coercion (cf. Hansen 
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and Stupputat 2005: 24; Mbembe 2003: 21). The colonial state’s delegation to farmers of 
private authority over their farms (cf. Mbembe 2001: 28–9) and all those living on them gave 
rise to practices of rule which certainly manifested not only in rigid work regimes, physical 
violence and even death (McCulloch 2004), but also in the farmer’s ability to punish and 
expel a worker and his family from the farm at a moment’s notice.19 Farmworkers had very 
little choice but to accept these punishments as they had no way of openly challenging the 
power of the farmer (Rutherford 2001a: 113). They instead resorted to covert methods of 
resistance – desertion, pilfering, foot-dragging, nicknaming, gossiping, and secret warnings to 
fellow job-seekers, and so on – which Scott (1985) calls “weapons of the weak”. But 
governmental technologies were also always present and, as Vambe (1972: 213ff.) illustrates, 
a farmer who used only the deductive elements of his sovereign power could quickly find 
himself short of labour, despite the mechanisms both he and the state had at their disposal for 
procuring and controlling labour (cf. Ferguson 2013a). Farmers thus also drew, at the same 
time, on what Foucault (1983) calls “pastoral power” – the kind of power that a shepherd 
would have over his flock, a power which sought to “care” for each individual member of 
that flock. Pastoral power “requires obedience, but also detailed knowledge about individuals. 
It focusses on the individual’s conduct and produces obedient subjects through ‘the conduct 
of conduct’ – the normalisation of people’s conduct. Its essential mechanisms are continuous 
care and the compulsory extraction of knowledge rather than violent coercion and the 
delimitation of rights” (Oksala 2013: 328).  
 As in colonial Natal (Atkins 1993: 72), some Rhodesian farmers thus sought to set 
themselves up in the role of a benevolent patron or quasi-chief, seeking to attract clients to 
their farms to live under their “care”. Such farms would get a good reputation among job 
seekers who, once employed, would recruit kin and others from their home villages over 
time. However, even the “edification” which farmers and their wives sought to provide for 
their workers made use both of elements of pastoral power (e.g. rudimentary healthcare, 
provision of rations) and discipline or even physical punishment. For many farmers during 
colonialism, a beating was a form of correction that would “edify” and instil aspects of 
civilisation (cf. Li 2007: 14; Mbembe 2001: 27), while the “[improving] effects of capitalist 
discipline upon sections of the population deemed to lack these habits” (Li 2007: 20) also 
justified hard, unrewarding labour as a form of edification. Farmers and their wives, though, 
                                                          
19 Mbembe (2001: 28) notes that one characteristic of colonial sovereignty (“commandement”) “was the 
confusion between the public and the private; the agents of the commandement could, at any moment, usurp the 
law and, in the name of the state, exercise it for purely private ends”.   
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often understood – and continue to understand – their power over their workers in terms 
similar to pastoral power, aspiring to know their workers and “care” for them in various 
ways, even if this was not realistically possible.20      
 Analyses which focus too much on the sjambok and other mechanisms of violent 
control under colonialism thus miss the crucial role which trusteeship played. As Stoler 
(2006b: 134) shows, brutality was not the only tool of empire, but the development of 
sympathy for the downtrodden was also crucial: “Sympathy conferred distance, required 
inequalities of position and possibility, and was basic to the founding and funding of imperial 
enterprises”.21 A similar tendency, I argue, was evident in microcosm on many commercial 
farms, where the “pastoral” role of the “trustee” adopted by the farmer and the “farmer’s 
wife” served to reinforce the hierarchy between the “trustees” and those configured “deficient 
subjects” who were mostly in a state of permanent tutelage (Li 2007: 14). This was a 
permanent state because it was always necessary for the trustee to maintain their superior 
position over the ones they sought to “improve”. However, the farm hierarchy did allow for 
some workers to be “improved” (i.e. modernised, civilised) to the point of occupying senior 
and responsible positions, thus moving “closer” to the white farmer figuratively and 
physically (Rutherford 1996, 2001a).22 Many of the activities of “farmers’ wives” took the 
form of trusteeship rather than the more masculine aspects of edification, which used regimes 
of hard labour and even violence over male workers.  Thus, these “mini-sovereignties” made 
use of various forms or techniques of power, operating in conjunction, in order to meet the 
goals of their raison d'être, which was the capitalist production of plantation crops such as 
tobacco, tea, sugar cane, cotton and maize. Just what combinations of these forms of power 
were used depended not only on political-economic factors in different eras (Phimister 1988: 
57ff.; Rubert 1998) but also the ideologies, attitudes and practices of farmers (reinforced by 
their institutions), as well as on the extent to which each farmer went along with or 
challenged such norms.  
                                                          
20 As I discuss in Chapters Two and Three, this problematic benevolent vision of themselves both masks and 
justifies various forms of structural and physical violence.    
21 Mbembe (2001: 34–5) makes a similar point when describing the paradox of “commandement”, which had 
both elements of “possessiveness, injustice, and cruelty”, but “conceives itself as also carrying a burden, which 
is yet not a contract … a free gift, proposing to relieve its object of poverty and free it from debased condition 
by raising it to the level of a human being” (original emphasis).  
22 Senior workers interacted closely with the white farm owners and often were provided with housing which 
was closer to the farmer’s homestead, while general workers seldom interacted directly with the farmer and 
lived in accommodation situated the furthest from the farmer’s homestead (see Rutherford 2001a).     
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 Rutherford (2008: 92–3) argues that commercial farm “mini-sovereignties” continued 
to be “nurtured” by the independent Zimbabwean state after 1980. However, although such a 
designation tends to suggest a powerful and independent entity influenced little by outside 
forces, and changing little over time, political, social and economic changes brought about by  
independence did impact on the nature of domestic government (2001a: 97–138). Such 
changes, for example the introduction of minimum wages in 1980 and workers committees 
shortly afterwards; alterations in production regimes (e.g. with the growth in export 
horticulture); increasing corporatisation and the shift to agribusiness, with the associated 
growth of “scientific” labour management practices; and new opportunities for farmworkers 
to acquire land and consumer goods, did not, however, dismantle domestic government, but 
necessitated new ways of control and discipline. Thus, Rutherford argues, there was a broad 
shift from a colonial “violence and mealie meal” approach (ibid.: 112) centred on the 
physical power of the farmer and his “boss-boy”, to one in which violence was less 
pronounced and access to (or the limitation of) various forms of credit, including for 
agricultural inputs,23 along with the “inflated surveillance” of workers by an increasing 
number of foremen and clerks became crucial to the workings of this “revamped domestic 
government” (ibid.: 130). In other words, there was a shift towards more bureaucratised, 
governmental techniques of power after 1980. Nevertheless, rather than propose an 
evolutionary progression from violence and discipline as the main forms of control before 
1980 towards a more “modern” and “humane” system thereafter, I argue that a more dynamic 
and awkward relationship between several forms or techniques of power was operating 
simultaneously on different commercial farms before and after independence. These forms of 
power acted upon and had to be negotiated by farmworkers, who experienced such forces 
differently depending on factors such as their location in the farm hierarchy and their gender 
(see Chapter Six).   
 As I will elaborate in Chapter Three, after Zimbabwe’s independence the ZANU-PF 
government, for pragmatic reasons, allowed white farmers to remain farming and largely 
maintain the system of domestic government (Herbst 1990; Pilossof 2012; Rutherford 1996; 
Selby 2006). While white farmers may have thus come to see themselves as a “protected 
species” or “royal game” under the new regime (Selby 2006: 74–5), in reality farmers and 
farmer bodies had to negotiate their position very carefully, diverting attention away from 
their privileged position as land owners and elites and reminding the government and 
                                                          
23 Which often entrenched older forms of indebted labour on commercial farms.    
31 
Zimbabweans generally of their indispensable value to the country’s economy.24 It was 
during this period, and especially when the state was developing what would become the 
Land Acquisition Act in the late 1980s, that bumper stickers could be seen on motorcars 
proclaiming “No Farmers, No Future”, while a narrative emerged from farmers emphasising 
their role in feeding the nation (Pilossof 2012: 167). Farmer organisations also acted 
strategically to emphasise their value to the government and powerful state organs. Every 
year, for example, the CFU arranged a tour of the most developed and productive white 
commercial farms for defence students at the Zimbabwe National Army’s officer training 
college (see The Farmer, 8 March 1990), while they also regularly arranged for the army to 
conduct military training exercises on certain farms. This wooing of the army acknowledged 
the military’s central role and power within the state, with farmers hoping that by showcasing 
the modernity and productivity of their farms, they would continue to be protected, despite 
the constant rhetoric of land expropriation from government ministers and the President.  
 I argue that these strategies, aimed as Rutherford (2001a: 61) points out at casting the 
commercial farmers’ role in neutral, technical and apolitical terms, also bear resemblance to 
elements of the “defensive power” observed by Salverda (2010) in his study of elite Franco-
Mauritian land owners in Mauritius. Such elites now also find themselves in an awkward 
position within the Mauritian political economy and, Salverda argues, rather than deploying 
their power proactively and expansively, their position now necessitates the deployment of 
“defensive” power, through keeping a low profile, working behind the scenes and avoiding 
open confrontation and the political arena (2010: 387). In Zimbabwe the CFU and most 
farmers aspired to deploy their power in this non-confrontational way, but the strength and 
historical profile of their institutions, the importance of their contribution to the economy and 
the controversial and pressing nature of the land question prevented them from deploying a 
defensive strategy in all areas. I argue that they thus concentrated mainly on depoliticising 
their role and pushing an image of themselves (quite publicly) as an indispensable asset 
through a project Li (2007: 10) calls “rendering technical”, a term she uses to describe the 
                                                          
24 At independence, around 42 per cent of the country’s land was owned by some 6,000 commercial farmers, 
most of whom were white (Scoones et al. 2010: 2). Although the relative importance of agriculture to 
Rhodesia’s economy fell from 26.9 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product in 1948 to 12.4 perc cent by 1979 
(due as much to the growth in manufacturing as the effects of international sanctions and the 1972–1980 war), 
agriculture – particularly white commercial agriculture – continued to be crucial and was expected to be a 
backbone of the new country’s economy (Stoneman 1981b: 127). This was not just because of its contribution to 
the GDP but also because commercial agriculture produced 40 per cent of the materials used in manufacturing 
(ibid.: 136) and employed by far the largest labour force of all sectors (ibid.: 141). Despite the highly skewed 
land-ownership in favour of white farmers, the government chose largely to maintain the status quo (see Chapter 
Three).  
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ways in which development practitioners and “civil society” actors use discursive practices to 
translate issues such as poverty, landlessness and hunger into technical terms, to be solved by 
technical interventions. In so doing, they divorce local problems from the highly structural 
and political issues which have caused and perpetuate them, thereby diffusing the potential 
for any challenge to the system. The project of “rendering technical” their role was the main 
defensive strategy by which farmers and their representatives hoped to survive and “belong” 
in independent Zimbabwe.                        
 They were helped in this project, at least initially, by the emergence of “civil society” 
organisations whose main interests were the welfare and “improvement” (Li 2007) of 
workers and their families residing on commercial farms. Although, as I will show in Chapter 
Three, these NGOs did provide a challenge to the power of farmers and their institutions, and 
did much to force a gradual change in farm conditions and the nature of domestic 
government, I contend that they also inadvertently helped farmers to render their role 
technical and apolitical. In addition, although initially exposing the poor conditions on the 
farms, the presence of NGO activities allowed commercial farmers and their representatives a 
strategic opportunity to portray to the state the efforts they were making to “improve” their 
workers. As I will show in Chapter Three, such strategies of “defensive power” ultimately 
failed by the end of the 1990s, not just because, as Worby (2003: 57) argues, the occupation 
by white farmers of most of the best farmland presented a visible reminder to the ZANU-PF 
government of their “sovereignty promised but not yet fully realised”, but also due to a 
combination of other factors. Among these, I argue, was the state’s own loss of popularity 
and sovereignty in the context of structural adjustment and neoliberalism,25 coupled with the 
growing “civil society” activity and forms of “transnational governmentality” which came 
increasingly to fill the void left by the retreating state, especially in the area of social welfare 
(Ferguson and Gupta 2002). I will outline these arguments more fully in the chapters that 
follow. First, however, I turn to a discussion of the methodological approach which I used in 




                                                          
25 Zimbabwe adopted the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-sponsored Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP) in 1990, embracing market reforms, including reduced spending on crucial social welfare 
services such as education and health. While the Zimbabwean state remained powerful in some areas, its 
withdrawal from social welfare services was significant.   
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Multiple Strands, Multiple Sites: Methodology and Ethics  
This research project came about due to the convergence of a number of my academic 
interests and professional experiences over the last 14 years. Yet, even many years before 
this, the seed had been planted. I grew up in Harare surrounded by the descendants of migrant 
labourers, from Malawi in particular. Many of those who worked in the gardens and houses 
of white suburban families were originally from Malawi while some of the middle-class 
black families who moved, after 1980, into the suburb where I lived were of Malawian origin. 
At the government high school I attended in the 1990s, a number of my fellow pupils were 
from such immigrant families.26 Having studied anthropology as an undergraduate, my first 
postgraduate research project during my Honours year was on informal trading brothers who 
came from a Malawian farmworker background (Hartnack 2001). Growing up on a 
commercial farm, these young men had been part of a Boy Scout troop, where they had learnt 
how to tie different kinds of knots, and to crochet and weave. Their formal education may not 
have been adequate, but they now used their scouting skills to make a living, crafting 
beautiful hammocks for sale to passing tourists. By this time, the farm takeovers were 
ongoing, raising questions of what was happening to displaced farmworkers. After working 
for a Zimbabwean NGO for two years, I returned to academia and conducted in-depth 
research (2004–2005) on displaced farmworkers for my Masters research (see Hartnack 2005, 
2006, 2009a, 2009b).  
 When, after working as a research and evaluation consultant for a number of South 
African NGOs between 2007 and 2011, I returned to academia, it seemed important to build 
on my previous work about Zimbabwean farmworkers, but to explore different questions. 
Initially considering a study of one NGO (FOST) and the lives of vulnerable farm children 
and orphans after FTLRP, I soon realised that there were broader questions to analyse, about 
the history of the involvement of white women on commercial farms, the role of such 
initiatives in power relations, and the current scenario on farms in terms of issues to do with 
welfare, livelihoods and personhood. I brought my experience as both a scholar of farm 
labour and displacement, and as one who had participated in “improvement” projects aimed 
at subalterns in my professional work.  
 I have already hinted at aspects of my positionality, namely that I am a white, male, 
urban Zimbabwean who now lives in South Africa: a fellow migrant whose family also came 
                                                          
26 See the articles in Raftopoulos and Yoshikuni (1999) for insight into Zimbabwe’s urban history and the role 
of migrant labourers.  
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to Southern Rhodesia and who has now moved away. In terms of my positionality as a 
researcher, I am both an insider and an outsider: a Zimbabwean by birth and identification, 
but (now) of South African nationality,27 an urbanite studying farmers and farmworkers, a 
scholar studying NGOs and an NGO-worker who is a scholar. My study is also about 
radically different kinds of people – black farmworkers, white (and black) farmers and 
“farmer’s wives”, and black and white NGO workers: subalterns and elites alike entangled 
within the (post)colonial milieu.28 For, as Marcus (1995: 101–2) points out, without 
displacing the “subaltern point of view” from the centre of ethnographic endeavour, it is 
important to include elites and powerful institutions “in the picture” to gain a more complete 
understanding of the structures of power and issues such as subaltern resistance and 
accommodation. Indeed, Nyamnjoh (2012) has recently argued that such a focus is long 
overdue in southern African anthropology. My positionality, also entangled, differed in 
relation to each kind of interlocutor, with varying practical, methodological and ethical 
implications. I found the flexibility of my positionality, and the fact that I was at once both 
insider and outsider, to be an advantage: allowing me to draw on a deep knowledge and 
experience of Zimbabwean history, issues and idioms (cf. Falzon 2009: 17), and to gain 
access and build rapport with these different kinds of interlocutors, while also enabling some 
distance and a complication of the notion that I am conducting ethnography “at home”.   
 If this study has been multi-sited in terms of social space (i.e. the situations of my 
interlocutors), it has also been so in terms of both time and geographical space. While 
primarily ethnographic in approach, the study is also distinctly historical, interpreting and 
reinterpreting (sometimes neglected) aspects of colonial, postcolonial and recent 
Zimbabwean history. I draw on both primary sources (ethnographic interviews, life histories 
and archival material) and much published material. As I demonstrate, this historical-
ethnographic approach provides an important method by which, through the “juxtaposition of 
data” (Falzon 2009: 2), to understand the complexity of the present. I share with Comaroff 
and Comaroff (1997: xv) a distrust of the “tendency to cast the current moment – 
postcolonial, post-cold war, post Fordist, postmodern, or whatever – in terms of 
transcendence or negation, as part of a telos of cutoffs and contrasts”. To this list of “posts” 
                                                          
27 Although I keep up my residency in Zimbabwe, which means I did not have to seek permission to carry out 
the research from the Research Council of Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the recently adopted Zimbabwe 
Constitution entitles those who are born in Zimbabwe to citizenship, regardless of whether they have taken up 
another passport.   
28 See Mbembe (2001) and Nuttal (2009) for different theoretical reflections on the concept of “entanglement” 
in postcolonial Africa.  
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might be added “post-land reform” in the Zimbabwean context. Instead, I feel that it is 
important to take Mbembe’s (2001: 17) notion of “entanglement” seriously: the idea that time 
in the African postcolony is not linear, but “an interlocking of presents, pasts, and futures that 
retain their depths of other presents, pasts, and futures, each age bearing, altering, and 
maintaining previous ones” (original emphasis). Furthermore, time is made up of 
“disturbances”, “instabilities” and “unforeseen events” but these do not necessarily lead to 
chaos and anarchy, or to “erratic and unpredictable behaviours” (ibid.). Such entangled time 
is also not irreversible but calls into question the “hypothesis of stability and rupture 
underpinning social theory” (and many understandings of current-day Zimbabwe!) (ibid., 
original emphasis). I therefore take Rutherford’s (2004a: 143) comment about farm-welfare 
initiatives as a starting point for this research:  
 
It is unclear now how these experiences, organizational forms, and memories will influence farm 
workers, farmers and NGO staff in the emergent arrangements and power relations on the still existing 
commercial farms and the newly resettled farms, but they will be drawn on in varied ways for 
different purposes, linking up with and working under other projects and activities. 
 
As I will show, however, the pre-independence welfare endeavours were similarly entangled 
with post-1980 NGO activities on farms.  
 Unlike many other studies of commercial farming and the FTLRP, and in contrast to 
the traditional ethnographic approach of a small-scale study in a single site, I did not choose 
one specific district or bounded site in which to conduct my research. Rather, my research 
took me to remaining commercial farms, land reform plots, townships, NGO offices and field 
sites, suburban townhouses and communal areas. Given the nature of the questions I sought 
to answer, I adopted Marcus’ (1995: 106–9) suggestion of “following” to determine 
geographical sites: following a metaphor or idea (farm welfare); a plot or story line; and 
people as they moved around. Recognising that a multi-site approach does not necessarily 
lead to a more holistic picture (Falzon 2009: 16), it is nevertheless important to consider that 
the radical upheavals and shifts which have been witnessed in rural and urban Zimbabwe 
over the last 15 years require a more mobile ethnography to track shifting ideas, people, 
livelihood options, forms of personhood, and so on, and to understand the complex ways 
these connect to historical and global processes (Marcus 1995).  
36 
 Moreover, with my fieldwork planned mainly for 2013 – an election year in which 
people were understandably nervous – finding one rural site in which to immerse myself 
would have been difficult and perhaps even ethically questionable.29 My partial focus on 
historical questions and the involvement of (former) farming and NGO elites in welfare 
programmes allowed me to conduct half of my research in Harare and in spaces where such 
concerns were negligible (e.g. NGO offices). However, to answer questions about current 
welfare initiatives, conditions and power relations on farms, rural fieldwork was necessary. 
My farm-welfare focus meant that this aspect of the study broadly kept to the areas most 
targeted by welfare initiatives after 1980: those in which the most labour and capital-
intensive commercial farming was practiced in Mashonaland East, West and Central 
Provinces, and Manicaland – an area I refer to as “the highveld”. Within this large area, my 
study was multi-sited, with the various sites being determined by the questions I sought to 
answer. I thus chose suitable working commercial farms which are the focus of Chapter Four, 
pre-selecting some at the start of the research process, and being introduced to others during 
the course of fieldwork. To ensure that I could get the depth of insight crucial for 
ethnographic research, one of the main case studies was a farm on which I had previously 
conducted research and about which I therefore had a deep, longitudinal knowledge. Being 
already familiar with the farm operator and workers, I could stay at the farm easily and build 
on my previous ethnographic insights. I was introduced to people on land-reform farms 
during the course of my fieldwork, and was able to conduct more in-depth work on some than 
on others. Again, the farm in a case study I draw on extensively in Chapters Four, Five and 
Six I was able to visit over the course of several months and use the assistance of a key 
interlocutor who lived there to provide me with important ethnographic insights about 
everyday life on contemporary farms.         
 Another “site” where I was able to conduct in-depth participant observation was in the 
offices, rural skills-training centre and field sites of the Kunzwana Women’s Association 
(KWA). The Director very kindly agreed to let me become a volunteer during 2013, allowing 
me access to the inner-workings of the organisation through attendance at staff meetings, 
                                                          
29 The previous election period saw some of the most brutal political violence since 1980 after President Robert 
Mugabe lost the first round of the Presidential Election to Morgan Tsvangirai in March 2008 (see Sachikonye 
2011). This violence – as was the intention of the perpetrators – was still fresh in the memory of many 
Zimbabweans, despite five years of a so-called “unity” government. While several researchers have managed to 
conduct successful in-depth rural studies during the period between 2009 and 2013, it was difficult to gain entry 
in the context of looming elections and the accompanying uncertainty and fear, while from an ethical 
perspective, it was also important to take such fears and potential for harm into account when designing the 
research.   
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training sessions and in the everyday life of the staff. As KWA’s “roving staff member”, I 
assisted the organisation to develop their resource centre and wrote several articles on KWA 
members for their 2013 Annual Report. In return, I could “hang out” with and interview staff, 
observe and participate in events, draw on the KWA archive, meet members and visit some 
of their field sites. I use the insight I gained from this ethnographic work extensively in 
chapters Three and Five. Thus, although there are multiple examples included, for each kind 
of physical “site”, be it the remaining farms, the land-reform farms or the NGOs, there is at 
least one “anchor site” in which I was able to gain significant ethnographic insight through 
participant observation and the formation of deep relationships. A final “site” was on the 
streets of downtown Harare and in the surrounding townships30 with a key interlocutor, 
Evidence, who grew up on a farm under the care of FOST. I conducted ethnographic research 
with him and his brothers to understand how people who grew up on farms now survived and 
built their livelihoods and personhood in urban Zimbabwe.         
 In this fieldwork process, which spanned over nine months during the course of 2012, 
2013 and 2014 (not including extensive library research in Cape Town and several interviews 
conducted with ex-farming families in South Africa), I employed the following methods: 
 
Textual Methods 
As other anthropologists have found (see Morreira 2013: 28), “the field” is constituted as 
much through texts and various written forms, as the physical landscape.31 Library/archival 
research and other forms of data-gathering, through online platforms and social media are as 
much a part of fieldwork as immersion in the physical environment of “the field”. I not only 
spent much time understanding the historical context of farm welfare through secondary 
sources (published texts, newspaper articles), but also gained access to several private 
archival collections of former farmers who were involved in welfare activities. Moreover, I 
continued to interact closely with key interlocutors when I was back in Cape Town through 
electronic media such as email, Facebook and the WhatsApp messaging service.     
 
Ethnographic Interviews and Life Histories 
                                                          
30 Also commonly called “high-density suburbs”.   
31 See Gupta and Ferguson (1997) for a classic text on what constitutes “the field” in contemporary 
anthropology.  
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During the course of my fieldwork I conducted 124 full interviews or life-history recordings 
(over an hour long) with current and former farmworkers, current and former farmers and 
“farmer’s wives”, current and former NGO officials, communal-areas farmers and 
government officials such as agricultural extension officers. Some of these interlocutors were 
interviewed more than once, while less formal, everyday interactions were also recorded in 
my field diaries. Many of the interviews with former farm owners and NGO officials were 
taped (see Appendix A for full details of these interviews). In addition to full interviews I 
also held 20 meetings with various people and organisations relevant to my research. Insights 
gained during these meetings were also valuable to the research.     
 
Focus-group Discussions 
I conducted 17 focus group discussions with various groups of interlocutors, including 
current and former farmworkers and communal areas farmers. See Appendix A for details.   
 
Farm Youth Surveys 
With the aid of field assistants, I conducted a livelihoods and aspirations survey of 34 young 
people living on various farms close to Harare.32 I used some of this data in Chapter Four. 
See Appendix A for details.  
 
Participant Observation and Experience 
As detailed above, aside from formal and informal interviews, I gained much of my data by 
“hanging out” with, walking, talking, eating and observing life with my various interlocutors 
in order to gain the “cognitive non-linguistic ethnographic understandings” (Falzon 2009: 9) 
which interviews cannot provide. I recorded such experiences and my responses and initial 




                                                          
32 I largely did not need to make use of assistants or translators for my full interviews, but for some of the focus-
group discussions and the surveys I employed assistants who were also key interlocutors of mine.  
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Ethical Considerations 
I have already indicated above that my choice of focus and research sites was partially 
motivated by ethical concerns, particularly the guiding principle of “do no harm” in the 
context of Zimbabwe’s socio-political environment. My decision to work mainly through an 
NGO, on farms not targeted for redistribution, and with post-land reform sites and affected 
interlocutors who did not feel that my research would endanger them placated many of the 
ethical concerns I envisaged. I was nevertheless extremely careful, particularly in the run-up 
to the July 2013 elections, to ensure that my research would not have any foreseeable 
negative impact on my research participants, either at the time of my research or residually. 
Indeed, for this reason, most of the rural fieldwork was conducted in November/December 
2013 and March/April 2014 when elections were over. I also went through a thorough 
informed consent process with each participant to ensure that they were aware of the aims of 
my research, the possible dangers and the intended outcomes.  
 As with my previous research, I found that an ongoing verbal informed consent 
process which is repeated with individual participants at every meeting is more valuable than 
a once-off written informed consent form, which tends to intimidate people, who are often 
wary of signing (see Hartnack 2009a). Where interviews and focus discussions were taped, I 
sought permission for such taping before recording commenced and made it clear that the 
recording would only be used for the purposes of my research. In many instances I did not 
even attempt to tape interviews as I sensed that it would be inappropriate to do so. I also, at 
each meeting with an interlocutor, reminded them that what we discussed would be kept 
confidential, and guaranteed that they would remain anonymous in my thesis and published 
work (unless they felt that anonymity was not necessary). All of the interlocutors included, 
even those (few) who admitted that there was a risk involved in speaking to me, were still 
happy to do so on the condition that their anonymity (and that of their farms) would be 
maintained. I thus use pseudonyms for all farms that I write about, and I have deliberately 
been vague about their locations. Likewise, I use pseudonyms for most of my farming or ex-
farming interlocuters,33 and for all current and former farmworkers. In some instances, 
however, pseudonyms have not been used for research participants, especially current and 
former NGO staff who did not mind their names being included, or those whose insights were 
mainly historical and who therefore did not mind being quoted.   
                                                          
33
 I use real names of ex-farming interlocutors in only a few cases. This is particularly when, as was the case 
with Edone Ann Logan, Sue Parry and Nancy Guild, they provided historical information about organisations 
they were involved with and did not mind their names being used.  
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 To remain as true to the ethnographic context as possible, I have used first names for 
my close interlocutors: whether they are farmers, farmworkers or NGO personnel. I have, 
however, used surnames for informants who I interviewed but who were not participants to 
the same extent. I am aware of the power dynamics inherent in naming, and I do not want it 
to appear that I have set up a hierarchy between those whom I call by their surnames and 
those for whom I use first names. My use of first names is thus merely to indicate that I was 
literally on first-name basis with these interlocutors, while surnames indicate a less intimate 
role in my research.        
 
Structure of the Thesis  
Since the thesis sets out to examine the genealogy of farm welfare and its effects in 
Zimbabwe, it is structured chronologically. In Chapter Two I elaborate on themes relating to 
the masculine process of colonisation and the role that settler women increasingly played in 
taming such masculinities and managing settler identities from the early part of the twentieth 
century. I explore the origins of settler agriculture and attempts that farmers made to civilise 
both the “virgin” bush and what they saw as the “raw natives” who worked for them through 
various “modern” methods. I argue that white women on farms played an important part in 
this civilising mission, through rudimentary health-care provision and, later, through 
institutions such as the Women’s Institute. I also show that Anglican boys and girls schools 
on the highveld played a key part in reproducing the kinds of farmers and “farmer’s wives” 
who would take forward their civilising mission on the farms. I argue that such endeavours 
set the scene for welfare initiatives after Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980.  
In Chapter Three, I outline the ways in which white farmers after 1980 sought to 
maintain their privileged position through emphasising their modernity, their technical 
expertise, their value to the country’s economy and their “care” for farmworkers. I analyse 
the simultaneous growth of farm-focussed NGOs and the importance of “farmer’s wives” 
both in founding such initiatives and as implementers. I argue that such programmes were 
both maternalistic and biopolitical in nature, and were part of the growing forms of 
“transnational governmentality” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002) which came to challenge both 
the farmers’ and the state’s power in the 1990s.  
 In Chapter Four, I outline the period of farm takeovers from 2000 and the introduction 
of the FTLRP shortly thereafter. Using Rutherford’s (2008) notion of “modes of belonging” 
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as a heuristic tool, I then discuss the dynamics of welfare and power relations on several 
farms (black- and white-owned) which are still running on a commercial basis. I argue that 
while domestic government has been weakened, so too has access to welfare and other 
resources for farmworkers, particularly because large-scale farmers now find themselves in 
“survival mode” due to the insecurity of the contemporary political-economy. I then assess 
the “terrain of struggle” (Rutherford 2013) for former farmworkers on some non-productive 
large- and medium-scale “A2” farms. I critique scholars who have argued that land reform 
has done away with problematic power relations on farms, showing instead that farmworkers 
are still engaged in struggles for livelihoods and resources, often in extremely unfavourable 
and precarious circumstances.  
Chapter Five assesses the impacts of the FTLRP on farm-focussed NGOs after 2000, 
and their struggles and strategies to maintain their funding and their core missions. While 
many of these organisations initially adapted quite well by adjusting their focus, growing 
funding and political constraints by 2005 have forced many to downscale drastically and 
largely drop any significant support they once gave to farmworkers. I then discuss several 
new grassroots welfare initiatives which have arisen in places to assist and advocate for 
former farmworkers as they negotiate an often difficult political and economic environment.  
In Chapter Six I use the life histories and experiences of several of my interlocutors to 
illuminate issues around personhood and subjectivity for farmworkers and former 
farmworkers in the context of debates around dependence and interdependence in 
contemporary Africa (Ferguson 2013a). I argue that for many (former) farmworkers, 
cultivating multiple subjectivities and (inter)dependencies forms an integral part of their 
strategies of personhood and of hope for the future, but that this is a precarious and difficult 
struggle for most.  
The concluding chapter reflects on the theories I have drawn on relating to power, 
identity and belonging, and the ways in which these have succeeded as tools for 
understanding the historical and ethnographic data presented in the thesis. I conclude that to 
understand the multiple and dynamic forms of power operating on commercial farms, and the 
ways in which “welfare” and “improvement” initiatives were imbricated in these, careful 
attention must be paid to both political-economy and identity in the longue durée of 
Zimbabwe’s colonial and postcolonial history. Moreover, I conclude that FTLRP did not do 
away with problematic power relations, but that former modes of power are entangled in the 
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contemporary moment, continuing to influence the struggles which (former) farmworkers 



























The Taming of “Virgin” Bush, Frontier Masculinity and “Raw Natives”: Farmworkers 
and the Civilising Mission in Colonial Zimbabwe 
 
[The] inscription of Africans as dirty and undomesticated, far from being an accurate depiction of 
African cultures, served to legitimize the imperialists’ violent enforcement of their cultural and 
economic values, with the intent of purifying and thereby subjugating the unclean African body and 
imposing market and cultural values more useful to the mercantile and imperial economy. 
(McClintock 1995: 226) 
It is impossible to lay too great a stress on the [white] women of this era, for it was they who formed 
the traditions that are still held dear in Rhodesia, who brought their children to respect and live for 
God and their country, to value honesty, morality, courage and beauty, and to give unselfishly. It was 
they who spread these principles, too, outwards towards the Africans, to whom these seemed strange 
ideas at first but who nevertheless received the benefits of them. (MacLean 1974: 198) 
 
Introduction   
The above two incongruously juxtaposed quotes illustrate the incommensurability of the 
colonial project and the ways in which colonial settlers themselves viewed their role and 
practices, a contradiction which is at the heart of this chapter. I examine below the origins 
and histories of such practices and initiatives aimed at “edifying” (Rutherford 2001a) or 
“improving” (Li 2007) farmworkers, which were introduced by white commercial-farming 
settlers between 1890 and 1980. Such efforts fell within wider colonial endeavours intended 
to have a “civilising” influence on the practices of the indigenous inhabitants of Zimbabwe 
around health, hygiene, work, family, sexuality, marriage, childhood and domesticity. A 
number of scholars have already examined different aspects of the dynamics and effects of 
these processes in colonial Zimbabwe and southern Africa. These authors have focussed on 
topics such as social reproduction and gender struggles for African women under colonialism 
(Barnes 1999; Schmidt 1992); the development of discourses around hygiene and associated 
consumption patterns (Burke 1996; McClintock 1995); missionaries, domesticity and the 
civilising mission (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, 1992, 1997); struggles over African 
childhood and child labour (Grier 2006); the development of a “moral discourse” around 
African marriage and sexuality (Jeater 1993); white settler ideology and identity (Kennedy 
1987); white women in Rhodesia (Kirkwood 1984a, 1984b); the Homecraft movement 
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(Ranchod-Nilsson 1992); and African spirituality, resistance and politics (Alexander 2006; 
Ranger 1970, 1999). Rather than covering the same ground as these detailed studies, in this 
chapter I focus specifically on these processes linked to white-owned farms in the colonial 
era, a focus which has been largely sidelined or eschewed in the above assessments. This is 
perhaps unsurprising given the lack of public archival material on the often mundane, 
quotidian activities of “farmers’ wives”; often doubly concealed within both the relations of 
domestic government on privately owned farms and within the domestic space of such farms 
(see Rutherford 2001a: 65–80). While the more public activities and accomplishments of 
male farmers often made it into official records, these seldom involved farm-welfare 
activities.   
 It is, however, possible to provide a more complete picture than currently exists by 
drawing on the memoirs and private papers of “farmers’ wives” and interviews with some of 
those who were involved, as well as small details from existing studies, often not examined 
adequately, on the ways in which farmers and farmworkers were imbricated in these 
discourses. I thus seek to provide more insight into the maternalistic elements of the 
institutionalised practice of “edification” (of farmworkers by white farmers). I conceptualise 
maternalism as a mode of being and acting consistent with the dynamics of classic 
paternalism (e.g. Du Toit 1993; Van Onselen 1992, 1996), but more particularly related to 
domesticity and attitudes and activities of elite women within a domestic context, including 
within the intimate context fostered by “domestic government” on commercial farms. The 
activities of “farmer’s wives” and female NGO personnel before and after independence can 
be described as maternalistic in this sense.  I contend that in order to understand the context 
in which farm NGOs operated after Zimbabwe’s independence, as well as their approach to 
their work, the nature of the interventions they made, the ways in which farmworkers 
responded, and the outcome of such interventions, it is necessary to gain a fuller and more 
nuanced understanding of what interventions were being implemented on white-owned farms 
before 1980 aimed at perpetuating settler ideologies and instilling “proper” practices around 
such issues as domesticity, hygiene, sexuality and work. This is because, as I will show in 
later chapters, both the wider colonial-era processes of inculcating “modern” and “civilised” 
values and the more localised farm-level efforts continued to shape and influence welfare and 
“improvement” initiatives for farmworkers, especially between 1980 and the commencement 
of the FTLRP in 2000, but also thereafter. They also continued to shape white identities and 
actions after 1980.    
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Conquest, Settler Identity and the Civilising Mission   
McClintock (1995) points to the fundamental anxieties and contradictions at the heart of the 
process by which European male imperialists “discovered” and conquered the feminised and 
eroticised “virgin” lands and their “savage” inhabitants. Not only was their often 
foregrounded “imperial megalomania” complemented – or indeed enhanced – by a 
“contradictory fear of engulfment” by the dangerous feminine unknown (ibid.: 26–7), but 
“empty lands” were in fact often visibly peopled prior to the arrival of the first white men 
(ibid.: 31). In part to deal with this conundrum, McClintock argues, the indigenous 
inhabitants – who were not supposed to be there – were “symbolically displaced” onto a trope 
she refers to as “anachronistic space”, where they “do not inhabit history proper but exist in a 
permanently anterior time within the geographic space of the modern empire as anachronistic 
humans, atavistic, irrational, bereft of human agency – the living embodiment of the archaic 
‘primitive’” (ibid.: 30; see also Fabian 1983).34    
 The colonial conquest of Zimbabwe demonstrates similar dynamics. On the basis of 
treaties and concessions disingenuously extracted from Ndebele King Lobengula (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2009: 45), Cecil John Rhodes’ newly constituted British South Africa Company 
(BSAC) was, in 1889, granted a royal charter by Queen Victoria to “administer and exploit” 
Mashonaland at its own risk (Kennedy 1987: 11). The imperial appetites of a number of 
colonial powers in southern Africa had been whetted following the discovery of gold on the 
Witwatersrand in 1886. The exaggerated accounts of prospectors and adventurers who 
ventured north of the Limpopo River created a fantasy landscape for would-be colonists, 
where the “legendary riches of Ophir” lay, waiting passively to be discovered (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2009: 46).35 Convinced that a “Second Rand”, even more sumptuous than the first, 
was located in Mashonaland, Rhodes and his associates were prepared to invest much and use 
                                                          
34 Fabian (1983) argues that anthropology, through creating representations of the Other as outside of “modern”, 
progressing time, participated in a very similar endeavour, justifying colonial domination and denying their 
research participants the status of coevals. Acutely aware of the history of such ethnographic power relations, I 
strive to present those who participated as interlocutors, coeval in the process of research, and engaged with me 
in the process of co-producing their own, dynamic, stories (see Nyamnjoh 2012). See Mbembe (2001: 24 ff.) for 
another analysis of the dynamics of colonial conquest.    
35 For an important discussion of the settler myths about Great Zimbabwe and the “ancient” gold mines, see 
Chennells (1985: 32–3). Settlers believed that the “only important human developments on the plateau had been 
accomplished by a non-African people”, a belief which both allowed them to rescue “the lands from black 
savagery and inertia … restoring it once again to Europe”, and to set up an historical precedent in terms of the 
use of black labour by white settlers. Furthermore, the claim that the previous immigrant races treated their 
black workers in a brutal fashion allowed for the comforting suggestion “that the new colonizers were more 
benign than their predecessors” (ibid.).        
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whatever dubious means it took to claim this prize before their competitors could.  They duly 
funded and organised a “Pioneer Column”, consisting of two units: the 189-strong Pioneer 
Corps and the British South Africa Company Police (BSAP), numbering some 500 men. 
 Unlike the later (1894) Afrikaans “treks” of farmers to districts such as Melsetter, 
Marandellas and Enkeldoorn,36 the Pioneer Column which crossed the Limpopo River in 
June 1890 was entirely male. Rhodes had placed a ban on women entering the new colony, 
which was only lifted a year later. The initial imperial act was thus not only symbolically but 
also very tangibly a male one. Although there were some members of the Column drawn 
from notable Cape and Natal families, most “were part of that mobile multitude of single 
young men who had traversed the length and breadth of South Africa in the late nineteenth 
century, trailing a succession of disappointments behind their expectations” (Kennedy 1987: 
13). They had high hopes for the riches they were convinced they would gain in the new 
colony. Arriving at the site which would become Fort Salisbury, they raised the Union Jack 
on 13 September 1890, claiming Mashonaland as part of the British Empire. Although other 
names were mooted, the early settlers soon named the country “Rhodesia”, thereby claiming 
the “privileged relation to origins” for the founder of the BSAC (McClintock 1995: 29).  
 From the very inception of the plan to seize the region between the Limpopo and 
Zambezi rivers, various permutations of the civilising mission were used to justify both the 
occupation and the methods used to achieve this aim (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 43–4). Early 
missionaries, who had worked in Matabeleland for 20 years prior to 1890, offered visions of 
a wild and uncivilised landscape, “immorally ‘natural’ [and thus] literally in a state of 
original sin” (Ranger 1999: 15). They “saw their evangelical task as bringing Christian 
culture into unredeemed and primeval nature, thus freeing Africans from their abject 
dependence on it” (ibid.). Other missionaries did not see their role in such seemingly benign 
terms, however. Rev. Charles Helm, who won the trust of Lobengula and served as an 
advisor in negotiations over the 1888 Rudd Concession, justified leading the King into a “trap 
that would eventually remove [the Ndebele kingdom] from the scene” by stating that he 
believed it was “the will of God” that the “Matebele power should be broken completely” 
(Samkange 1969, in Ravenscroft 1983: 57). Similarly, Catholic missionary Father Peter 
Prestage, who accompanied the Pioneer Column, wrote after the 1893 defeat of Lobengula: 
“If ever there was a just war, the Matebele war is just … I am delighted that such a tyrannical 
and hateful rule has been smashed up” (in McLaughlin 1996: 10).      
                                                          
36 Now called Chimanimani, Marondera and Chivu respectively.  
47 
 Indeed, many of the pioneers initially felt that what they saw as barbaric atrocities 
committed by Ndebele raiding parties on Shona villagers (see Boggie 1962: 131) justified the 
destruction of the former and the occupation of the latter’s territory to “protect” them from 
these depredations. With Rhodes, the settlers could then argue “that a savage and brutal 
authority had made way for a civilised, benevolent one” (Chennells 1985: 34). However, after 
the final defeat of the Ndebele in 1897 and Rhodes’ settlement with their remaining leaders, 
many whites came to mythologise the Ndebele as noble savages, renowned for their military 
prowess, loyalty and nobility, while disparaging the “shifty” Shona, whom they feminised 
and portrayed as untrustworthy and unreliable (ibid.: 36–7; see also Comaroff and Comaroff 
1992: 46, Lowry 1997: 274).37 However, despite such ethnically differentiated conceptions of 
the noble savage, most settlers viewed Africans in general as inferior and primitive, their 
culture lagging 2,000 years behind European civilisation. In short, they were “anachronistic 
humans” (McClintock 1995: 30). Rhodes himself stated that “the natives are like children. 
They are just emerging from barbarism. They have human minds … and we ought to do 
something for their minds and their brains that the Almighty gave them” (in Samkange 1982: 
10).38 Hand in hand with violent conquest, the idea of British trusteeship over their colonial 
subjects was present from the beginning of Rhodesia’s history.39 
 In 1891, there was an estimated white population of 1,500, while the African 
population was below 500,000 (Kirkwood 1984b: 146). At this stage, the vast majority of the 
white occupiers were male fortune-hunters and soldiers. While small numbers of white 
women did begin to arrive in the country thereafter – as wives were sent for, adventurous 
single women made the journey, and farming families came up from the south – white society 
largely maintained its male soldier/adventurer frontier character until after the 1896 Ndebele 
and Shona rebellions had been suppressed.40 While these uprisings were ultimately 
unsuccessful, a tenth of the white population were killed (around 370 settlers), including nine 
                                                          
37 See Hamilton (1998) and Laband (2009) on the dynamics of similar (and connected) constructions of the “the 
Zulu” as “noble savages” in nineteenth-century South Africa.   
38 As Jeater (1993: 46) points out, however, although there was “broad agreement among the Occupiers in 
Southern Rhodesia that the Africans were primitive savages, there was still little agreement about what, if 
anything, should be done to overcome this state of affairs”.  
39 See Li (2007), Lorimer (1978), Mellor (1951) and Stoler (2006a, 2006b) for discussions of different 
manifestations of imperial trusteeship around the colonial world.       
40 In independent Zimbabwe, these uprisings are now called the First Chimurenga. Chimurenga is a chiShona 
word which refers to a revolutionary struggle. It is also applied to the war of independence between 1972 and 
1980, which is referred to as the Second Chimurenga, while the ruling ZANU-PF party has also called the 
2000–2003 land takeovers the Third Chimurenga. In the case of the 1896 uprisings, some scholars have argued 
that the name is misleading since it unifies a complex set of resistance struggles or zvimurenga (plural – see 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 55). 
48 
women and 23 children (Kennedy 1987: 19; Kirkwood 1984b: 145). The nature and extent of 
damage that was inflicted by the Shona and Ndebele “rebels” on the white settlers in this 
moment, as well as the latter’s subsequent military triumph, had a significant impact on the 
collective psyche and identity formation of white Rhodesians, for whom their sufferings and 
military victories in 1893 and 1897 became (decidedly masculine) founding myths (see 
Kirkwood 1984b: 145). The frontier nature of the country, the threat of uprisings and health 
risks such as malaria discouraged white women from settling in the colony during the first 
twenty years of occupation, and it was not until after 1911 that larger numbers began to arrive 
(Mlambo 1998: 128). Thus, while the 1890s white population was predominantly male and 
the first decade of the twentieth century saw the ratio of females to males remaining static at 
less than 500 females per 1,000 males, by 1921 the proportion of females to males had 
increased to 771:1,000 (ibid.).     
 A frontier society dominated by soldiers and fortune-hunters for the first two decades 
was bound to develop what Bush (2004: 87) has called “marauding frontier masculinities”. 
White men, single or away from their wives, satisfied their sexual needs with African women 
from the outset, with many of these unions being coerced in various ways (Kennedy 1987: 
174; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 62; Pape 1990: 701, 711–14; Schmidt 1992: 235). In rural areas, 
white farmers were known to cohabit with black women (Kennedy 1987: 177), while they 
also, along with mine managers and shopkeepers, coerced or had black women procured for 
them by male subordinates (Pape 1990: 713). There were concerns by the authorities over 
this widespread miscegenation and the growing number of mixed-blood “coloured” children 
being produced (Kennedy 1987: 177). However, the 1903 Immorality Suppression 
Ordinance, while making sex between a black man and a white woman illegal, did not 
criminalise sex between a white man and a black woman (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 63). 
Instead, despite protests by members of white society, the authorities initially did little about 
such unions but rather tolerated the presence of white (mainly Continental European) 
prostitutes to meet the sexual needs of settler men (Kennedy 1987: 178; Kufakurinani 2013). 
At the same time, this era was associated with profound settler paranoia around “black peril” 
cases, where black men, particularly domestic servants, were accused of raping or attempting 
to rape white women (Pape 1990: 703; Schmidt 1992: 233).41 Thirty black men were hanged 
for these offenses, often on minimal evidence, while not a single white man was executed for 
a similar crime (Pape 1990: 720). 
                                                          
41 Paranoia around the “black peril” was also fuelled by reports that the white prostitutes were having sex with 
black clients (Pape 1990: 703).   
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 After 1900, when hopes of finding the Second Rand had faded, Rhodes and his BSAC 
administrators became preoccupied with building a “white man’s country” in Southern 
Rhodesia, making great efforts to promote social, economic and political conditions to attract 
European settlers rather than temporary expatriate workers (Mlambo 1998: 131).42 They were 
specific about what kind of white settler they wanted, designing policies which favoured 
British citizens (resident in Britain or other colonies) who had some capital to invest and 
were prepared to work on the land. They were particularly keen to attract hard-working 
middle-class men (with an education and some capital) who were prepared to become the 
farmers who could develop the countryside, rather than wealthy gentlemen of leisure or 
ordinary white labourers (Hodder-Williams 1983: 105; Mlambo 1998: 139).43 The 
requirements were strict and many would-be settlers who did not have the required capital to 
invest in the land did not qualify, despite the generous support and cheap land that the 
authorities were willing to offer to those who did. Thus, in general, those coming directly 
from Britain to settle in Southern Rhodesia before World War Two were members of a 
“migratory elite” (Kennedy 1987: 6), although they were drawn predominantly from the 
British lower-middle classes (Lowry 1997: 266) rather than the upper class.44 
 The gender imbalance and the resulting social and moral problems, however, were 
identified as an impediment to the BSAC’s vision of a settled middle-class society. In 1901 a 
“Rhodesian Committee” of the Society for the Overseas Settlement of British Women was 
established, providing assisted passages to suitable (middle-class) single women or widows 
who were to be placed in approved employment as domestic helpers, children’s nurses, 
school matrons, nurses and governesses (Mlambo 1998: 130).45 Such women – who were 
also envisaged as wives – were not only being attracted and assisted into the country to 
                                                          
42 The colony was called Southern Rhodesia to distinguish it from the two BSAC-administered protectorates, 
North-Western Rhodesia and North-Eastern Rhodesia to the north of the Zambezi River, which became 
Northern Rhodesia in 1911.   
43 The extent to which the BSAC was determined to control which kind of white settler was allowed into 
Southern Rhodesia is illustrated by the failure of one famous early settler, Kingsley Fairbridge, to obtain 
permission for a child immigration scheme he planned to establish in Southern Rhodesia. Hoping to bring 
lower-class children out from Britain to be trained (and labour) at farm schools, the BSAC rejected Fairbridge’s 
proposal “on the grounds that the country was too young to cope with a child immigration scheme (Jenkins 
1997: 75). In fact, the BSAC and white society’s fears about bringing unskilled white settlers into the colony to 
work as labourers was less about logistical capacity to “cope”, than about the presence of unskilled black labour 
and the fact that “as servants, the immigrants would have to consort with black servants” (ibid.). As I will show 
below, the issue of social class and fears around the consequences of interracial sex were intimately tied.     
44 They were part of a migratory elite insofar as in the first half of the nineteenth century, migrants had been 
from the lower echelons of European society, whereas by the late nineteenth century, middle- and upper-class 
migrants were predominant (Kennedy 1987: 6).  
45 Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, similar efforts were made to encourage and assist women of 
“good character, health and capacity” to settle in Southern Rhodesia (Mlambo 1998: 130).    
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guarantee permanent settlement through the stable families and children they would produce 
(Kirkwood 1984b: 143) but also as bearers of the civilising mission to their own husbands 
and homes, thereby taming frontier masculinities (Callan 1984: 6). As the second quote in 
this chapter’s epigraph suggests, white women were held up as the bearers and passers-on of 
the moral fibre of white society.46 They were expected to perform this role not only by 
keeping their men from the temptations of miscegenation but also by ensuring that their 
domestic life was up to the expected middle-class standards and set a good example to white 
newcomers and the “natives”. Just as elsewhere in the colonial world, “a properly managed 
home [was] more than a precondition of the civilizing mission: it [was] a part of it” (Callan 
1984: 9, original emphasis). 
 The fear of miscegenation and particularly “black peril” played an important role in 
establishing white settler identities in Southern Rhodesia. Kennedy (1987: 146) argues that 
they served to unite the disparate members of white society against a common 
(manufactured) threat, and to speed up the process by which newcomers were familiarised 
with the norms regarding interracial relations. Pape (1990: 699) adds that they also helped to 
solidify gender differences “and thereby to construct a white and male supremacist social 
order”. Certainly, these issues helped to constitute Africans in Southern Rhodesia as an 
“external frontier” – a racial “Other” against whom the colonial Europeans could define 
themselves (Stoler 1991, 1997). Interracial unions, however, disrupted (symbolically and 
physically) such clear colonial distinctions and power hierarchies between white rulers and 
black subjects because they produced populations of “mixed blood”. Stoler (1997: 199) 
argues that such “degenerate” populations and debates over their inclusion or exclusion, 
formed an “interior frontier” against which white colonisers also defined themselves. Apart 
from the “coloured” population, in Southern Rhodesia poor whites constituted a particularly 
threatening group for the middle-class English settlers. Indeed, one of the main rallying calls 
in the campaign against joining the Union of South Africa in the 1922 Responsible 
Government referendum was the threat that this would bring “the dumping of large numbers 
of land-hungry and semi-literate poor whites” from South Africa (Lowry 1997: 268). Poor 
whites were feared both because of their largely Afrikaans heritage, which would threaten the 
                                                          
46 Many settler women took this role very seriously. In 1910, a leading Anglican churchwoman initiated the 
Rhodesian Women’s Union (later Church Women’s Society) in an attempt to tackle vices such as impurity, 
temper, swearing, drinking and debt among settler men and “to encourage the proper care and upbringing of 
children” (Welch 2008: 101). See Stoler (2010: 32ff.) for a discussion of white women as the “custodians of 
morality” in the wider colonial world and Bush (2004) for their role as empire builders and guardians of moral 
and physical health and hygiene in the colonial home in the twentieth century. For a broader discussion of the 
construction of moral discourse in Southern Rhodesia see Jeater (1993).     
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“British character” of Southern Rhodesia, and because they were seen as “degenerates”: not 
fully white themselves and likely to mix freely (sexually and socially) with Africans (ibid.: 
269; Stoler 2010: 36).  
 White middle-class identities and ideologies were thus being created within Southern 
Rhodesia in opposition to these “external” and “interior frontiers”, as they were in other 
colonial contexts (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: 22; Stoler 2010: 40). But settler identities 
and ideologies, and therefore practices, were also influenced by those they brought with them 
from England or other colonies such as Natal. Goodlad (2000), in tracing how 
conceptualisations of class and notions of universal “Englishness/Britishness” developed in 
nineteenth-century Britain, argues that the influential new “middle” class emerging out of the 
industrial revolution valorised England’s heritage of “freedom” and its “entrepreneurial 
ethos”, which they contrasted to Continental Europe’s “intrusive centralized government” 
(ibid.: 144).47 The early Victorian era saw the dominance of a middle-class identity which 
valued robust individualism, entrepreneurialism, free-market competition, local self-
government, and the autonomy of the family, despising centralisation, and the meddling 
bureaucracy of an intrusive state (ibid.: 145–47). However, by the mid-nineteenth century, 
the development of a British bureaucratic state was taking place, and another middle-class 
identity – “the professional ideal” – came to compete with the entrepreneurial ideology (ibid.: 
148). Both were opposed to the “Old Corruption” of the upper classes, but engaged each 
other in a discursive battle over which version of the self-made man was acceptable, and what 
constituted proper, gentlemanly, Englishness (ibid.: 159). While professionals, who embraced 
the new bureaucratic order, were seen by entrepreneurs as lacking autonomy and individual 
vigour, entrepreneurs became increasingly to be seen as “philistines”, and “materialistic 
pretenders”, in contrast to “genteel” professionals (ibid.: 158–9). By 1875, the latter version 
of gentility and “Britishness” had won the battle. 
 Entrepreneurialism, however, did not disappear and the values of robust 
individualism, energetic and vigorous manhood, competition and the spirit of self-help were 
particularly desirable in settlers such as those recruited as pioneers and later encouraged to 
farm in Southern Rhodesia. But, while aggressive competition and acquisitive materialism 
continued to be important in the colonial context, just as with the “marauding” frontier 
masculinities, contemporary bourgeois ideologies around “English gentility” required such 
                                                          
47 There was also a religious dimension to this contrast, with Protestantism and British histories of dissent and 
non-conformism contrasted with conformist Continental Catholicism.    
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identities to be moderated, and entrepreneurial practice to be domesticated (ibid.: 161) as the 
country became more settled. The ideology of domesticity played such a role and, along with 
powerful settler institutions (see Chapter One), helped to convert undesirable frontier 
masculinities and rampant materialism into acceptable settler masculinities and commercial 
practices which were – at least in appearance – “synonymous with gentlemen” (Morrell 1997, 
2001). The ideology of the civilising mission and the “white man’s burden” – which were 
intricately linked to domesticity and the role of women – also played a crucial dual role in 
justifying colonial rule and capitalist exploitation (Goodlad 2000: 162), and “rendering … 
tractable and ruly” the “savage peoples” in the colonies (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: 24). 
Thus, while British women were expected to occupy roles associated with domesticity in 
Southern Rhodesia, it was a fairly robust, even entrepreneurial, maternalistic form of 
domesticity modelled on the likes of Florence Nightingale which was required (see Goodlad 
2000: 162–5). For those occupying such a role had important work to do in managing the 
settlers’ exterior and interior frontiers, moderating the masculinities of their menfolk, and 
keeping up respectable “English” standards.    
 On white-owned farms, Rutherford (2004b: 546) argues, farmworkers came to mark 
an “interior frontier” which played an important part in the ways in which white farmers 
constituted their private and public identities. This interior frontier, imbricated as it was in the 
intimacies of paternalism and domestic government, required management through the 
civilising mission and notions of trusteeship, “care” and “edification” (Rutherford 2001a). 
Influenced both by Southern Rhodesian sexual and social politics around race, class and 
respectability and by bourgeois identities and ideologies which circulated between the 
metropole and the colonies, “farmer’s wives” played a fundamental role in these endeavours, 
which had as much to do with settler identity as they had to do with managing labour.    
 
Settler Agriculture and the Virgin Soil 
There was no significant commercial farming by white settlers in Southern Rhodesia prior to 
1904 (Arrighi 1970: 201). Aside from some market gardening, there was little interest as 
capitalist agriculture was a risky enterprise and a successful African peasantry was already 
meeting the limited needs of the mines from their surpluses (Palmer 1977a: 227). Those who 
did occupy land before 1904 were either only using it for subsistence purposes (especially the 
Afrikaans settlers), or were using it as a base from which to conduct more profitable activities 
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such as mining, transport riding and construction (Arrighi 1970: 209). Factors such as the 
arrival and extension of the railway network, the South African War (1899–1902) and the 
recovery of the mining industry after the 1903 financial crisis meant that from 1904, 
agriculture became a desirable option for growing numbers of white settlers due to greater 
demand for produce and less competition from South Africa (Phimister 1988: 59).48 
Especially after the 1908 decision of the BSAC to promote settler agriculture through their 
“white agriculture policy”, a steady stream of English-speaking settlers who had access to 
capital arrived and were given access to the best land in the colony, which was well-watered, 
fertile and situated on the highveld close to the expanding transport routes (ibid.: 65; Palmer 
1977a: 227). The BSAC appointed a professional director of agriculture, and experts were 
recruited to provide white farmers with extension services. Research and experimentation 
farms were established and in 1912 a Land Bank was set up which gave loans of up to £2,000 
to help farmers to establish themselves (Palmer 1977a: 231; Rubert 1998: 21ff.). 
Consequently, while in 1903 less than 400 white farmers were on the land, by 1914 there 
were 2,040 farms being cultivated by white settlers, covering an estimated 183,400 acres 
(Phimister 1988: 60). Production, particularly of maize for both the local market and for 
export, rose dramatically during this period (Palmer 1977a: 232).         
 Another major reason why agriculture was able to “take off” after 1904 was because 
of legislative policies which allowed white farmers to establish extractive “semi-feudal” 
relations of control over African peasants living on the land they expropriated (Arrighi 1970: 
208). While by 1902 nearly three-quarters of the land in Southern Rhodesia had been 
alienated for use by whites, African peasants were generally allowed to remain on their 
ancestral land provided they either paid rent to the new owner or supplied him with their 
labour (ibid.).49 Hut tax was doubled in 1904 and between 1908 and 1914 a host of new taxes 
and levies were introduced with the aim of squeezing peasants into wage labour on white-
owned farms and mines (Phimister 1988: 66). White farmers could thus charge those living 
on their land various fees (for grazing, dipping etc.) and, along with the labour they could 
                                                          
48 For detailed analyses of the political economy of mining, agriculture and labour in Rhodesia in the early 
decades of the twentieth century see Arrighi (1967, 1970), Grier (2006), Palmer (1977a, 1977b), Phimister 
(1988), Rubert (1998), Rutherford (1996) and Van Onselen (1976).    
49 Although the indigenous population was fairly small at the turn of the twentieth century (below 500,000) most 
people were settled in what Beach (1998: 3–4) calls the “Great Crescent”, which had long been favoured due to 
its suitability for habitation and cultivation. Much of the land in this arc, which runs from the north of the 
country right round to the east, and then proceeding to the southwest (i.e. avoiding the low-lying and arid south-
east lowveld and much of the dry and sandy west of the country), was alienated for white settlement by the early 
twentieth century. Consequently, the many areas chosen for white settlement were inhabited prior to colonial 
conquest.      
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extract, this income proved a boon to many in raising capital. While “Native Reserves” had 
already been set aside for black settlement (often, but not always, in areas of sandy soil and 
unreliable rainfall, but importantly nearly always far from the transport routes – see ibid.), 
farmers, landholding companies and the BSAC administrators alike were initially quite happy 
(until after the 1930 Land Apportionment Act) to allow peasants residing on alienated land to 
remain until they could no longer afford, or no longer wanted to do so. For many, remaining 
and working for white farmers was an unpalatable option (see Vambe 1972: 213ff.) and a 
move to the increasingly crowded reserves was preferable (Palmer 1977a: 238). For this 
reason and the increased demand for labour as European agriculture expanded, white farmers 
began to rely more and more on the recruitment of labour from Northern Rhodesia, 
Nyasaland and Portuguese East Africa (Arrighi 1970: 210; Hodder-Williams 1983: 112; 
Rubert 1998; Rutherford 1996). While many of these workers came of their own accord, 
some were also recruited through the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau (RNLB).50 
 Like the pioneers before them, many of the early white farmers imagined themselves 
as tamers of a wild and virgin wilderness, perpetuating the “myth of the empty, unformed 
land” which it was the settlers’ destiny to shape (Chennells 1985: 34).51 The presence of 
indigenous peasant farmers on their land directly contradicted this notion, something white 
farmers attempted to resolve by identifying them in ways that rendered them “anachronistic 
humans” (McClintock 1995: 35). The word often used by farmers and colonial officials to 
describe “the natives” was “raw” (see Rutherford 1996: 79), signifying their lack of 
modernity and locating their “primitive” culture within the state of nature.52 In this state, 
African “tribesmen” had been unable to tame the land and needed to be brought into 
civilisation through various means, including through “the gospel of labour” (Steele 1985: 
45; see also MacLean 1974: 175; Pandombiri 1948).53 Merely “scratching the surface” of the 
soil before moving on to new lands – which is how the settlers viewed African “slash and 
burn” agriculture – did not constitute proper, modern cultivation (Comaroff and Comaroff 
1992: 41; MacLean 1974: 202), which required a permanent presence and deeper penetration 
                                                          
50 Later to become the Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission (RNLSC).      
51 See Schmidt (2013) for a detailed study of the “taming” of the landscape and the people by white colonial 
farmers who settled in the Honde Valley.     
52 Mbembe’s (2001: 28, 33) observations that the “natives” were seen both as “unformed clay” who the settlers 
sought to shape, and as the “raw material” of colonial government are also apposite here.  
53 Settlers justified the use of labour as a civilising tool through the stereotype of Africans as inherently lazy, 
undisciplined and immoral (see Jeater 1993: 49). It is also important to note, however, that middle- and upper-
class Victorians already had similar ideas about the working classes in Britain, not least agricultural labourers 
(see Comaroff and Comaroff 1992; Jefferies 1981; Lorimer 1978: 80).   
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of the “virgin” soil with suitably modern tools.54 This explains how it was that the settler 
farmers could still view the land as “virgin bush” despite its use by the indigenous inhabitants 
for centuries. Of course, white farmers who settled after World War Two may well have 
found the land on which they pegged their farms uninhabited as anyone living there would 
have long since been forced into the reserves. But, as Chennells (1985: 35) points out, this 
“was an empty land created by chicanery, brutality and finally legislation”.  
 
Institutionalised Paternalism and Domestic Maternalism  
The “gospel of labour” was shared with farmworkers with the help of the 1899 Masters and 
Servants Act, a key ordinance which fostered the paternalistic and “feudal” control of labour 
by white farmers. Rutherford (1996: 84) characterises colonial labour relations on European 
farms as “coercive domestic relations”, where workers were not under a labour agreement 
guaranteed under contract law but rather under a “codified domestic relationship” 
administered under criminal law and the courts. The Act, which mainly applied to farm and 
domestic workers, was derived from the 1856 Cape Statute which in turn was based on an 
1841 British law with medieval roots (ibid.). It obliged masters to fulfil certain obligations, 
particularly the provision of standard wages, as well as lodgings and food of an adequate 
nature for workers living on his property. The expectation of the state on all three obligations 
was low and punishments for failing to meet them were light. In return, the servant was 
bound to carry out duties prescribed by the master, not only on his property, but anywhere in 
the country (ibid.). Through this Act, paternalism was institutionalised on commercial farms 
and a “close bond” between master and servant legislated. Harsh penalties awaited servants 
who broke this bond by disobeying commands, failing to perform duties, missing work or 
threatening the master or his property (ibid.). Through this piece of legislation, successive 
authorities55 sought to outsource – to a large but not complete degree – their role in the 
government of servants, particularly those living on private properties such as farms. This 
institutionalisation of paternalism set the scene for the development of an entrenched system 
of “domestic government” by the 1940s (Rutherford 1996, 2001a).   
                                                          
54 See Moore and Vaughan (1994) for a detailed account of indigenous shifting cultivation practices in southern 
Africa (particularly Northern Rhodesia/Zambia).   
55 By this I mean the BSAC until 1923, the government of Southern Rhodesia once Responsible Government 
had been granted to the colony by Britain in 1923, and the illegal Rhodesian Front regime after the 1965 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).   
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 The Masters and Servants Act was distinctly patriarchal – the “close bond” it 
encouraged being between the recognised jural identities of male farmer and male worker. As 
Rutherford (1996: 89) points out, “Loyal and domestic wives were necessary for both of 
these jural identities” so as to ensure their physical and social reproduction. Before the 1940s, 
when the stabilisation of the African workforce through “proper” family life became a 
concern, this was particularly true for the white farmer. As argued above and in Chapter One, 
the settlers in Southern Rhodesia held particular “modern” notions of the household, 
masculinity and the ideal role of women. The bourgeois “doctrine of domesticity” (Comaroff 
and Comaroff 1992: 39), or the “Victorian cult of domesticity” (McClintock 1995: 34), was 
very strongly ingrained in the moral outlook of the kind of middle-class British settlers which 
the BSAC sought to attract. As outlined above, the settlers had great fears of domestic 
degeneracy brought about not only by their close contact with “degenerate” races and classes 
but also by the harsh frontier conditions and frequent economic depressions they had to 
survive before World War Two (McClintock 1995: 49ff.).56 This was particularly true for 
undercapitalised farmers in Southern Rhodesia in the 1920s and 1930s. “Farmers’ wives” 
were expected to keep up “proper standards” of domestic life despite the hard times many of 
them fell on as they sank into debt and poverty, haunted by the spectre of poor-whiteism.   
 The very fraught daily interactions between black male house-servants and “farmers’ 
wives” recorded by Boggie (1959) and Richards (1952) are more than an indication of their 
racial prejudice or sexual fear: they are also an indication of the fear these women felt at the 
certain knowledge that their families were on the cusp of slipping into domestic degeneracy 
by failing to maintain the domestic standards both they and their community expected (see 
McClintock 1995: 53). Far from simply the need to keep their homes and families happy and 
healthy, these standards were determined by the “Victorian fetish for measurement, order and 
boundary” (ibid.: 169), where rigid timetables and routines around activities such as cleaning 
and eating were adhered to. The slow slip into domestic degeneracy (and the opprobrium the 
woman attracted for being perceived as responsible for it) is not only illustrated by Lessing in 
her novel The Grass is Singing (1950) but also by her own mother’s experience.57 Forced to 
shelve her upper-middle-class aspirations, Emily Tayler fell into depression and, despite her 
socially liberal outlook, experienced the same frustrations as the above “farmer’s wives”:  
 
                                                          
56 By this I do not mean degeneracy as a result of sexual contact with colonial Others, but rather due to not being 
able to keep up appropriately bourgeois English standards in the home.   
57 See Chennells (1985) and Steele (1985) for analyses of the social dynamics explored in The Grass is Singing.  
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Throughout my childhood [my father] remonstrated with my mother, more in sorrow than in anger, 
about the folly of expecting a man just out of a hut in the bush to understand the importance of laying 
a place at table with silver in its exact order, or how to arrange brushes and mirrors on the dressing 
table. For very early my mother’s voice had risen into the high desperation of the white missus, whose 
idea of herself, her family, depended on middle-class standards at Home. (Lessing 1994: 73)   
 
For Hylda Richards and other “farmers’ wives”, however, from its foundation in 1925 
(Logan 2000: 55), the Women’s Institute became a key ally in their struggle to maintain the 
“proper” standards of domesticity. Through the Institute, many young rural wives – often 
isolated from each other and in need of companionship – were able to share ideas about the 
“household arts” and how to “maintain the standards to which they and their husbands were 
accustomed” so that they could be “better wives, mothers and citizens of their new country” 
(MacLean 1974: 197). The initial focus of the FWISR was very much on helping white settler 
women to overcome the challenges they faced in civilising their own homes (Logan 2000: 
55–6). This was because the founders and early members recognised the dangers of “living in 
a country where it would be all too easy to slip into careless laxity … [and become like] ‘poor 
whites’ – the people who ‘went under’, who found the battle too much for them and slipped 
to the level of the simple people around them” (MacLean 1974: 197). Note here how “going 
under” is not associated with the financial ruin brought about by external factors such as 
drought or depression, but with “laxity” and the failure of the white family to maintain proper 
domestic and racial standards, regardless of their economic position.  
 Even from the earliest days of white farming, for reasons outlined above, domesticity 
was accorded “a civilizing function reaching far beyond the threshold of the home” (Hansen 
1992: 3). Before the 1940s white women living in rural areas mainly extended their family 
role as medical carers outwards to workers living on their properties or to other people in the 
vicinity.58 As MacLean (1974: 152) writes: “Many Native Commissioners’ wives, in 
common with other Rhodesian wives, especially on farms, conducted unofficial clinics on 
their back verandas and, as their timidity and fear were overcome, a few native women would 
come with their babies and try out the European magic”. This observation is borne out in the 
accounts given by or about women living in rural districts before 1923 (recorded in Heald 
1979). For nearly all of the “farmer’s wives” included by Heald, some mention is made of 
their role in providing medical care to workers. It is not just the fact that they played such a 
                                                          
58 See Vaughan (1991) for a detailed analysis of colonial medicine and its role in constituting and controlling 
African subjects. See also Comaroff and Comaroff (1997: Chapter Seven).  
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role that is important, but that several decades later, these women or their family members 
felt that this role was worth recording. One contribution reads: “The African children often 
got sick and would come to me for help. I learnt to heal the worst burns by beating up the 
yolk of an egg with a little raw linseed oil and a little lime water” (ibid.: 104). Another reads: 
“There being no doctor within easy reach, Mother, of course, had to minister to all the labour 
force and their wives and families as well as her own” (ibid.: 218). Yet another: “In the case 
of the farm’s African tenants’ wives having difficulty while in labour – fairly rare in those 
days – Mrs. Trinder was always willing to do what she could. She had a wonderful reputation 
among the Africans” (ibid.: 291).59  
 It is clear that many early “farmers’ wives” felt that it was their duty to play the role 
of the nurturing mother-figure to the resident black population, particularly women and 
children, but also to the “boys” – the demasculating, infantalising label that white settlers 
applied to adult black male workers (Bush 2004: 96; Kennedy 1987: 140).60 This was 
partially the result of English middle-class “do-gooding” (Kirkwood 1984b: 159; see also 
Lorimer 1978) and a sense of the “white man’s burden” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 61), 
but it had other functions as well, including ensuring that the labour force was as productive 
as possible. In many instances, the “farmer’s wife” used medicine as a civilising force among 
the workers, as missionaries were also doing (Bashford 2004; Comaroff and Comaroff 1997). 
For example, one of the women whose activities were described in the previous paragraph 
competed with the local “witch-doctor” and tried to discourage her patients from using his 
services. On at least one occasion, the failure of her patient to heed this advice ended in 
“tragedy” (Heald 1979: 218). In these accounts, no matter how home-made and rudimentary 
the remedies of the white women were they were always expected to trump the “primitive” 
medical knowledge of indigenous healers.61 Food and nutrition could also be a point of 
intervention for some “farmers’ wives”, although there were often complaints that white 
farmers did not provide workers with an adequate or varied enough diet (see Kennedy 1987: 
                                                          
59 There are also similar references in other of the accounts about “farmers’ wives” in the book (ibid.: 252, 274, 
293, 313, 322). Similar accounts of the pre-independence involvement of white “farmer’s wives” in healthcare 
for farmworkers (from Shamva) are recorded in Logan (1997: 24, 44) and (from Wedza) in Macdonald (2003: 
234–5). Perhaps the most comprehensive health scheme for farmworkers before independence was run on 
tobacco farms in Goromonzi and Melfort districts from the 1950s by Dr Joan Lamplugh, a “missionary doctor” 
who had previously worked in the Belgian Congo (Shearer 1999: 89, 143–4, 175). In 1968 Dr Lamplugh also 
established the Glendora Trust which provided a free child-welfare scheme to assist those suffering from 
malnutrition (ibid.: 143). Most of these women were also members of the FWISR.   
60 Child labourers and pre-pubescent boys who were commonly recruited for a number of tasks by white settlers 
from before 1900 were commonly referred to as picaninnies (see Grier 2006).     
61 There is one account, however, in which a little white boy dies of malaria because his family refused the 
“native remedy”, which they later found out was effective (Heald 1979: 20).  
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164; Steele 1982: 48). Lessing (1994: 72) notes how her mother (a qualified nurse) “agonized 
over the bad diet of the farm labourers, tried to get them to eat vegetables from our garden, 
lectured them on vitamins”. The civilising nature of this concern is revealed by the fact that 
the workers preferred to gather “wild” vegetables, but these were not considered to be 
“proper”, like domesticated European vegetables such as tomatoes or lettuce.           
 These early maternalistic farm-welfare endeavours, in which the domestic roles of 
white women helped male farmers to fulfil their obligations under the Masters and Servants 
Act, also played an important part in attracting and controlling the labour force. Rhodesian 
mines either used a totally closed labour compound designed to control, survey and discipline 
workers, or (if a large enough mine) a “three-tier” compound system in which the inner 
compound for general workers was closed and prison-like, while the outer tiers, inhabited by 
skilled and senior workers, were gradually less controlled (Van Onselen 1976: 128–36). Mine 
compounds thus had much in common with other institutions which made use of panopticism 
as a means of control (Foucault 1984a: 206–13). The lack of capital available to most farmers 
prior to World War Two, however, along with the spread-out nature of fieldwork and the fact 
that workers were mainly voluntary recruits,62 meant that most farmers could not afford to 
build or run a closed compound system, even if they wanted to (Rubert 1998: 125). Most 
farm compounds before the 1950s consisted of a collection of wattle and daub huts built by 
individual workers, usually situated some distance from the farmer’s homestead and typically 
near a water source. The “extreme openness” of most farm compounds was in fact a 
recruiting tool for farmers as they used the relative “freedom” and sense of “independence” 
enjoyed by workers (after hours) to offset the fact that they could not match the wages 
offered to mine workers (ibid.: 126). 
 Labour shortages, especially at crucial stages in the production process of crops like 
tobacco, could cause the collapse of a farm (Kirkwood 1984b: 151; Phimister 1988: 86). As 
Kirkwood (1984b: 151) argues, “a wife’s attitude to workers and their families could be 
crucial. If she handled morning ‘clinics’ and other encounters with patience, sympathy and 
interest, a genuine rapport developed between the two worlds of white and black”. Given the 
abovementioned dystopian accounts of Boggie (1959), Richards (1952) and Lessing (1994), 
it is likely that this romanticised outcome was seldom achieved, but that should not diminish 
                                                          
62 While some farmworkers were recruited through the RNLB, most came of their own accord and were 
contracted by individual farmers for whatever length of time was agreed. So keen were the authorities to 
facilitate this flow of “voluntary” labour from outside the country that in 1936 they introduced a free transport 
system – the Ulere Motor Transport System – to ferry workers from the border posts in the north-east to the 
farming districts of the highveld (Rubert 1998: 30ff.).  
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the fact that the “farmer’s wife’s” maternalistic pastoral role was still important in persuading 
workers that her husband’s farm was a good option for their employment. Indeed, farms 
where the owner was known to be too violent and not provide adequate (and timely) 
payment, or other needs such as credit, were often deserted by workers, who then gave the 
farm a nickname or carved such warnings into nearby trees, which warned-off potential 
employees (see Phimister 1988: 90; Vambe 1972: 213ff.). For these “farmers’ wives” 
exercising their tenuous but important pastoral power (Foucault 1983) over farmworkers and 
their families, medicine and associated rudimentary welfare interventions were “often the 
perfect governmental combination of assistance and rule” (Bashford 2004: 132), allowing 
them to change the workers’ conduct through various “civilising” techniques, routines and 
disciplines while also being seen to be a provider.      
 
Spare the Rod, Spoil the Crop    
Below this apparently benign and “civilised” façade, however, lurked the violent reality of 
labour relations in the colonial era. If maternalistic pastoral care for the workforce was 
necessary, for many farmers so were violent methods of control and discipline. The Masters 
and Servants Act was both ambiguous about and lenient on physical punishment meted out 
by the master on their servants, stating that if the master was convicted of “unlawfully 
assaulting” a servant, the magistrate could cancel the contract (Rutherford 1996: 85). While 
not officially sanctioned, physical punishment appears to have been tolerated by the 
authorities. According to McCullough (2004: 226–7), “there is ample evidence from 
Southern Rhodesia that in the period before 1914 flogging was the unofficial policy of the 
Native Affairs Department”. Especially in the first two decades of the colony, when “frontier 
masculinity” (Bush 2004: 87) was as yet unrestrained, the animal hide whip or sjambok was a 
common instrument of punishment on mines and settler farms (Arrighi 1970: 208; Phimister 
1988: 88; Vambe 1972: 213ff.). In some cases, assaults were so severe that they resulted in 
death (McCullough 2004: 225), but the perpetrators were rarely found guilty of murder or 
punished to any great extent.  It is not surprising, then, that Vambe (1972: 219) came to the 
conclusion that from the beginning: 
 
the white Rhodesian farmer … represented the worst in European racial feelings, both in the role of 
employer and as an individual. He was harsh, domineering, unfair, in-human and took the law into his 
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own hands when dealing with Africans, some of whom felt that they were placed in the same class as 
the cattle or even lower.  
 
McCullough (2004: 229) argues that there was “a system of brutality that, in the period before 
World War Two, permeated labour relations in parts of British Africa”. Violence, he 
continues, was amplified by political-economic factors such as economic depression and 
labour shortages, and social factors such as the male nature of white society and the shortage 
of suitable wives for settler men.   
 Not every farmer used violence to the same extent, and some were noted to be fair and 
kind, even by critical authors (Lessing 1994; Vambe 1972).63 Far from being embarrassed, 
however, farmers themselves sometimes openly discussed their use of physical punishment. 
Boggie (1962: 133) relates how at a Christmas clothing hand-out for workers in around 1920, 
one worker “insolently” threw back the cap he was handed by her husband: “With the fury of 
a charging lion, the Mandatory Power who ruled this farmyard, sprang at that native and 
struck him on the jaw, but in doing so he sprained one of his fingers, and was thus unable to 
continue the thrashing he meant to administer”.64 Another Rhodesian farmer commented in 
the 1930s that: “A good clout over the head has excellent results for a misdemeanour 
provided it is not done too often, but thrashing in the proper sense of the word is a mistake 
and only ends in the lowering of the white man’s prestige” (in Steele 1982: 53). White 
farmers thus had the conception of themselves as the sovereign rulers of their farms for whom 
the exercise of “deductive powers” such as violence was natural (Foucault 1997). Through 
the Masters and Servants Act, and the official policy of impressing upon “the European 
farmer his duty of edifying Africans and his obligation to ‘take the trouble’ to control their 
activities” (Rutherford 1996: 80), farmers really could take the law largely into their own 
hands.   
 McCullough argues that the settlers’ use of violence was not reconcilable with their 
yearning for civility (2004: 237), but misses another point, namely that violence and other 
                                                          
63 Just as attitudes and practices varied between individual farmers, they could also vary by district, depending 
on their histories of settlement and social character. See Hodder-Williams (1983: 82–9) for a discussion of the 
social dynamics and political rivalries of settler farmers in the Marandellas (Marondera) District, where distinct 
areas of land were settled by Afrikaans farmers from South Africa, English-speaking South African farmers and 
wealthier upper-middle-class farmers straight from Britain. Other authors such as Kirkwood (1984b: 151) have 
noted that different white farming districts came to take on slightly different social characters (e.g. “tough”, 
“aristocratic”, “progressive”) depending on the kinds of settlers who farmed there. Depending on their histories 
of settlement, some districts were more uniform in social and economic character than others.         
64 See Shutt (2007) for a detailed analysis of white colonial concerns about the perceived “insolence” and “bad 
manners” of “natives”, and their attempts to regulate and punish such behaviour.   
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forms of strict bodily discipline were an integral part of the civilising process even within 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century European society. The objects of this civilising 
process within the European household were children, who were viewed widely as primitive 
throwbacks (McClintock 1995: 50) and the unruly, undisciplined and wilful bearers of 
original sin (see Miller 1980: 3–91).65 Widely used child-rearing manuals prescribed 
uncompromising routine, discipline and corporal punishment and warned that any softness or 
leniency on the part of the parent would result in the child usurping the parents’ authority and 
ultimately do the child no favours in its journey towards self-disciplined adulthood (ibid.).66 
Upon graduating from the nursery, most middle-class British children were sent away to 
boarding schools where they continued to be “civilised” through various techniques of 
discipline and physical punishment (see Morrell 1997, 2001). Thus, although Goodlad (2000: 
153) argues that Victorian British socialisation processes took place more through 
autonomous households and “domestic surveillance” than through panoptical Continental 
(Foucauldian) institutions, by the twentieth century British children were also clearly being 
subjected to a range of institutionalised socialisation processes.          
 This was true for Rhodesian farmers’ children and had a profound impact on the 
character of their own paternalistic relations with those who, like children, were under their 
care and guidance. This point is illustrated well by a prominent farmer D.C. “Boss” Lilford, 
who gained a widespread reputation for the strict way he handled his labour force. An article 
written about him explored his values, noting his love of “discipline” and “order”: 
 
Discipline was ingrained in me at school. Our masters were military men, straight from the World 
War I battlefields. They did not tolerate sloppiness of any kind, or deviation from rules. It seemed 
harsh at the time but, in the long run, one began to realise that it had been worthwhile, not only for the 
good of the unit, but as regards the strengthening of one’s own character. I have followed this method 
with anyone under my jurisdiction, be it a child of mine, or an employee.67 
 
                                                          
65 See Castañeda (2002) and Lancy (2008) for detailed discussions about how children and childhood have been 
constructed and understood in a wide array of historical, cultural and geographical contexts. It should further be 
noted that women were also subordinated and subjected to a range of violent controls which were sanctioned by 
European society at that time.    
66 In the British Empire, New Zealander Doctor Truby King was a very influential author of “scientific” 
parenting books (Lessing 1994: 23) which sought a similar outcome. King advocated strict, cold discipline and 
rigid routines around feeding, sleeping and toilet training; the baby should not be indulged but left to cry so that 
it may “learn who is boss right from the start” and learn its place in the world (ibid.). 
67 Illustrated Life Rhodesia (Whyte 1969: 175). Lilford attended Plumtree High School, a rural boarding school 
established by the Anglican Church in 1902 (see below).  
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Farmers like “Boss” Lilford believed that it was their duty, as the patriarch, to both provide 
for those under their jurisdiction (determined by what station they held) and to discipline 
anyone who deviated from his rules (cf. Hodder-Williams 1983: 202). There was no 
contradiction between violence and civility because violence was an integral method through 
which civility, the civilising mission and the gospel of labour were “shared”. Thus, along with 
pastoral power, farmers also exercised their sovereign power and their disciplinary power 
(Foucault 1983, 1984b, 2007) on their farms in the colonial era, with the civilising mission as 
a key justification and tool for all three of these techniques of power. The capitalist endeavour 
of raising-up crops and cattle might have been the key aim of such techniques of power, but 
raising-up and civilising/modernising “raw natives” through work and discipline was also an 
important aim, which in turn reinforced white settler identities and the relations of production 
that supported them.        
               
Settler Institutions, Muscular Christianity and Bourgeois Domesticity  
As outlined in Chapter One, the role of settler institutions became crucial in perpetuating 
settler masculinity, domesticity and other practices and cultural understandings among the 
English-speaking white farmers in Southern Rhodesia. The settler institutions dominated by 
white farmers included rural boarding schools, farmers’ associations and unions, sports 
“country” clubs and voluntary associations such as the FWISR. Although the role that some 
of these institutions played, particularly in political and economic farming matters, has been 
examined (see Herbst 1990; Hodder-Williams 1983; Kennedy 1987; Pilossof 2013; Selby 
2006), the role that schools, the FWISR and the church (particularly the Anglican Church) 
played in social and cultural aspects of farming life has not been properly examined, although 
it is mentioned in various memoirs and histories about farming districts (see Hodder-
Williams 1983; Macdonald 2003; Shearer 1999). These three closely interlinked institutions 
played a particularly important role in many farmers’ and their wives’ attitudes towards 
social welfare, charity and their duty towards their country and other people.68 Following 
their establishment in the 1920s and their consolidation over the next two decades, by the 
1940s these institutions had developed aspects of their work directly related to promoting a 
specific kind of ethos and intervention in the lives of black farmworkers by white 
                                                          
68 Individuals such as Ethel Tawse Jollie – herself a founding member of the FWISR in Southern Rhodesia, the 
first female parliamentarian in the British Empire, a “farmer’s wife”, and an avid publicist of the colony – did 
much to promote these institutions and the values they represented among white Southern Rhodesians (see 
Lowry 1997, 2000).   
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landowners. Heavily influenced if not falling directly under the ministry of the Anglican 
Church, the two most influential institutions on the ideologies and labour practices of white 
farmers and their wives were boarding schools and the FWISR.        
 
The Role of Settler Schools 
In contrast to the Natal Midlands, where Morrell (1997, 2001) has examined the role of 
schools in the reproduction of middle-class English settler values, no such analysis has been 
conducted for colonial Zimbabwe. Schools, however, particularly private schools linked to 
the Anglican Church, played a very similar role on the Rhodesian highveld to that described 
by Morrell in the Natal Midlands. Furthermore, the values such schools sought to inculcate 
into their wards had significant implications for the attitudes and outlook of many future 
farmers and “farmers’ wives” on the highveld from the 1930s onwards.  
 Although some notable schools were founded soon after 1890, the period of colonial 
conquest and the lack of white families in the colony early on meant that schooling for settler 
children became more of a concern after 1896.69 With the rising number of settlers and the 
increasing number of families with children, the BSAC administrators began to finance farm 
schools and urban boarding schools for white children from 1899 (Kennedy 1987: 171). It 
was the Church of England, however, whose missionaries saw education as a key tool of the 
church’s mission and who had pretentions of becoming “the chief educator of the people” as 
they were in England (Welch 2008: 104). In line with the BSAC’s revised vision to build a 
British middle-class society, the Anglican Church “did not believe that there could be a ‘great 
white Christian civilisation’ in Rhodesia without English Church Schools” (ibid.: 105). 
Importantly, the main aim of these schools was “not so much to provide an occupational skill 
as to inculcate the character suitable for imperial responsibilities” (Kennedy 1987: 172). With 
this in mind, the Church established St Johns Grammar School in Bulawayo in the late 1890s 
and Plumtree High School in 1902. In 1908, however, the BSAC withdrew its support from 
denominational schools and the Anglican Church had to abandon its hegemonic vision. In 
1910, St Johns was forced to close and Plumtree School was taken over by the government in 
1914 (Welch 2008: 105).   
                                                          
69 The Dominican Convent (1892) and St Georges College (1896), both Catholic Church-linked schools, were 
the first to be established.  
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 Although a few Anglican schools remained open for wealthier settlers in Bulawayo, 
many farmers in the 1910s sent their children to non-denominational government boarding 
schools or to Catholic schools.70 The expansion of government support for schooling after 
Southern Rhodesia won self-government in 1923 also widened the choice of schools 
available, but many families were forced to make great sacrifices to send their children 
(especially boys) to senior schools in South Africa. So common was this practice that 
dedicated trains were run to ferry Southern Rhodesian boys to Johannesburg and 
Grahamstown until the 1970s (Willard 2011: 14). The increasing presence of middle-class, 
English farming settlers after World War One gave the Anglican Church a second chance to 
establish itself as the dominant force in settler education. They were led in this endeavour by 
the vision and ambition of Edward Paget, the fifth Bishop of Mashonaland, who served the 
diocese for 30 years (1925–1955) and actively supported the establishment of five schools – 
Ruzawi (1928), Bishopslea (1932), Springvale (1952), Peterhouse (1955) and Arundel (1955) 
– which became important settler institutions for highveld farmers (see Gibbon 1973; Willard 
2011).71   
 By 1923 the wealthier farmers in Marandellas (now Marondera) district were calling 
for the establishment of a boarding school in the area specifically for farmers’ children 
(Hodder-Williams 1983: 99). In 1926, Bishop Paget happened to meet a fellow Oxford 
graduate Rev. Robert Grinham and Maurice Carver, who had come to South Africa with the 
ambition of establishing an Anglican preparatory school for boys (Gibbon 1973: 39). Paget 
persuaded them to consider Mashonaland and they duly visited the diocese and settled on the 
site of the old Ruzawi Inn, five kilometres from Marandellas. In February 1928 Ruzawi 
School opened with 19 boys, and was very soon a popular option among farmers on the 
highveld. Hodder-Williams (1983: 101) points out that “the foundation, and rapid reputation, 
of Ruzawi School indicates … the very real transfusion among some of the settlers of a 
peculiarly British caste of mind”.72 The school was run along similar lines to the Natal 
schools described by Morrell (1997), making use of a “muscular Christianity” (Hodder-
Williams 1983: 100) specifically designed to produce a certain kind of “gentleman”. In 
                                                          
70 See Lessing (1994: 90ff.) for a description of life as a boarder at the Dominican Convent in the 1930s. 
Although many Anglican farmers such as the Taylers (Lessing’s parents) sent their children to Catholic schools 
before the 1930s, they often “chafed at the spectacle of English Church children being educated, albeit on 
English public school lines, by Dominican nuns and French and German Jesuits” (Welch 2008: 105).    
71 Ruzawi was a boys’ preparatory school, as was Springvale. Bishopslea was a girls’ junior school while 
Peterhouse and Arundel were boys’ and girls’ senior schools respectively.  
72 See Hodder-Williams (1983: 100) for a discussion of the politics around the establishment of Ruzawi School, 
which some feared would be elitist and enhance divisions among farmers of differing economic means.  
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Ruzawi’s case, the ethos of chivalry was even incorporated into the coat of arms with the 
adoption of the motto “Learning Knights”, after a Saxon gospel which used the term to refer 
to a disciple (Evans 1945: 63). As in British public schools, “Strictness, harsh living 
conditions and regular use of corporal punishment, accompanied by liberal doses of religious 
instruction, was the normal regime” (Morrell 1997: 173).73  
 The religious and moral instruction was taken very seriously and sought powerfully to 
inculcate a sense of noblesse oblige and encourage pupils to take up the “white man’s 
burden” that came with their future position as the kind of “high-minded” and “humane” 
Englishmen that the Anglican Church hoped would take forward its civilising mission (see 
Welch 2008: 10). Discussing Ruzawi, Evans (1945: 61) quotes Grinham at length writing 
about the refurbishment of the “native village for School servants during 1936–1938”. The 
original wattle and daub huts were deemed “hygienically and economically” unsatisfactory 
and the school board decided to provide accommodation which was more durable and 
hygienic (ibid.). “Would it not be possible”, they asked, “to build up at Ruzawi homes for 
these boys, where they could have their wives and bring up their families in a Christian 
community with decent living conditions and their own school and church?” (ibid., original 
emphasis). The “village” was duly designed and built with “whitewashed brick 
accommodation for married workers, communal bathrooms and laundry houses with water 
laid on, school buildings, decent sanitary arrangements, and incinerators for the destruction of 
rubbish” (ibid.: 62). Signalling both the valorisation of Christian (monogamous) marriage and 
the preoccupation with the hygiene of those who worked in close contact with white staff and 
pupils (e.g. cooks), “single” workers and those who worked outdoors were provided only 
with upgraded wattle and daub “rondavels”. A church and school buildings for use by the 
workers were built in the middle of the “village”. This complex was opened by Bishop Paget 
himself in 1937 at a ceremony attended by the whole school. The function of these buildings 
as, among other things, a deliberate pedagogical tool to instil a certain kind of ethos in 
Rhodesia’s future farmers is illustrated clearly by Grinham: “This care bestowed upon the 
African servants at Ruzawi is very valuable as an example to the boys of the School of the 
right way to treat native labour. There is reason to believe that the lessons learnt in this way 
are not forgotten” (ibid.: 62). 
                                                          
73 A farming interlocutor of mine who went to Springvale House testified that this was the case. Grinham did 
not shy away from administering corporal punishment on the boys and the hostel dormitories were freezing cold 
in winter due to lack of heating and window panes deliberately removed to maintain fresh air (Pers. Comm. with 
Paul White, Harare, 17 November 2013).          
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 The foundation of Ruzawi was always meant as the first step in the establishment of a 
number of diocesan schools on the highveld, catering largely for wealthier farmers’ children. 
The body which established Ruzawi had a deliberately pluralised name: Ruzawi Schools 
Limited, and managed to secure the support of the Beit Trustees in this ambitious vision 
(Gibbon 1973: 40). Until the 1950s, however, boys still had to travel to South Africa to get 
the kind of secondary education offered by Anglican Church schools. This changed with the 
founding of Peterhouse School, the long-awaited “senior Ruzawi” in 1955 (Gibbon 1973: 
123), with which both Paget and Grinham were centrally involved. Reinforcing the 
importance of the Natal Midlands diocesan schools as a model for their Rhodesian versions, 
Mr Fred Snell was recruited by Paget to be the first Rector of Peterhouse, having served in 
this position at Michaelhouse for the past 12 years (ibid.). It would be fair to conclude that, as 
with the Natal Midlands schools, Ruzawi and Peterhouse were striving to produce graduates 
who would embody a certain form of settler masculinity that would identify them as 
“gentlemen” (Morrell 1997) – gentlemen who would turn into future masters and 
modernising farmers.74 
 The education of farmers’ daughters was not neglected by the Ruzawi group either. 
The “girls Ruzawi” (Willard 2011: 15), based in Salisbury but with boarding facilities, was 
founded in 1932. A school particularly close to Bishop Paget’s heart, the aim of Bishopslea 
was to provide junior school girls with a good academic education but, just as importantly, to 
foster “good character” (ibid.: 66). The Bishop was said to favour “the company of 
intelligent, educated and determined women with a mission in life … women who were 
competent, well-read, able to pursue serious goals, and who cared for others” (ibid.). He 
wanted girls in his new school “to grow up able to take a similar important place in the 
world” and meet challenges head-on (ibid.). Like Ruzawi, Bishopslea waited for its senior 
school until 1955 when Arundel School was founded as a sister school for Peterhouse. While 
Arundel was not strictly a diocesan school, the Anglican Church was strongly influential in 
its model of education, which was similar to that espoused at its preparatory school. While 
these girls schools were not intended to produce “kitchen doormats, or shrinking violets” 
(ibid.), the education provided and the roles it prepared girls for were situated very much 
within the realms of domesticity and wifehood; to provide the farmers and captains of 
industry – the elite – with competent and dedicated helpmates who, predominantly, would 
                                                          
74 There is no better example of the kind of man these schools sought to produce than Ruzawi old-boy C.G. 
Tracey, who went on to become not only the largest pig farmer in the country but a leading figure in the 
development of the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean agricultural sector (see Tracey 2009). 
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play the supportive role expected of “incorporated wives” (Callan 1984 – see Chapter One). 
However, as the above quotes illustrate, the kind of domesticity they were being trained for 
was of a robust, maternalistic kind, rather than one designed to foster subservience.            
 
The Women’s Institute and Homecraft Clubs on Farms  
Graduates of schools such as Bishopslea and Arundel were expected to have adopted the 
values which drove another crucial settler institution: the Women’s Institute (WI). This had 
distinctly middle-class rural roots both in Canada, where it was first started by “farmers’ 
wives” in 1897, and in England and Wales, where it was introduced in 1915 (Logan 2000: 
54). Although it sought to give women a voice, the Institute was firmly rooted in the ethos of 
bourgeois domesticity and the important role of the wife in the English family home. Indeed, 
its Canadian founder stated: “A Nation cannot rise above the level of its homes, so it is the 
duty of women to work and study together in order to raise their homes to the highest 
possible level” (in ibid.: 59). The lack of middle-class amenities, the isolation of rural white 
women and the threat of domestic degeneration ensured that such an organisation would 
catch on quickly in Southern Rhodesia.75 Two women – Constance Fripp, a former Oxford 
Don, and Beatrice Richardson, a Scottish pioneer with a keen interest in domesticity – were 
instrumental in establishing the WI in the colony. In 1925, together with several of their 
friends and neighbours, they formed the first group in Essexvale (now Esigodini), before 
embarking on tours of the country to encourage other women in rural districts to form similar 
groups. In 1927, a constitution was adopted, spelling out aims such as improving rural 
amenities, forming friendships between town and country women, teaching home-making 
skills (including agriculture, rural handicrafts, domestic science and hygiene) and providing a 
platform through which their members could “take an effective path in the life and 
development of [the] country” (ibid.: 58).  
 By the 1960s, over 50 WI branches had been established, “one or more in almost 
every town and village in the country”.76 “Farmers’ wives” were predominant in the many 
rural WIs: indeed, meetings of the Marandellas branch (initiated in 1936), were held at the 
                                                          
75 Preserving the middle-class values not just of “the home” but also of “home” was important for these British 
women. Southern Rhodesian WI co-founder Constance Fripp was said to have “visualised a body of organised 
women helping to build up the best of British tradition in a part of Africa hitherto unknown” (Jane Needham, 
writing in Home and Country, 1951. Quoted by E.A. Logan. Report of Hon. Archivist. September 2001. Private 
Papers of E.A. Logan).   
76 Email correspondence with E.A. Logan, 10 June 2014. She is referring here to “villages”, or small rural 
service centres, in white commercial farming districts rather than African villages in the Communal Areas.    
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same time as farmers’ association (FA) meetings (Hodder-Williams 1983: 198), while it was 
also common, as in the case of the Jumbo WI (Mazowe), for the WI to provide refreshments 
for their husbands during FA meetings.77 The dual aim of the FWISR was summed up by its 
motto “For Home and Country”, from which the name of its magazine Home and Country, 
launched in 1936, was derived (Logan 2000: 61; NFWIR 1967). Thus, while activities 
connected to the home and husbands were central, just as important were activities connected 
to the country and its development. Representing a large proportion of the white women in 
the country and counting among its members women such as Ethel Tawse Jollie and Muriel 
Rosin (female members of parliament),78 the annual Congress of the FWISR discussed 
important social, political and economic issues, and submitted many of its resolutions to the 
government for attention. The lobbying of “The Women’s Parliament”, as the FWISR 
Congress was dubbed (ibid.: 60), resulted in the government enacting many of its resolutions, 
from the establishment of the government archives, a nervous diseases hospital and teacher 
training college to the introduction of domestic science classes and cattle tuberculosis testing 
(ibid.). While WI members overwhelmingly upheld the “traditional, white male-dominated, 
political system” of the country (Lowry 2000: 186), it is clear that the FWISR gave them a 
vehicle through which they felt they were centrally involved in the development of their 
nation and its people. This calls into question Pape’s (1990: 720) assessment that white 
colonial women were mostly involved with “organising their social clubs, tyrannising their 
domestic servants, and occasionally helping out with more productive tasks”. In fact, white 
women were at the forefront of maintaining and managing settler identities in Southern 
Rhodesia.     
 In this regard, one of “the most outstanding schemes” undertaken by the FWISR was 
the Homecraft movement and the promotion of African women’s clubs from the 1940s.79 The 
self-professed duty of white settlers to teach Africans their “modern”, “civilised” ways in the 
domestic sphere, agricultural practice, science, law and industry has been comprehensively 
studied.80 Domesticity and “proper” sexual and hygienic practices were particularly important 
aspects of this mission, which targeted African women in particular since they were often 
seen as the most uncivilised and immoral members of their race (Jeater 1993: 244; Schmidt 
                                                          
77 Jumbo WI 21st anniversary report (no author or date) entitled Jumbo Women’s Institute, December 1945–
1966. Private papers of E.A. Logan.  
78 For more on Tawse Jollie see Lowry (1997, 2000) and on Rosin see Kufakurinani and Masiiwa (2012).  
79 Report of the Hon. Archivist. E.A. Logan, September 2001. Private papers of A.E. Logan.  
80 See Burke (1996); Comaroff and Comaroff (1991, 1992, 1997); Jeater (1993); McClintock (1995); Moore 
(2005); Schmidt (1992); Thornton (1995) and West (2002).   
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1992: 99). Thus, as McClintock (1995: 31) argues, “African women were subjected to the 
civilizing mission of cotton and soap … [they] were to be civilized by being dressed (in 
clean, white, British cotton)”. Missionaries were the frontrunners in the endeavour of 
teaching African girls in mission schools from 1916 onwards about personal and social 
hygiene, domesticity and how to be a “proper wife” (Burke 1996: 44ff.; Kirkwood 1984a: 
111; Schmidt 1992). In the 1920s, the government sought to encourage this teaching to have 
a reach far beyond mission schools, funding the training of a cadre of African “home 
demonstrators” – called “Jeanes teachers” – who were to travel around villages and teach 
skills such as personal and household cleanliness, child welfare, mothercraft, cookery, 
dressmaking and so on. These teachers were also meant to live an exemplary life themselves 
in order to show those around them how to live properly (Burke 1996: 47).  
 Another important step in the history of Homecraft in Southern Rhodesia was the 
establishment of the Hasfar Homecraft Village School near present-day Mvurwi in 1943 by 
Anglican Missionary Catherine Langham (Kirkwood 1984a: 111; Logan 2000: 66). The 
school sought to produce “clean, disciplined and domestically able African women” (Burke 
1996: 57) and was enthusiastically supported by the FWISR. By 1947, a group of volunteers 
from the FWISR, who became known as “the hygiene ladies” began visiting their local 
townships to give talks and demonstrations to African women.81 This led to the formation of 
the first Homecraft clubs in Gatooma (Kadoma), run by white women from the FWISR, and 
local branches introduced a committee member specifically dedicated to promoting 
Homecraft. Rural white women, particularly the wives of farmers and government officials, 
were instrumental in starting Homecraft clubs and when Helen Mangwende, the wife of Chief 
Mangwende, initiated a number of clubs in the Mrewa area, Homecraft was on its way to 
becoming a mass rural movement (see Burke 1996: 58). In 1952 the Federation of African 
Women’s Clubs (FAWC) was created – under the FWISR – as an umbrella body for the 17 
clubs in existence. By 1970, there were 800 clubs throughout Rhodesia with 16,000 
members; by 1975 there were 23,000 members, while Radio Homecraft (broadcast twice-
weekly in vernacular languages) ensured many more rural women received the teachings 
espoused by the movement (ibid.; Logan 2000: 59; Ranchod-Nilsson 1992: 195; West 2002: 
77).  
 Authors such as MacLean (1974) and Ranchod-Nilsson (1992), in focussing on the 
Homecraft clubs run by the wives of white civil servants in African reserves give the 
                                                          
81 Email correspondence with E.A. Logan, 10 June 2014.  
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misleading impression that there were no clubs in the commercial farming districts in which 
farmworkers were included. Thus, while “farmers’ wives” are sometimes mentioned in 
passing by those who have written about the Homecraft movement, those who have studied 
the history of commercial farmworkers have not explored this further, and the movement’s 
presence on farms has consequently been overwhelmingly obscured. In fact, most WI 
members before the 1960s were “farmers’ wives” and many clubs were run on farms by these 
women, overseen by their local branch’s committee member for Homecraft.82 Edone Ann 
Logan, herself the former archivist of the National Federation of Women’s Institutes of 
Zimbabwe (NFWIZ), expressed great frustration that Homecraft clubs on commercial farms 
and the involvement of “farmers’ wives” in such clubs have been largely ignored.83 Logan 
married a Shamva farmer in 1962 and was soon invited to join the local WI, where she 
became involved in Homecraft, first as a judge for clubs in the neighbouring African reserves 
and then as the local WI branch member for Homecraft.84 A teacher by profession, Logan 
made impressive progress: “I took on Homecraft in Shamva and we started not only clubs on 
every farm, but we started a club in the township … and we used to take it in turns to take 
their meetings”. What made the endeavour worthwhile for Logan was that she found the 
members so keen to learn: “I got excited because the people on our farm knew very few skills 
… they wanted to know how to cook simple meals, they wanted to know hygiene, they 
wanted to know everything to do with running a home”.85 
 When challenged, Logan concedes that not every “farmer’s wife” in the district would 
have run a club on their farm:  
 
I am saying everyone, but it’s not everyone’s cup of tea. But there was a movement, and if they 
weren’t involved directly, they would always help. Like if you would have Mrs so-and-so, who sat on 
a hill and loved tea parties and things, but she was a brilliant crocheter, and so you would say “Mrs 
so-and-so, next month please could you come and demonstrate to the women’s clubs how to make a 
baby’s bonnet”, and she would … I never ever found anyone not willing to do that.86 
 
                                                          
82 Taped interview with Edone Ann Logan, 18 March 2013, Juliasdale.  
83 In interview (18 March 2013) and in email correspondence with myself, 10 June 2014.  
84 African reserves were called “tribal trust lands” (TTLs) between 1967 and 1980 and “communal areas” (CAs) 
thereafter.  
85 Michael West (2002: 68ff.) argues that Homecraft became so popular with African women after 1950 
because, despite colonial efforts to keep Africans at the lowest level, many aspired to the limited kinds of 
“modern” middle-class lifestyles that were available to Africans at that time, and embraced bourgeois 
domesticity as a part of this goal.   
86 This and the previous quotes are from the taped interview with Logan, 18 March 2013, Juliasdale.  
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On Logan’s farm, club members were drawn from the wives of all permanent workers, as 
well as some young unmarried women. Single female seasonal workers seldom joined as they 
were too busy and, during peak cotton reaping season, membership of the club dropped as 
everyone was busy working.87 Other farming districts also had similar establishments, with 
some clubs on farms, some on mines and some in the small district towns, most run by 
“farmer’s wives”. The Jumbo WI (Mazowe), for example, ran at least three clubs,88 while in 
Ruwa, Molly Brown was recognised as the WI Woman of the Year in 1979 for her club, 
which had been running for 21 years.89 Other farming interlocutors report running Homecraft 
clubs in Norton and Bindura during the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, on the many farms where the 
“farmer’s wife” was a member of the WI, there was a strong possibility that the wives and 
daughters of permanent male farmworkers were members of a Homecraft club at some point 
during the colonial era.90    
 A number of authors have examined the Homecraft movement and its implications.91 
While some, such as Burke (1996), have focussed on its links to the increasing marketing and 
consumption of toiletries and other products associated with bourgeois domesticity, others 
have explored the political dynamics of the movement and its consequences. The movement, 
of course, became useful to the state in promoting first its idea of a “partnership” between the 
races during the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953–1963), and later the goals of 
the “Community Development” rural development strategy between 1962 and 1979 (Law 
2011; Ranchod-Nilsson 1992: 204).92 Thus, some authors see the Homecraft movement as a 
deliberate deployment of the ideology of domesticity to ensure European hegemony, maintain 
stability and preserve colonialism for as long as possible (see Law 2011: 470). Law (2011), 
however, critiques the notion that the movement should be understood in purely instrumental 
terms which reduce it to a tool in service of the British Empire. She maintains that different 
women had different – and dynamic – motivations and understandings of domesticity as they 
put themselves in the maternalistic role of teachers of their black counterparts.  
                                                          
87 Email correspondence with E.A. Logan, 10 June 2014.  
88 Jumbo WI 21st anniversary report (no author or date) entitled Jumbo Women’s Institute, December 1945–
1966. Private papers of E.A. Logan. 
89 See Shearer (1999: 134); WI “Woman of the Year” document. Private papers of E.A. Logan.   
90 Of course, as Hodder-Williams (1983: 199) points out, the many other middle-class voluntary organisations 
which burgeoned after World War Two, such as Lions Club and Round Table, as well as garden and sports 
clubs, sucked members away from the WI. Thus, even if most of the WI members in a district were involved in 
Homecraft, they by no means reached all the farms in that district.   
91 Burke (1996); Kaler (1999); Kirkwood (1984a); Law (2011); Ranchod-Nilsson (1992); West (2002). 
92 See Holderness (1985), Keatley (1963) and Loney (1975) for different perspectives on “partnership” and the 
Federation; and see Bratton (1978) and Mutizwa-Mangiza (1985) for analyses of Community Development.  
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 The same is true for the “farmers’ wives” who ran clubs on their farms. After World 
War Two, more and more women were recruited to work on farms as the country’s 
agricultural sector boomed and the male labour supply became inadequate (Barnes 1999: 37; 
Rutherford 1996: 88). Mrs D.C. Lilford, wife of the abovementioned disciplinarian and chair 
of the 1950 FWISR congress, stated in her speech that African women had become valued 
workers in industry and farming, but would need help because they were “totally unprepared” 
for entry into the “industrial age”. She argued that through Homecraft, the FWISR could 
make a valuable contribution “to help the African woman become a useful part of the social 
structure” (Kaler 1999: 286). The inadequate supply of male migrant workers also 
necessitated a new focus on stabilising and reproducing the workforce through attracting 
entire families to the farms and fostering a “modern” family and domestic life among them, 
with African women servicing the domestic needs of their husbands, producing children and 
(with these children) acting as a reserve army of labour (Grier 2006: 186; Rutherford 1996: 
88). It is therefore no surprise that the Homecraft clubs were present on farms, given that they 
fed directly into these aims. But, as Logan shows, individual white women did not 
necessarily see their activities in such instrumental terms, but saw themselves as maternalistic 
teachers whose duty was to share their domestic skills and knowledge with African women 
(Kaler 1999: 270). Logan, in fact argues that a “farmer’s wife” could not avoid being 
maternalistic because workers would constantly approach her with their problems: “Whether 
she liked being involved or not – she was involved! … [You] were involved very much in the 
health, you were involved, often, in domestic problems, and they would come to you as a 
mother, so you were a maternal [figure] ... well you had that image”.93       
 The Homecraft movement was badly affected by the war of liberation, which 
intensified after 1972. Not only were the African Nationalists and their guerrilla fighters 
unsurprisingly against such endeavours, making it unsafe for black women to participate, but 
often white women could no longer travel safely to club meetings. Furthermore, as Ranchod-
Nilsson (1992) argues, many of the clubs in the TTLs had the unintended outcome of 
bringing rural women to a political and gender consciousness which led them to participate in 
the struggle for liberation in various ways, setting them at odds with the ideological position 
of their white “teachers”. On white farms, white women became preoccupied with the safety 
of their own families and, often, the farm operations while their husbands were away on 
frequent army “call-ups”. Farms and farmworkers were particular targets of guerrilla attacks 
                                                          
93 Taped interview with E.A. Logan, 18 March 2013, Juliasdale.  
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on the highveld of Mashonaland and Manicaland (see Moorcraft and McLauglin 1982: 130), 
with districts in the north and east of the country seeing up to three-quarters of farms 
abandoned by their owners by the end of the war (Arnold 1980: 130). The movement thus 
petered out after 1975, only to be (partially) revived again after Zimbabwe’s independence.       
 
Farm Schools and Child Labour 
While Homecraft clubs and the domestication of African women could perhaps be viewed as 
a dispensable extra, maintaining access to the labour of children and adolescents was, for 
most farmers, an indispensable necessity. Providing some form of farm schooling for the 
children of African workers became a key tool in meeting this need. Many “farmer’s wives” 
were involved in running or supervising such schools in addition to their roles in healthcare 
or Homecraft. The link between settler agriculture, child labour and farm schools in southern 
Africa goes right back to 1658 and Dutch East India Company slave plantations at the Cape 
(see Levine 2013: 25). Farm schools in colonial Zimbabwe had additional precedents to draw 
on, notably English factory schools and Christian mission schools, where children worked for 
part of the day and spent the other part of the day in school, learning basic industrial skills 
along with their religious and moral instruction (see Burke 1996; McLaughlin 1996; Vambe 
1972, 1976). As the colonial political economy squeezed African families out of most forms 
of self-advancement by the 1920s, their young developed a strong “thirst for education” 
(Grier 2006: 177; West 2002: 36–67) in the hope of accessing what limited job opportunities 
were available to educated blacks. Before the 1950s, government policy on education for 
Africans largely sought to provide the bare minimum that would ensure that they were 
available to work as children and would be compliant as adults (Grier 2006: 194). There was, 
initially, a strong suspicion that too much education would be a bad thing and that “raw 
natives” made better labourers. African children and adolescents were faced with a “catch-
22” situation, argues Grier (2006: 194) in her important study of child labour in colonial 
Zimbabwe. They desperately wanted to escape the life of poorly paid unskilled manual labour 
that the state planned for them, but had to perform this kind of work at school to obtain even 
the basic education on offer.  
 White farmers, from the early 1920s, knew that even a poor-quality school could help 
them to attract and maintain the labour of African tenants and migrant workers. More than 
200 farm schools were established by the end of the decade, often with the assistance of 
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missionaries (ibid.: 174). Under the 1929 Native Development Act, farmers could get state 
support to pay teachers and build school infrastructure without having to provide much in the 
way of teaching: the main aim was the acquisition of family labour rather than education 
(ibid.: 189). Nevertheless, many farmers declined to register their schools so as to maintain 
absolute control over the children and their teachers. Large tea estates in the eastern 
highlands introduced, in 1925, another kind of school aimed at attracting adolescent workers 
who were favoured as tea pickers because they were easier to control than adults and their 
smaller hands were thought to be able to pluck the delicate leaves more carefully. These were 
the “Earn while you Learn” boarding schools which offered free primary (and later, 
secondary) education to African children in return for their half-time labour (ibid.: 174ff.). 
The real shift in emphasis and scale came after World War Two due to a combination of 
more progressive government policy (e.g. 1959 Native Education Bill which enforced 
registration and regulation of farm schools) and the desperate need to stabilise the farm 
labour force in the face of stiffer competition from industry and large-scale migration of 
Africans to urban centres. While some farmers still resisted registration and the authorities 
continued to express concern that there were “bogus” schools being run on tobacco farms to 
attract children for use in gang labour (ibid.: 193), many farmers realised that they had to 
provide better living conditions and amenities if they were to have a stable labour force.94 
Farm schools offering primary education thus became more common in the 1950s and 1960s.    
 Communist Party activist Doris Lessing was typically scathing of such attempts to 
improve conditions for farmworkers and the rhetoric of “partnership” during the Federation. 
On a visit to some tobacco farms in the mid-1950s, she provides a bleak picture which 
portrays these initiatives as little more than an attempt to paper over the squalor, paternalism 
and exploitation inherent within the sector (Lessing 1968: 149ff.). Grier (2006), however, 
argues that farmers faced a very real challenge in attracting labour and were forced to put 
some positive measures in place to retain workers and stop young men in particular from 
voting with their feet (ibid.: 187). She thus argues that the growth in farm schools represented 
an important shift in the way the state and white farmers viewed African children: from full-
time workers from an early age to seeing them as deserving of education alongside work 
(ibid.: 195). That farm schooling – which was largely sub-standard and seldom more than 
                                                          
94 The government was also increasingly encouraging farmers to improve living conditions for workers on their 
farms and to stabilise their workforce through building better family housing in a farm “village”, rather than a 
labour compound. The Ministry of Agriculture’s Technical Bulletin No. 17 (Du Toit 1977), for example, offers 
detailed guidelines to farmers on how to improve housing, sanitation and healthy farm “village” layout.  
76 
three years in duration – could genuinely play an important role in keeping workers on a farm 
is indicative of the limited options available to black workers in that era. But as Grier herself 
examines, many black youngsters ran away to towns and, later, to join the guerrilla fighters in 
their struggle for independence. Many were even inspired to join the war to escape what they 
saw as the hard labour, long hours, poor food and constant control they found themselves 
experiencing at their “Earn while you Learn” schools (see Bond-Stewart 1984: 5). 
Nevertheless, some reasonably good farm schools (albeit offering a second-class education) 
were built and supported by farmers such as Tom Dawson in the 1950s and 1960s, often with 
the assistance of the Anglican or Presbyterian church (see Perold 2002: 172). Such farmers 
also typically sponsored children with potential to obtain further education, although this 
tended to be in skills related to the farm’s requirements. As I will discuss in Chapter Four, ex-
farmworkers still identify strongly with these schools, and on some resettled farms, these 
have played a crucial role in assisting them to maintain ties to their homes, a sense of 
belonging and access to various resources, including education.  
 
Conclusion  
The colonial era saw the interplay between a number of different, dynamic factors, all of 
which influenced power relations and living and working conditions for workers on 
commercial farms. Perhaps most important was the changing political economy and the 
government’s adoption of policies which were highly favourable to settler farmers, not only 
in destroying their early competition by peasant farmers, but in ensuring that they could gain 
access to the cheap, pliant labour they required (see Clarke 1977). Furthermore, legislation 
such as the 1899 Masters and Servants Act and the administration’s fostering of “domestic 
government” (Rutherford 1996) gave farmers much paternalistic power over their workers 
under conditions which have often been described as semi-feudal. A second set of factors, 
however, influenced conditions, power and labour relations on white farms, including the 
farmers’ and their wives’ constructions of masculinity and femininity and their self-
consciously British middle-class ideologies and practices around violence, discipline, 
domesticity, hygiene, race and gender, and their particular attitudes towards their duty to 
spread “modernity” and “civilisation” to the workers. While deductive forms of power 
(violence, discipline) were present, they acted in combination with softer, more productive, 
forms of power which sought to attract workers and change their conduct more subtly. Thus, 
while a farmer such as D.C. Lilford emphasised uncompromising discipline and hinted at 
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violent consequences for transgressors, his wife was simultaneously inculcating domesticity 
into female workers through her Homecraft club. The combination of soft and hard power 
could also change over time, as in the case of Tom Dawson, who used to beat workers, but 
underwent a Christian conversion experience which made him adopt a much more benevolent 
attitude (see Hartnack 2006: 62).       
 However, despite the ethos of paternalistic care espoused by many farmers, their 
various welfare and edification attempts, and some improvement in conditions from the 
1950s (more schools, better housing and healthcare), labour relations and conditions could 
not escape the contradiction with which I opened this chapter, between the actual process of 
capitalist colonial exploitation and the settlers’ views of their own civility. The living and 
working conditions on farms continued to be generally very poor and a comprehensive study 
by Clarke (1977) showed that squalor, child malnutrition, low wages, lack of access to water 
and sanitation, exposure to dangerous chemicals and substances and lack of union 
representation, among other problems, were common on commercial farms. He pointed out 
that for farmworkers “the crisis of poverty is not a temporary one – like a recession, which 
may soon pass – but is of an enduring nature, a real ‘crisis of survival’”. Alluding to the fact 
that the industry itself was unlikely to reform itself, given the vested interests in maintaining 
the status quo, Clarke argued that “The ingredients of a realistic solution, if it is to be 
seriously sought, must then include a host of new policies – regarding wages, union 
recognition, educational provision, medical aid, housing, and social services to name a few 
areas” (ibid.: 11). This situation, which prevailed at the dawn of Zimbabwe’s independence, 
set the scene for the new policies which were expected to be introduced by the new state, and 
for attempts by international humanitarian agencies to address the many issues faced by 
workers on farms. The following chapter will examine both state and non-state action 
regarding farmworkers in the first two decades after independence, and particularly the role 
played by farmers and “farmers’ wives” in endeavours to improve conditions on white-owned 





























From Homo Technologicus Par Excellence to Personae Non Gratae: Modernity, Welfare 
and Trusteeship on White-owned Commercial Farms, 1980–2000 
 
Without their [the white population] “benevolent” intervention in the economy, we inherently, so it 
would appear, lack the knowledge, resources, technology, skills practices, imagination and willpower 
to make it on our own. Zimbabwe must be the only country in the world whose technical conditions 
for production have been defined in such a racist framework. (Bornwell Chakaodza, Sunday Mail, 15 
March 1992) 
 
Neoliberal capitalism, in its millennial moment, portends the death of politics by hiding its own 
ideological underpinnings in the dictates of economic efficiency: in the fetishism of the free market, 
in the inexorable, expanding “needs” of business, in the imperatives of science and technology. 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2001a: 31) 
 
Introduction: Compromises, Defensive Power and White Projects of Belonging 
Zimbabwean society at the dawn of independence in 1980 was profoundly impacted and 
traumatised by the fierce guerrilla war that had raged for much of the preceding decade.95 The 
birth of the new nation did not come about through an outright military victory by African 
nationalist forces, but rather through negotiations necessitated largely by the exhaustion of 
the warring parties (the minority government and the various guerrilla factions) and pressure 
for a pragmatic compromise applied on them by their respective regional allies, and the 
international community (Mtisi et al. 2009: 165).96 The nature of the settlement reached at the 
1979 Lancaster House conference was therefore determined by a range of political and 
economic forces which determined the nature of the compromise and necessitated the policy 
                                                          
95 See Alexander et al. (2000), Bhebe and Ranger (1995, 1996), CCJP (1999), Godwin and Hancock (1993), 
Grundy and Miller (1979), Kriger (1992), Lan (1985), McLaughlin (1996), Moorcroft and McLaughlin (1982), 
Mtisi et al. (2009), Ranger (1985) and Sachikonye (2011). 
96 Mounting international and military pressure forced Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front government to negotiate an 
“internal settlement” with some of the more moderate African nationalist factions in 1978. The subsequent April 
1979 elections, won by Abel Muzorewa, were meant to legitimise a process Smith hoped would be acceptable to 
the international community. The war, however, continued as the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) 
and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), under the umbrella of the Patriotic Front, did not recognise the 
settlement or what they regarded as a puppet government. The international community thus pushed for fresh, 
and truly inclusive, negotiations between all the warring parties. These took place at the 1979 Lancaster House 
Conference in London (see Mtisi et al. 2009: 162–5).  
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of reconciliation announced by Robert Mugabe in 1980 (Raftopoulos 2004: x).97 Thus, while 
the main African nationalist factions, under the umbrella of the Patriotic Front, had always 
demanded a radical political and economic redistribution of power and resources away from 
the white settlers, the Lancaster House constitution forced them to adopt a less radical policy. 
Twenty out of the 100 Parliamentary seats, for example, were reserved for members of the 
white minority for at least seven years, while the new state was to pay pensions to all 
Rhodesian civil servants, even if they had left the country (Mtisi et al. 2009: 165).  
 It was the “Land Clause” of the proposed Bill of Rights which proved to be a major 
point of conflict, however (ibid.; Selby 2006: 111). This clause protected white-owned 
farmland against compulsory acquisition without compensation for a decade, enshrining the 
willing-buyer–willing-seller principle as the method by which the new state would have to 
embark on the important task of addressing the skewed land-ownership patterns and the 
desire for land restitution by the black majority. The Rhodesian National Farmers Union 
(RNFU) went so far as to send delegates to London during the conference to ensure that the 
interests of white farmers would not be forgotten amidst the political bargaining (Selby 2006: 
111–12).98 The Patriotic Front was not happy to accept the clause, but was forced to do so 
under pressure from its regional allies (Zambia, Mozambique), and with vague promises that 
Britain and America would assist the state to purchase land for resettlement (Mtisi et al. 
2009; Selby 2006). The Lancaster House constitution therefore effectively allowed white 
settler capital a decade-long period of consolidation, during which the radical redress of 
colonial inequalities was suspended (Raftopoulos 2004: x; Stoneman 1981a: 4–6).  
 Nevertheless, when Mugabe’s faction of the Patriotic Front (known as the Zimbabwe 
African National Union – Patriotic Front or ZANU-PF) won the 1980 elections, “there was 
immediate and widespread concern in the farming community” due to Mugabe’s previous 
radical statements on land and about white Rhodesians (Pilossof 2012: 26).99 The new Prime 
                                                          
97 At independence, Robert Mugabe became the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe. He became the Executive 
President after the 1987 Unity Accord between ZANU-PF and Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU.  
98 In fact, Selby (2006: 112) argues that many aspects of the “Land Clause” in the final constitution, including 
the willing-buyer–willing-seller principle, were directly influenced by the slick behind-the-scenes negotiation 
strategies of the RNFU, and based on the position paper (favouring the interests of white farmers) they were 
asked to submit.        
99 Other members of the white community and white interest groups were also very concerned about ZANU-
PF’s victory because they saw it as an extremist Marxist-Leninist terrorist organisation, an image heightened by 
Rhodesian government propaganda and the actions and rhetoric of the Patriotic Front during the war. Christians, 
including members of the Roman Catholic Church (of which Robert Mugabe was a member), for example, were 
concerned that a ZANU-PF victory would lead to a Marxist society in which religion would be banned (see 
Randolph 1985: 71; Spring 1986: 16–17). Many whites consequently left the country after 1980 fearing that 
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Minister, however, assuaged their fears, firstly with his now often-quoted magnanimous 
reconciliation speech at independence (see Raftopolous 2009: x–xi), and secondly with his 
personal visits to address white farmers’ associations in many commercial farming districts in 
the early 1980s, and his speech at the 1980 CFU annual congress (see Pilossof 2012: 84–5). 
Many of the white farmers I interviewed told me of how charming, impressive and persuasive 
Mugabe was at these meetings and how they were convinced to remain and farm, based on 
these personal appeals. One recounted that Mugabe told farmers in Odzi to ignore his public 
pronouncements on land and rest assured that he would guarantee their security, saying, “Do 
not be afraid of what I say, but rather judge your position by my actions”.100 The third factor 
which convinced farmers that there was a future for them was just such an action: the 
appointment of Denis Norman, a white farmer and the recent President of the RNFU, as the 
country’s first Minister of Agriculture (Selby 2006: 114).  
 While the constitution bound the new government to respect property rights and avoid 
expropriation of white farmland, the other gestures – personally convincing farmers to stay, 
and appointing a white farmer-politician to the Cabinet – were voluntary, and represent the 
pragmatic acknowledgement by ZANU-PF of the farmers’ valuable skills and the importance 
of the commercial farming sector to the economy and food security. At independence, 
agriculture was the second largest sector of the economy, accounting for 12.4 per cent of the 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Stoneman and Davies 1981: 97).101 The sector 
was also the largest employer (34% of the workforce), although its workers were the most 
poorly paid (ibid.: 100). While they were far outnumbered by peasant farmers, commercial 
farmers produced 79.48 per cent of gross agricultural output (including almost all of the 
country’s export crops such as tobacco, tea, coffee and sugar) and their output per hectare (in 
monetary terms) was almost four times that of the peasant-farming sector (Herbst 1990: 37–
9).102 Although the government talked in terms of constructing a new society using the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
there was no future for them in independent Zimbabwe. Indeed, the white population dropped from 250,000 in 
1978 to 100,000 by 1985 (Selby 2006: 117).   
100 Interview with John and Sue Davies, Harare, 28 March 2014. Compare with Bond and Manyanya’s 
observation of this pattern of anti-business rhetoric being followed up with pro-business policies (2002: 27). 
101 Manufacturing was the largest sector (24.8% of the GDP) while mining and quarrying only accounted for 7.9 
per cent of the GDP (ibid.). 
102 This was despite the war and the large reduction in tobacco production due to international sanctions. 
Economic and trade sanctions were placed on Rhodesia by many Western countries following the Smith 
government’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. Generous state support for white 
commercial farmers (subsidies, marketing and inputs) during the war played an important role in the dominance 
of white agriculture over the peasant sector (Shopo 1987: 201ff.), but these subsidies masked the fact that by 
1978, 40 per cent of white farms were technically insolvent, due to the impact of the war and sanctions 
(Stoneman 1981b: 137). 
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principles of “Zimbabwean socialism” (Randolph 1985: 70) or “scientific socialism” (Kader 
1985), realpolitik and a sense of risk aversion trumped ideology from the outset (see Herbst 
1990: 56). Thus, the ZANU-PF 1980 election manifesto stated that “while a socialist 
transformation process will be brought underway in many areas of the existing economic 
sectors, it is recognised that private enterprise will have to continue until circumstances are 
ripe for socialist change … the role of technical skills and the need to develop them will be 
fully recognised” (in Randolph 1985: 71). Similarly, in August 1980, the new Prime Minister 
told an interviewer: “We cannot ignore the reality of individualism which we have inherited 
… we cannot ignore the reality of private enterprise … by seizing private property … we 
can’t do that without ruining the socio-economic base on which we want to found our 
society” (ibid.: 73). In 1980, the state therefore made something of a Faustian bargain with 
capital and white commercial farmers in particular, allowing the system of “domestic 
government” (Rutherford 2001) to be maintained to a large extent. However, it is important 
to note the temporary nature of this bargain, as envisaged in the 1980 ZANU-PF election 
manifesto.103     
 Commercial farmers, who continued to be very well organised through their main 
representative, the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU – formerly RNFU), while embracing 
their unexpected position as economic “royal game” (Selby 2006: 74–5), were aware that this 
position would have to be constantly reaffirmed and secured, relying, above all, on their not 
openly challenging the power of the state.104 In Chapter One, I discussed how white farmers 
after independence were no longer close to the centre of political power and their position 
was made all the more awkward by their historical closeness to the colonial regime and the 
fact that the new power-holders were sworn enemies of that regime (cf. Von Blanckenburg 
1994: 115). Consequently, the CFU quickly tried to distance itself from politics, become 
“apolitical” and practice “affirmative parochialism” (Pilossof 2012: 70) as a method by which 
to ensure the continuation of the white commercial-farming sector. The economic and social 
                                                          
103 Official government policy on land and agriculture also adopted a pragmatic approach, seeking on one hand 
to prioritise the “transformation of the land system and redistribution of land” (Zimbabwe, 1981: 6) and on the 
other to promote a number of production systems including communal farming and cooperatives, private, family 
and corporate farms and state farms. Land rights were to be “entrusted” to “private individuals or groups of 
individuals for as long as such trusteeship best serves the national interest” (ibid.: 4, emphasis added). Policy 
also sought to increase land and labour productivity, increase agricultural employment, achieve national and 
regional food security and self-sufficiency and “extend the role of agriculture as a major foreign exchange 
earner and source of inputs to local industry” (ibid.). The latter goal, in particular, favoured the existing white 
commercial farming system (see also Zimbabwe, 1982).      
104 It is interesting that (some) farmers chose to refer to themselves as “royal game”, for the metaphor invokes 
not only protection, but also the sole right of the sovereign to hunt and kill such game without notice. At least in 
hindsight, many of my farmer-interlocutors appear to be aware of this irony.   
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power which these elites continued to hold had to be deployed in “defensive” ways (Salverda 
2010) as far as was possible. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that “The power the farmers 
exercised was not so much in direct lobbying as in contributing to an atmosphere of [state] 
risk-aversion by stressing the importance of commercial agriculture” (Herbst 1990: 56). 
Rather than aggressively fighting for their place, they tried to “affect the ‘atmospherics’ of 
the land debate by stressing the dangers of drastic change, by giving wide circulation to 
reports that argued against quick resettlement, and by highlighting the importance of White 
commercial farming to Zimbabwe” (ibid.).105  
 The state’s acceptance of commercial farmers and the commercial farming system as 
indispensable assets enabled white farmers – over time – to deploy defensive strategies aimed 
at depoliticising their history, their position as major landowners and capitalist elites and, at 
the same time, emphasising their role as skilled modern producers, major employers, feeders 
of the nation, earners of foreign currency and contributors to the GDP. They came to see 
themselves, and promote themselves, as what one commentator described (sarcastically) as 
“Homo Technologicus Par Excellence” (Chakaodza 1992). This strategy, I argue, thus 
involved the “rendering technical” (Li 2007) of their role and structural position, a strategy 
through which white farmers sought to remove political questions, such as their control of 
prime farmland, from the equation and put themselves forward as the technical answer to 
Zimbabwe’s economic questions. This endeavour (which was always a work in progress) was 
a key way in which white farmers after 1980 sought to belong, both in terms of remaining on 
their land, and also in terms of how they viewed their role and place in independent 
Zimbabwe. In a 1991 survey of 52 white farmers,106 65 per cent of respondents felt that they 
were fully integrated into Zimbabwean society, citing their important contribution to the 
economy as the reason they should be acknowledged as members of society and be allowed 
to safeguard their own interests (Von Blanckenburg 1994: 115). In a follow-up survey 
(1993), many farmers felt that they “could best strengthen their position by an improved 
viability of the farms and that generation of more employment and higher food and export 
production would help” (ibid.: 117). Thus, for many, their sense of belonging in Zimbabwe 
                                                          
105 For example, in the CFU’s 1991 land-reform proposals, which were made in response to the Land 
Acquisition Bill then being debated, stress was laid on the importance of commercial agricultural and of not 
undermining the status quo. In his Foreword, CFU President Alan Burl opened by stating: “The magnitude of 
the part played by agriculture in the national economy, for the benefit of all Zimbabwe’s people, is such that the 
nation, as it embarks upon new land policies, cannot afford to get the answers wrong, if Zimbabwe wishes to be 
a recognised and meaningful participant in the 21st Century” (CFU 1991: 1).   
106 The survey, carried out under the auspices of the Department of Agricultural Economics and Extension at the 
University of Zimbabwe, was of farmers in four areas of the country, namely Wedza, Glendale, Masvingo East 
and Marula.  
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relied on them becoming ever more efficient in their role as modernising, capitalist producers 
and developers of the rural economy and infrastructure.  
 Even 15 years after the commencement of the FTLRP, all the (former) farmers I 
interviewed felt strongly about their contribution to independent Zimbabwe, and the place 
they felt this earned them. Andrew Smyth, for example, stated that he “had the honour of 
developing a piece of virgin land, with my wife, into the biggest apple farm in the country”. 
Formerly closely involved with wage negotiations between the CFU, the unions and the 
government, he described the idea that commercial farming was inherently exploitative as 
“absolute rubbish”, stressing the fact that commercial farming provided a livelihood to 
thousands of workers.107 Other farmers – similarly unconcerned with the historical processes 
which allowed them access to large landholdings and cheap labour – also stressed their role 
as employers and producers, justifying their ownership of land in terms similar to those used 
by Robert Foster: “I had 1,000 hectares of land, but I made up for 4,000 people in 
Chitungwiza [a working-class satellite town of Harare] who had no land with the agricultural 
surplus I produced. We can’t all be farmers”.108 Others stressed their role in helping black 
communal farmers in various ways,109 serving on Rural District Council (RDC) 
committees,110 or contributing at a high level to the development of a modern agricultural 
sector (see Tracey 2009). Such discourses have been critiqued for ignoring structural 
inequalities, exploitative labour conditions and the racially skewed land-ownership patterns 
(see Pilossof 2012), but regardless of such contradictions (which some of my interlocutors 
freely acknowledged), they show clearly how the project of modernising the rural areas 
allowed white farmers to carve out a space for themselves in independent Zimbabwe. Indeed, 
while Pilossof suggests that such forms of belonging were “unbearable”111 and other authors 
(Alexander 2004; Hughes 2010) argue that whites struggled to “belong”, my interlocutors 
demonstrate a remarkable confidence about their role and place in Zimbabwe before 2000.        
 But technical prowess, industrial-scale production and economic value alone were 
neither enough to sustain this sense of belonging nor enough to depoliticise the position of 
white farmers. Trusteeship and farm-welfare initiatives – building on the older 
paternalistic/maternalistic Rhodesian-era endeavours but now incorporated into the (white 
farmers’) technical project of agrarian modernity – therefore also became increasingly 
                                                          
107 Taped interview with Andrew Smyth, Harare, 6 June 2013.  
108 Interview with Robert Foster, Harare, 7 July 2013.  
109 Taped interview with Bruce and Megan Jones, Harare, 28 February 2013.   
110 Taped interview with Adam Hills, Harare, 11 June 2012.  
111 The title of his 2012 book is The Unbearable Whiteness of Being: Farmers’ Voices from Zimbabwe.  
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important to such attempts to belong and in rendering technical the role of white farmers in 
Zimbabwe. These endeavours played a dual role since at the same time as they allowed 
farmers another means by which to deploy their power defensively at the national level, they 
also allowed farmers and their wives to exercise various forms of “soft” or productive power 
in the control and management of labour at farm level in an era where labour control through 
violence was no longer officially permissible. Thus, as set out in Chapter One, the balance 
between Foucault’s unstable and dynamic “triangle” (Moore 2005: 7) of powers – 
government, sovereignty and discipline – shifted after 1980 away from an emphasis on the 
more deductive elements of discipline and sovereignty to one in which productive 
governmental and biopolitical techniques were used to “conduct the conduct” (Oksala 2013: 
324) of farmworkers, especially with the advent of farm-welfare NGOs.    
 In the remainder of this chapter, I explore the dynamics of these welfare and 
“improvement” projects for farmworkers on commercial farms on the Zimbabwean highveld 
in the 1980s and 1990s. I first examine how farm-welfare endeavours came to play an 
important role in establishing the place of white farmers and “farmers’ wives” in independent 
Zimbabwe, and then proceed to discuss the role played by NGOs and other globalised 
purveyors of “transnational governmentality” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 989) and how these 
both became imbricated in and influenced or built on older forms of farm-welfare discourse 
and practice. I will also show, through this discussion, how farms in the era of independence 
became globalised zones in which several modes of sovereignty were entangled and 
competed in a single site (Moore 2005: 7). The entrenched sovereignty of the farmer 
(domestic government) competed with the sovereignty of the state and with new forms of 
governmentality brought in by local and transnational NGOs in particular, but also 
increasingly by multinational corporations through new globalised regulations set up to 
police producers in the developing world. Such forms of transnational governmentality 
increasingly bypassed the state, I argue, with implications for how the state viewed white 
farmers and farmworkers.   
 
Trusteeship, Farm Welfare and White Farmers in Independent Zimbabwe 
In Chapter One, I briefly summarise Hughes’ argument (2010) about white farmers and their 
unsuccessful efforts to “belong” in independent Zimbabwe. He argues that white 
Zimbabweans’ loss of political power in 1980, rather than leading them to engage with black 
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Zimbabweans and genuinely participate in the new nation, led them instead to “bond with 
African nature” and practice environmental escapism (2010: xv). Although Hughes’ 
argument is compelling in some ways, it nevertheless ignores other important ways in which 
white farmers sought to claim a place in Zimbabwe after 1980. What is missing is any sense 
that rural (and other) whites might adopt a dynamic combination of strategies aimed at 
finding a sense of belonging in the new nation in which this was no longer clear-cut. Rather 
than being static, or mutually exclusive, such strategies could combine and change over time 
and their combination depended on factors such as gender, generation, political outlook, 
socio-economic position or geographical location. Thus, within one family, let alone one 
farming district, different members would engage in varying strategies to secure their sense 
of being “at home” in Zimbabwe. For some, escape into the landscape and activities focussed 
on the wilderness (hunting, fishing, game viewing, painting) would certainly have 
predominated. But for others, enjoyment of such things would have been combined with 
different activities which were more engaged with other aspects of the nation and its 
economic and social issues, as well as with different kinds of Zimbabweans they met in the 
process.112  
 Most engagement for white farmers and their wives, however, took place in the 
course of participating in the two major ways in which many attempted to find a sense of 
belonging: modernising agricultural production and projects of trusteeship. Despite the state’s 
rhetoric against paternalism, and some policy interventions aimed at undermining it (such as 
the scrapping of the Masters and Servants Act and the introduction of the minimum wage in 
1980) the project of white-farmer paternalistic/maternalistic trusteeship over farmworkers 
was enabled by the state’s tacit support for the continuation of the system of domestic 
government on private farmland. Although the health and welfare of farmworkers had been 
singled out as a particular issue in ZANU-PF’s 1980 election manifesto (Herbst 1990: 183), 
the state saw the development and welfare needs of people living in the former reserves (now 
called communal areas) as more pressing, especially since these areas had been its major 
support-base during the war (ibid.: 184). Furthermore, it tended to regard the welfare of 
farmworkers as the duty of their employers and the Rural Councils under which commercial 
farms fell, and it was also much easier, logistically and politically, to implement welfare 
                                                          
112 Since the year 2000, there has been growing debate about white Zimbabweans and the ways in which they 
did or did not manage to engage with black Zimbabweans, integrate into and “belong” in Zimbabwean society 
after 1980 (see Alexander 2004; Fisher 2010; Hammar 2012; Hartnack 2014; Hughes 2010; Kalaora 2011; 
Pilossof 2012; Wylie 2012).     
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services in communal areas (ibid.).113 Rutherford (2001a: 3–4) argues that most policy-
makers, development experts and academics before and after 1980 imagined Zimbabwe’s 
rural areas as a dualistic space consisting of “modern” white commercial farms and 
“traditional”/backward/underdeveloped communal areas, with the latter in need of 
development. He contends that the state designed its development interventions based on this 
“entrenched official imagination” where farmworkers, being neither peasant farmers nor 
white commercial farmers, occupied a liminal position and were thus marginalised from state 
development policies and programmes (ibid.).114 
 The period 1980–1983 therefore saw a paradoxical situation in which farmworkers 
benefitted from some dramatic changes in their working conditions (introduction of minimum 
wages, better employment security, benefits such as gratuities, holiday and sick leave, and 
workers committees – Loewenson 1992: 64; Rutherford 2001c: 197–8)115 while at the same 
time their specific developmental and welfare needs were ignored by the new government. 
However, studies on the health status of farmworkers (e.g. Chikanza et al.: 1981), which 
indicated that their situation was not improving, prompted the government to take a more 
proactive role by 1983 in pressuring Rural Councils and individual farmers to do more to 
meet the health needs of their employees (Herbst 1990: 185). Unfortunately, such pressure 
from provincial health officials was met by resistance, especially from the stronger Rural 
                                                          
113 Zimbabwe inherited a dual structure of rural local government from Rhodesia (Herbst 1990: 181–2). The 
former “native” reserves were administered by Native Councils, which were headed by white Native 
Commissioners (under whom fell “traditional” authorities such as chiefs and village heads). White commercial 
farming areas were served by Rural Councils, which grew out of the road councils that, since the 1920s, had 
overseen the building and maintenance of infrastructure in white farming areas (ibid.). After 1980, District 
Councils served the communal areas, and were run by representatives elected by the local population. By 
contrast, Rural Councils continued to be run by councillors who were elected by land-owning commercial 
farmers only. Farmworkers had no vote and consequently no say in how the Rural Councils were run, or what 
issues they addressed, despite far outnumbering white farmers in commercial farming areas (ibid.; see also 
Bratton 1978; Hammar 2003; Mutizwa-Mangiza 1985; and Rutherford 1996 for more detail on the history and 
dynamics of local government and rural administration in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe).          
114 For detailed discussion and analysis of the Zimbabwean state’s development approach and praxis in the 
1980s see Alexander (1994, 2006); Auret (1990); Bond and Manyanya (2002); Dansereau (2005); Dashwood 
(2000); Davies (2004); Drinkwater (1991); Herbst (1990); Masters (1994); Moore (2005); Raftopoulos and 
Sachikonye (2001); Werbner (1999); Worby (1998).  
115 Post-independence labour relations continued to be determined by the colonial-era Industrial Conciliation 
Act (of 1934 – amended 1959), but were partially amended with the introduction of the Employment Act and 
the Minimum Wage Act (both of 1980). In 1985, the comprehensive Labour Relations Act was introduced, 
repealing the Industrial Conciliation Act and bringing together the provisions of the Minimum Wage and 
Employment Acts (see Ncube 2000: 187). In the agricultural sector, Statutory Instrument 300 of 1983 
determined Agricultural Industry Employment Regulations, but was amended many times subsequently (S.I. 
No. 653 of 1983, S.I. No. 675 of 1983, S.I. No. 15 of 1985, S.I. No. 30 of 1988, S.I. No. 224 of 1989 and S.I. 
No. 160 of 1991). In 1993, the comprehensive Collective Bargaining Agreement: Agricultural Industry was 
introduced, under the Labour Relations Act. This agreement covered a wide range of issues, including wage 
grades, allowances, working allowances, leave, sickness benefits, contracts, protective clothing, termination of 
employment, etc.   
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Councils in the Mashonaland provinces, where most farm labour resided (ibid.: 186). 
Partially as a result of such resistance to its development mission, the state began a long-term 
initiative to change the structure of local government, a project which finally came to fruition 
with the amalgamation of the two structures into Rural District Councils (RDCs) in 1993.116 
Despite its concern, however, the government stopped short of legislating or enforcing 
standards which would have required farmers to provide satisfactory living conditions and 
social services for farmworkers, effectively leaving such matters up to the discretion of each 
farm owner (Loewenson 1992: 71).   
 White farmers could thus continue to embellish a narrative of trusteeship which 
emphasised worker edification. Except that this role now took on heightened importance and 
became increasingly part of a more “modern” corporate farming system than during the era of 
family farming. The incorporation of farming enterprises and the move away from family 
farming had begun during the UDI period, with the production of sugar, tea, maize, cotton 
and forestry products being dominated by transnational corporations by 1980 (Shopo 1987: 
198). After independence, individual farm-owners also increasingly changed their ownership 
status or bought farms in a company name in order to benefit from special allowances which 
had been introduced when the tax laws were amended.117 As discussed in Chapter One, 
“revamped domestic government” after 1980 saw a move away from the “violence and 
mealie meal” labour management of the colonial era, to more “scientific” labour management 
techniques in which access to credit was used to attract labourers, while “inflated 
surveillance” by an increasingly bureaucratised middle management was a crucial tool of 
control (Rutherford 2001a: 112). Provision of incentives, including better housing and 
welfare facilities, also became an important method by which farmers attracted and stabilised 
their (permanent) labour forces, and workers finally had the ability to take up their issues 
with government officials such as industrial relations officers (Rutherford 2001c: 197–8). As 
former farmer Kevin Munro put it: “Prior to independence, if you wanted to fire somebody 
you could, and you did. After independence, it wasn’t that easy, so you actually had to make 
sure that you had some way of communicating and motivating people, so that they wanted to 
                                                          
116 The Rural District Councils Act was passed in 1988, but it was not until 1993 that the first Rural District 
Council (RDC) elections were held (Hammar 2003: 137–8).  
117 Interview with Robert Foster, Harare, 7 July 2013. See Du Toit (1993) for an important discussion of the 
dynamics of similar changes in the structure of agriculture – from old-style paternalism to “scientific labour 
management” – on South African wine and fruit farms.    
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work for you”.118 Within this “revamped” domestic government, “farmers’ wives” continued 
to play the major role in worker-welfare issues, although many also helped their husbands 
with other crucial aspects of running the business, such as book-keeping, organising salaries 
or the farm store.  
 Since there is a wide literature on how poor conditions on many commercial farms 
continued to be in the 1980s and, to a lesser extent, the 1990s119 it is important to distinguish 
between white farmers’ narratives of themselves as good employers and providers of welfare, 
and the actual conditions on their farms. For many farmers and their wives, placing 
themselves as trustees over “their” workers “provided a normative framework, often implicit, 
justifying their presence and allowing them to take their privileges and relative comfort for 
granted”, as Gartrell (1984: 167) observed in the context of colonial officials. Adopting the 
role of the trustee also served to reinforce the hierarchy between the “trustees” and the 
“deficient” farmworkers, who remained in a state of permanent tutelage (Li 2007: 14). The 
trope of care and provision therefore reinforced white farmers’ perceptions of themselves as 
important contributors to the nation, rather than exploitative elites. Doug and Fiona Pierce, 
for example, owned a tobacco farm near Bindura, and had done much to improve the 
conditions under which workers on their farm lived and worked. They provided brick housing 
with electricity for the 70 permanent workers, plots of land to grow food, a preschool, a 
women’s club, and they paid for health workers and for the primary-school education of the 
workers’ children. Fiona was actively involved in all the various farm NGO initiatives in the 
1990s and was mentioned by NGO officials I interviewed as an example of a “farmer’s wife” 
who had done much for the workers.120 Reflecting on her life on the farm, she told me the 
following: “I’m not ashamed of … you know we had horses, we’d go to the shows and we 
had our own lifestyle but we put everything we could back, so I could quite happily ride past 
                                                          
118 Taped interview with Kevin Munro, Harare, 16 July 2013. Note also how his statement indicates the ways in 
which commercial farmers were being made more accountable to the state and wider laws of the land.   
119 For example, Amanor-Wilks (1995, 1996), Bourdillon et al. (1996), Chadya and Mayavo (2002), Chikanza et 
al. (1981), Loewenson (1992), McIvor (1995), Mugwetsi and Balleis (1994), Rutherford (2001a, 2001c), 
Sachikonye and Zishiri (1999), Tandon (2001), GAPWUZ (1997). 
120 In Doug and Fiona’s personal papers, they showed me much documentation to support claims that they were 
exceptionally engaged, active and caring farmers, in terms of worker-welfare. These included letters of thanks 
and encouragement from the SCF FHW programme (1996, 1997), the Silveira House Farm Workers’ Nutrition 
Improvement Programme (1997), the CFU AIDS Programme (1997), invitation letters to a field day hosted at 
their farm and letters of thanks for the day from the National Employment Council for the Agricultural Industry 
(1998), a letter from the Principal of Mupfurudzi School acknowledging receipt of school fees for 62 children 
(2000), a FOST orphan register, and an article in Zimbabwe Tobacco (1997) calling their farm a “model for 
farm community development”.         
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people working in the fields, doing their, their piecework and not feel that I was taking 
advantage”.121   
 But their relations with farmworkers had a more important, and more public, role in 
constituting white farmers’ identity and claims to belong. In Chapter Two, I introduced 
Stoler’s (1997) concept of “external” and “interior frontiers”: population groups in 
colonial/postcolonial contexts against whom the colonists come to define themselves. 
Drawing on Stoler (1997), Rutherford (2004b: 546) suggests that black farmworkers have 
“marked such an interior frontier for the public identity of white farmers/settlers, reinforcing 
and disrupting the more powerful and pervasive social divide between European and African 
in colonial and postcolonial Zimbabwe”. For white farmers, the interior frontier role that was 
played by farmworkers produced a sense of trusteeship and “care”, something they drew on 
and emphasised especially at times when their identity as settlers, racists or exploitative 
abusers was foregrounded, as it increasingly was by the 1990s (ibid.: 552–4). In other words, 
at such times, white farmers used narratives about their care for and close relationship with 
“their” workers as an instrument with which to deflect accusations that they were settlers who 
did not properly belong in Zimbabwe.       
 An interesting example of the need for white farmers (or at least their representatives) 
both to preserve their sense of trusteeship and gain public mileage from their endeavours for 
workers is provided by the Farm Woman of the Year Award, which was introduced by the 
CFU-linked publication, The Farmer magazine, in 1992.122 When Felicity Wood became the 
editor of The Farmer in 1991, she had the idea of setting up an annual competition which 
would also lead to a good front cover and story for the magazine. After her initial idea for a 
farmworker of the year award was turned down by the editorial board, she suggested the 
Farm Woman of the Year Award. “When I thought of this award, I was thinking of the many 
black women on farms who did so much as farm health workers. I thought it would be given 
to one of them”, she told me.123 The board agreed to the award, but instead of nominating a 
woman from the farmworker community, nominated a white “farmer’s wife”. The first award 
was given to Kerry Kay for her work running the CFU AIDS programme and in subsequent 
years the selection committee (chaired by a white “farmer’s wife”) again chose white women. 
Wood’s original idea, to recognise the role primarily of black farmworkers, had quickly been 
                                                          
121 Taped interview with Doug and Fiona Pierce, Harare, 31 March 2014.  
122 See Pilossof (2012) for a comprehensive and illuminating analysis of The Farmer and its history and role.  
123 Interview with Felicity Wood, Harare, 1 June 2012.  
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co-opted as a public celebration of white achievement and philanthropy. “It was my fault”, 
says Wood, “My perception of what they would do was incorrect!”124  
 Although it is perhaps understandable that white “farmers’ wives” would want 
recognition for their role, given that their men had been so prominently positioned and their 
achievements so boldly lauded, this incident also precisely illustrates why Rutherford’s 
application of Stoler’s “interior frontier” is apt. The suggestion that black farm health 
workers should be given a prominent award by The Farmer (and thus by the CFU) ahead of 
white “farmers’ wives” was an anathema to the CFU and its selection committee precisely 
because to do so would be to close the gap between “trustee” and “deficient subject” (Li 
2007: 14) in a way that would not only hide the role of the trustee from public view, but more 
importantly threaten to make this role redundant. Since the role of trustee was so important to 
how white farmers and their wives came to define themselves, and constitute their public 
identity, Wood’s suggestion would likely have been too much of a threat, especially in the 
1990s, as more pressure was being put on white farmers over the issue of land reform.          
 Although the trope of care and provision for farmworkers needs to be problematised, 
this should not obscure the fact that many farmers and their wives (drawing on traditions of 
“edification” described in the previous chapter) did genuinely try to improve living and 
working conditions on their farms after 1980, especially as commercial agriculture enjoyed a 
resurgence after the war (Pilossof 2012: 27).125 My interviews with (former) farmers and their 
wives (from 23 different farms located mainly on the highveld) indicate that there were a 
range of attitudes and levels of participation in welfare attempts after independence. For 
example, some of the more active women, who ran women’s clubs, AIDS programmes, 
preschools, orphan programmes and clinics on their farms, and hosted field days with farm 
NGOs, conceded that in their respective districts, they and a few others were the most active, 
while others were much less involved, mainly due to having other commitments and lack of 
interest in organised forms of welfare. According to several farmworker NGO activists I 
                                                          
124 Although The Farmer was technically independent of the CFU after 1980, being published by the Modern 
Farming Publications Trust, the CFU still maintained a great deal of influence over the publication (Pilossof 
2012: 75–6). Indeed, every serving president and director of the CFU was automatically appointed to the MFP 
Trust’s Board of Trustees. As Pilossof (ibid.: 76) concludes, The Farmer “was not an independent magazine 
with a mandate to publish what it liked. It was essentially controlled and manipulated by the CFU”.     
125 In addition, it should not be forgotten that white farmers and their wives were also often involved in 
charitable works not directly connected to their farms but rather to churches or philanthropic organisations such 
as the Soroptomists, or the Lyons Club or Rotary Club. For example, the Melfort Farm Project, set up in 1979 to 
assist destitute, disabled and elderly black Zimbabweans (many of them former farmworkers), was initiated by 
the Catholic Church but drew in many farmers and their wives from that district to serve on the committee and 
source support from organisations to which they were connected (Interview with April Piercey, Melfort, 26 
March 2014. See also Shearer 1999: 151).  
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interviewed, it was often a younger generation of white women – in their 20s and 30s in the 
1980s and often with tertiary education – who played a leading role in farm-welfare 
endeavours. However, even for those farmers and their wives who may not have been 
naturally inclined to champion farm welfare, a combination of overlapping factors pushed 
many to become more involved or concerned with worker-welfare during the last decade of 
the century. These factors included economic liberalisation, the growing HIV/AIDS crisis, 
increasing tensions around land reform, the move to export crops and associated global 
standard requirements and the rise of farm-welfare NGOs.      
 Yet my interviews show that even farmers who did not become active in the broader 
welfare campaigns led by the CFU or NGOs also commonly implemented improvements in 
living and working conditions and ran welfare programmes. The following conversation with 
former tobacco farmers David and Norma Frost126 illustrates this point: 
 
AH: Would you say the period after independence of stability allowed you to do well enough to then 
invest in these “extras”?127  
DF: Absolutely!  
NF: Ja, definitely.  
AH: But you never had any NGOs or something coming and helping out with things … it was all sort 
of your own initiative?  
DF: Ja.  
NF: We didn’t really want anybody else because then … 
DF: We were quite happy to do it. We didn’t want … we didn’t need interference or help from 
anybody else because when you start getting help then you start getting … 
NF: Problems! Interference! And if the system is running as it was, you didn’t want that.  
DF: And I thought it ran pretty well. I think the proof of the setup was the stability of the labour 
force.     
 
Farmers such as the Frosts, then, tried to maintain their sovereignty and the primacy of their 
domestic government after independence, preferring not to engage with NGOs who might 
                                                          
126 Recorded Interview with David and Norma Frost, Harare 19 March 2014.  
127 The Frosts implemented improvements and welfare endeavours on their farm after 1980, including brick 
housing with electricity, a crèche, a health worker, a primary school, a retirement village for farmworkers and a 
sponsored soccer team.  
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“interfere” with the way they ran the farm. Welfare endeavours, however, still became an 
important aspect of labour stabilisation and management for them, as well as an important 
part of their private and public identification as “good” white farmers. The Frosts, now in 
their early 80s, are an example of an older generation of farmers who preferred not to let 
outside powers undermine their paternalistic control over their farm and those who worked 
for them, despite holding a strong ethos of worker edification. Many younger farmers, 
however (such as the Pierces, introduced above), saw the value of working with NGOs and 
were increasingly prepared to allow “improvement” programmes onto their farms, despite the 
threat such access might have to their authority.       
 
Neoliberalism, Civil Society and Biopolitical Maternalism on Commercial Farms 
Zimbabwe obtained its independence at the dawn of the neoliberal era of Thatcherism and 
Reaganomics, an era characterised by what has been called “millennial capitalism” 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2001a). Indeed, in 1981 the World Bank’s influential “Berg Report” 
outlined “a package of neo-liberal strategies – that to correct the distortions and inefficiencies 
created by protectionist policies, the ‘state’ in Africa should take a back seat, cut back on 
parastatal activity, and hand over control to private capital investment” (Shopo 1987: 191). 
Unlike other African countries whose earlier liberation coincided with the era of state 
development, Zimbabwe had to commence its socialist development vision not only 
constrained by the Lancaster House Agreement and a sense of economic pragmatism, but also 
by the realities of the emerging neoliberal world order.128 Thus, “there were strong 
undercurrents of neo-liberalism beneath ZANU-PF’s socialist rhetoric from the outset of 
independence” (Davies 2004: 27). Helped particularly by Scandinavian donors, the state 
nevertheless made impressive progress in the 1980s, primarily in health, education and rural 
roads, water and sanitation (Hifab/Zimconsult 1989; Muzondidya 2009: 168).129 While it was 
not until 1990 that Zimbabwe announced its intention to adopt market-based reforms and the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP – see Dashwood 2000: 143), even in its 
                                                          
128 For a comprehensive discussion of neoliberalism and its impact in Africa see Comaroff and Comaroff (1999, 
2001), Ferguson (1999, 2006), Ferguson and Gupta (2002), Geschiere et al. (2008), Moyo and Yeros (2005), 
among others.  
129 It must be noted, however, that during the same period the predominantly siNdebele-speaking peoples of 
Matebeleland were not only increasingly marginalised in terms of state development but also suffered some of 
the worst violence in Zimbabwe’s history during the Gukurahundi massacres of the early mid-1980s. These 
massacres, largely of rural civilians, were carried out by the Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwe National Army who 
were deployed in the region ostensibly to quell an insurrection by dissidents loyal to the opposition Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (see CCJP 1999; Eppel 2004; Sachikonye 2011).   
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decade of state welfarism, the ZANU-PF government was making concessions to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in order to be able to access 
international finance. For example, although there was an option, and strong moral grounds, 
for Zimbabwe to default on its US$700 million inherited debt from Rhodesia, local and 
international bankers managed to persuade Mugabe to honour this debt (Bond and Manyanya 
2002: 24). These same institutions also “compelled” the government to abandon some of its 
social policies as early as 1983 (Muzondidya 2009: 169).130   
 Road signs in the Willowvale industrial area in southern Harare offer a revealing 
insight into the mindset of state bureaucrats in the early 1990s. While the streets in the older, 
eastern side of the area have names from the colonial era which evoke manufacturing 
precincts in London (e.g. Dagenham and Eltham Roads), the western end of Willowvale is 
traversed by a number of streets with unlikely names: Empowerment Way; Affirmative Way; 
Indigenous Way; Reform Way and, strangest of all, ESAP Way. Pointing the way both to 
manufacturing warehouses and the envisaged market-led future, the road signs here present a 
strange combination of government aspirations which could only ever benefit a small, 
politically connected elite. As several authors have shown, the move towards structural 
adjustment was not only necessitated by growing pressure from the IMF, World Bank and 
local business sector (see Dansereau 2005), but also by the vested interests of a political elite 
who were abandoning broader social programmes in favour of their own self-interest (Bond 
and Manyanya 2002; Dashwood 2000; Davies 2004). Indeed, it is ironic that this very 
precinct was made infamous in the 1988 “Willowvale Scandal” in which several senior 
government officials were discovered to have used their privileges to buy discounted vehicles 
from the state-owned Willowvale Motor Industries, selling them at a huge profit on the black 
market (Dashwood 2000: 101). This scandal served to quicken the move towards market-led 
reform as the inefficiencies of state-owned enterprises were blamed for causing the shortage 
of vehicles and the emergence of a black market in the first place (ibid.: 102). 
“Indigenisation”, “empowerment” and “affirmative action” continued to benefit a small elite 
                                                          
130 Zimbabwe joined the IMF in 1980, borrowing US$30 million in April 1981. Zimbabwe’s economy grew by a 
record 26 per cent during 1980 and 1981, due to the newfound stability, the end of sanctions and record gold 
prices. However, an international recession then caused commodity prices to fall and terms of trade to 
deteriorate. The 1982/83 drought also impacted the economy severely, and Zimbabwe began to struggle to meet 
its loan repayment conditions. The government was forced to borrow another, larger amount, from the IMF in 
1983, this time with more stringent conditions. The government’s eventual decision to honour Rhodesia’s debt 
also increased the country’s levels of indebtedness (see Dansereau 2005: 8–13). Thus it was that the so-called 
Bretton Woods institutions came to dictate to Zimbabwe on issues of social and economic policy soon after 
independence, paving the way for the adoption of ESAP in 1990.   
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throughout the 1990s era of structural adjustment, at the expense of the rural and urban poor 
(see Dansereau 2005; Gibbon 1995).131  
 From soon after independence, the government also had to get used to coexisting and 
competing with another favourite child of neoliberalism: non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), whose numbers increased rapidly in the 1980s. Although the ZANU-PF government 
favoured cooperatives, it nevertheless tolerated NGOs, so long as they were prepared to 
become “partners” with and participate in its development vision, which many did in the 
1980s (Rich Dorman 2001: 133). Even at this early juncture, however, the relationship was 
strained by the fact that Western funders were increasingly unwilling to give development 
money to state bureaucracies (particularly if they were socialist-leaning), but valorised NGOs 
and other “grassroots” channels of implementation (Bornstein 2005: 14; Ferguson 2006: 38). 
Such non-state entities were a part of another phenomenon (re)emerging with neoliberalism: 
civil society, which Comaroff and Comaroff (2001: 40) call the “big idea of the millennial 
moment”. Much theorised, debated and critiqued, civil society continues to be a 
contradictory, ambiguous and “slippery” concept; an “empty abstraction”, known “primarily 
by its absence, its elusiveness, its incompleteness” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999: 2, 7). It 
has nevertheless been reified and embraced since the 1980s as part of neoliberal 
globalisation’s “development-by-civil-society” mantra following the state’s failure to deliver 
on its promise of modernity (Geschiere et al. 2008: 5).132  
 Theorists of the relationship between “the state” and “society” have often not paid 
close enough attention to the ways in which states have come to be spatialised, or how they 
“represent themselves as reified entities with particular spatial properties” (Ferguson and 
Gupta 2002: 981, original emphasis). Ferguson and Gupta (2002: 982) argue that popular and 
academic discourses (including those of the state) tend to imagine and present the state by 
way of two images: “verticality” and “encompassment”. By “verticality”, these authors mean 
“the central and pervasive idea of the state as an institution somehow ‘above’ civil society, 
community, and family”, while the idea of “encompassment” suggests that the nation-state 
surrounds these “smaller” entities, at the same time as it is itself contained within the 
“international community” (ibid.). Within this imagination, civil society has come to be seen 
as occupying a middle zone and, while encompassed by the state, plays a mediating role 
                                                          
131 See Davies (2004: 27–32) for an excellent analysis of the multiple strands of the official imagination of 
bureaucratic and political elites by the late 1980s which made the adoption of ESAP desirable.     
132 For further critical discussion of historical and theoretical dynamics of civil society see Comaroff and 
Comaroff (1999, 2001), Ferguson and Gupta (2002), Kasfir (1998) and Masunungure (2008).   
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between “an ‘up there’ state and an ‘on the ground’ community” (ibid.: 983). These 
metaphors, the authors argue, are powerful because of the way they become “embedded in 
everyday practices of state institutions” and because these practices then produce spatial and 
scalar hierarchies (ibid.: 984).  
 This imagined framework, however, has been increasingly challenged in the era of 
neoliberal globalisation, and new forms of “transnational governmentality” associated with 
forms of capitalism which work decreasingly through the old order consisting of “statist 
projects of verticality and encompassment” (ibid.: 995). This shift has undermined claims that 
the nation-state is necessarily “above” other actors, or naturally encompasses them (ibid.: 
989). Indeed, these new transnational modes of government (in the Foucauldian sense – see 
Chapter One), taking advantage of new technologies and mobilities to undermine old state 
sovereignties (see Comaroff and Comaroff 2001a: 30), have had a particularly profound 
impact in Africa, where global financial institutions, multinational corporations, 
internationally linked NGOs and “grassroots” organisations have increasingly challenged the 
state (ibid.; Ferguson 1999, 2006, 2008; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Piot 2010). Ferguson and 
Gupta (2002: 994) therefore call for an abandonment of outdated “topographical” metaphors 
of the state and for theorists to “treat state and non-state governmentality within a common 
frame” in order to “understand the spatiality of all forms of government” emerging with 
neoliberalism (ibid.: 996). My discussion of NGO activity on commercial farms (below) is 
sensitive to these conceptual concerns, locating such activity not “between”, or as a mediator 
between the state and the “grassroots”, but as part of the “emerging system of transnational 
governmentality” (ibid.: 990) in 1990s Zimbabwe, which increasingly challenged and 
threatened the state.                   
 The role of NGOs in independent Zimbabwe has been critically examined by a 
number of scholars who have provided comprehensive analyses of NGO-state relations and 
the politics of democratisation (McCandless 2012; Rich Dorman 2001), multinational 
Christian NGOs (Bornstein 2005), and NGOs in the context of rural development, land and 
agrarian reform (Moyo et al. 2008; Helliker 2006; Helliker et al. 2011). While most NGOs 
concentrated on the communal areas, a number came to play an important role on white-
owned commercial farms, not least because of the government’s almost total neglect of the 
development needs of farmworkers, but also because their health status, working and living 
conditions were known to be very poor. As such, NGOs connected to international 
“development regimes” (Li 2007: 16) came to identify farmworkers as a population in 
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particular need of “improvement”, an old notion “invigorated by neoliberalism” (ibid.: 263). 
Much has subsequently been written about these farm NGOs, their activities and the position 
of their beneficiaries by NGOs themselves, and by academics.133 It is not necessary to 
replicate such analyses here, but I will instead focus on a mostly neglected aspect: the ways 
in which white farmers and their wives, as well as their discourses, practices and attempts to 
achieve a sense of belonging were, or became, imbricated in the work of farm NGOs, and 
how these both influenced and were influenced by NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 There has sometimes been a tendency by NGOs and scholars alike to view farm 
NGOs as coming to commercial farms from somewhere “outside”, from a separate realm 
called “civil society”, which aims to “reform” or “improve” the local context, to make society 
“civil” (cf. Rutherford 2004a: 128). Commercial farms are often seen as something of a 
tabula rasa onto which NGOs sought to write their development and “improvement” agenda, 
struggling against the resistance of conservative and retrogressive farmers whose interests 
these activities challenged (see McIvor 1995: 23–31). There was indeed initial resistance to 
outside welfare initiatives from farmers who typically were suspicious of anything which 
threatened to undermine their “domestic government”, or brought “politics” onto the farm 
(Auret 2000: 30; Rutherford 1996, 2001a). However, this is only part of the story. The 
preexisting “interior frontier” which incorporated notions and traditions of 
paternalistic/maternalistic edification (feeding into both the private and public identifications 
of farmers), and desires to modernise and improve (see Rutherford 2004b: 132) provided a 
platform on which there was potential to build. As the example of the Frosts (above) shows, 
resistance to NGO penetration does not necessarily mean that a farm had no “domestic” 
welfare initiatives. Furthermore, as explored in the last chapter, there were notable examples 
of pioneering “welfare” interventions which would act as models for NGOs after 
independence: The Homecraft clubs of the FWISR and mobile health and hygiene schemes 
such as the ones run by Dr Joan Lamplugh in Goromonzi and nursing sister Ting Edmonstone 
in Mazowe (see Auret 2000: 10) long predated the arrival of neoliberal NGOs. In addition, 
those farmers and their wives who did willingly become involved in NGO initiatives often 
acted as a crucial key to open up farms which had previously been closed to NGOs. 
                                                          
133 For NGO works see Auret (2000), FOST (1998, 2002), McIvor (1995), Mugwetsi and Balleis (1994), 
SAfAIDS/CFU (1996), SCF (2000a, 2000b) and for work by academics see Chambati and Magaramombe 
(2008), Helliker (2006, 2008, 2009), Rutherford (1999, 2001a, 2004a, 2004b, 2014), Moyo et al. (2000), 
Sadomba and Helliker (2010). 
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 Below I shall focus mainly on the histories and approach of the foundational and most 
far-reaching farm-welfare programme (the Farm Health Worker Programme, and its offshoot 
the Farm Worker Programme) and another, smaller, farm NGO which arose in the mid-
1990s, Kunzwana Women’s Association (KWA). These programmes illustrate the role that a 
number of constituencies played in farm welfare and the formation of such initiatives, 
including local government employees and development activists, international donors, white 
farmers and their wives, and farmers’ representative bodies. I shall, however, also draw on 
examples from other farm NGOs and farmworker initiatives, to illustrate the dynamics 
between these actors and the sometimes conflicting, often pragmatic, occasionally 
contradictory influences they had on the approaches, ethos and praxis of farm-welfare NGOs. 
I shall argue that all these programmes were biopolitical in nature and made use of what I call 
biopolitical maternalism in the production of life on commercial farms. In other words, whilst 
biopolitical, they also drew on older, maternalistic forms of welfarism linked to white 
“farmers’ wives”.    
 
The Farm Health Worker Programme and Farm Worker Programme  
The origin of the Farm Health Worker Programme (FHWP), which was the first farm-welfare 
initiative involving international NGOs, illustrates a common pattern found in most of the 
subsequent programmes set up to “develop” farmworkers after independence. That is, rather 
than being preconceived and brought onto the farms by one outside agency, it developed 
more organically out of a number of separate preexisting local concerns about farm welfare 
and ad hoc efforts to address this problem. As McIvor (1995: 35) observed, the programme 
did not arise “out of a strategic plan to rectify the conditions of farm labour” or represent 
some “grand design of the kind that informed health programmes in communal areas” 
(McIvor 1995: 35), but was initially quite experimental and flexible in nature. The initial 
steps of the FHWP were taken in 1980 when Dr Richard Laing, then superintendent of 
Bindura District Hospital (later Provincial Medical Director for Mashonaland Central) 
realised that the health needs of farmworkers on tobacco farms in the district were not being 
adequately addressed. Unlike communal areas, which were set to benefit from a massive state 
health intervention, including the introduction of village health workers (VHWs, see Auret 
2000; McIvor 1995), commercial farming districts were not included. After several months of 
Dr Laing and his staff voluntarily visiting farms around Bindura to raise awareness about this 
situation (Auret 2000: 26), Sister Edmonstone, who ran the Mazowe Rural Council clinic, 
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suggested that she train women from farms to be primary healthcare workers to perform a 
similar role to the VHWs. Farmers from six farms agreed, and in 1981, she trained 12 Farm 
Health Workers (FHWs) at Tsungubvi Council Clinic (ibid.: 21). 
 Dr Laing, meanwhile, approached Save the Children Fund-UK (hereafter SCF) to 
fund a wider pilot project in the Bindura commercial farming district, where the FHW 
concept would be tested. The objectives of the pilot were to vaccinate all children on farms 
and monitor their growth and development, radically improve water and sanitation provision 
and the nutritional status of children, provide primary curative healthcare, prevent malaria, 
increase awareness on health and hygiene matters, and reduce the number of admissions for 
preventable conditions to Bindura Hospital (ibid.: 27). SCF agreed to partner with the 
Ministry of Health and provide funding for a two-year pilot project involving 16 farms whose 
owners had agreed to participate. The FHWP was launched in August 1981 with each 
farmworker community selecting two women to be trained as FHWs. This differed from 
Sister Edmonstone’s cohort, who had been selected by the farm owners and had consequently 
been found not to have the full support of the workers on their farms. The specifics of the 
various phases of the FHWP and the challenges it faced and successes it garnered have been 
discussed fully elsewhere (Auret 2000; McIvor 1995).134 It went on to become a foundational 
programme, spreading to other provinces and broadening its scope (especially in 
Mashonaland Central) to include women’s clubs, preschools and early childhood 
development, adult literacy, water and sanitation and the introduction of Farm Development 
Committees (FADCOs). In 1991, a spinoff programme called the Farm Worker Programme 
(FWP), funded and implemented by SCF, was launched to provide wider social services to 
farmworkers in Mashonaland Central.135  
 Thus, the local concerns and initiatives of a district medical practitioner (employed by 
the government) and a Rural Council nurse (employed by white farmers) were the catalyst 
which attracted international donors and sparked the development of what became the most 
widespread and significant health intervention on commercial farms in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Diana Auret, herself an ex-“farmer’s wife”, human rights campaigner, author, and manager of 
                                                          
134 After the completion of the pilot programme, the proposal for a full FHW programme was accepted and, with 
funding from SCF and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), it expanded to over 100 farms in 
Mashonaland Central and then to Mashonaland East and West, and Midlands province (Auret 2000). By 1989, 
the FHWP was found to have exceeded its original target and had reached 560 farms and over 200,000 farm 
dwellers in these provinces (ibid.: 43).     
135 The FHWP – by now a national programme – continued under the sponsorship of the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).    
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the FWP in the 1990s told me that the idea of village and ward development committees, 
from which the FADCOs grew, had been heavily influenced by work which she was involved 
in for the Chinoyi diocese (Catholic) helping peasant farmers returning to their homes from 
the “protected villages” into which they were corralled by the Rhodesian government at the 
height of the war.136 There was thus a considerable cross-pollination of ideas and practices 
between local arms of government, paternalistic farmers, churches, local development 
practitioners and international development organisations in the development of the FHWP 
and, later, the FWP. The common thread that linked these together was that for the first time 
farm-welfare endeavours became truly biopolitical in intent and method, if not in scale.  
 The FHWP and the FWP represented a move away from simple domestic 
“edification” (Rutherford 2001a) to biopolitics because a wider partnership between the 
government health ministry (which played a coordination role), international donors and 
Rural Councils – drawing in ever more farmers – began “organizing the production of life” 
on the farms, deciding “who and what [was] valued, who [was to] be supported and who left 
behind” (Piot 2010: 135). Farmworkers as a population became the focus of these 
programmes, with special emphasis on women and children, and on those residing 
permanently on commercial farms. Just as farmworkers had been “left behind” by the 
programmes of national government, casual and seasonal workers were not able to access 
many of the aspects of farm-welfare programmes to the extent that permanent workers could. 
Such inclusions and exclusions resonate with Agamben’s (1998) conceptualisation of 
biopolitics in terms of who is consigned to “bare life” and the “state of exception”, both 
within the broader nation and at the level of the farm. The increasing casualisation of the 
agricultural workforce following the adoption of ESAP and the retreat of state welfare after 
1990 increased the significance and impact of these biopolitical inclusion/exclusion 
tendencies in farm-welfare programmes.  
 These programmes were also biopolitical not only because of the new statistical, 
record-keeping and measurement practices which were introduced but because they sought to 
produce a particular kind of subject: a self-disciplined, autonomous, responsible subject – in 
short, a good neoliberal subject. Regular competitions, for example, were introduced, with 
prizes offered for the best kept homes and prettiest gardens. Farm Health Workers would 
inspect homes to ensure proper waste disposal; that toilets were clean, pot-racks were built 
                                                          
136 Taped interview with Diana Auret, Cape Town, 28 August 2013. On Protected Villages see Bhebe and 
Ranger (1995), CCJP (1999), Kriger (1992).    
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and dishes were washed. White “farmers’ wives” often acted as the judge of home and garden 
competitions, handing out suitable prizes to the winners. Women’s clubs also promoted 
modern domesticity, hygiene, “proper living” and appropriate child care and nutrition, 
building on the pre-independence efforts of the Homecraft movement. The “farmer’s wife” 
also judged competitions of craft and needlework produced by the women’s clubs.137             
 The FHWP and the FWP therefore introduced an expanded form of maternalism into 
the farms, a biopolitical maternalism in which the FHWs and the “farmers’ wives” combined 
to exercise productive power over farmworkers through surveillance, training, competition 
and rewards. At a higher level, female development workers coordinating these programmes 
oversaw the training, mobilising, coordination and reporting of the farm-level implementers, 
again combining surveillance and reward. There was therefore a hierarchical form to this 
biopolitical maternalism, flowing from the provincial coordinators down through the 
“farmers’ wives” to the FHW and ultimately to the farmworkers on each farm.138 The several 
women I interviewed who were involved in the upper echelons of these programmes – Diana 
Auret, Lynette Mudekunye, Irene Mutumbwa and Lynn Walker – all stressed that, despite the 
challenges they faced, they were able to get “farmers’ wives”, in particular, actively involved 
in supporting their intervention at farm level. For Mudekunye, “[It was] very very important 
[to get them involved] because very often they were teachers or qualified in more of a social 
side, and they weren’t necessarily using that training, and this gave them an opportunity to 
become involved”.139 By the time the programmes were well established, they had a presence 
on hundreds of farms on the highveld, with “farmers’ wives” overseeing FHWs, preschools, 
women’s clubs, domestic competitions and FADCOs (some more actively than others). As 
fieldworkers with the FWP’s successor, the Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ – 
established in 1996) told me, “We went to farmers’ associations and received lots of support 
from the wives: this even ballooned quite a lot and we couldn’t keep up!”140 Thus, despite the 
above-noted caveats over the varying levels of commitment of each “farmer’s wife” and the 
varying effectiveness of the programme on each farm, the FHWP and the FWP extended their 
biopolitical reach to 80 per cent of the nearly 600 commercial farms in Mashonaland Central 
                                                          
137 Note the strong resonances with the pre-independence bourgeois ideologies and maternalistic practices of 
“farmers’ wives” and other settler women, as well as the links to similar endeavours within Victorian Britain.  
138 Note how the NGO itself thus strove to achieve vertical encompassment of the farms.   
139 Taped Interview with Lynette Mudekunye, Manager of the Farm Healthworker Programme 1991–1996 and 
founding member of the Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe, via Skype, 12 November 2013.     
140 Interview with FCTZ Field Officers, Harare, 11 November 2013.  
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by the end of the 1990s, not just nominally, but with concrete interventions such as active 
FHWs and functional preschools.141      
 
Kunzwana Women’s Association  
In Mashonaland East, it was the Kunzwana Women’s Association (KWA) which came to the 
fore in the mid-1990s as a major vehicle through which biopolitical maternalism reached 
commercial farms. The founder of KWA, Emma Mahlunge, had worked as a social worker 
with the Zimbabwe Republic Police for many years, and had been heavily involved in the 
Kuyedza Women’s Clubs, set up before independence for the wives of African policemen. 
When she retired in 1992, Mahlunge was persuaded not to let her skills go to waste: “So I 
thought about it and I thought which area, now, because there were so many NGOs around, 
but I thought deeply on which area was really disadvantaged during that time and where there 
were [not] any other organisations going there”.142 She consequently identified female 
commercial farm/mine workers (and their children) in Mashonaland East as a target group, 
and resolved to form women’s clubs with them which would concentrate on health and 
hygiene, cooking, childcare, literacy, and imparting skills from which they could generate 
income. With some female volunteers, who would later become KWA Field Officers, 
Mahlunge conducted surveys on tobacco farms in the province. However, many farmers were 
initially not interested or suspicious of their proposed work with farmworkers: “You could 
see that they were giving us very little time and sometimes he could even talk to you while 
walking away!” In cases where farmers were dismissive, they proceeded anyway by joining 
the workers in the fields during the day (masquerading as casual employees) and staying over 
in the farm compound at night to tell the women about their proposed activities and teach 
them about hygiene and childcare.143 Interestingly, this approach echoes that used by ZIPRA 
and ZANLA guerrillas to infiltrate farms and protected villages during the war in order to 
“re-educate” people about the struggle against colonialism. An important point here is that 
the founders of KWA, while attempting to set up an NGO, were not anti-government or 
ZANU-PF at all, but drew on histories and practices of the struggle to bring the changes they 
wished to see. Indeed, one of the first field officers was married to a war veteran, 
demonstrating the close connections to the struggle and the governing party.        
                                                          
141 Chris McIvor, Zimbabwe Programme Director for Save the Children Fund (UK), in Auret (2000: xiii).    
142 Taped interview with Emma Mahlunge, Harare, 14 March 2013.  
143 Dr Emmie Wade, Director of KWA, from notes made at KWA staff meeting, Macheke, 26 February 2013.   
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 In order to gain real access to a larger number of farms, however, a different strategy 
was required. Mahlunge approached the District Administrator (DA) for Goromonzi to ask 
his advice and he suggested she speak to the chairman of the Ruwa Rural Council, a white 
Scottish “farmer’s wife” called Nancy Guild. Nancy had been involved in and led Rural 
Councils and farmers’ associations since the 1970s, which was unusual for a woman at that 
time. She explained how she came to break into this realm so dominated by men:  
 
I got involved out of interest because I wondered how it came together. The men used to meet at the 
club and us women would play tennis while they had their meeting. We would often hear shouting 
and I thought to myself, “it that how the council is run?” So I decided that women should be involved 
and I got myself nominated by some farmers who were in favour. And the shouting stopped because 
for those who used to shout, to have shouted in front of a woman would have been a let-down to 
themselves. So there was debate after that, but it was never abusive.144       
 
As someone with great experience of farmer politics and of winning over conservative male 
farmers to a progressive idea, Guild was the ideal person to help KWA. She was able to take 
Mahlunge to a number of FA meetings and introduce KWA and its proposed work. As 
Mahlunge recalls: “I went with Mrs Guild and she talked to them about how important it is to 
have an organisation which can work with the farmworkers and it was going to help both the 
farmworkers and the farmers”. Thus, KWA’s foundation saw the formation of an unlikely 
partnership between black Zimbabwean development workers with links to liberation war 
veterans and a white “farmer’s wife” who had once carried an Uzi submachine gun around 
her farm while her husband was away on active service. Guild went on to play an important 
role in KWA, becoming their first Board Chairperson and serving in executive and non-
executive positions for a number of years.  
 In this way, KWA gained access to 163 farms in Mashonaland East by the end of the 
1990s, establishing clubs on many of them. Although some “farmers’ wives” did become 
actively involved with these clubs, teaching domestic skills and judging competitions, there 
was less involvement than in the FHWP in Mashonaland Central. The biopolitical 
maternalism of KWA was mainly conveyed by KWA’s Field Officers who taught farm 
women about “proper” living and trained local club leaders to pass on this knowledge, along 
                                                          
144 Taped interview with Nancy Guild, Harare, 15 June 2012. This is another example of the “civilising” 
influence of white women on white farming men in colonial Zimbabwe.    
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with skills – in cooking, sewing, soap-making and craft – to other women. As noted by 
Rutherford (2004a: 129), KWA’s approach was aimed at “cultivating proper behaviour for 
women along European patriarchal models that have shaped projects directed towards 
African women since the colonial era”. The emergence of HIV/AIDS as a major issue on the 
farms in the 1990s also increased KWA’s access as farmers realised “if we don’t do 
something, what will happen to the workers?”145 AIDS awareness and the distribution of 
condoms therefore became a major part of KWA’s mandate, along with awareness-raising 
about other communicable diseases such as diarrhoea and cholera, and how to prevent them 
through hygienic living.146     
 Helliker (2006, 2008, 2009) characterises donor-funded farm NGOs as “intermediary 
NGOs”, distinguishing them from civil society organisations of a more “grassroots”, 
membership-based nature. This term may not be helpful though, as it falls into the trap which 
Ferguson and Gupta (2002) caution against, namely a “topographical” understanding of a 
state “up there” and “grassroots communities” which need civil-society organisations to be an 
intermediary between them. While KWA club members paid a small membership fee, and it 
styled itself as a “community-based organisation”, almost all of KWA’s funding came from 
“outside [international] donors”,147 making it far closer to what Helliker sees as an 
“intermediary NGO”. Interestingly, KWA’s founders positioned it as just such an 
intermediary, its vision statement asserting that its beneficiaries should “enjoy equal status in 
the Zimbabwean development process, become major participants in their own development 
efforts and benefit from national resources and programmes”.148 KWA saw its role as linking 
marginalised farmworkers into the national “development process”, where they could benefit 
from “national resources and programmes”. Like the FHWP/FWP, relevant government 
ministries were seen as partners of KWA (although not to the same extent as the FHWP). 
However, in a Zimbabwe in which structural adjustment had resulted in a severe withdrawal 
of such resources and programmes, and there was no longer a meaningful national 
development process, this vision could only ever be a pipe dream. While KWA was by no 
means an “agent” or “puppet” of their international donors (see Sadomba and Helliker 2010), 
and still had great control over its agenda and activities – which were heavily influenced by 
                                                          
145 Interview with Dr Emmie Wade, Harare, 21 June 2012.  
146 Local NGOs were key agents of broader state and international agency programmes in activities such as 
condom distribution as condoms were often subsidised and endorsed by the government and multinational 
organisations such as Population Services International.  
147 E. Mahlunge, “Director’s Message”, 1999 KWA Annual Report.   
148 Ibid.  
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local histories and practices – its work represented much more an attempt to link farmworkers 
to transnational biopolitical programmes (and thereby to transnational governmentality), than 
to a strong developmental state.        
 
Welfare Initiatives and the Commercial Farmers Union  
I have already illustrated how strongly the CFU and its members felt about their perceived 
public image as carers for farmworkers. While farm welfare was thus undoubtedly used as a 
“powerful propaganda tool” (Pilossof 2012: 95), this was by no means its only function, nor 
were welfare attempts understood in such an instrumental manner by all of those involved. 
The Agricultural Labour Bureau (ALB), the arm of the CFU responsible for labour issues – 
including collective bargaining over wages with unions and the government – walked such a 
line between image management and actively trying to encourage improvements for workers 
on farms. In the 1990s, they faced pressure from NGOs such as SCF in this regard, but 
according to the then ALB Chief Executive, Ewan Roger, an ALB workshop in 1995 was 
what really pushed them into action. “We invited Patrick Chingoka [a leading businessman] 
to come and address us on what the perception of black Zimbabweans was towards white 
farmers. He mentioned ten words: words like ‘arrogant’ and ‘shrewd’. This really jolted us as 
up until that point we thought we were the good guys!”149 The ALB thus put together an 
agricultural workers welfare plan which attempted to get farmers to commit to specific 
minimum standards of sanitation, water, health, housing and education and, in 1997, it 
published a handbook containing all relevant information on workers’ rights (Acts and 
Statutory Instruments), and guidelines for building acceptable housing and sanitation, as well 
as information on the CFU’s AIDS and orphan programmes. The ALB had, in fact, already 
proposed such a code in the 1970s, which at that point they directly linked to “image 
management” (Clarke 1977: 152–3). The 1997 code, apart from being a useful reference 
manual for farmers, performed a similar role, but the difference was that by the 1990s there 
were other initiatives being pursued by the CFU and NGOs which could help to animate 
some of the sentiments expressed in the handbook. 
                                                          
149 Interview with Ewan Roger, Harare, 21 March 2014. It is surprising that the ALB continued to hold such 
unrealistic ideas of how farmers were perceived given that The Farmer had published the results of a survey in 
which similar sentiments were expressed in December 1991 (see Pilossof 2012: 92). However, it does indicate 
the resilience and importance of the myth which white farmers held onto about their contribution and place in 
the country.  
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 The CFU AIDS Control Project arose out of the activism of Mutorashanga farmer 
Peter Frazer-Mackenzie in 1986, who realised the impact that AIDS would have on the 
workforce unless more was done to provide education on the disease.150 By 1990, he had 
become the CFU AIDS representative and the CFU had signed an agreement with a funder to 
assist them to distribute awareness materials and condoms to commercial farms. A voluntary 
network of AIDS-awareness coordinators was appointed by each CFU branch to assist AIDS 
representatives appointed by the FAs.151 By the later 1990s, the project was being run by 
Kerry Kay who, with the assistance of 52 “farmers’ wives”, coordinated peer education, 
condom distribution, drama groups, video presentations and home-based care activities. 
There were also 135 voluntary trainers (senior farmworkers) and 9,750 trained peer educators 
throughout the farming districts.152  
 Another example of biopolitical maternalism, the project did genuinely attempt to 
educate farmworkers about HIV and foster “behaviour change”, although it did not address 
the structural aspects of commercial farming that encouraged the spread of HIV in the first 
place: the gendered nature of farmwork, for example, which ensured that seasonal and casual 
workers were women over whom permanent male workers had power. Several of the white 
women I interviewed had been heavily involved in the project, either as district coordinators 
or in implementing the project on their farms through condom distribution, training of 
trainers, showing videos and hosting events such as the World AIDS day commemorations. 
Like other welfare projects, CFU AIDS was not universally adopted by farmers. One 
coordinator in Manicaland, Kate Viljoen, recalled that when she hosted a World AIDS Day 
event on a Sunday, other “farmers’ wives” at the club laughed at her for spending her day in 
such a manner. She also faced criticism for going into the compound by herself: “I was 
highly criticised in the beginning for going to the compound because ‘no, no, no, you were 
testing God, by going to the compound at night because it’s too dangerous’”.153 However, as 
the campaign grew, many of those who had dismissed it joined in: “Eventually, this main 
critic would come with me, and she would like hijack the whole thing [laughs] … she 
overcame [her fear] and saw that it actually wasn’t dangerous”. 
                                                          
150 See The Farmer, 8 November 1990, “Editorial: Dealing with the Scourge of AIDS”. HIV infection rates 
increased dramatically in Zimbabwe from an estimated 5 per cent of the adult population in 1987 to a peak of 
26.5 per cent in 1997 (Zimbabwe National AIDS Council n.d.: 1). 
151 The Farmer, 15 November 1990, “Funds for AIDS awareness in Zimbabwe”.  
152 Information from the Agricultural Labour Bureau Handbook (1997: 109). 
153 Taped interview with Kate Viljoen, Durban, 11 August 2013. Note the lingering paranoia about the “black 
peril” still evident among white Zimbabweans in the 1990s.   
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 The Farm Orphan Support Trust (FOST) was another initiative which became closely 
linked with the CFU and drew in large numbers of commercial farmers by the end of the 
1990s. At the beginning of Chapter One I outline the organic origins of FOST after Dr Sue 
Parry and her husband discovered four young children abandoned on their Headlands Farm. 
Parry had already been involved with an initiative run in Manicaland by the SNV Netherlands 
Development Organisation, which sought to establish preschools on commercial farms.154 
FOST was a response to the AIDS epidemic, anecdotal evidence of growing numbers of 
orphans on farms and warnings by experts that Zimbabwe could have as many as 600,000 
orphans by the year 2000 (see SAfAIDS/CFU 1996: 2). Following research and a national 
seminar in 1995, FOST was launched as a voluntary welfare organisation whose aim would 
be to provide community-based support for orphans and vulnerable children on farms, 
particularly through farmworker community fostering arrangements. FOST’s Executive 
Committee contained representatives from CFU, the farmworkers union, SCF, SAfAIDS, the 
ALB, churches and the University of Zimbabwe. Its national offices were at CFU 
headquarters and until 1999 it operated through donations from individuals and the 
agriculture industry (FOST Annual Report 1998/99). From the beginning, FOST also sought 
to build a strong relationship with the Ministry of Social Welfare, and its representatives were 
quickly asked to participate in government child-welfare forums. Like other NGOs, it did not 
perceive its role as being outside of the government’s efforts, but rather as a partner. 
However, because the government’s resources were so minimal by that stage, especially for 
farming areas, the government was very much the junior partner.   
 FOST also tried to integrate with the existing efforts of other farm NGOs, rather than 
compete with them. Thus, in Mashonaland Central, FOST was incorporated into the FADCO 
system of the FWP; in Mashonaland West, they used the FHWP as a platform; and in 
Manicaland, they used the preschools being supported by SNV as their base. A Mutare-based 
NGO, the Family AIDS Caring Trust (FACT) became a partner for training purposes. The 
activities of FOST involved providing what they saw as “comprehensive” support to farm 
orphans through assisting foster families, registering orphans living on farms, training 
caregivers, teaching children lifeskills and vocational skills, awareness raising and 
information dissemination. By 1999, international donors such as DANIDA and the Bernard 
van Leer Foundation were sponsoring FOST and it became fully operational, with full-time 
provincial coordinators, fieldworkers and a director overseeing the operations. International 
                                                          
154 Taped interview with Dr Sue Parry, Harare, 19 June 2012.  
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agencies such as UNAIDS and USAID subsequently declared that FOST was among the best 
private-sector responses for children affected by HIV anywhere in the world (UNAIDS 2001; 
USAID 2000). Now linked fully to transnational development practices and discourse, FOST 
also became an example for other “non-governmental” AIDS responses elsewhere, feeding 
positively into the technical projects of modernity and trusteeship promoted by the CFU and 
its members.            
 
Export Horticulture, Transnational Governmentality and Sanitised Production      
By the mid-1980s the commercial agriculture sector begun to focus on new export 
opportunities, and the production of fruit, vegetables and cut-flowers became popular options 
for farmers seeking to diversify, especially on the highveld (Moyo 2000: 91).155 Even before 
the adoption of ESAP in 1990, the Export Promotion Programme (1987–1991) allowed 
horticulture farmers easy access to foreign currency for inputs, to encourage new ventures, 
and the expansion of existing horticulture operations (ibid.: 60). From 1990 a number of 
further policies were introduced with deregulation which allowed the export horticulture 
sector to grow radically, including the Special Horticultural Foreign Exchange Facility, the 
Export Retention Scheme and the Export Revolving Fund (ibid.: 61).156 By the mid-1990s, 36 
per cent of commercial farmers were engaged in horticulture, mainly in the Mashonalands 
and Manicaland; the area under horticulture had trebled from what it was in 1980 and the 
monetary value of horticultural produce had grown from Z$16 million in 1983 to Z$121 
million by 1992 (ibid.: 91–2). More than 80 per cent of cut-flowers were exported to Holland, 
while 73 per cent of vegetables were exported to the United Kingdom.            
 This wide-scale shift towards export agriculture served to link commercial farms – 
already fairly independent from the state despite its efforts after 1980 to undermine domestic 
government – more closely with overseas markets, regulations and regimes as farmers sought 
to establish and retain competitive advantage in strategic export crops. A 1997 BBC 
documentary made by Mark Phillips about a Mashonaland East vegetable farm producing 
mange-tout peas for British supermarket chain Tesco illustrates these dynamics perfectly (see 
Cook 2011). The documentary shows the Tesco produce buyer on his annual visit to 
Chiparawe farm to inspect the production and packaging processes, hygiene and quality of 
                                                          
155 Although tobacco was always an export crop, it was marketed through a locally run auction system which 
meant that individual farmers or farming enterprises did not themselves have to deal with foreign markets.   
156 See Selby (2006: 191ff.) for more detail on the impact of ESAP on commercial farmers.  
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the crop. It reveals the strenuous processes and standards that a grower must meet if they 
wish to retain their access to such markets and it also shows the influence that a British 
corporation had on this farm in southern Africa.157 Hall (2005) describes the scene recorded 
in the documentary:             
 
Workers on the Chiparawe farm thought that Tesco was a foreign country – they offered it gifts, sang 
songs of dedication to their “dear friend” Tesco and worked under the shadow of a large Tesco flag. 
“I've never been there but I can imagine it. I take it to be quite superior, quite magnificent,” was how 
Blessing Chingwaru, chief mange-tout picker at Chiparawe, described the mythical Republic of 
Tesco. 
  
Put on for the visit, it may have been, but this show of dedication illustrates graphically the 
ways in which additional, transnational regulations and norms, such as those required by 
Tesco, inevitably amended the practice and nature of domestic government following 
structural adjustment. The pressure to gain and maintain access to highly competitive global 
markets meant that Zimbabwean export horticulture producers were not able to withstand the 
new regulations and practices demanded by the market and the consumers. By 1997, the 
Horticulture Promotion Council of Zimbabwe (HPC) was developing its own code of practice 
which would cover labour employment, social issues, chemicals, environment, packhouse 
conditions and product origin and traceability (Auret 2002: 17). Farms were thus becoming 
globalised zones or “enclaves” closely integrated with overseas markets and globalised 
regulations, bypassing to some extent the weakening local state (Ferguson 2006: 40). The 
move to export horticulture thus brought new modes of transnational governmentality to 
compete with and complement that of the NGOs which worked on such farms.  
 The mange-tout peas documentary also juxtaposed the poor working and living 
conditions of the Chiparawe farmworkers who grew and packaged the peas, with images of 
middle-class English consumers eating dinner, seemingly oblivious to the exploitative 
manner in which their greens were produced.158 Along with similar works of exposé in other 
                                                          
157 See Lines (2008) for more analysis of the growth of global supermarkets and their control over agricultural 
value chains.    
158 Lynn Walker, a British development worker who was involved with SCF and was later the Director of 
FOST, told me that Chiparawe farm was actually one of the more “progressive” in terms of the workers’ living 
conditions and the way they were generally treated. This, however, did not prevent British viewers from being 
shocked by the documentary and putting pressure on supermarkets like Tesco to introduce ethical trade 
standards (Interview with Lynn Walker, Harare, 30 May 2012). 
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industries, the documentary played a crucial role in heralding in a new movement aimed at 
ensuring that products made in developing countries and sold in the West were produced and 
traded in an environmentally, economically and socially ethical manner. Various countries 
had already founded fair trade bodies by the early 1990s, leading to the establishment of an 
umbrella body, Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO) in 1997. In 1998, a 
group of British companies, unions and NGOs also launched the Ethical Trading Initiative 
(ETI), which would become a global leader in monitoring and certifying produce sold in the 
UK.159 ETI quickly set out to develop a code of practice for producers and chose three 
countries in which to test the implementation of this code, Zimbabwe being one. The HPC 
forged links with ETI and the Zimbabwe ETI Working Group was established to oversee the 
ETI pilot project in the country. The working group involved representatives from NGOs, 
producers and the unions, but (germane to my argument) not from the government (Auret 
2002: 18). Witnessing the credibility that horticulture was gaining with its export markets as 
a result of the code, other commodity sectors also wished to participate in a national code. 
This led to the formation of the Agricultural Ethics Assurance Association of Zimbabwe, 
whose code was signed off by (non-governmental) “stakeholders” in Zimbabwe in 2000 and 
by ETI in 2001 (Auret 2002: 22). 
 This “ethical turn” (Freidberg 2003: 29) represented a change from a commodity 
fetishism in which exotic produce had long been marketed in ways which “obscured the 
social relations and exploitative practices of production” (ibid.) to an approach which sought 
to put “transparency” at its core and instead fetishised “standards” (ibid.: 39). Increasingly 
powerful global supermarket chains demanded from producers not only traceability of the 
product, but that a rigorous set of standards be met in terms of chemical use, hygiene and the 
living and working conditions of workers. This attempt to “clean up” global supply chains 
resulted in regular audits and inspections for farmers exporting fruits, vegetables and flowers 
to overseas markets. Freidberg links this “export-oriented hygienic mission” (2003: 36) to 
earlier civilising missions and their concern with hygiene (see Chapter Two). The move 
towards export horticulture thus augmented and gave impetus to existing biopolitical 
activities of “farmers’ wives” and NGOs around health, hygiene and living conditions 
particularly because such endeavours were now fundamentally linked to market requirements 
and profit. 
                                                          




Conclusion: More than Anti-politics?  
In an 1891 essay,160 Oscar Wilde provided a withering critique of the charity efforts 
associated with capitalism:  
 
Just as the worst slave-owners were those who were kind to their slaves, and so prevented the horror 
of the system being realised by those who suffered from it, and understood by those who 
contemplated it, so, in the present state of things in England, the people who do most harm are the 
people who try to do most good. 
 
Most scholars who have examined the role of welfare initiatives on commercial farms in 
independent Zimbabwe have come to a similar conclusion. In 1999, Zimbabwean land 
scholar Sam Moyo argued that NGOs were largely reactive rather than agenda setting; tended 
to be disinterested in land redistribution issues; and, rather than being progressive, were even 
anti-change on land issues (MWENGO 1999: 8). He went on to say that the elite leaders of 
NGOs were disconnected from peasant and working-class interests; their reliance on “liberal 
democratic support”, especially donor funding and political alliances with capital, led them to 
sympathise with the ideology of these supporters and back free-market and non-state 
interventions in land; and that they tended to select “safer” and “easier” issues to work on 
than the structural problems related to land (ibid.). Helliker (2008: 244) concurs that “NGOs 
involved in rural development in Zimbabwe have simply reproduced the prevailing agrarian 
structures of domination rather than facilitating the transformation of unjust land tenure 
regimes”. Moyo et al. (2000) outline three approaches towards farmworkers since 1980: the 
“nationalist” approach of ZANU-PF and (at times) the state, which have often been hostile to 
those they see as foreign or “alien” migrant workers; the “workerist” approach of the unions, 
and the “welfarist” approach of farmers and farmworker NGOs. Critiquing the shortcomings 
and dangers in all three, they call for a “transformative” approach which would move beyond 
the status quo and provide land to farmworkers and security of tenure in “residential-
business-social hubs” (ibid.: 196), where they would also have access to common property 
resources and be provided with amenities such as schools and clinics.  
                                                          
160 The Soul of Man under Socialism, 1891.  
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 As I have argued above, white farmers and their representatives sought to “render 
technical” (Li 2006) their role in independent Zimbabwe, depoliticising their privileged 
position and deploying “defensive power” (Salverda 2010) through emphasising their role in 
modernising the countryside and “caring” for farmworkers, who formed an “interior frontier” 
(Rutherford 2004b) for white farmers’ private and public identities. Farm NGOs 
inadvertently assisted them in these endeavours, despite setting out to change the conditions 
in which farmworkers lived and worked on the farms. It could be said that, in common with 
other development agencies elsewhere (see Ferguson 1990; Li 2006), NGOs also themselves 
rendered complex political problems such as the colonial history of skewed land ownership 
and capitalist exploitation of landless peasants into technical terms, requiring technical 
solutions which only they could bring. The NGOs discussed in this chapter did indeed work 
through the capitalist commercial-farming system, making use of preexisting farmer histories 
of paternalistic/maternalistic welfare in the process. In many ways, their biopolitical 
endeavours could be said to have constituted a “minimalist biopolitics”, aimed at survival and 
basic improvements in living conditions rather than radical change (see Redfield 2005). 
However, it would be too simplistic to conclude that they did not seek in some ways to 
change the dynamics of this system, or that they did not succeed in some areas. The 
biopolitical thrust of the NGOs, multinational corporations and movements such as Fair 
Trade certainly undermined the domestic government of farmers and forced them gradually 
to improve the conditions on their farms and the ways in which they dealt with workers.161  
 Those who worked for farm NGOs reject the assertion that they were simply 
upholding the status quo, emphasising instead that farmworkers gained new knowledge about 
their rights and new confidence about advocating to their employers for their needs through 
forums like the FADCOs.162 Or pointing out that “It wasn’t radical in terms of changing the 
patterns of land ownership: it was radical in bringing people who had never spoken to one 
another to sit down and talk to one another. And it really had begun to bring about some 
dialogue”.163 The FCTZ argued that its “programmes sought to breakdown [sic] the 
hierarchical structure on farms and dilute the pervasive authority of the farmer over all 
aspects of farm worker lives” (Chambati and Magaramombe 2008: 217). Many of those I 
                                                          
161 Such positive changes, however, must be viewed in the broader political-economic context of the 1990s 
where the real wages of workers (as gazetted) were declining and falling further and further behind the poverty 
datum line (see Chambati and Moyo 2007: 13ff.).    
162 Taped interview with Diana Auret, Cape Town, 28 August 2013. See Rutherford (2004a) for a critique of 
FADCOs. 
163 Taped interview with Lynette Mudekunye, via Skype, 12 November 2013.  
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interviewed argued that the “wildcat strikes” in 1997 and other forms of farmworker 
mobilisation were partially the result of their work on the farms and the new-found 
knowledge and confidence that farmworkers had gained.164 In fact, by 1996 a forum called 
the Farm Workers Action Group (FWAG) – consisting of several NGOs, government 
departments, unions and associations – emerged, adopting a more vocal stance on political 
issues such as tenure security for farmworkers and conditions on farms (see The Farm 
Worker, July 1996; Gaidzanwa 1999). According to some of those involved, it sought to go 
beyond welfare to make a difference at the structural level (Chambati and Magaramombe 
2008: 216). To this end, FWAG even called for the introduction of “common border 
villages”,165 a seemingly “transformative” suggestion close to the “residential-business-
social-hubs” later called for by Moyo et al. (2000).  
 Whatever the case, NGOs and other transmitters of transnational governmentality to 
commercial farms played a part in bringing white farmers and the Zimbabwean state into 
confrontation in the year 2000. They helped to turn white commercial farms into zones of 
modern globalisation linked more and more to forms of transnational governmentality that 
bypassed a state lurching increasingly towards political and economic crisis. This became 
particularly obvious and acute as the effects of ESAP were felt and the state found itself and 
its power waning, and as poverty rapidly increased. Whatever the other complex causes of the 
land takeovers from the year 2000, I argue that – more than simply the white occupation of 
most of the prime land (Worby 2003: 56) – it was also the forms of transnational 
governmentality acting on commercial farms that were a visible reminder to the ZANU-PF 
state “of a sovereignty promised but not yet fully realised” (ibid.). Despite their best effort to 
depoliticise their work and position, then, both farmers and farmworker NGOs found 
themselves very quickly becoming personae non gratae at the turn of the century. The 





                                                          
164 On the other hand, Lynn Walker argues that not a single farm on which the SCF programme was 
implemented experienced a strike in 1997, and that this fact was used to sell the merits of the FWP to farmers 
(Taped interview with Lynn Walker, Harare, 30 May 2012). This suggests that NGO welfare programmes could 
indeed act to pacify workers and dissuade them from taking radical action over larger structural issues.     




































The Politics and Pragmatics of Labour, Welfare and Livelihoods on (Former) 
Commercial Farms in the Context of Radical Agrarian Change 
 
[The] severing of territorialized control over labour on the former commercial farms has been a very 
significant change in terms of farm labour relations and for current and former farmworkers. But it is 
not necessarily a change that is inherently positive. (Rutherford 2014: 219) 
 
Introduction: Terrains of Politics in Land Reform and Land Reform Research 
Early in the year 2000, Zimbabwe entered an era in which social, political and economic 
problems which had intensified during the 1990s converged into a multidimensional “crisis” 
(Raftopolous 2009). A complex set of factors including unpopular economic policies; 
currency devaluations; food and fuel shortages; growing unemployment; increasing poverty; 
land hunger and the slow pace of land reforms; corruption scandals; and government 
decisions such as the unbudgeted 1997 pension pay-out to Liberation War Veterans, saw a 
loss of popularity for the governing ZANU-PF party and the rise of the labour and civil 
society-backed opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party by 1999 (see 
Muzondidya 2009; Raftopoulos 2009). When the proposed new constitution, backed by the 
ZANU-PF government, was defeated in the February 2000 referendum, pro-ZANU-PF 
militants (including and often led by War Veterans) mobilised groups of youths, peasants and 
unemployed black Zimbabweans to occupy the 4,200 white-owned large-scale commercial 
farms (LSCFs),166 initiating what became known variously as the land invasions, Jambanja or 
                                                          
166 These white-owned commercial farms, along with other large land-holdings owned by local and international 
corporations, churches, trusts and so on amounted, in the year 2000, to some 11.7 million hectares, or 30 per 
cent of Zimbabwe’s land area (Scoones et al. 2010: 4).  
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Third Chimurenga.167 The ensuing “crisis”, its causes, dynamics and outcomes, have received 
much scholarly attention in the years since 2000.168 
 The period of Jambanja – during which the (often violent) confiscation of land from 
commercial farmers was frequently characterised by critical commentators and the 
international media as “chaotic” (see Matondi 2012: 13; Willems 2004) – was, from July 
2001, increasingly rationalised (in law and policy) and bureaucratised by the state under the 
rubric of the “Fast-track Land Reform Programme” (FTLRP; Chambati 2013a: 163). Land 
compulsorily acquired by the state was to be resettled by two types of beneficiary: the A1 
small-scale peasant farmer (either in villagised arrangements or on individual plots); and the 
A2 small- to medium-scale commercial farms for the capitalised elite (Matondi 2012: 9–10; 
Scoones et al. 2010: 3–4). While statistics vary between sources, it has been estimated that by 
2011, around 145,775 A1 farms and 16,386 A2 farms had been allocated on a total area of 
close to 9 million hectares, with two-thirds of this land going to A1 farmers (Matondi 2012: 
9). This left approximately 800 un-gazetted LSCFs/corporate estates, with less than 300 being 
farmed by white farmers (ibid.).  
 In the late 1990s, close to 200,000 permanent workers and a slightly smaller number 
of casual or seasonal contract workers were employed on LSCFs (Chambati and Moyo 2007: 
9). Permanent workers tended to reside on the farms while seasonal workers either lived on 
the farms as the wives and children of permanents, or were accommodated temporarily 
during the agricultural season. With their dependents, it was believed that the total farm-
dwelling population was over 1.5 million.169 Implicated in 2000 by ZANU-PF as supporters 
of the white farmers and opposition MDC, farmworkers had long been constructed in the 
narrow state discourses around citizenship as “aliens” and “totemless” foreigners due to their 
                                                          
167 The use of the term Third Chimurenga to describe the farm takeovers was a rhetorical strategy of ZANU-PF 
and its supporters to link this endeavour to the previous two revolutionary wars (see Marongwe 2003, among 
others, for a discussion of the farm occupations and the identity of and dynamics among the occupiers). 
Jambanja is a widely used colloquial word in the majority chiShona language referring to a violent and chaotic 
conflict. It is applied particularly to the period of farm occupations and associated violence and lawlessness in 
the early part of the 2000s. Since it is important to distinguish between the period of farm occupations and later 
attempts by the government to bring this largely uncoordinated and extra-legal action under the umbrella of an 
official government land-reform programme, I refer to the initial period of violence as the farm 
takeovers/occupations or use the term Jambanja, while I use the official name (FTLRP) to refer to the post-2000 
agrarian dispensation in general. 
168 See, among many others, Alexander (2006), Bond and Manyanya (2002), Campbell (2003), Cliffe et al. 
(2011), Crush and Tevera (2010), Hammar et al. (2003, 2010), Harold-Barry (2004), Moyo and Yeros (2005), 
Moyo et al. (2008), Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009), Raftopoulos and Savage (2004), Sachikonye (2011), 
Scoones et al. (2010), Worby (2001). 
169 Estimates of how many farmworkers were employed and living on LSCFs vary, with those of the 
Commercial Farmers Union being above official estimates, particularly with regard to casual or seasonal labour 
(see Chambati and Moyo 2007: 9). The above statistics represent a middle path between the two estimates.   
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migrant-worker origins (Muzondidya 2004; Rutherford 2001b, 2003, 2004c), and as 
unproductive and dependent lackeys without a proper development ethos (Moyo et al. 2000: 
189–90).170 They thus not only failed to qualify for land under the FTLRP, but were the most 
badly affected by violence and displacement as farms were seized and often looted during the 
Jambanja period (GAPWUZ 2010; Rutherford 2001b; Sachikonye 2003). It is difficult to 
provide an accurate estimate of how many farmworkers were physically displaced, but 
Scoones at al. (2010: 128) estimate that around 45,000 permanent farmworker households 
(some 225,000 people) were forced to leave the farms following the takeovers. While only 
between 5 and 10 per cent of former farmworkers are estimated to have been beneficiaries of 
the FTLRP (ibid. 127), the bulk of the farmworker population on redistributed land remained 
in their farm-compound accommodation, eking out a living in various insecure ways 
(Sachikonye 2003).171    
 The situation of white farmers and their workers attracted increasing scholarly 
attention in the first years after the launch of the FTLRP.172 While some chose to focus on the 
physical displacement of farmworkers and the ways in which displaced workers sought to 
recover (Hartnack 2005, 2009b), others examined the conditions and livelihoods of those who 
remained on the farms, who they saw as “displaced in situ” (Magaramombe 2010). Other 
studies highlighted the human-rights abuses experienced by farmworkers as a result of the 
land takeovers (GAPWUZ 2010). Another group of scholars, linked to Zimbabwean think-
tank the African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS), took a divergent analytical approach 
which makes use of a Marxist political economy framework to explore the ways in which the 
FTLRP is positively resolving “the agrarian question” (Moyo and Chambati 2013; Moyo and 
Yeros 2005).173 Like Scoones et al. (2010) and Hanlon et al. (2013), they adopt an overtly pro 
fast-track land reform stance, seeing the replacement of large-scale capitalist farms with 
smaller land units farmed predominantly by peasants as a socially and economically 
                                                          
170 It has been argued that, within the independent Zimbabwean nation-state, farmworkers occupied a position 
akin to Agamben’s (1998) “state of exception”, given that they remained within the polity, but as outsiders who 
did not qualify for the same rights as other citizens (Wisborg 2013: 265). To this can be added that their position 
largely remained that of perpetual “subjects”, rather than as full “citizens” of independent Zimbabwe (see 
Mamdani 1996).    
171 While, by the 1990s, most farmworkers were Zimbabwean-born, many had ancestral links to Malawi, 
Zambia and Mozambique. Most, however, did not any longer have strong ties with their ancestral homelands 
and consequently less than 3 per cent stated that they wished to be “repatriated” when they lost their jobs on the 
farms, or were displaced (Chambati and Magaramombe 2008: 228).   
172 For example: Chambati (2003), Chambati and Magaramombe (2008), Chambati and Moyo (2004, 2007), 
Hartnack (2005), Kibble and Vanlerberge (2000), Rutherford (2001b, 2003, 2004c), Sachikonye (2003). 
173 For different perspectives on the history and dynamics of “the agrarian question” see Neocosmos (1993) and 
Bernstein (2004, 2006). 
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progressive move which has undermined the capitalist super-exploitation of the former 
system and created better opportunities for land beneficiaries and agricultural labourers (see 
also Matondi 2012).  
 Chambati has been the most prolific author to have examined the dynamics of the 
restructured “agrarian labour relations” following the FTLRP.174 His work is based on a 
national baseline survey conducted by AIAS in 2005/6 and subsequent follow-up research in 
six districts, providing much insight into emerging labour dynamics in new resettlement 
areas. Chambati critiques authors who have focussed on farmworker displacements, human-
rights abuses and formal job losses, claiming that such a focus represents “a conservative 
orientation towards implicitly defending the poorly remunerated wage labour in the former 
LSCF” (2011: 1048). For Chambati, the old LSCFs represent the super-exploitative system of 
local and global capital – developed under colonialism – in which landless workers were 
trapped in a semi-feudal master–servant relationship. Furthermore, he argues that the “labour 
residential tenancy” of the “compound system” tied residency to employment, enabling 
farmers to exercise “total control” over them and extract their labour on terms which did not 
allow them to meet their social reproduction needs (Chambati 2011: 1051–2).  
 For Chambati (2011, 2013a), the redistribution of farmland to thousands of 
indigenous farmers and the creation of a more diversified agrarian structure has not only been 
overwhelmingly positive for the beneficiaries, but has also been progressive for farmworkers 
and agrarian labour relations generally. He argues that the FTLRP has resulted in a “net gain 
in livelihoods” (2011: 1052), with family members from close to 170,000 farm households 
benefiting from some 570,000 new “self-employed” agricultural jobs, and the creation of 
355,000 “permanent” jobs and over a million casual employment opportunities (ibid.: 1060; 
Chambati 2013a: 167). Former farmworkers still living in the farm compounds, he argues, are 
in a “qualitatively” different position because their employment rights have been delinked 
from their land rights; the racialised master–servant relationship has been replaced with 
progressive “social patronage labour relations” (2011: 1057); new farmers have less control 
over farmworkers (ibid.: 1065), who consequently have increased bargaining power with the 
greater number of potential employers they can sell their labour to and can also choose to sell 
it in “competing non-farm jobs” (ibid.). Freed from the repressive master–servant relationship 
and tied housing, Chambati (ibid.) argues that former farmworkers are now “engaged in 
wider autonomous struggles to improve their material conditions and social reproduction”. 
                                                          
174 See Chambati and Magaramombe (2008), Chambati (2011, 2013a, 2013b). 
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 I do not take issue with a political economy analytical approach which highlights the 
structural inequalities, labour exploitation and contradictions of large-scale commercial 
farming. Chambati’s analysis (2011, 2013a), however, makes use of an extremely simplistic, 
static and crude understanding of labour relations, conditions and power dynamics on the 
former LSCFs. He interprets Rutherford’s (2001a) notion of “domestic government” as an 
inherently repressive system which used (only) “intimidation, racial abuse, arbitrary 
dismissals and violence to manage labour” (ibid.: 1050). He argues that Zimbabwe’s 
independence “did not significantly alter agrarian labour relations” and that farmworkers 
uniformly experienced “appalling living conditions” in terms of their housing, education and 
health (ibid.: 1051). Within this system farmworkers, both before and after independence, are 
seen as little more than slave labourers while farmers are seen as little better than slave 
masters: there is no room for farmworker resistance, agency and choice, their possibilities 
and permutations over time, and no indication of the opportunities that “domestic 
government” offered to some workers, depending on where they were placed. Similarly, there 
is very little acknowledgement of the differentiation between farms depending on the 
(changing) attitudes of their owners towards worker welfare and the influence that NGOs, in 
particular, came to have on the way white farmers treated their workers.  
 While Rutherford (2014) also situates his work on farmworkers within a political 
economy framework, he feels that the way authors such as Chambati (2011) have used this 
approach has its limitations, especially in understanding “the practices shaping political 
action, particularly mobilization and demobilization, facing farm workers and farm dwellers” 
(Rutherford 2014: 216). He critiques Chambati for “assuming that dependencies and power 
relations can be swept away through massive land distribution” (ibid.: 222) and claiming that 
labour relations on commercial farms prior to 2000 were inherently worse than those now 
existing on resettled farms. Rutherford (2014) points out that studies in South Africa (e.g. Du 
Toit 2004) have shown that the material conditions and possibilities for farmworkers have 
actually worsened since they were “freed” from the “residential labour tenancy” of the farm 
compound (through eviction from the farms), and that their relations with new patrons, 
including kin, are “fraught with power” and can be just as exploitative, insecure and 
disadvantageous, if not more so. He highlights the fact that there were a “diversity of working 
and living conditions found on former commercial farms” in Zimbabwe and that Chambati’s 
analysis occludes “the actual terrain of struggle for farmworkers through these power 
relations”, both prior to the FTLRP and subsequently (Rutherford 2014: 220). Rutherford 
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argues that Chambati (2011) has ignored the question of power and politics within the new 
agrarian relations and failed to examine critically the actual social relations of dependency 
and power relations involving farmworkers, land-reform beneficiaries and local state and 
party power-holders (2014: 222).      
 Rutherford (2014: 220) thus calls for an approach which provides “a finer appraisal of 
the terrain of politics … [which can] assess the possibilities for various struggles over 
working conditions, living conditions and access to land-based resources for farmworkers and 
farm dwellers”. He suggests that a useful theoretical approach involves paying attention to 
“the cultural politics of belonging on particular social territories and its intersection with 
wider political economic conditions” (ibid.). He draws here on Africanist scholars who have 
used the concepts of “belonging” and the “politics of recognition” to examine the power 
relations shaping the ways in which people make claims to different resources, and how 
others may discount these claims (e.g. Geschiere 2009; Nyamnjoh 2006; Taylor 1994). 
Furthermore, he calls for attention to different and at times competing “modes of belonging”, 
which he sees as “the routinized discourses, social practices and institutional arrangements 
through which people make claims for resources and rights, the ways through which they 
become ‘incorporated’ in particular places” (Rutherford 2008: 79). He argues that 
Zimbabwean farmworkers up to the year 2000 were dependent on a “conditional mode of 
belonging” called “domestic government” (2008, 2014), which fundamentally determined 
what claims they could make and the terms of their struggles over access to resources and 
livelihoods. There was, however, room within this mode of belonging for some resistance, 
negotiation and mobilisation, particularly as it was influenced by the activities of NGOs and 
unions in the 1990s (see Rutherford 2014: 223–9).  
 Rutherford sees the “virtual destruction of the territorialized mode of belonging of 
domestic government” after the FTLRP (2014: 230). Not able to provide recent ethnographic 
evidence himself, he draws on the existing literature to speculate about what modes of 
belonging farmworkers are negotiating in their present circumstances, and what implications 
this has had on their ability to influence their living and working conditions and secure their 
livelihoods. Noting the varied outcomes for former workers, he nonetheless points out that 
most studies have indicated that farmworkers are in a very precarious position in terms of 
their livelihoods and access to resources such as housing and land.175 Moreover, Rutherford 
                                                          
175 See Mabvurira et al. (2012), Magaramombe (2010) and Mutangi (2010) for examples of additional authors 
who have focussed on the precarious living, working and livelihood situations of former farmworkers after the 
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also cautions against overly positive assessments which, for example, claim that 350,000 
“permanent” jobs have been created, when such opportunities have been poorly remunerated, 
insecure/short-term and mostly informal in nature (2014: 232). He observes, however, that 
there is no study “that provides insight into the particular cultural politics shaping the claims 
and access to resources for these former farmworkers on the FTLRP farms” (ibid.), and also 
that there has not been much scholarly attention paid to the power relations on the 
approximately 800 or so undesignated LSCFs and plantations.176   
 This chapter seeks to go some way in addressing these knowledge gaps by providing 
an ethnographic account of factors shaping the cultural politics of belonging and giving rise 
to situated conditional “modes of belonging” on non-designated commercial farms on the 
highveld. It will explore important aspects of the political economy of commercial agriculture 
over the last decade and what influence this has had on operating LSCFs, and what 
implications this has had for labour and power relations, welfare and livelihood opportunities 
for workers on these farms. The chapter will also examine some of the dynamics found on A2 
land-reform farms and farms given over to (often illegal) low-cost housing developments, 
and some of the struggles that former farmworkers in such situations have faced in 
maintaining access to important resources and livelihoods. It shows that in both cases, there 
has been a dwindling in the provision of farmer and NGO welfare support for farmworkers 
and dwellers as both the edificatory elements of domestic government and the biopolitical 
maternalism of NGO programmes have receded or been displaced. I argue that although the 
specific forms of power associated with domestic government and biopolitical maternalism 
may have diminished, in the contexts I have examined the FTLRP has not done away with 
problematic power relations nor revolutionised labour relations, but provided a different set 
of power relations and challenges which farmworkers must continue to negotiate to meet 
their short- and long-term needs. Moreover, new modes of conditional belonging have often 
left farmworkers and dwellers to rely on their own ingenuity for survival as resources and 
forms of welfare offered prior to 2000 are more insecure or no longer present to the same 
degree.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
FTLRP. The chapter by Scoones et al. (2010) also indicates that pay is low and conditions are poor for “new” 
farmworkers, even if the scale of employment opportunities has increased. Interestingly, earlier work by 
Chambati (Chambati and Magaramombe 2008) provides a much more nuanced and balanced assessment of the 
position of farmworkers before and after the FTLRP than his later work shows.    
176 These farms are estimated to employ over 136,000 permanent and seasonal workers (Chambati 2013a: 167). 
Some scholars are now addressing issues and dynamics relating to local cultural politics on “fast-track farms”, 
including how former farmworkers are placed, and their struggles to access resources (see Mkodzongi 2014, and 
Sinclair-Bright 2014, whose PhD dissertation is forthcoming).    
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Reconfigurations of Domestic Government on Surviving LSCFs  
Despite attempts by white farmers to resist or at least delay eviction: physically, through 
negotiation and through the courts, the Jambanja was remarkably successful in removing 
them from their land. Even farms owned by individuals and companies from countries whose 
governments had signed a Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement 
(BIPPA) were not exempt, with 76 per cent of the 258 of such properties having been 
forcibly acquired by 2013.177 By early 2004, there were no more than about 800 white 
farmers still farming and “the farming community had been almost entirely destroyed” 
(Pilosoff 2012: 60). A decade later, the number of remaining LSCFs and corporate estates is 
less than 1,000, with fewer than 200 being farmed by white farmers. Nevertheless, through 
various strategies and arrangements with local power-holders, some white farmers did 
manage to remain farming, often on reduced landholdings and on fairly disadvantageous 
terms (Matondi 2012: 220; Pilossof 2012; Selby 2006). Additionally, from around 2009, a 
number of white farmers have made arrangements to rent or manage A2 farms with 
individual beneficiaries, raising the ire of the state, the former owners of those properties and 
displaced farmers generally (Kalaora 2011).178  
 During this time, some farmers attempted to use welfare projects as one strategy 
through which to remain on their farms, believing that the presence of a school, orphanage or 
a clinic might give them some protection. This was seldom a successful long-term land-
retaining strategy, but has worked in a small number of cases as, during the course of my 
fieldwork, I heard about orphanages on white-owned farms in Chinoyi, Mazowe, Juru, 
Norton, Glendale and Chikombedzi. Other white “farmers’ wives” in districts such as 
Macheke and Wedza were still heavily involved in supporting their local schools with an 
overt hope that this support would be seen by farmworkers, land beneficiaries and local 
authorities as indispensable.   
 The case of one farmer, who part-owned a conservancy outside Chiredzi, illustrates 
how complex the motivations of such endeavours could be in the context of Jambanja. The 
farmer, Richard Hick, owned an office and an adjacent yard in Chiredzi town. In Chiredzi, 
there was a small community of visually impaired black Zimbabweans who, from 1997, Hick 
permitted to use the office telephone and play sports in the yard, something he describes as “a 
                                                          
177 See Gumbo (2013).   
178 Personal communication, anonymous employee of the Commercial Farmers Union, June 2012. See also 
Moyo (2013: 51).   
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very low-key benevolence”.179 On one hand, the motivation for this “benevolence” came 
from his Christian beliefs and “a theology that creates a sense that one needs to be more 
compassionate”, but on the other, he admits that at that time “it was in line with … being seen 
to be a good guy”. Reflecting on his initial motivations, Hick is aware that such acts of 
charity also have their rewards: “deep down there is a strategic thing, you know, and of 
course, there’s benefits as well where you feel that at least you’re not totally selfish”. In 
2000, when the economic crisis deepened, what had been a small-scale project grew to 
include up to 50 blind people and their families from all over the south-east lowveld and 
beyond. Hick undertook to feed members of the “blind community” until there was “political 
change”, which he believed would come soon.    
 He mobilised local companies and overseas donors so that he could provide each 
family with a food pack every few months, which he handed out after a religious gathering, 
sometimes held at his farm, followed by lunch and games. This was during a period where he 
also chose to support the MDC openly, and at that time he felt that the project “looked good 
politically”. When Hick’s section of the conservancy was occupied by settlers in the early 
2000s, he hoped the project might save his farm: “I thought maybe I’d be the ‘nice guy’ left 
on the land … and all the ‘bad guys’ would be invaded, but in fact it worked the other way!” 
He also found that he was not above using his charity as a strategy to hold on to his farm: “I 
remember taking the blind people out to the farm, and they were sitting in the back of the 
vehicle. They couldn’t see the invaders, but the invaders could see them – that I was letting 
the blind community enjoy the fruits of the farm because I was such a ‘nice guy’. And I was 
manipulating … [a complex situation]: you could feel it”. It is apparent how complex Hick’s 
motivations were and how confused he was by the situation and how to act in accordance 
with his own ethics and religious beliefs, and at the same time look after his own interests. 
Ultimately, his charitable support of the blind led the “invaders” to view him less as a “good 
guy” and more as a threat in the context of his open support of the MDC and his was the first 
farm in the district to be taken, in 2003.   
 However, rather than spur farmers and their wives to become more involved in 
welfare-related projects, the period of Jambanja most often had the opposite effect. Despite 
the common expectations of white farmers and the state’s construction of farmworkers as 
loyal to their bosses, labour forces were by no means united in their political outlook or views 
about how to act in the face of impending farm takeovers. It was common for there to be 
                                                          
179 Taped interview with Richard Hick. Cape Town, 7 January 2014.  
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some active ZANU-PF members among the workers who might secretly encourage their 
colleagues to attend political rallies or join in with the invasions (see Hartnack 2006: 82), but 
workers were caught between their bosses and the would-be land invaders, and many initially 
chose to defend the status quo (ibid.). The introduction by the government of Statutory 
Instrument 6 (SI6) in early 2002, however, changed the relationship between white farmers 
and workers fundamentally, causing many farmers to abandon the myth of farmworker 
loyalty and adopt the language of betrayal (Pilossof 2012: 202; Selby 2006: 307–8). 
Supported strongly by the main agricultural union, GAPWUZ, as well as several smaller – 
and more militant – unions, SI6 required farmers whose land had been acquired to pay a 
comprehensive retrenchment package to each worker they laid-off.180 Encouraged by the 
unions and ZANU-PF militants, farmworkers on most farms which had not yet been 
designated demanded, sometimes violently, to be paid their packages as well, despite there 
being no legal basis for such requests. Farmers often had little choice but to give in to their 
demands.  
 According to some farmers, the SI6 regulation in effect, “got workers to go out and 
Jambanja [seize] farms on behalf of war vets – it went like wildfire through the districts”.181 
The mobilisation of farmworkers against farmers altered the long-established terms of 
domestic government. On one hand, it undermined the power white farmers had over their 
labour forces, but on the other, it also undermined the unwritten obligations within domestic 
government for the farmer to “edify” workers and provide them with their welfare needs. 
Besides the practical challenges introduced by SI6, the emotional aspects of this shift were 
also significant, with most farmers and their wives abandoning the welfare endeavours they 
had initiated in the past.182 Former Manicaland farmers Wendy Cooke and her husband 
illustrate this point well. They had worked closely with farmworker NGOs in the 1990s, 
establishing brick housing, decent sanitation, a clinic and a preschool, paying a farm health 
worker (FHW) and initiating an income-generation sewing project for women. Around the 
time of the 2003 SI6 strikes her husband was diagnosed with a malignant brain tumour. 
Wendy had to negotiate with the striking workers and the militant union members who were 
                                                          
180 When introduced, the SI6 package consisted of: three months’ salary in lieu of notice; three months’ salary 
as a severance package; one months’ salary as a relocation allowance (or the actual cost of relocation); the 
gratuity payable in terms of Statutory Instrument 323 of 1993, (the Agricultural Collective Bargaining 
Agreement in force at that time), which normally equated to around one month of wages; and two months’ 
salary for every completed year of service. My thanks to Marc Carrie-Wilson (CFU) for these details.  
181 Interview with Robert Foster, Harare, 7 July 2013.   
182 As Robert Foster pointed out (interview, 7 July 2013), those farmers with the most established and stable 
workforces were the hardest-hit by SI6 because they had to pay out large amounts to long-serving workers.  
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pressing her to pay, despite the property never having been designated for acquisition. “I had 
to manage it as well as the stress of my ill husband, and the workers knew he was sick” 
Wendy remembered. “Once we were full of war vets I lost heart. I was so incensed with the 
workers after that I shut the crèche, preschool and clinic. Our workers were brainwashed by 
these new unions”.183 
 Bruce and Megan Jones, who were still farming tobacco on a portion of their farm at 
the time of our interview, having come to “a delicate arrangement” with the “new land 
owners”, are another case in point.184 Young farmers with progressive attitudes towards 
labour relations, by the 1990s they provided brick housing with electricity for the workers, 
land to grow vegetables, a well-stocked clinic with trained health workers, a proper preschool 
and feeding scheme, and they paid for the workers’ children to go to both junior and high 
school in the nearby town. Megan also worked with several farmworker NGOs and started 
her own skills-focussed women’s club on the farm. However, the labour force demanded “the 
package” in 2002 which, explained Megan, “was … almost like a cut-off point”. It “created a 
major change in the way that all of our welfare and things were structured”. The reason for 
this was both economic and personal. The “package”, for their almost 200 mostly permanent 
and long-term workforce, “set us back very hard”, according to Megan. They closed the farm 
down and re-hired those who wanted to return to work “as day-one employees” and at the 
lowest pay grade, and “they were re-employed on the understanding that basically all of the 
advantages that they had were no longer there”. As Megan explained, they thus reduced their 
welfare endeavours to the bare minimum required by law: 
 
So all the schemes … they were meeting a natural death anyway because of the confusion that was 
going on, but from our point of view, you’ve had to dish out an amount of money that could bankrupt 
you, basically. Ja, and that your workers have gone down that route: well then we start again from the 
beginning. 
 
The Jones’ story charts the breakdown of a form of domestic government which had 
developed on LSCFs by the 1990s, a form which drew on both old paternalistic/maternalistic 
and more “modern” labour management techniques where the “will to improve” (Li 2007) 
and edify (in conjunction with NGOs) were central. Whilst, in terms of access to resources 
                                                          
183 Interview with Wendy Cooke, Harare, 23 March 2013.  
184 Taped interview with Megan Jones, Harare, 28 February 2013.  
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and availability of care, this hegemonic “mode of belonging” can hardly be described, in 
Ferguson’s (2006: 36) terms, as “socially thick”, it was replaced by a mode that was 
significantly more “socially thin” (ibid.) than had been the case before. For this reason, 
though, this new mode was also less able to control workers than had been the case before 
2000. As I will show below, the FTLRP, among other things, meant that farmworkers, while 
still dependent on the farms for cash and shelter, began to hedge their bets and look 
elsewhere to meet the balance of their needs and long-term strategies. For farmers, this made 
the building up of “close” and trusting relationships with “loyal” workers much more difficult 
and put further strain on these relationships. Crucially, the FTLRP and the associated 
economic crisis also created a very insecure operating environment (politically and 
economically) for those commercial farmers who continued to farm, a situation which Megan 
and many other farmers I interviewed called “survival mode”.     
 
The “Survival Mode” of Belonging on Large- and Medium-scale Tobacco Farms   
Gerald Du Toit had been in desperate survival mode for five years when I met him in 2013. 
He had been forced off Elgin Farm, in Mashonaland Central, after the extremely violent June 
2008 Presidential election run-off. Local ZANU-PF party officials and some demonstrators 
besieged his homestead and he “had to run”, but these would-be farm occupiers seemed not 
to have the backing of more senior Party figures and once Gerald left, they never actually 
occupied his land. The Du Toits had owned Elgin Farm since 1952 and Gerald was not about 
to give up on it. He instructed the workers and their families (some 400 people) to remain in 
the farm compound and to plough the soil in preparation for the new season. For several 
months, he came to the farm under the cover of darkness, bringing the workers their pay 
packages and some provisions in the hope that he could stealthily claim back his farm: “I 
believed that you have got to make sure that you don’t allow a vacuum to be created. So I 
looked after my workers there like this for three or four months and nobody pitched up: so I 
went back to the farm because I had occupied the vacuum!”185   
 Having obtained finance from a tobacco company,186 the political disturbances and 
various climatic factors caused his 2008 yield to be very poor and Gerald got into “serious 
                                                          
185 Interview with Gerald Du Toit, Elgin Farm, 26 March 2013. Note how, like other farmers/“farmer’s wives” 
quoted in the chapter, Gerald refers to the workers as “my workers”, signalling his sense of paternalistic 
proprietorship over them.   
186 Farmers have been unable to access loans from commercial banks for most of the last decade. Several large 
tobacco financing companies, including some from China, have stepped into this role, however.    
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debt”, amounting to US$167,000 plus interest of 12 per cent per annum. Like many other 
remaining farmers, he used his house in Harare’s suburbs as surety with the financiers since 
his land could not be used as collateral anymore (cf. Chambati 2013: 9). Being “totally 
owned by the financiers and … mortgaged up to the hilt”, Gerald had no choice but to try 
every means by which he could continue to produce a tobacco crop. Luckily, he was able to 
continue farming and his next four seasons allowed him to clear the debt. However, in the 
2012/13 season, which was coming to an end at the time of our interview, the 48 hectares of 
Virginia tobacco he planted had not done well because of erratic rainfall. The quality of his 
leaf usually meant that he was able to fetch a high price at the auction floors, but since the 
overhead costs (seeds, fertiliser, chemicals, labour, fuel, transport etc.) had become very high, 
Gerald claimed that he needed to fetch an average price of US$5.50 per kilogram just to 
break even and pay back his loan.187    
 Caught in a debt trap, Gerald had to find ways of continuing to farm, despite both 
political and economic threats to his business. One crucial strategy was, in his words, to “play 
the game” – which means continually agreeing to help local power-holders such as the chief 
with gifts such as diesel and even cattle. In other words, Gerald paid unbudgeted informal 
taxes to ensure that his operations could continue. Another strategy Gerald employed was to 
let the farm infrastructure become run-down, explaining: “I have learnt that the worse the 
buildings look the safer you are”. Thus, although the workers’ housing was still connected to 
water and electricity, it was falling into disrepair.188 Furthermore, as with the cases described 
above, all his previous welfare endeavours (such as the farm health worker) were 
discontinued in 2004 when he became “fatigued”. He also took the decision to leave most of 
the day-to-day business of the farm to a few of his senior workers and only travel to the farm 
for two days a week so as to minimise his visible presence. His absence, however, and the 
lack of control over his workforce became a major burden. Shortly before my visit to the 
farm, a barn full of curing tobacco – which requires careful monitoring – had been ruined 
when the night-shift workers failed to monitor it adequately. But the real crunch came later in 
2013 when a “huge amount” of fertiliser which he had bought with the advance he had 
obtained for the 2013/14 crop was stolen by one of his senior workers. To make matters 
                                                          
187 The average price fetched at auction for flue-cured tobacco in the 2012/13 season was US$3.71 per kg. In the 
2013/14 season, it fell to US$3.17 per kg. Very good quality tobacco, which is well-processed and flavourful 
can fetch over US$5 per kg.  
188 The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) also currently advises its members not to invest in capital expenses 
which are not directly connected to production, given that their position is insecure (Personal communication, 
anonymous CFU official, March 2014). 
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worse, there was renewed interest in his farm following the 2013 ZANU-PF election victory 
and it appeared that Gerald had finally lost his battle to continue farming.   
 The political-economy of large-scale tobacco farming for those commercial farmers 
still attempting to operate is therefore not particularly favourable.189 This has important 
ramifications for the conditions farmworkers have to endure and what welfare and other 
resources they can access on such farms. The very same pressures apply to many of the A2 
commercial farmers trying to grow tobacco on their so-called “fast-track farms” (Matondi 
2012), as illustrated by the case of Garikai Mawoko and his farm in Mashonaland East. 
Garikai was allocated the 550 hectare Eagles Nest farm in 2004. Although he has family 
connections to ZANU-PF, he was an ideal beneficiary for other reasons, being trained in 
finance and agriculture and having managed several tobacco farms since the 1990s. Garikai 
managed to secure a lease on the farm from the government, but financial institutions and the 
tobacco companies will not accept this as surety, so he has to use his house in Harare as 
collateral.190 “I really wish I had the title deed in my hands”, said Garikai, who took the 
unusual step of paying the previous owner for the farm equipment and livestock.191 A few 
seasons after he took over, the district lands committee informed him that 160 hectares of the 
farm were to be allocated to A1 settlers, reducing his land-holding to 390 hectares. Although 
he now assists these neighbouring A1 farmers, particularly with tillage, problems such as 
unmanaged firebreaks and stray cattle plague their relationship.                       
 Thus, despite his political connections, his agricultural nous and the fact that his farm 
is productive, Garikai admits that he is continually on edge and in an insecure position. “I 
will talk to you because I believe the truth must come out”, he said. “But you must know that 
there are very strong party structures on every farm”, he told me, “Even having a murungu 
[white person] like you here is a risk … if I play my cards wrong I could lose the farm: a lot 
                                                          
189 According to informants, some corporate tobacco estates which have well-connected board members and 
shareholders have managed to do well because they have kept secure access to large areas of arable land. The 
tobacco financing companies are also prepared to lend them money at lower interest rates since they are not as 
much of a risk as insecure individual farmers (Interview, Gerald Du Toit, Elgin Farm, 26 March 2013). 
However, although this was true for a large tobacco estate I conducted interviews on in Mashonaland West, the 
operators still had to make significant resources (cash and kind) available to local power-holders such as war 
veterans, army officers and even the local chief, who fined the farm US$500 for not observing the traditional 
day of rest (chisi). Farmworker welfare tended to suffer as a result of the informal taxes required to continue the 
farm operations (Interviews, Dale Farm, Mashonaland West, 11 March 2013). 
190 Interview with Garikai Mawoko, Eagles Nest Farm, 28 November 2013. A2 farmers are first issued an “offer 
letter” on the farm they have been allocated by the government which technically gives them the right to occupy 
the farm. They may then be granted a 99-year lease, but relatively few A2 farmers have yet managed to secure a 
lease. Neither offer letters nor leases are accepted as surety by financial institutions.    
191 Interview with Garikai Mawoko, Eagles Nest Farm, 28 November 2013.  
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of money is at stake”.192 Garikai therefore has to provide constant donations, transport and 
personnel for political rallies, especially around election time, to ensure he stays in good 
books with both party and state agents. Like all large tobacco farmers, Garikai uses loans 
from one of the main tobacco companies and has fallen into debt (US$80,000) due to several 
poor seasons in a row, further complicated by a hail storm the previous season which 
destroyed a quarter of his crop. “The margins in farming are getting tighter and tighter and I 
am now in survival mode”, he explained. Garikai also faces problems with theft, having had 
US$2,000 stolen from the farm office and 100 litres of diesel drained from the tractors. 
Suspecting that his senior workers were involved, he threatened to drop their pay grades if the 
thefts continued. The extent of Garikai’s insecurity on his own farm was evident when we 
drove to the compound. As I got out of the car he warned me to lock the car door, saying “I 
don’t trust anyone here anymore”. Indeed, he characterised farming as combat: “It’s a battle 
front: you are fighting against cash flow, difficult politics, too much rain, not enough rain, 
Agribank not lending and all these problems”.           
 Managing a large labour force is one of these “problems”, not least because it is very 
difficult to ensure that they work for him during crucial times.193 In peak periods there are 
high levels of absenteeism as many of his employees go to surrounding A1 plots and perform 
maricho (piece work) for US$5 per day, which is more than he can pay. Although Garikai 
warns the workers not to moonlight he also uses various incentives to try and encourage 
loyalty. Those who prove to be diligent and do not absent themselves he pays at a higher 
wage grade than the legislated minimum wage.194 Garikai also gives the workers a small plot 
of land to cultivate as an incentive and to foster “a sense of belonging”, but will remove this 
privilege from a worker who is too often absent. However, other provisions for workers are 
“falling apart” due to Garikai’s difficult financial position. He used to provide credit to 
workers, but now only does so for emergencies, and he had to stop providing free maize meal 
as he cannot afford to do so any longer. Having been very involved in worker welfare on his 
previous farm, Garikai introduced a Farm Development Committee (FADCO) at Eagles Nest. 
For a few years this was very active and he would provide prizes to encourage neat houses 
                                                          
192 Despite these concerns, which we discussed before my visit and which I offered to mitigate by meeting him 
in Harare, Garikai insisted that I was “welcome” to visit him at the farm as long as the visit was about academic 
research on farm welfare issues and his name and the farm’s name were kept strictly anonymous.  
193 He employed 90 permanent workers and 30 seasonal workers in 2013/14.  
194 The gazetted minimum wage for the lowest grade of general agricultural worker at that time (November 
2013) was US$65 per month. Higher-level workers could earn anything up to double this amount, depending on 
which of the ten employment grades for agricultural workers their job corresponded with (see Mutenga 2013). 
Employers are also required to pay workers at one-and-a-half times their normal daily rate for overtime worked, 
and double for work on public holidays.    
130 
and clean toilets, and so on, but the FADCO has not been active recently because of Garikai’s 
financial worries. He employs a woman to run the preschool and she also acts as a health 
worker, although anyone requiring treatment must attend the nearest government clinic if 
they need medicine. It is evident that, although Garikai cares about farmworker welfare, and 
conditions on his farm are not bad, he has had to withdraw most of his resources from welfare 
issues and he also has no time to dedicate to welfare since he is in “survival mode”.   
 Unfortunately, the 2013/14 season was not a good one either. Excessive rains from 
mid-January to mid-February caused leaching, waterlogging and the tobacco to ripen at too 
fast a rate for his barn capacity. Not only was his yield reduced and quality affected, but the 
prices offered at the auction floors in 2014 were lower than the previous year, meaning that 
he only made an average of US$3.60 per kg on his crop.195 This was not enough to repay 
Garikai’s loan and resulted in his “biggest cash deficit to date”.196 As a result, he had to send 
most of his workers on unpaid leave in July 2014 while he negotiated conditions for another 
loan with his financiers. For Garikai, it was a case of the old farmer maxim “next year will be 
better” (Richards 1952), while the workers had to negotiate a few months without any pay at 
the very time in the agricultural cycle where piecework opportunities were limited. And 
according to Garikai, he is not alone in his struggle, telling me that although some A2 
tobacco farmers had done well in 2014, “the bulk are having difficulties”. The position of 
Garikai and most other large- and medium-scale tobacco farmers who rely on unfavourable 
terms from financiers who “own you”,197 and the vagaries of both the climate and the market, 
over which they have no control, brings to mind the observation of Lines (2008: 93) that 
contemporary agriculture is “not farming but gambling”.198 For farmworkers on LSCFs 
(including productive A2 farms), although there might be some truth in the argument that the 
desperation of farmers for labour gives them slightly more bargaining power with both their 
formal employers and the A1 farmers they moonlight for (Chambati 2011, 2013), their 
livelihoods are still insecure, their earning capacity is low, and welfare provision on 
commercial farms has fallen to a bare minimum. 
                                                          
195 See Newsday, 17 March 2014. “Is tobacco going the way of cotton?” on low prices for tobacco in 2014.  
196 Email correspondence with Garikai Mawoko, 29 July 2014.  
197 Interview with Gerald Du Toit, Elgin Farm, 26 March 2013. 
198 As Garikai himself told me, small-scale tobacco farmers (resettlement and communal area) – the majority of 
whom access finance through contract farming arrangements with various companies, and whose overheads are 
much reduced by using family labour or informal sharecropping arrangements, and relying on local forests for 
fuel – appear to be in a much better position than large-scale producers (see Scoones, 24 November 2014).      
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 Life for farmworkers and dwellers on rented tobacco farms, however, can be 
significantly worse. Waterloo Farm, close to Harare, is another tobacco farm which has never 
been designated. Soon after 2000, the white owners went into partnership with a black 
Zimbabwean and gave the farm a chiShona name in a bid to downplay the farm’s white 
ownership. They then moved to America, leaving the farm operations and upkeep to the local 
partner. The partner allowed the farm to become run-down and then suddenly died in 2013.199 
The shareholders then rented the farm to another operator, who continued to farm tobacco 
and employ the farm dwellers on a seasonal basis. These operators, however, were given no 
responsibility over the farm compounds, which fell into further disrepair and have no 
electricity, water or toilets. The inhabitants of these squalid compounds use the bush as toilets 
and have to fetch water from over a kilometre away at the tobacco barns. The operators use a 
small number of male senior workers and a large number of female casual workers who are 
paid the minimum wage200 but are laid off for four months in the off-season. 
 On such a farm, the desperation of the women who are the bulk of the workers fosters 
their abuse, super-exploitation and profound poverty. Very few men choose to work at the 
farm, preferring to sell their labour on nearby urban building sites or in brick-making and 
illegal quarrying, supplemented in the agricultural season with piecework. Many of the 
women living and working on Waterloo Farm, however, are single mothers and there are not 
many options for them to earn cash outside of seasonal wage labour on the farm. While some 
rely on selling firewood, dwindling forest resources in the area make this an increasingly 
difficult option. Their access to their farm houses also depends on their being available for 
work at the farm, but in the months they are not required, alternative livelihood opportunities 
are scarce. Although Chambati (2011, 2013) assumes that there are many off-farm income-
generating opportunities where farm dwellers or workers can sell their labour, this is not the 
case for most women living on Waterloo. There is thus a distinct gender discrepancy in what 
non-agricultural jobs are available, with women having severely limited options. Single 
mothers are in a particularly precarious position as their households rely on this single, 
seasonal salary to get by. On this farm, unlike on some others, the farm dwellers do not even 
have access to small plots on which to grow their own food.  
 Several of the women I interviewed were thus engaged in prostitution and 
transactional sex as a means of survival, and several of them were HIV positive (cf. Hartnack 
                                                          
199 Interviews with farmworkers, Waterloo Farm, November 2013 and March 2014.  
200 US$2.80 for each day worked in March 2014. 
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2005). Although they had managed to access anti-retroviral drugs from a government clinic 
in Harare, they struggled to pay for transport to reach the clinic and were not paid on the days 
when they missed work in the tobacco season. The male farm foremen also took advantage of 
these women, demanding sex in return for favourable work allocations. One woman I 
interviewed, Dorcas Shamu, was pregnant with the child of one such foreman. He had 
refused to take any responsibility for the child.201 A mother of two children whose father had 
also abandoned her, Dorcas by no means had a smorgasbord of livelihood options available 
to her. In 2009, the US-based shareholders introduced a bursary scheme for all the school-
going children of those working at Waterloo Farm. It was discontinued in 2013 when it was 
discovered that the local partner had diverted the funds for his own use. When I met Dorcas 
in late 2013, she was worried that her oldest daughter (12) was going to have to drop out of 
school and would soon fall pregnant and be drawn into prostitution. However, when I visited 
again in March 2014, the bursary scheme had been reinstated, giving her household the 
necessary relief and some hope that there was a future for them. The scheme, however, also 
trapped Dorcas on the farm, with its abuses and low pay, since it was only available as long 
as she continued to work there.  
 Trapped in farm compounds which amounted to little more than abandoned labour 
reserves, abused by foremen who practiced “delegated despotism” (Addison 2014), and with 
no NGOs, unions or other parties to assist them to mobilise, Dorcas and her colleagues are 
easily super-exploited and live under conditions which threaten to reduce them to a state of 
“bare life” (Agamben 1998). This form of faceless agricultural capitalism in which distant 
shareholders leave local operations to dishonest partners and uncaring tenants creates a 
socially bare mode of belonging (to extend Ferguson’s 2006 distinction between socially 
“thick” and “thin”) in which farmworkers and dwellers can only stake a profoundly reduced 
claim to resources, rights and relationships which would improve their lives (and indeed 
might endanger their lives in the name of short-term survival) compared to the former 
cultural politics which characterised more intimate modes of domestic government and the 
biopolitical endeavours of NGOs. Furthermore, any resources they can access are extremely 
tenuous and insecure, relying on a host of political-economic factors over which they and the 
farm owners/operators have little or no control.  
 
                                                          
201 Interviews with Dorcas Shamu, Waterloo Farm, 18 November 2013 and 18 March 2014.  
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Power, Belonging and Survival on Small-scale Commercial Farms  
If farm dwellers on tobacco farms such as Waterloo have become “incorporated” in place 
(Rutherford 2008: 79) in ways which are radically limited and constraining, how are 
farmworkers and dwellers on other sorts of commercial farming enterprises placed? On a 
small dairy farm in Mashonaland East and a small horticulture farm in Manicaland’s 
highlands, both privately owned, the cultural politics of belonging have both strong 
continuities with intimate, paternalistic “domestic government”, but also depart from this 
model in various ways and for various reasons. Rivendell Farm, which is a formerly white-
owned dairy enterprise on 40 hectares of land, employs 43 workers. The farm – complete 
with its pedigree Jersey herd – was purchased in 2001 by Martin Chitsike, a medical 
specialist, and his wife Kundai, a former nurse who now runs a plant nursery. Middle-aged, 
and widely travelled and read, both Martin and Kundai hold strong African Nationalist views 
but nevertheless considered it beneath them to simply take the farm from its white owners, 
who Kundai described as “beautiful people”. Having moved to Rivendell in 2002, the 
Chitsikes were forced to move back to their home in Harare in 2007 when Kundai suffered 
allergies caused by the cattle feed. Close enough to Harare for a comfortable commute, 
Martin continued to run his practice in conjunction with the farm. Despite now being off-
farm, they continue to run the dairy, although not at its previous level, and have recently 
added a piggery, sheep and vegetables in a bid to diversify the farm’s output. Securing 
reliable markets for their produce has been a struggle, however, and Kundai told me the farm 
does not currently generate much profit: “If it wasn’t for my husband’s surgery, we would 
have closed shop long back”, she said. “And my husband takes this place like a hobby, a 
retirement home for him, when he won’t be running a private practice anymore. So he loves 
the place, he loves the mombes [cattle]”.202 
 Although Kundai sees the former owners as good people who “tried their best” to 
look after the workers, she feels that the living and working conditions of the workers when 
they took over were poor:   
 
Housing on farms left a lot to be desired, such that the first time we came here, and we were going 
round the compound, we couldn’t fit into the houses. We had to [bend] right down, you know? And I 
wasn’t comfortable, even [about] the salaries. I remember the first time I sat with Mrs Davies to pay 
                                                          
202 Taped interview with Kundai Chitsike, Rivendell Farm, 8 November 2013.  
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the workers, and I couldn’t look them in the eye: things like three dollars … I mean it broke my heart: 
the salaries, the living conditions!203   
 
Kundai believes that the way in which they are now treating the workers is significantly 
better than the former owners. With an emphasis on respect and dignity, she describes how 
she calls the workers “mkoma” (brother) and tries to foster a “family” environment. This is in 
contrast to the former owner who workers told me was a perfectionist with a short temper, 
although he also taught them much about dairy farming. The Chitsikes immediately upgraded 
the farm compound, building several new brick houses, as well as new toilets. “My husband 
is a medical person”, explained Kundai, “You can’t have people living in squalid conditions 
and you call yourself a medical doctor … having kids with kwashiorkor in there!” The 
workers are also paid above the minimum wage and permitted to live with their family 
members, including grown children. The latter is a change from the previous regime as one of 
the “mitemo yepurazi” (rules of the farm – Rutherford 2001a) was that no children over the 
age of 16 were allowed to live with their parents because Mr Davies said they were a crime 
risk.204  
 However, even within this relationship, which on the surface mirrors Chambati’s 
(2011) “kinship social patronage”, there are contradictions, class tensions and power relations 
at play. Just as in paternalistic domestic government, the farmworkers rely on the generosity 
and goodwill of their employers, rather than a wider and enforceable set of standards, to 
determine how they live and work. When the Chitsikes first arrived at Rivendell, they had the 
intention of paying for the school fees of the children and assisting to develop the workers’ 
skills further. This they did for a while, but they eventually gave up when they did not see the 
intended results and “not a single person graduated from high school”. Hygiene also, just as 
in the past, is an issue which exposes class-based fault lines. Being a nurse and aware that the 
dairy requires cleanliness, Kundai was particularly keen to encourage the workers to attend to 
their personal hygiene: “I believe in a proper flushing toilet, proper shower, for the workers. 
And I don’t want them to come to work stinking”, she told me. She said that she made sure to 
                                                          
203 In fact, the ZW$3 paid to the worker in question was probably what remained after the farmer had deducted 
any advances that had been made during the month. The previous owners paid the gazetted wages for the dairy 
industry and workers did not complain to me that they had been poorly paid by them. Workers I interviewed 
told me that travelling salespeople also sometimes had to approach the Chitsikes and request them to deduct 
money they were owed on items purchased by workers on credit. 
204 Interview with Talkmore Banda, Rivendell Farm, 8 November 2013.   
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encourage cleanliness sensitively and in subtle ways such as buying soaps and toiletries for 
workers and their children. But then she confides that this has not always worked:  
  
Them being them, I think they have got their own traumas. Like we tried to put in a modern toilet up 
there, and I think they couldn’t use it properly. You know, when you are used to squatting … [laughs 
awkwardly] it’s very sad – I’m laughing because if you don’t laugh you’ll cry, you know? You try 
and upgrade someone but they still want to stay there.  
 
Indeed, Kundai feels an acute sense of resignation about the seeming un-improvability of 
the workers and puts this down to the fact that “colonialism did a thorough job on the farms”. 
There are other strains too, such as the pilfering that has increased since they moved back 
into town, the workers’ chopping of live trees for firewood or their children’s penchant for 
shooting birds with their catapults. “They bleed you dry”, Kundai told me, “Especially if you 
are not living on the farm”. When they tried to grow potatoes, for instance, they found that 
most of the crop disappeared during the night as it reached maturity, something they are 
convinced their workers were involved in. While she is sympathetic towards the workers’ 
plight, Kundai’s own interests and those of the farm ensure that the Chitsikes have to exercise 
power over the workers, such as when they had to dismiss some who were caught stealing. 
But for all the dignity and humanity which the Chitsikes genuinely try to foster in their 
dealings with the workers, the “family” relations inevitably bear a resemblance to traditional 
agrarian paternalism. As Kundai admitted to me: “I have given up begging them to do things: 
I now have to use divide and rule in order to manage them”. This comes very close to Du 
Toit’s (1993: 333) observation that one of the key dynamics of paternalism is to diminish the 
threat which the workers pose as a group by atomising them, playing one off against the other 
and placing each one in an individual relationship with the farmer. 
 Economic realities also put a limit on what the Chitsike’s can do for the workers, such 
as when the workers requested a pay rise in 2013, but Martin had to tell them this was not 
possible due to the farm’s current unprofitability. The permanent workers are able, however, 
to put their regular salaries towards school fees and various off-farm projects, especially 
because they have free accommodation, electricity and water provided at the farm, and grow 
their own vegetables in the compound. As Talkmore Banda told me, “You need security to 
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bring your kids up, because it is very expensive”.205 Because it is securely owned and heavily 
subsidised by a lucrative urban business, Rivendell provides many of the workers with a 
relatively stable base from which to put together a number of livelihood strategies and plans 
for the future. Talkmore’s wife, for example, engages in cross-border trading to supplement 
her household’s income. Some workers send seeds and fertiliser back to their rural homes so 
that relatives may put in a crop; others spend their salaries on consumables such as 
televisions and mobile telephones which travelling salespeople offer them on credit.  
 For many, however, a nearby “high-density” suburb of Harare has offered the chance 
to invest in an urban housing stand. Several of those I met had each been paying a housing 
cooperative run by “war veterans” US$40 per month over the course of 2012 and 2013, 
having been promised that their stands were secure and that building would begin shortly. It 
turned out to be a scam, tolerated by the authorities until after the 31 July 2013 elections due 
to its vote-winning potential. The “war veterans” disappeared a few months later, leaving 
those workers involved duped out of several hundred dollars, with their dreams of owning 
their own houses in tatters.206 The future is also not promising for many of the grown children 
of the Rivendell workers, who languish around the farm, occasionally performing casual 
work when it is available. The lack of opportunities in the wider economy has ensured that 
many of these young people are largely “stuck in the compound” (Hansen 2005) and, despite 
the Chitsike’s best intentions, have few options other than making themselves available as 
convenient and cheap agricultural labour.207  
 Clover Farm, in Zimbabwe’s eastern highlands, demonstrates a similar pattern of 
reliance on a working farm as a foundation on which to build further survival options. Clover 
is much smaller than Rivendell and employs only 15 workers. Growing vegetables, fruit and 
flowers for the local market, it also just breaks even and offers its single white operator, Greg 
Wilde, a lifestyle that “beats sitting in an office all day”.208 Unlike Rivendell, Clover is rented 
and its small compound is dilapidated and unhygienic. While it does provide access to clean 
water and electricity, there is only one toilet for all of the resident families, who have built 
themselves small grass washrooms or use the nearby forest for their ablutions. A number of 
the small children who play around the compound during the day suffer from ringworm, 
although the easy availability of fresh fruit and vegetables on the farm appears, at least, to 
                                                          
205 Ibid.  
206 See Masuko (2008) on the dynamics and politics of peri-urban housing cooperatives run by war veterans.  
207 Although, as Jones (2009) shows, the youth in Zimbabwe are getting on with life and overcoming obstacles 
in creative ways despite the economic constraints they face.  
208 Interview with Greg Wilde, Clover Farm, 23 November 2013.  
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have kept them fairly well nourished. While the workers have vegetable gardens and access 
to patches of land to grow their own crops, the farm operator pays very little attention to the 
workers’ living conditions. He is constrained in this regard by a physical disability which 
does not allow him to negotiate the steep paths that lead into the compound. When asked, 
Greg says “Look, I wouldn’t trade places with them, but the farm gives them a half-decent 
living”. Most of the workers earn slightly more than the minimum wage set for the 
horticulture industry, with the two senior (male) workers earning double the minimum in 
November 2013.209 With wages making up half of the monthly turnover, Greg feels that if he 
has to pay the workers more, the business will collapse. There is some truth in this as the 
statutory minimum wage for the horticulture industry rose significantly in 2012–13, while 
prices for the produce shrunk by 10 per cent over the same period and the market for 
vegetables also became increasingly depressed. Thus Greg, who only draws his own basic 
living expenses from the farm, uses his tenuous position as a threat to the workers, telling 
them that if their wage-demands are too high, the whole enterprise will close. 
 The living the Clover workers make from the farm may be only “half-decent”, but 
they are able to use this as a base from which to attempt a number of other livelihood and 
social reproduction strategies. Greg relies heavily on the workers to assist him with many of 
the duties a fully able-bodied farmer would do for himself. Although he cannot afford to pay 
them more, and pays little attention to their living conditions, he pays on time and allows the 
workers, all but two of whom are permanent employees, to cultivate their own vegetables and 
crops. He also neither has the ability nor the interest in monitoring every aspect of their after-
hours activities, opening up space for them to broaden their options. The regular nature of the 
payments and the fact that the workers do not need to expend much cash for their day-to-day 
living has enabled some of the women on Clover to start an informal savings club (called 
mukando), which has helped them to meet some of their longer-term needs. Every month 
since June 2011, three women who are close friends have put part of their salary into the 
mukando. Every third month, one of them receives the full amount. Beginning by putting 
only US$20 in per month, by late 2013 the women were saving US$70 per month in this way.  
 One of the women, Charity Moyo, started petty trading and was able to apply for a 
passport using the savings. She then began cross-border trading, travelling to Johannesburg in 
her monthly three days of leave, bringing back two-plate stoves, microwave ovens and 
blankets to sell around the district. So successful has this business been that Charity now 
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takes orders and brings back larger items such as fridges and beds. Her business is helped by 
the fact that there are a number of hotels in the area and there are no shops where the 
employees of such establishments can buy these goods on credit. She continues working in 
the farm kiosk to pass the time and to make the extra money to re-invest in her business. 
Through this side-project, Charity is able to send her three children to a better school in the 
closest town. Another of the club members financed the completion of her family’s house in 
her rural home while the other bought a chainsaw which she hires out to informal loggers in 
the district. Crucially, however, these women are not single mothers but have husbands 
whose income can also be used towards important household expenses, freeing them up to 
save in this way. Charity and four of her friends from Clover have also instituted a grocery 
club where they each put in US$5 per month, whereupon one member travels 20 kilometres 
to the nearest town and buys non-perishable groceries in bulk which they share after six 
months. This not only saves on transport and the cost of groceries, but also provides an 
emergency stock which the members can borrow from in times of need. Thus, these 
ingenious forms of social and economic mutual aid help the workers to plan for and meet 
both their short and long-term needs.   
 These two small-scale farms demonstrate the contradictory nature of “belonging” on 
working farms in the current moment. The workers are dependent on the continued viability 
of the enterprise for small but reliable salaries which allow them to invest in a range of off-
farm projects to further their family interests. They also rely on the free accommodation, 
electricity and water, as well as vegetable gardens and plots on which to grow their own 
crops. The workers also make use of close friendships they have developed at these farms to 
share information about opportunities and club together to save money and engage in 
mutually beneficial projects. They also rely on the fairly benign regimes of weakened 
“domestic government” on these two farms, whose operators – for different reasons – do not 
enforce strict rules about who they live with or what they do with their free time. The 
relatively good position of workers on these two farms is illustrated by comparison to former 
farmworkers on farms which are no longer commercially run.    
 
“New Slavery”? Struggles to Belong and Survive on Unproductive Fast-track Farms   
While the contention of authors such as Chambati (2011: 1057) and Mkodzongi (2014) that 
old farmworkers/dwellers remaining on so-called “fast-track farms” are in a better position 
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than under the former commercial farming regime may be true in cases they have examined, 
such positive assessments tend to ignore or downplay contemporary struggles faced by 
former farmworkers. While I have not conducted wide-scale research on the conditions faced 
by former farmworkers on resettlement farms, I seek here to provide an insight into these 
struggles from the few farms whose former workers I did conduct ethnographic research with 
on the highveld. I make no claims that these cases are representative of the wider post-land 
reform labour dynamics on resettled farms, but seek to complicate the above positive 
assessments by providing some alternative experiences and perspectives, especially from 
unproductive A2 farms and a farm taken over for peri-urban housing purposes.  
 Two sets of former farmworkers living on farms in Mashonaland West suggest that, 
especially on A2 farms which are not being productively farmed, those still residing in the 
old farm compounds face a very insecure and marginalised existence, socially, politically and 
economically, although they engage actively in struggles against such challenges. On a farm 
near Chakari, 55 households are living in a compound on an unproductive A2 farm. The farm 
they used to work on was allocated to five A2 beneficiaries in 2002, of which only one has 
been farming seriously since then.210 At first, the former workers did not find themselves in a 
bad position, but this did not last:  
 
When the new owners first came, they showed us some love because they wanted us to help them to 
understand the farm. But then they started to deny us to look for firewood and tend our gardens, they 
even denied us to look for poles to build our houses, but they did allow us to plough our small plots.  
 
In 2008, the owner obtained an eviction order against the farm dwellers, but they were able to 
organise themselves in resistance to this move. They identified a lawyer, who also happened 
to have a productive A2 farm nearby, to help them fight their case. They agreed to work in 
his fields for a period of time in return for his legal services and their eviction was duly 
overturned. While this has offered them some security since then, they have recently been 
asked for rent, which they are resisting as they “have no source of income to pay it”. 
Fortunately, the new ZANU-PF district chairman is a relative of one of the compound 
leaders, and they will use this connection to fight for their right to remain if necessary. Most 
of the households survive through a combination of the crops they grow on the small single-
acre plots they continue to have access to, and on piece work on productive farms in the 
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district. A few are involved in brick moulding, while young farm dwellers also engage in 
gold-panning and even cattle rustling. However, those I interviewed felt that their livelihood 
options were limited and inadequate, especially in the off-season. They told me that they 
survive on just one meal a day and that of the 50 children in the compound, only 10 are in 
school. They commented that most families marry their daughters off very early, not so much 
because they can extract bridewealth in this way, but because it means one less dependent to 
care for. As one man said, “I am a parent, but I can even accept that offer and say ‘ah – good 
luck!’”    
 On another farm near Chegutu, almost 200 people are residing in the farm compound 
of an A2 farm that was allocated in 2010.211 The new owner of the portion of the farm they 
continue to live on has not asked them to leave, but has been demanding that they pay US$40 
per household per month in rent and US$5 for electricity. There is no agricultural activity 
taking place at the farm, and with no regular income, these charges are all but impossible for 
most households. The farm dwellers therefore perform maricho piecework on some nearby 
A2 farms which are productive, as well as in Chegutu town. 
 For another group of former workers in Mashonaland East, life has been even more of 
a struggle. These workers were first evicted in 2004 when the farm they worked on was 
occupied, living rough for almost two months. The district lands committee then allocated the 
farm to an A2 farmer and told the workers to move back into their houses.212 The new farmer 
performed a number of activities on the farm but paid the workers way below the gazetted 
wage for their labour. The workers grew vegetables for sale to supplement these wages but 
the owner deliberately released his cattle into their gardens at night to destroy their crops. 
They worked for him on very low wages for four years, but in 2009 he told them that they 
would have to work on the farm in return for their accommodation, telling them “I have an 
offer letter, so I can do what I like on my farm”. One former worker was particularly eloquent 
in his description of the situation they now faced: “With the old slavery, we used to get 
shelter, salary, food, clothes, but with this new slavery, we only got houses – no pay, no food, 
no clothes – and we were told we had to work for him in order to stay. It’s modern-day 
slavery!” In May 2012, the workers finally organised themselves to confront their employer 
and they told him they would not work for free for another season. After a tense impasse, 
their employer finally evicted the 14 remaining households at gun-point in January 2013 and 
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they were left squatting on a nearby roadside with some of the belongings they managed to 
rescue.213 Attempts by the workers to involve the law failed as their employer was well 
connected to senior members of the local police. Two of the (male) former workers also told 
me that their boss had sexually abused them on several occasions, in return for small 
payments.  
 While these examples show that farm dwellers are not simply passive victims, but 
actively organise and attempt to find ways to maintain access to key resources such as 
housing, it is also apparent that the power relations on A2 farms have often left them in a 
very vulnerable and insecure position. This is worsened by the fact that unionism in the 
agricultural sector has weakened since the FTLRP, with membership of the main union, 
GAPWUZ, dropping by almost 400 per cent from 250,000 to below 60,000.214 On farms 
which are not being run as a business, and even those which employ some casual labourers, 
unionism is obsolete since permanent or at least seasonally contracted workers are the only 
ones who can join unions. Moreover, according to GAPWUZ officials, farmers who claim to 
make use of “family” labour also tell the unions that the labour relations are a family issue 
which do not involve outsiders, a situation which fosters retrogressive “coercive domestic 
relations” (Rutherford 1996: 84). There has also largely been a “limited presence of state 
labour officials” in resettlement areas (Chambati 2011: 1064) and, as the case above 
illustrates, law enforcement agencies have not generally taken the side of farm dwellers in 
disputes with those on whose land they live.        
 A final example illustrates further the power relations shaping the ability or inability 
of farm dwellers to make claims to important resources and thus to “belong” in specific 
places. The struggles of farm dwellers in these situations are over more than housing and 
access to natural resources and land, but also control of and access to schools and graveyards. 
More than simply about practical concerns, these struggles often involve deep issues of 
                                                          
213 Although Chambati (2011: 1062) states that government “policy” has been to allow former farmworkers 
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putting farm dwellers in a vulnerable position (Email correspondence with Marc Carrie-Wilson, CFU Legal 
Affairs Manager, 1 August 2014; see also Freeth (20 August 2014) for an example). For further examples of 
recent evictions of former workers from “fast-track farms” see articles in Newsday (24 July 2013, 12 March 
2014, 15 March 2014, 21 May 2014 and 19 August 2014); SW Radio Africa (17 March 2014); Daily News (3 
August 2014); and VOA News (21 February 2012), among many others.     
214 Taped interview with Gift Muti, General Secretary of GAPWUZ, Harare, 26 November 2013. Chambati 
(2011: 1064) concedes this point since only 4.4 per cent of workers included in the AIAS survey were aware of 
union activity in their area and even fewer (3%) were paid-up members.   
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identity, family history, community cohesion and attachment to place. Albany Farm, a former 
large producer of tobacco and maize, is located in Harare South, close to the urban edge of 
the city. Never officially designated, it was nonetheless taken over by ZANU-PF supporters, 
led by their local Member of Parliament, and parcelled out as housing stands for illegal 
housing cooperatives in 2003. Although the workers played a leading role in supporting the 
election of the MP in the year 2000, the settlers were hostile to them. Henry Mbwando, a 
Pentecostal pastor who became a key leader of the farm-dweller community at that time, 
describes the struggle thus: 
 
When these guys came in, their first port of call – they wanted to take over every brick house, chasing 
out these farmworkers. I said “No, but this is insane, we don’t do that. You guys, you came in because 
you said you needed land. Here’s the land. If you want to stay, build your own! This man, this old 
man that you are asking … to get out of his four-roomed house: honestly, he never even got his 
pension from the guy you chased away who owned this place, so this is his benefit, this is his pension! 
There is no way that [anyone] is going to leave these houses! If it means you kill us, you have to kill 
us as well”.215    
  
However, after many of the illegal houses were bulldozed during the government’s notorious 
2005 Operation Murambatsvina, the settlers attempted to evict the farm dwellers from the 
compounds again, as these had been left intact during the “clean-up” operation.216 Henry and 
the farm dwellers once again resisted, this time obtaining leave to remain from a magistrate. 
The struggle over housing has not ceased, however, because since 2005 newcomers have 
been building their houses on open spaces directly adjacent to and inside the main compound 
in a move the compound-dwellers see as an attempt to possess the space by gradual 
occupation.  
 Not being employed, many of the farm dwellers fell back on the farm’s natural 
resources to make a living. Speaking to three men who were breaking rocks down into gravel 
in November 2013, they explained, in terms reminiscent of Hardin’s “tragedy of the 
commons” (1968), how they came to engage in this occupation: “Some of us started poaching 
sand, quarrying and cutting trees. It is near Mbare (market) so we sold the gum plantations 
                                                          
215 Taped interview with Henry Mbwando, Harare, 14 June 2013.  
216 Operation Murambatsvina (clean out the filth) was a widespread urban “clean up” operation conducted by 
the Zimbabwean government in mid-2005, targeting informal housing and informal traders. Three-quarters of a 
million people lost their homes or livelihoods as a result. See Vambe (2008) for a comprehensive analysis of 
Operation Murambatsvina. 
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there. The new settlers started it and they did not want us to do it, but it was a fight, so we 
joined in. We turned this place into a desert!”217 When I asked them who gives them 
permission to use the farm’s resources they replied: “Nobody. We just do it until we are 
chased”.218 Despite these livelihood options and the piecework jobs they do on building sites 
and in people’s fields, none of the men felt they had a secure or adequate livelihood, saying 
that they would never afford to send their children to secondary school. A survey of young 
farm dwellers revealed the bleak prospects they also faced. One woman wrote: “You might 
be employed for two or three days, but to get paid, you end up reporting to the police and 
sometimes … you may be chased away from the farm”. Another young respondent wrote: 
“Some of the children, they were forced to work and if they refused, they will be beaten”. 
And, as at Waterloo Farm, single women often do not have options outside sex work: “So far, 
it is the worst thing because there is no employment, so we [are] living as prostitutes to keep 
our children”.219 
 The farm school and the graveyard also became key sites of struggle for the Albany 
Farm dwellers, for whom these are important cultural and practical resources. The farm 
school was founded by an Anglican minister from Zambia who lobbied the farmer to build a 
junior school in 1953. His daughter is still the principal of the school, most farm dwellers are 
graduates, and some, such as Henry Mbwando, are involved in running it still. When the 
settlers arrived, they wanted to take over the school and rename it after the ZANU-PF MP, 
but Henry and his colleagues resisted this move fiercely. They were helped by the fact that 
Henry is a well-known pastor and HIV campaigner who used his position to challenge them. 
Another graduate who is now a senior staff member is also the local ZANU-PF chairman, 
which helped in their endeavours to prevent the school’s takeover. It is clear that while the 
larger farm is gone from their control, the school acts as the one space which the farm 
dwellers can still call their own and which they are in charge of. Their children attend and the 
parents participate and often do piece jobs for the school in lieu of school fees. Henry often 
refers to the school as “our island” and “our refuge”.   
                                                          
217 I am not suggesting, here, that Hardin’s controversial and ideologically dubious claims about the nature of 
communal property are necessarily correct. However, it seems to me that in situations such as this case, where 
one set of institutions governing resource use have been suddenly displaced and not yet replaced by other sets of 
rules, an open access system of the sort described by Hardin can occur and quickly lead to the depletion of 
natural resources. It is also interesting that farm dwellers themselves see their actions in these terms.     
218 Focus-group discussion with farm dwellers from Albany Farm, 18 November 2013. For more on the rise of 
informal quarrying, sand poaching and brick moulding, and their environmental consequences, see Mhlanga 
(2014b) and Mbayiwa-Makuvatsine (2014).     
219 Livelihoods survey of 34 young farm dwellers on peri-urban farms, June 2013.    
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 The graveyard, which is sandwiched between the main compound and the school, is 
also an “island”, in which all the long-standing farm dwellers have buried generations of 
relatives. Henry’s parents and three of his siblings are buried there and, with 
Malawian/Zambian roots, he has no alternative home at which to bury his kin and perform 
important family rituals. The graveyard, along with the school, is the only area of the farm 
where there are still established trees growing and Henry describes it as the “one heritage site 
that we still have”. The settlers, however, started to bury their dead at the site, wanting to 
avoid paying burial fees for the urban cemeteries in nearby Harare. When word of this 
“illegal” burial site reached the Harare District Administrator (DA), he banned any new 
burials from taking place. Settlers continued to perform burials, often at night, which brought 
the police to the farm as it was not clear who these graves belonged to and how they had died. 
The farm dwellers, led by Henry, then approached the DA and persuaded him that they had 
nowhere else to bury their dead and nor could they afford the US$115 burial charge required 
for an urban cemetery. Henry explained it thus when I first met him: “To the administrators, 
the burial ground is closed. But to us, when we get a burial order we tell them that we will be 
burying at Albany. It’s our culture to bury our whole family in the same place, so we fought 
the DA on this issue”.220 This lobbying resulted in the DA acquiescing by allowing only those 
who have a proven ancestral connection to the farm to use the site as a burial ground. 
Although illegal graves still do appear, the involvement of the authorities has allowed the 
original inhabitants of the farm to maintain privileged access to what is a sacred space for 
them, at least for the moment.    
 Graveyards are important sites of struggle for former farmworkers, particularly on 
peri-urban farms taken over for low-cost housing (see Hartnack 2006, 2009b), but also in 
other resettlement areas. The displaced farm dwellers from the previous example illustrate 
this further. While camping on the side of the road, one of the displaced women suffered a 
miscarriage, probably due to the stress of her situation. The displaced workers buried the 
foetus that night in their graveyard on the A2 farm they had been evicted from. When the A2 
farmer found out, he went to the police and accused them of aborting the baby, and its corpse 
was duly exhumed. It was found to have died naturally, but the farmer used the incident as a 
pretext to have the former workers further displaced from their temporary campsite. In the 
case of peri-urban former farms such as Albany, these local struggles over the contested 
terrain of graveyards are imbricated in wider struggles of control over territory by local 
                                                          
220 Interview with Henry Mbwando, Harare, 4 June 2013.  
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political and bureaucratic structures such as city councils and urban planning departments, 
which are in the process of trying to formalise and provide services to the new occupants of 
low-cost housing on former farmland. The presence of former farmworkers with claims over 
important sacred sites on those farms complicates these projects and does not bode well for 
their future as these farms get formally incorporated and “developed” by urban authorities. 
As Henry pointed out ominously, new City of Harare development notice signboards had 
recently mysteriously appeared on the farm, reminding him and his fellow former workers 
that they ultimately have no power over the future of their homes. While the former workers 
could hold out against the “illegal” settlers (with the help of the local authorities), it is likely 
that they will be no match for the bureaucratic power of these very same authorities when 
they decide to incorporate these liminal zones on the margins of the city into their plans and 
procedures.              
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined key aspects of the “actual terrain of struggle” (Rutherford 2014: 
220) faced by farmworkers and dwellers as they negotiate the “cultural politics of belonging” 
in a number of post-FTLRP settings. It shows how varied the outcome for farmworkers and 
dwellers has been, and how such outcomes have been determined by very specific local 
factors and power dynamics, which affect how they (and different members of these groups, 
such as single women) can or cannot respond to livelihoods-related and other challenges. It 
also shows that for farmworkers on farms still running on a commercial basis – particularly in 
the tobacco sector and on smaller commercial farms – there is now minimal interest in 
worker welfare by farm operators and next to no involvement of NGOs, unions or 
government officials in enforcing welfare standards or running programmes which could 
improve their working and living conditions. In other words the mode of belonging on these 
farms – which still resembles a form of domestic government – has been reformulated, but in 
ways which still privilege local factors and power relations over wider standards and in ways 
which have ensured that the edification obligations inherent within the former mode of 
domestic government have largely been abandoned for powerful social and economic 
reasons. As I will elaborate in Chapter Five, the biopolitical maternalism of farm-focussed 
NGOs was also in decline by 2005. These new modes of belonging are thus much more 
“socially thin” (Ferguson 2006: 36) than in the past, or even so bereft of options for resource 
and welfare access that they can be described as socially bare. Farmworkers on such farms 
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thus have to find ways of meeting their own welfare needs, which, in the right circumstances 
can be positive, but can also put them into conflict with their formal employers and are also 
by no means fail-safe. The insecure political and economic climate means that farmers and 
workers are in “survival mode” and find it difficult to make long-term plans.  
 For farm dwellers on unproductive “fast-track farms”, the few examples I was able to 
include in my research suggest that the situation can be worse because they are even more 
insecurely placed, live a much more hand-to-mouth existence, and engage in struggles over 
key resources on a much reduced footing, seldom with the assistance of outside 
organisations. Contrary to what Chambati (2011) argues, various forms of violence and the 
threat of violence hang over many of these farm dwellers on a regular basis. While the 
“racialised master–servant relationship” has been replaced, this has not necessarily been with 
positive (romanticised) “social patronage labour relations” (ibid.: 1057), but with relations 
which risk becoming colonial-style “coercive domestic relations” (Rutherford 1996: 84), and 
according to the farmworkers themselves, are as or even more fraught and coercive than 
those which existed previously. Again, the key point is that, just as in traditional paternalism, 
the nature of life depends on localised factors and relationships and how these are impacted 
by wider political-economic factors. It is thus fair to conclude that, rather than sweep away 
problematic power relations, for farmworkers in the above scenarios, the FTLRP replaced 
them with different and sometimes more bewildering ones which they must, and do, 
constantly negotiate for survival. In Chapter Six, I will explore the dynamics of such 










Strategising for Survival: The Decline of Farm-focussed NGOs and the Role of New 
Welfare and “Improvement” Initiatives for Farm Dwellers after Fast-track Land 
Reform 
 
What is an NGO? I don’t get it! Can it be an NGO when it gets 100 per cent of its funds from 
government? No! It’s a government department! (Then Zimbabwean Minister of Mines and Mining 
Development Obert Mpofu, Speech given at National Diamond Conference, 25 February 2013)  
 
 
Original FOST logo taken from the current FOST Facebook page.  
 
Introduction: Adapting to the “Politics of Exclusion” 
Like all logos, that of the Farm Orphan Support Trust (FOST) says much about its vision, 
history and identity. Hand-drawn in black-and-white, it features two children alone under a 
small tree. One, an older boy, reaches up into the tree as if to pick something from its 
branches while a little girl is already munching on a piece of fruit. A description of the logo 
(created in the late 1990s) found in the papers of FOST founder Dr Sue Parry reveals that this 
tree is an indigenous wild fruit tree, the Mutamba.221 The description plays with the notion of 
the fruit tree being a provider, protector and a nurturer that is “rooted in the community” and 
belongs to everyone, and yet is also reliant on those who use it for protection. Whilst visually 
the logo positions the tree as a nurturing presence sustaining the children, the written 
                                                          
221 Mutamba is the vernacular chiShona name for the tree botanists call Strychnos spinosa. Not to be confused 
with the tree indigenous to the tropical Americas also known as Mutamba (Guazuma ulmifolia).  
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description rather points to the similarity between orphans and the latter aspect of the tree: 
part of “the community” and thus everybody’s responsibility. Below the drawing, in bold 
green lowercase lettering, are the letters f.o.s.t. What is striking about these letters is that the 
“f” is in the same, uniquely stylised font as the “f” on the green logo for the Commercial 
Farmers Union (CFU), which is designed to suggest the leaf of a maize plant. While the 
drawn elements of the FOST logo thus evoke a romanticised African rural scene, the lettering 
links FOST directly to white commercial farmers and the CFU. Post-2000, this logo has 
remained with FOST, on vehicles, letterheads, business cards and promotional 
paraphernalia,222 as a constant reminder of the organisation’s historical connection to white 
commercial farmers. This is an awkward history that FOST has had to downplay and work 
around in the fraught politics of land and “development” that has characterised twenty-first-
century Zimbabwe. 
 The Kunzwana Women’s Association (KWA) has had no such difficulties with its 
logo, which depicted two stylised hands.223 Its history has also been much more closely 
aligned to the governing party than NGOs such as FOST. Nevertheless, following the 
FTLRP, its field staff had to be very careful to prove that they did not represent the political 
opposition or the interests of Western governments. Sitting with me in a hot car on the 
journey back from a field visit, a KWA Field Officer (and former chairman of her local 
ZANU-PF cell) illustrated this point with the following anecdote:  
 
When I came to Zvimba, I went to the DA to introduce myself. These boys from the President’s 
Office [state intelligence officers] came to me and asked me many questions: “Who are you; where do 
you come from; where do you live; which party do you belong to?” I told them, “I am unaffiliated” 
but they asked many questions. I told them to call the DA in Macheke as I come from Macheke. They 
called and the DA told them that I am ZANU-PF through and through, and they gave me the go-ahead 
to do my work. But that day, several of my colleagues from Red Cross and FACT were chased and 
not allowed to proceed with their work because they were suspected of being from the opposition.224  
 
These two vignettes illustrate the political complexities faced by farm-focussed NGOs 
operating in post-FTLRP Zimbabwe, in an environment which – as illustrated in the above 
                                                          
222 Although there are some alternative fonts used on some of their reports, the Director’s business card (given 
to me in 2011) and the current logo on FOST’s Facebook page both use the original lettering.  
223 Changed, by 2003, to the present logo of a rural woman holding a hoe.  
224 Interview with anonymous KWA Field Officer, Harare, 21 November 2013.  
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epigraph – has been characterised by sustained suspicion towards NGOs by the ZANU-PF 
government. Rich Dorman (2001) has astutely analysed changing relations between the 
Zimbabwean state and NGOs between 1980 and 2000. She argues that until 1997, such 
relations were generally characterised by “the politics of inclusion” – in which the governing 
party and the state “sought to incorporate most groups into their alliance, on their own terms” 
(ibid.: 229) and most NGOs were content to partner with the state rather than challenge it 
directly.225 Increased funding for NGOs in the 1990s, including for those focussing on 
governance, democracy and human rights, unsettled the state, which in 1995 introduced the 
Private Voluntary Organisations (PVO) Act. The PVO Act was built on the repressive Smith-
era Welfare Organisations Act (1967), which had sought to control organisations which 
might support the intensifying liberation struggle (ibid.: 179). Governance-focussed NGOs in 
turn launched a campaign against the PVO Act, which laid the platform for their later 
collaboration with the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the National 
Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in the democratisation movement of the late 1990s (ibid.: 
193; Sachikonye 2012).226 The growing political threats, criticism, loss of popularity of the 
ZANU-PF government and civic unrest during this period (see Raftopolous 2009) caused a 
shift in the previous relations between state and society, leading to an intensification of “the 
politics of exclusion” after 1997 (Rich Dorman 2001: 229). Especially after the constitutional 
referendum of 2000, the government became increasingly intolerant of groups organised 
outside the state (ibid.: 229) and these now required “controlling, legislation, intimidation and 
violence to keep them in line” (ibid.: 281).227         
 In Chapter Three, I argue that a more subtle challenge to the state’s power was 
simultaneously taking place through the work of welfare NGOs on commercial farms and 
their introduction of particular forms of transnational governmentality to these spaces. Thus, 
although farm-focussed NGOs were not centrally involved with the more direct political 
challenges to the ZANU-PF government, they could not avoid being seen as part of the 
growing movement opposing the government. This was reinforced by the fact that key figures 
in the farm-welfare movement such as Diana Auret were directly linked to key figures in the 
                                                          
225 See also Sachikonye (2012: 131ff.) for a similar analysis of the changing relations between the state and 
civil-society organisations. 
226 Morgan Tsvangirai, who went on to become the President of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), 
was at that time the Secretary-General of the ZCTU, and many future MDC leaders were involved in the NCA. 
227 See the essays in Hammar et al. (2003), Harold-Barry (2004), Raftopoulos and Sachikonye (2001), 
Raftopoulos and Savage (2004), Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009) for more analysis of the complex social, 
economic and political dynamics of this period. 
150 
NCA and, later, the MDC.228 The minutes of a meeting between FOST and the Ministry of 
Social Welfare on 20 April 1999 demonstrate that farm-focussed NGOs were already 
negotiating the “politics of exclusion” by that stage.229 Diana Auret, who was one of FOST’s 
representatives, is reported to have asked the Ministry’s representative, Mrs Murungu, why 
FOST was not invited to assist in organising a recent workshop on the “Farm Model of 
Orphan Care” in Mashonaland Central. She pointed out that FOST was heavily involved in 
the province, and her confusion is understandable given that the Ministry had earlier “tasked” 
FOST to help them develop the model.230 Auret also questioned why a recent government 
report had not mentioned the work of FOST, saying that FOST and the Ministry of Welfare 
were meant to be partners and expressing some frustration at these omissions. While Mrs 
Murungu blamed poor communication and a lack of resources, Auret and other senior FOST 
staff were clearly frustrated that FOST’s role as an active partner of the government (see 
Chapter Three) appeared to be increasingly disregarded by the Ministry.  
 After the constitutional referendum, however, farm-focussed NGOs not only had to 
contend with outright hostility from the government but the fact that their work was 
increasingly disrupted by the land takeovers and the politics of Jambanja (see Chapter 
Three). Of the few scholars who have examined the impact of these events on farm-focussed 
NGOs and how these responded, sociologist Kirk Helliker’s work is the most detailed and 
prolific (see Helliker 2006, 2008, 2009; Sadomba and Helliker 2010), while REPSSI (2002) 
conducted a situational analysis of the activities of FOST. Other authors have focussed on 
this issue in less detail (Chambati and Magaramombe 2008) or in passing (Rutherford 2004a: 
140–3; 2014: 235–6). The work of Helliker, in particular, provides a useful assessment of the 
political relations, organisational challenges, funding dilemmas, staffing issues and practical 
quandaries faced by NGOs such as FOST in the early 2000s.231 However, such work has still 
not adequately explored the complex impacts which Jambanja and the subsequent post-
FTLRP era (including the advent and demise of the 2009–2013 “unity government”) had on 
the operations and approach of farm-focussed NGOs. There has also been little, if any, work 
on what new forms of non-state “improvement” targeting or including (former) farmworkers 
                                                          
228 Diana Auret’s husband, Michael, was the director of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), 
resigning in the late 1990s to join the NCA taskforce (see Rich Dorman 2001: 283). He later became a founding 
member of the MDC, for whom he became a Member of Parliament in 2000.  
229 Minutes found in the private papers of Dr S. Parry, FOST Founder. 
230 See “Farm Orphan Support Trust Report” by Dr S. Parry for the CFU Annual Congress, 1999 (Undated 
print-out of the speech given in early 1999. Found in the private papers of Dr S. Parry).   
231 However, while Helliker optimistically positions his work as “thick description” from the “inside” of NGOs 
(e.g. Helliker 2006: 286), his study of FOST is based solely on one interview with the then Director and on 
some of their annual reports, along with the REPSSI assessment (2002).  
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are emerging on the highveld. In this chapter I address these deficiencies, using a 
multifaceted approach which draws on archival material,232 as well as interviews with current 
and former NGO staff and ethnographic fieldwork with NGOs and grassroots welfare 
initiatives.      
 I will show that for NGOs such as FOST, KWA and FCTZ, while they survived, and 
in some cases even grew during the period of Jambanja, in most cases they did so by 
strategically changing their approach and gradually reframing their understanding of what 
constitutes vulnerability and how they should respond to it. Founded in an era when 
farmworkers, and particular sub-groups within this population such as children and women, 
were seen as the most vulnerable members of Zimbabwean society, these NGOs now have a 
much broader understanding of who qualifies as vulnerable. This has largely taken their work 
away from a deliberate focus on farmworkers/dwellers and the needs of particularly 
vulnerable members of this community, to a funder-driven focus on all rural Zimbabweans, 
and general development needs such as improved water and sanitation access. I will further 
show that the period after 2006 has been particularly tough for farm-focussed NGOs, for 
political, practical and funding-related reasons. As a result, while those such as FOST, KWA 
and FCTZ are still operating in Zimbabwe’s rural areas, they no longer have a strong 
presence on current or former commercial farms and, even where they do, their major target 
group tends to be land-reform beneficiaries rather than former farmworkers. The specific 
biopolitical focus of these NGOs on farmworkers and their families is thus no longer 
apparent, unlike during the era of biopolitical maternalism on commercial farms between 
1980 and 1990. Moreover, instead of being invested in the struggles for survival of their 
former beneficiaries, such NGOs are mainly invested in their own struggles for survival. As I 
will discuss in the second half of the chapter, a few new initiatives of local activists and other 
would-be developers now partially occupy the space once filled by NGOs.    
        
“Weathering the Storm”: Farm-focussed NGOs and Jambanja 
The steadily increasing number of commercial farm occupations shortly after the 
announcement of the constitutional referendum result in February 2000 not only unsettled 
farm-focussed NGOs but also began to have a direct impact on their programmes and 
                                                          
232 Especially the minutes of meetings, speeches, letters and field reports found in the private papers of FOST 
founder, Dr Sue Parry, who kindly allowed me access to these documents, as well as similar material in the 
archive of the KWA.  
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activities. Such impacts must be considered against the backdrop of wider social and 
economic problems already affecting Zimbabweans by the late 1990s, such as crippling fuel 
shortages, inflation of 60 per cent and unemployment of over 50 per cent (Raftopoulos 2009; 
Slaughter and Nolan 2000), as well as uncertainty about the political future of the country. 
However, because these NGOs were largely reliant on farm owners as core partners in 
implementing their programmes, Jambanja was a particularly uncertain time for them. The 
farm occupations were also often accompanied by violence and the displacement of both 
farmers and farmworkers, who were the beneficiaries of these NGOs (see Feltoe 2004; 
GAPWUZ 2010; Hartnack 2006, 2009b; Reeler 2004; Sachikonye 2011).  
 FOST, which was in an important phase of its growth from a voluntary network to a 
more professional NGO with full-time staff and donor funding,233 initially found the farm 
occupations very unsettling. At a meeting of the Executive Committee on 14 March 2000, 
soon after the first occupations, Chairman Sue Parry “thanked everyone for the support given 
to farmers during the difficult times of farm invasions by War Veterans” and noted that the 
launch of the Farm Model of Orphan Care was postponed because of the impending 
parliamentary elections (June 2000) and the occupations.234 From the way these events were 
discussed at this meeting, there is a sense that the committee members were not sure how to 
interpret them, and expected the situation to return to normal after the elections. At another 
Executive Committee meeting on 9 May, it was reported that a grant proposal for the 
European Union was not submitted due to “insecurity in the invasions”, and various outings 
for farm orphans had been cancelled.235 More worryingly, the Fieldworker in Mashonaland 
Central was reported to have been approached by members of the Central Intelligence 
Organisation (CIO) and asked if she worked with the Aurets.236 Furthermore, the FOST 
driver was accused by the police of being involved in a hit-and-run accident in Harare, 
despite his being out of town at the alleged time of the accident. Interpreting the latter 
incident as another example of political harassment, the meeting resolved that “Provincial 
Officers [should] maintain work conduct up until their personal safety is threatened”.  Despite 
these events, the meeting was also informed that an article about FOST in an American 
magazine had led to “donations flowing to support orphans” and that the organisation was 
intending to hire a Director for the first time. 
                                                          
233 See “Farm Orphan Support Trust Report” by Dr S. Parry for the CFU Annual Congress, 1999.   
234 Minutes of full FOST meeting held at CFU on 14 March 2000. Private papers of Dr S. Parry.  
235 Minutes of full FOST meeting held on 9 May 2000. Private papers of Dr S. Parry.  
236 Mike Auret was, by that time, an MDC Member of Parliament.  
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 A well-attended “urgent” meeting of the Executive Committee was held on 30 May 
2000 specifically to discuss the situation on the farms and issues related to violence against 
farmworkers and their children. Sue Parry proposed that they “set up a trauma centre for 
sexually abused children from commercial farms [due to] the rate of rape and intimidation” 
which she said had increased, “with police reluctant to get involved” and farmworkers 
unwilling to identify the perpetrators.237 The meeting resolved that this would be too 
expensive and that FOST should rather support existing child-protection organisations. The 
“urgent” nature of the meeting and the main topic of discussion demonstrate the sense of 
panic that FOST’s leadership felt as violence on the farms increased and the elections 
approached. As the election drew nearer FOST was also “accused of being a ‘subversive’ 
organisation adversely influencing farm workers”.238 However, after the June elections, 
which were narrowly won by ZANU-PF, the minutes of such meetings reflect a much more 
measured discussion of everyday matters relating to FOST’s programmes. At a meeting in 
August, for example, there was no mention of farm occupations, while the Executive 
Committee meeting on 5 December 2000 (at which the newly recruited Executive Director, 
Hilary Spencer, was introduced) focussed mainly on practical ways in which the organisation 
could address various problems they faced, including some related to the land crisis, as well 
as others relating to inflation and FOST’s registration as a welfare organisation. Importantly, 
a range of different international funders were reportedly interested in funding FOST for the 
first time.239  
 Thus, although FOST and its farming partners and beneficiaries found the year 2000 
to be unsettling (the latter were reported to be “despondent” by FOST fieldworkers),240 the 
new funding interests and continued growth and professionalisation of the organisation gave 
                                                          
237 “Minutes of URGENT meeting held at CFU on 30 May 2000”, Private papers of Dr S. Parry. This period 
was indeed characterised by sustained and widespread violence and intimidation of farmworkers by war 
veterans, ZANU-PF militants and state security personnel, as well as physical displacement (see GAPWUZ 
2010; Hartnack 2006; Reeler 2004; Sachikonye 2011). However, subsequent surveys with farmworkers about 
this period have indicated that the rate of the worst kind of abuses was relatively low. In a survey of 166 former 
farmworkers (GAPWUZ 2010: 20), for example, only 2 per cent reported that they, or their families had 
experienced rape or murder, whereas 44 per cent had experienced common assault, 54 per cent had received 
death threats and 69 per cent reported political intimidation. While the violence on farms was profound, the 
general anxiety among white farmers and farm-focussed NGOs around rape, in particular, provides an 
interesting parallel with earlier white anxieties around “unruly” black men and the “black peril” (Pape 1990), 
which were clearly brought to the fore in the context of Jambanja (see Pilossof 2011).  
238 Report of the Farm Orphan Support Trust given at the CFU Annual Congress, August 2000, by Dr S. Parry. 
Private papers of Dr S. Parry.   
239 These included USAID, World Bank and Catholic Relief Services, while funding had already been received 
from DANIDA and the Bernard van Leer Foundation. “Minutes of FOST meeting at CFU (5 December 2000)”, 
Private papers of Dr S. Parry.   
240 “Monthly report of fieldworkers (Mash Central – Dec 2000)”, Private papers of Dr S. Parry.  
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it a renewed sense of confidence by the end of the year. This move away from being a 
voluntary network associated with white farmers and the CFU and towards being an 
independent NGO was important. The fieldworker for Mashonaland Central reported in 
December, for example, that the “C.F.U. Logo on [FOST’s] letter head [is] causing concern 
to government people [as] whatever [is] said by C.F.U. we are part of it”.241 But while FOST 
was growing and becoming independent, the model it had developed to assist farm orphans – 
that of providing comprehensive support to farm-worker communities and foster families to 
meet the needs of children – suddenly had to change as the realities in commercial farming 
areas changed.242 As Sue Parry explained:    
 
When … the invasions happened and the collapse of the farms, there was a point where we had to 
change our whole focus and we took on the theme of “all orphans rights realised”. And we were going 
for short-term emergency response, making sure they were getting food to the kids; [and] protection 
… People said to us that we were going to have to shut down FOST and we said “but the children are 
still there!” So we had to find some other way to reach them that’s most appropriate under the 
circumstances and in which we can still operate. And we knew the schools were still there, and 
somehow through the schools we hoped to reach the children in the schools and those who were no 
longer in the schools, and track where were they.243  
 
Like other NGOs, FOST thus moved away from its comprehensive developmental 
agenda and adopted a shorter-term relief model, including the provision of supplementary 
feeding, clothing and blankets (see Helliker 2006: 288; Rutherford 2004a: 142). The 
organisation, however, never let go completely of its desire to provide more than relief, 
which is why it decided to work with schools as a base from which to provide additional 
aspects such as psycho-social support. Despite the continued farm occupations, another 
fraught election period in 2002, the worsening social and economic situation and the 
introduction of an even more prohibitive NGO Bill in 2004,244 the organisation continued to 
grow throughout the early 2000s. By 2003, staff numbers had increased from less than 10 to 
21. It had a new, dynamic and experienced Director in the form of Lynn Walker and had 
                                                          
241 “Monthly report of fieldworkers (Mash Central – Dec 2000)”. It would appear that at this stage FOST was 
still including a CFU logo on its letterhead, along with its own logo, since it was still an affiliate of the CFU.  
242 See the report of the Interim Chairperson and Acting Director, Diana Auret, in the FOST Annual Report, 
2001. See Chapter Three for details on FOST’s approach and activities.   
243 Taped interview with Dr Sue Parry, Harare, 19 June 2012.  
244 Which in December 2004 became the Non-governmental Organisations Act. See International Bar 
Association (2004) and Sachikonye (2012: 144–47) for analyses of this piece of legislation and its implications 
for NGOs.  
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opened offices in Chipinge and Mvurwi.245 By 2004 it had expanded its staff to 24, and by 
2005 it had 31 staff and a fleet of 11 vehicles.246 Crucially, Lynn Walker had managed to 
position FOST as a local NGO, independent from the interests of white farmers, seeking to 
address the developmental needs of a vulnerable sector of society. She ensured that FOST 
was able to “‘balance’ its development practice through ‘sensitive negotiations’ with both 
global donors and local power structures” (Helliker 2009: 118), thereby succeeding in being 
“able to ‘weather the storm’, and to manoeuvre its way through a restructured and tension-
filled agrarian landscape” (ibid.).247     
 Likewise, in contrast to some other farm-focussed NGOs (see Chambati and 
Magaramombe 2008; Helliker 2009), KWA was also able to negotiate its way through the 
difficult new environment of the Jambanja period. Executive Director Emma Mahlunge 
noted in 2000 that the year had been “an extremely difficult one for all Zimbabweans”, and 
that the “commercial farm invasions by war veterans have had adverse effects on 
[Kunzwana’s] programme in many areas”.248 She nevertheless positioned KWA as a crucial 
agent in mediating between farmers and workers, and in assisting women on farms to deal 
with the challenges brought about by the farm takeovers. In 2001, she noted that farmworkers 
were the “first line victims” of the FTLRP and that the programme had affected nearly half of 
the farms on which KWA had established women’s clubs and play centres.249 Despite this, 
KWA was able to continue working with many of its groups on farms and even increased its 
membership. Mahlunge recalls: “It was [a difficult transition], but what we did was just to 
follow the instructions that we were given … We were asked to the DA’s office and [signed] 
a memorandum of understanding; there you would be told, you know, who to approach first 
when you are doing your activities … We didn’t find any problems ourselves because it 
seems our programmes were being accepted by everybody”.250 A former Field Officer 
explained the new approach KWA adopted in order to continue with its work:  
 
With Kunzwana we carried on … We used to go through the farmer long back, but now we go 
through the local leadership. You go and see the sabhuku [village head] before you enter the area, you 
see the councillor, you see the village elders [war veterans and party officials] before you get in the 
                                                          
245 FOST Annual Report 2003. The first Director, Hillary Spencer, did not occupy the post for long.   
246 FOST Annual Reports 2004 and 2005.  
247 See Helliker (2009) and Sadomba and Helliker (2010) for more detail on how FOST negotiated this period.  
248 “A Note from the Executive Director”, KWA Annual Report 2000.  
249 “Statement by the Executive Director”, KWA Annual Report 2001.  
250 Taped interview with Emma Mahlunge, Harare, 14 March 2013.  
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areas, and you even clear yourself from police. If you just get in the area without telling them, you 
will be really in trouble, even if they know that Kunzwana is working in the area, but you must follow 
the protocol.251  
 
Mahlunge argues that being an “indigenous” (i.e. Zimbabwean-founded and run) 
organisation whose only focus was on “social development” was also an important factor in 
avoiding the political harassment other (international) NGOs experienced. However, 
notwithstanding these adaptations, KWA gradually found that it could not continue working 
on commercial farms with farmworkers in the ways it had done before 2000. The volatile 
situation on commercial farms and the establishment of a new agrarian order inevitably 
caused many KWA women’s clubs to become dormant or close down (cf. Rutherford 2004a: 
140) and KWA Field Officers found it difficult to hold meetings and training sessions with 
surviving clubs. As a result, KWA started to explore other avenues to continue with its core 
mandate of providing “empowering” skills and education to rural women and youth. Two 
alternatives emerged and were pursued, the first being expansion into the old resettlement 
areas created in the initial phase of the land-reform programme in the 1980s. As Mahlunge 
explained, “instead of saying ‘the farms have been destroyed’ and so on, we went to the [old] 
resettlement areas and we used to have our meetings there. So that’s how we changed 
because our constituents now included more of those Phase One resettlement areas”.252 The 
second strategy was to acquire a piece of land on which to build a training centre so that 
KWA members could come for training away from their home areas. By 2002, a plot had 
been obtained in Macheke and KWA was raising funds from its various international donors 
to build its own training centre.253 KWA was therefore able to resist becoming merely a relief 
organisation and, with ongoing support from its international donors (it had eight major 
donors in 2005), it continued to provide empowerment tools to rural women through its 
pragmatic and politically savvy approach. The only casualty of the Jambanja period was that 
the organisation’s shift to areas which were easier to operate in caused fewer and fewer of its 
beneficiaries to be former farmworkers.   
 
                                                          
251 Taped interview with Hilda Kadirire, Macheke, 25 February 2013. KWA was, of course, also registered with 
the Ministry of Social Welfare and had signed an MOU with the district local government authorities.   
252 Taped interview with Emma Mahlunge, Harare, 14 March 2013. For more detail on Phase One of the land-
reform programme see Alexander (1994), Dekker and Kinsey (2011), Goebel (1999), Maposa (1995), Potts and 
Mutambirwa (1997).  
253 See KWA Annual Reports 2002, 2003 and 2005 for reports on the progress of the centre.  
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Treading Water: Farm-focused NGOs 2006–2014 
As is apparent from the previous section, the Jambanja period, despite its political and 
economic difficulties, did not see the drastic decline of resilient NGOs such as FOST and 
KWA, who continued to attract funding for their (strategically altered) programmes. Indeed, 
this finding complicates the sweeping claims that have been made by Hughes (2010: 115) and 
Murisa (2011: 145), that new resettlement areas and people living within them were 
deliberately not targeted by NGOs for various forms of support and relief. Although there 
was a reduction in such work in these areas, FOST in particular, and also others such as 
KWA and FCTZ, demonstrate that farm-focussed NGOs tried by all means possible to adapt 
their work to continue working in these areas, and had some success in this endeavour until 
around 2006.   The same cannot be said about the period from 2006 up to the present, a period 
in which such NGOs attracted hardly any academic attention at all.254 For KWA, 2006 was 
not a bad year as far as donor support was concerned, and the organisation was able to raise 
enough money to run its core programmes and complete the second phase of its training 
centre in Macheke. However, the following three years were very hard indeed as the 
organisation grappled with hyper-inflation, cash shortages, a violent election period, political 
uncertainty and diminishing support from international donors.255 KWA suffered a funding 
crisis and several employees were laid-off256 while field operations all but ceased. After a 
whole year with no funding whatsoever in 2009, the Director wrote the following memo to 
KWA staff: 
 
This memo serves to thank you all for being faithful to your work during KWA’s difficult times that 
left KWA in nearly closure position but you stood firm with or without remuneration. That is strength 
for [KWA] to have staff that put work first and benefits last. It means we all want to see development 
within our beneficiaries more so during the December 2009 Xmas holiday. You deprived your 
families to be with you and chose to work …257   
 
                                                          
254 While Helliker published a number of articles and book chapters on the topic between 2006 and 2010, these 
draw exclusively on his doctoral fieldwork, which was concluded in 2005. 
255 Taped interview with Emma Mahlunge, Harare, 14 March 2013. See Crush and Tevera (2010), Derman and 
Kaarhus (2013), Jones (2010), Morreira (2013), Parsons (2012), Raftopolous (2009) and Sachikonye (2011, 
2012) for a wide array of perspectives on this period. 
256 Interview with KWA Field Officer, Macheke, 25 February 2013. KWA has never had a large number of staff 
members (below 20) and never expanded in the way that NGOs such as FOST did. With the redundancies, staff 
numbers dropped to around 15. 
257 Memo written by KWA Executive Director Emma Mahlunge to all KWA staff, 4 January 2010.   
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Mahlunge noted that this situation was not ideal, but used the chiShona proverb hapana 
mvura isina chura (there is no stream/well without toads) to suggest that such difficulties 
were an inevitable part of the work they were doing. This attitude draws on the strong 
ideology of hard work, self-sacrifice and voluntarism which KWA not only cultivated for 
itself when it was founded, but has also always expected of its women’s club members.258 
Fortunately for KWA, the political and economic stability provided by the fledgling inclusive 
government – which had come into being in early 2009 after the major political parties signed 
the Global Political Agreement (GPA) – provided a better platform for organisations like 
themselves to attract international donors and continue with their work.259 By 2011, KWA’s 
programmes were supported by two reasonably sized grants and a few much smaller 
grants.260 A similar situation prevailed in 2013, with the Director noting that “there is need to 
step up diversification of [the] funding base, since most of the current funding frameworks 
will be concluded in 2014”.261 Despite this improvement in the funding situation, the former 
Director noted that it was still “shaky”.262 KWA’s training centre, now called the Mationesa 
Skills Training Centre, however, provides some additional revenue through its occasional 
hire and overnight guests who lodge in the dormitories. Over 5,000 members of the 152 clubs 
affiliated to KWA also pay a small annual affiliation fee of US$10 (US$5 for youth) which 
qualifies them for free training and participation in the “Market Fair” that is organised once 
or twice a year in Harare, and other events. 
 The period of the inclusive government (2009–2013) was also an easier operating 
environment politically, although field staff had to continue observing their careful clearance 
protocols. In 2011 a new Director, Dr Emmie Wade, was appointed following the retirement 
of Emma Mahlunge. Wade (who is Mahlunge’s daughter) is an economist with three decades 
of experience in development, having worked at the World Bank, the United Nations and 
various NGOs previously. She was able to forge close ties with the inclusive government’s 
Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Gender and Community Development and the Ministry of 
Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment in particular (both headed by ZANU-
PF Ministers). A KWA banner from this period illustrates how closely KWA sought to align 
                                                          
258 There is an interesting parallel between such expectations and those of the white women who ran Homecraft 
clubs before independence, and who complained when the African members would not work hard enough, or 
would expect payment for demonstrating skills to other women (see MacLean 1974: 255). 
259 See Morreira (2013), Murithi and Mawadza (2011), Raftopolous (2009) and Sachikonye (2012) on the GPA 
and the inclusive government. 
260 KWA Annual Report, 2011. The two larger funders were the United States African Development Foundation 
(USADF) and Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst (EED).  
261 “Message from the Director, Dr Emmie Wade”, KWA Annual Report 2013.  
262 Taped interview with Emma Mahlunge, Harare, 14 March 2013.  
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its development agenda with the kind of rhetoric used by these Ministries, and thus 
emphasise its role as a partner of the government. The banner has KWA’s logo at the top and 
the coat of arms of Zimbabwe at the bottom, next to the funders’ logos. In big red letters it 
proclaims: “UNITE TO ACHIEVE TOTAL EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN”. This 
strongly echoes a recurring campaign slogan of ZANU-PF: “100 Percent Empowerment”. 
Despite these efforts, however, KWA still faced challenges as the inclusive government’s 
term came to an end and another election approached in June 2013. Field Officers found it 
increasingly difficult to conduct their work with the clubs in the first half of 2013 because of 
the rising political tensions and because their members were being called to political rallies so 
often. Despite KWA’s good standing, there was consensus that they would have to suspend 
field operations until after the elections were over.263    
 Despite expectations that the 2013 elections would improve the country’s political 
and economic prospects, ZANU-PF’s win largely had the opposite effect, with economic 
growth slowing drastically from 2013,264 an almost immediate cash liquidity crisis and a large 
number of company closures by the year’s end.265 Furthermore, there were renewed fears that 
the new government would use the old draconian NGO legislation to restrict the work of 
NGOs, particularly those which had been involved in issues relating to human rights, 
transitional justice and democracy during the era of the inclusive government.266 KWA 
continued to cultivate a close relationship with government Ministries, but even so it could 
not escape the fresh hurdles being put in the way of NGOs by the new administration. This 
was made clear to me one Friday morning in November 2013, when I arrived at KWA’s 
offices to find the Director and staff despondently mulling a phone call they had received 
from Macheke. The training centre had been visited by a government official who insisted 
that it must be registered with the Ministry of Education as an educational institution, a 
process which would cost US$500. Their protests that they were already registered as a 
welfare organisation were ignored, leaving the Director to wonder where they would obtain 
the unbudgeted US$500 from. Staff members were also despondent about the fact that their 
salaries were not keeping up with the growing cost of living. It was clear that, while KWA’s 
Board and management expected the spirit of voluntarism yet again to carry them through the 
insecure times, staff members worried about how they would support their families, yet had 
                                                          
263 Notes taken at KWA staff meeting, Macheke, 26 February 2013.  
264 See SAPA, 7 November 2014, “Zimbabwe’s Economy Doing No Better”.  
265 See Eddie Cross, 17 November 2014. “Zimbabwe’s Economy: Back on the Precipice”.  
266 See The Zimbabwean, 14 September 2013, “Challenging Times for NGOs Ahead as Chikomo’s Trial 
Commences”.  
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no choice but to hold onto their jobs because there were very few alternative employment 
opportunities.          
 Another change in mid-2013 had also caused some disgruntlement among KWA’s 
field staff. Following an evaluation by one of its funders, it was recommended that KWA 
decentralise its field operations by re-deploying the three Field Officers to the training centre 
and handing over responsibility to 26 voluntary “area leaders” (already club members), who 
would coordinate and report on club activities, organise training sessions and identify the 
additional training needs of club members in their local areas.267 One long-serving Field 
Officer subsequently resigned because she did not agree with the strategy and nor did she 
want to sit at the training centre waiting for sporadic training workshops. KWA’s Director, on 
the other hand, reported that the move had resulted in club members contributing much more 
to their own training process, rather than relying on KWA to provide everything.268 This cost-
cutting endeavour is in keeping with KWA’s ethos of hard work and voluntarism, which at 
least some of the members buy into. One long-time member stated, for example: “Some say 
Kunzwana is not good because you are given nothing. But I say they are good because they 
teach you how to get a better life”.269 The danger, however, is that without the Field Officers 
providing regular input, encouragement and oversight for the clubs, members may feel 
abandoned by KWA and the clubs may eventually become dormant as impetus, and an 
adequate incentive for participation, is lost.270 Indeed, it appears that area leaders may be too 
busy during the agricultural season to play the coordinating and training role that is envisaged 
for them. One area leader who I met in November 2013, for example, expressed 
disappointment that the Field Officer would no longer be visiting regularly. When I returned 
to visit her in March 2014, she told me that the clubs had not been able to meet for the last 
few months because everybody was too busy with their own agricultural work.271      
 A combination of the above factors means that KWA’s clubs are not as active as in 
the past, and KWA’s capacity to reach really vulnerable rural women, such as those from 
former farmworker communities, is limited. Although some former farmworkers still do 
affiliate to KWA, many clubs in new resettlement areas (A1) are dominated, rather, by land-
                                                          
267 See “Message from the Director, Dr Emmie Wade”, KWA Annual Report, 2013.  
268 Ibid.  
269 Interview with Jasmine Wilo, Zvimba, 21 November 2013.  
270 While training workshops are held from time to time at the training centre (perhaps two or three per year) 
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271 Interview with KWA area leader, Zvimba District, 27 March 2014.  
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reform beneficiaries. A club initiated recently on a former Wedza commercial farm, for 
example, draws 80 per cent of its members from resettled households, while the farm 
dwellers who are members were those few lucky enough to be allocated land at the farm.272 
For former workers still living in farm compounds, their social, economic and residential 
marginalisation and insecurity can make participation in a club difficult. On a former 
commercial farm in Zvimba, for example, the club members are not drawn from the old 
compound. The former Field Officer for the area summed up the reason for this in moralistic 
terms: “If you give them skills, they do nothing with them; they only want to be fed. We tried 
to ask them to join the club, but they wanted hand-outs only. They are used to that life!”273 
She also suggested that the women were more interested in making money from the passing 
traffic through sex work than through the “hard” work required to engage in the kinds of 
income-generation activities valourised by KWA.274 There are thus still moral discourses 
being perpetuated around work and the “proper” ways in which women should behave and 
make money which now justify the exclusion of former farmworkers (the original 
beneficiaries) from the clubs (cf. Rutherford 2004a). While KWA still has some presence on 
former commercial farms, the inclusion of former farmworkers continues to dwindle in 
favour of mostly self-reliant and “entrepreneurial” resettled members. At the same time, the 
logistical and funding difficulties recently faced by KWA have meant that the input it 
provides to club members is not what it used to be.  
 Like KWA, FOST experienced major financial difficulties after 2005. As Field 
Officer Maxwell Vheremu explained: “Around 2008–2010 it was terrible! We really faced 
serious financial problems. The majority of staff were laid off in 2011 as our EU-funded 
programmes ended. Chipinge office closed and the food security programme ended. Eleven 
people were laid off there, and in Concession seven were laid off”.275 However, according to 
Programme Manager Peter Murwisi, the problem was not just that funding dried up, but that 
funders changed the way they supported programmes: “Initially, FOST had its project and 
funders came in and supported that. But now it’s a funders market: you have to go through 
their programmes and follow what they want … It’s a big challenge: funds are tied to some 
                                                          
272 Interview with KWA Field Officer for Wedza, Harare, 15 November 2013.  
273 Interview with Former Field Officer for Zvimba District, Zvimba, 21 November 2013. Such discourses 
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programmes or projects, so when we fundraise, we have to fit into their criteria”.276 It is little 
wonder, then, that Murwisi describes the current FOST activities as “confused”. This journey 
away from its original mandate (as amended after 2000) was quickened when the transitional 
government, supported by UNICEF, implemented a programme to restore the education 
system, and instructed FOST to concentrate on supporting children with school fees rather 
than the psycho-social support (PSS) they were providing.   
 Thus, although FOST still tries to support vulnerable households (especially those 
headed by grandmothers) and the youth in an effort to continue focussing on orphans and 
vulnerable children, its survival as an organisation has depended on taking on a few very 
different projects since 2010, while this core mandate has struggled for funding. FOST has 
also had to move outside its traditional seven districts of operation in order to work in other 
areas (communal areas) where their funders are working. Thus, Murwisi explains: “We still 
count 500 farms, but our activities there are few and far between. We might spend a year not 
doing anything and in some areas politics is a problem”. Furthermore, FOST has been forced 
to use volunteers on former commercial farms who are often vulnerable themselves and are 
not able to provide adequate support to other vulnerable households. While FOST and its 
field staff have managed to negotiate local political protocols successfully and do not face 
harassment, the organisation appears to have become little more than a consulting service for 
international agencies driving their own development agenda. Farmworkers, who were once 
the core beneficiaries of FOST, are no longer supported in any meaningful way by the 
organisation. It is unsurprising that former FOST employees feel that FOST’s “vision has 
been diluted”, and that it is not the organisation it was intended to be.277  
 The Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ) demonstrates a similar pattern to 
the previously discussed NGOs, as described by Director Godfrey Magaramombe: “All our 
programmes in the past 13 years have been on farms, well in the past 12 years, 10 years, 
[they] have mostly been on farms. It’s only later on that we started to move into communal 
areas because the funding sort of dried up”.278 One reason for this gradual diminishment of 
funding is that some major Western donors, for legal and political reasons, have been 
reluctant to fund work on what they see as the “contested land” of former commercial farms: 
“We had challenges with the European Union and USAID, but not from DfID. They adopted 
                                                          
276 Interview with FOST Programme Manager Peter Murwisi, Harare, 4 July 2013. See Rowden (2009) on 
global HIV/AIDS funding shifts and their impact on public health and the fight against AIDS.    
277 Taped interview with former FOST employee, Harare, 19 November 2013.  
278 Taped interview with Godfrey Magaramombe, Harare, 28 June 2013.  
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a middle-of-the-road approach of don’t ask, don’t tell”.279 According to other long-time staff 
members, the donors are now “very dictatorial and won’t give money for overheads”,280 
contributing to the drastic downsizing of what was once a large national NGO with 150 
employees, to an organisation with less than 20 staff members. Like FOST, in order to 
survive, FCTZ has shifted its focus to encompass all vulnerable people everywhere, even 
changing its mission statement and constitution which once promised a focus on 
farmworkers. A recently concluded “Protracted Relief Programme” included farm dwellers, 
along with residents of communal areas, but FCTZ was not at liberty to decide which wards 
would be chosen in its ongoing rural water, sanitation and hygiene project for UNICEF. As 
Magaramombe explained, “it’s up to the district water and sanitation committees to decide 
where we are going to work”. From once being the largest farm-focussed NGO in the 
country, FCTZ had reached the point, in 2013, where the Director could admit: “For us, at the 
moment, we don’t really have a programme on farms”.  
 
Contemporary Welfare and “Improvement” Endeavours Involving Farm Dwellers  
In the previous chapter, I argued that commercial farmers have generally decreased their own 
welfare efforts for workers on their farms, apart from in a few cases where they continue to 
be involved in schools or orphanages, partially as a strategy by which to remain on the land. 
Some of the larger enterprises producing export crops such as vegetables, flowers and tea 
also continue to have to meet various ethical trading obligations.281 The formerly farm-
focussed NGOs, however, are no longer active on remaining commercial farms and are 
showing a steadily decreasing concentration on farm dwellers on resettled land. This 
population therefore currently has less attention from would-be “developers” than at any time 
in the previous two decades. There are, however, a few initiatives aimed at, or including 
former farmworkers which deserve some discussion. These include some localised 
“grassroots” endeavours linked to Christian activists assisting farm dwellers to overcome 
various challenges, and an ambitious movement initiated by former white farmers which 
seeks, with Christian missionary methods and zeal, to revolutionise African agriculture.       
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Grassroots Activism, Organic Intellectuals and Farm Dwellers  
Where NGOs are no longer active, individuals and organisations linked to the Christian 
church have sometimes stepped in to assist former farmworkers on farms, or in post-
displacement locations (see Hartnack 2006, 2009b). On Albany Farm, a former tobacco farm 
close to Harare (see Chapter Four), the Reverend Henry Mbwando has instituted a number of 
small initiatives to assist the community he was born into to negotiate the harsh and insecure 
reality of their present existence. Henry’s biography is integral to his role as an activist for 
the former farmworkers at Albany farm. Born at Albany Farm 41 years ago to a Zambian 
mother and Malawian father, Henry is the last-born of six children. He attended the farm 
primary school founded by a Zambian cleric resident on the farm, but his parents could only 
afford to send him for two years of senior school as his father had retired by that time. At the 
age of 16, Henry became a security guard at the farm, a job he held for four years, but in 
1993 an opportunity opened up for him to undertake theological training. Graduating in 1996, 
he became a pastor in his Pentecostal church, the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God, Africa 
(ZAOGA).282 Moving to Harare, Henry went into full-time ministry until he fell ill in 2002. 
Much as ZAOGA provided a refuge for those struggling with the everyday challenges of life 
under ESAP (Maxwell 2005), the church adopted a decidedly exclusionary approach to 
members who were suspected of failing to live a “pure” and “holy” life (Machingura 2012). 
In the context of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, falling ill immediately attracted such suspicions, 
especially for a pastor, whose good health was meant to be an outward sign of his holiness.283 
Henry was stripped of his position and returned to Albany farm in 2003, just as “things were 
brewing up” politically and the farm was being occupied by ZANU-PF supporters.284 
 In 2004, Henry tested positive for HIV. Two years earlier his older brother had taken 
his life when he learned of his own HIV-positive status. Henry, rather, threw himself into 
defending the rights of his community against the encroaching settlers, an ongoing struggle I 
                                                          
282 See Maxwell (2005) for an excellent analysis of the role of the Pentecostal church (and ZAOGA in 
particular) in the lives of poor Zimbabweans in the 1990s.   
283 In his exploration of the practices of Zimbabwean Pentecostal churches towards those living with 
HIV/AIDS, Machingura (2012: 310) notes the following: “HIV and AIDS … is seen as a monster that came as a 
result of the sin of immorality, hence the theology of ‘splitting’. This is where patients are excluded as ‘them 
sinners, losers’, and ‘us, holy winners’”. He also notes that “Most of the public awareness on HIV and AIDS led 
by Pentecostal churches are nothing less than condemnation and damnation of people living with HIV and 
AIDS” (ibid.: 309). 
284 Taped interview with Henry Mbwando, Harare, 14 June 2013. I provide more biographical information on 
Henry in Chapter Six, including on his marriage and personal livelihood struggles. 
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described in the previous chapter. This work kept Henry going, though his illness worsened: 
“I get strength just knowing I have to be there for other people”, he told me (cf. Fassin 2010: 
91–2). A friend of his then invited him to attend a workshop of religious leaders from East 
and southern Africa at which he learnt that most of the participants were also living with HIV 
and had established a regional network through which they hoped to encourage more clerics 
to speak about the disease. They asked Henry to start a Zimbabwe chapter of this network 
and, in early 2005, connected him to the HIV programme of the World Council of 
Churches.285 In an ironic and serendipitous twist, the Southern Africa Regional Coordinator 
for this programme was Dr Sue Parry, the founder and former Chairman of FOST.286 Parry 
helped Henry by linking him with possible funders for his network because, as he explained: 
“I never knew anything about donors or … how to go about it!” She also took him under her 
wing medically, showing him how to improve his immune system, and eventually facilitating 
his commencement of anti-retroviral therapy (ART) at a private clinic in Harare. Henry today 
counts Parry as an important mentor: “Sue Parry is the woman who made me to be what I am. 
I was really grappling with life and I did not know what to do. But coming into contact with 
Sue was a transformation”. Having established his Zimbabwe chapter, Henry was asked by 
an international NGO to be part of a publicity campaign in which role-models (a teacher, a 
lecturer and a pastor) declared their HIV status and encouraged others to get tested.287 The 
publicity resulting from this campaign (he was the first Zimbabwean cleric to declare his 
status) then allowed Henry to launch himself as an HIV campaigner, as well as raise donor 
money to help people from a similar background to his.288  
 Henry is fond of pointing out that he could, at that point, have left the farm and gone 
to live in Harare. “But”, he says, “you cannot fight for people if you are located outside: if 
ever you are to win, you must fight from within the community”.289 Along with his 
participation in high-level HIV committees and advocacy work for NGOs, Henry dedicated 
himself to educating the farm dwellers about HIV and helping to get those who were sick 
onto ART, which became more easily available from state institutions after 2008. His 
newfound fame also gave him a certain power, he found, in his fight to advocate for the rights 
                                                          
285 Known as the Ecumenical HIV and AIDS Initiative in Africa (EHAIA).  
286 Sue Parry resigned from FOST in 2001 and took up the job at EHAIA shortly afterwards.  
287 The NGO also wanted to get a nurse to be part of the campaign, but the Ministry of Health refused. The fact 
that Henry had been excluded from his church did not undermine his legitimacy and he still wears his clerical 
collar to important meetings.  
288 There is a striking resemblance between Henry and an HIV-positive interlocutor of Fassin (2010: 91), whose 
HIV status, rather than causing him to fall into abjection, “evolved into a social resource, not only because of its 
economic consequences, but also due to its moral and even civic implications”.   
289 Interview with Henry Mbwando, Harare, 4 June 2013.  
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of the former workers, and he realised that he “was a voice for these people”. In addition, he 
was able to mobilise food hampers from private-sector sponsors from time to time, to assist 
vulnerable households to survive. Henry is an example of an individual who has taken on the 
role of a provider of welfare and champion of rights for his own community, one which, as 
Magaramombe (2010) has framed it, has been “displaced in-situ” following the FTLRP.290 
Importantly, Henry’s unique position and the quirks of his own life history which brought 
him there, have allowed him to play this crucial role, providing a level of support not enjoyed 
by many former farmworkers elsewhere. He continues to live in a crumbling brick single 
room at the farm compound, and his community’s struggle for survival is deeply imbricated 
with his own subsistence and survival struggles. 
 Another instance of grassroots, church-linked activism also targeting farmworkers 
was initiated by Learnmore Mpofu, a social and political activist in his forties who grew up at 
a mine in Mashonaland West.291 In the early 2000s, Learnmore made the acquaintance of a 
white commercial farmer named Mike Campbell, who later became famous for successfully 
challenging the takeover of his farm, and around 70 others, at the SADC Tribunal (see Freeth 
2011).292 Mpofu was an MDC activist at that time, but was also influenced strongly by his 
Christian faith; something he, Campbell and Campbell’s son-in-law Ben Freeth had in 
common. When the Campbell’s farm was eventually taken over despite the SADC Tribunal 
protection order (see ibid.), Learnmore tried to assist the workers in various ways. In late 
2008 Mpofu suggested to Ben Freeth that they conduct research on the experiences of 
farmworkers living on the farms protected by the SADC Tribunal ruling, many of which had 
nevertheless been taken. Freeth agreed to this project, and Learnmore travelled to many of the 
farms, gathering affidavits of the various sufferings and losses of their workers.293 Since that 
time, Learnmore has continued, where possible, to respond to cases of evicted farmworkers 
around the country, arranging relief assistance through Freeth and other donors.  
                                                          
290 Magaramombe (2010) uses this concept to describe the position of former farmworkers who, while not 
physically displaced, nevertheless saw the displacement of the whole farming system on which they relied for 
employment and access to various kinds of resources. 
291 Information in this section is from interviews with Ben Freeth on 4 June 2012, Learnmore Mpofu on 12 
February 2013 and 28 October 2013, and a focus-group discussion with members of the Community of Hope on 
29 November 2013. 
292 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal was established in 1992 as the highest 
policy institution in SADC. Located in Windhoek, Namibia, Tribunal members were only appointed at the 
SADC Summit of 2005 (see http://www.sadc-tribunal.org/).  
293 The intention of this exercise was to document infringements of the SADC Tribunal ruling, especially those 
relating to abuses experienced by farmworkers on the protected farms.       
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 In these endeavours, Learnmore works with a small group of people from his church, 
including his wife and the pastor. They have formed a group known as the Community of 
Hope through which they aim to assist vulnerable members of society, especially those in 
their district. Learnmore describes their vision thus:  
 
We chose farmworkers because they, in particular, suffer from lack of confidence and do not know 
how to put themselves forward. Given the situation that was there previously on the farms, they did 
not have to ask for anything as they were provided with everything by the white farmers. So they did 
not learn how to advocate for their needs as they just waited for the farmer to provide them with their 
needs. So now they do not know how to begin going around knocking on different doors to get what 
they need. We help them to do that by linking them to various organisations, and they then become 
teachers of the skills they get to others in their communities.294      
 
In line with his politics, religious beliefs and relationships with farmers such as Campbell 
(now deceased) and Freeth, Learnmore is given to romanticising and valorising the 
relationship between white farmers and farmworkers, buying into and perpetuating the trope 
of farmer provision and care which is prevalent in the work of Freeth (2011) and from many 
other former farmers (see Pilossof 2011; Rutherford 2004b). Learnmore’s words, however, 
inadvertently reveal the dependency that was created in this relationship at the same time as 
they deny farmworkers any agency or ability to fight for their own interests both before the 
FTLRP and thereafter.295 For instance, when discussing the case of the Chakari farm dwellers 
who hired a lawyer to contest their eviction (see Chapter Four), Learnmore told me that an 
intervention by him and Freeth had led to this successful legal challenge. The former workers 
I spoke to, however, had instead emphasised their own ingenuity and agency in resolving the 
matter. Li (2007: 24) points out that there is often a thin line between what Gramsci 
conceptualised as an “organic intellectual”, whose role “is to help subalterns to understand 
their oppression and mobilize to challenge it” and a trustee who seeks to “improve” the 
“deficient subject whose conduct is to be conducted”. Such imbrications and contradictions 
between these positions are present in the stories and work of both Learnmore and Henry, but 
Learnmore and his colleagues veer much more towards the position of trustee than does 
Henry, who is closer to a true organic intellectual.      
                                                          
294 Interview with Learnmore Mpofu, Harare, 28 October 2013. The skills to which he is referring are mainly 
agricultural skills designed to assist people to obtain improved household food security.    
295 See Hartnack (2009b) for a critique of such discourses and the ways in which former farmworkers did 
exercise agency in the tough pre- and post-land reform environments they had to negotiate.    
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 This is by no means to suggest that Learnmore and the Community of Hope do not 
care deeply about those they wish to help, and indeed Learnmore in particular has displayed 
great moral and physical courage in his political and social activism over the last 15 years. He 
has also managed to link various groups of former farmworkers to organisations he has 
established strong links with, such as Freeth’s Mike Campbell Foundation (financial 
sponsorship and relief), Doctors for Human Rights (medical assistance), Lawyers for Human 
Rights (rights training), Tree of Life (trauma and violence counselling) and Foundations for 
Farming (livelihoods skills training).296 It is to this last organisation that I now turn to explore 
the ways in which former white farmers have continued to reinvent themselves as trustees 
and agricultural modernisers despite no longer having their own land on which to carry out 
these twin endeavours. 
 
Neo Alvordism: White Farmers and Modernist Agricultural Evangelism  
On a chilly June day in 2013, a group of 13 people were seated in a small room at the 
headquarters of Foundations for Farming (FfF) at Resthaven Retreat Centre outside Harare. 
The group, consisting mainly of former farmworkers and a few A1 farmers, listened as a FfF 
trainer conducted a training workshop on the principles and methods of “farming God’s way” 
championed by FfF. Speaking in chiShona, but with the aid of the inevitable PowerPoint 
slides, the trainer shared an intriguing mix of meteorology, hydrology, agronomy, geometry 
and Bible verses with the men and women in the group. For every scientific principle given, 
there was a matching scriptural one. The group had been brought to the workshop by the 
Community of Hope, with sponsorship from the Mike Campbell Foundation, to learn the 
methods of “conservation farming”, perfected over many years of experimentation by white 
former commercial farmer Brian Oldreive.  
 After farming tobacco for many years, Oldreive became a charismatic Christian in 
1978, which led him to question the ethics of growing tobacco and to concentrate on maize 
and a wide range of other crops instead (see Oldreive 1993).297 Moving to Hinton Estate, near 
Bindura, in 1982 he started to research and experiment with conservation tillage to reduce the 
tremendous soil and water losses he observed resulting from conventional (Western) farming 
practices such as deep ploughing and the burning or clearing of organic waste. He also 
                                                          
296 On the work of Tree of Life see Morreira (2013: 65ff.) and Mpande et al. (2013).  
297 See Robbins (2004) who traces and analyses the global spread of charismatic and Pentecostal Christianity in 
the twentieth century. See Ganiel (2009) on charismatic Christians in independent Zimbabwe.  
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experimented with techniques to increase yields and perfected a method which led him to 
obtain a record 13.9 tonnes of maize harvested per hectare, despite not using conventional 
large-scale methods. Oldreive firmly believed that “God led him to Hinton Estate to establish, 
without doubt, the benefits of conservation farming” (ibid.: prelims). He called the method 
“farming God’s way” because he believed that in order to be “good stewards of what God has 
entrusted to us as agriculturalists” (ibid.: vii), farmers needed to return to more “natural” 
ways of farming which acknowledged that “in natural creation there is no deep soil inversion 
and that a thick ‘blanket’ of fallen leaves and grass covers the surface of the soil”.298 Not 
content to remain a voice calling in the wilderness, Oldreive shared his ideas as widely as 
possible in the 1990s, producing technical handbooks for both small and large-scale farmers.  
 Having been pushed off the land by the mid-2000s, Oldreive and several like-minded 
white farmers established Farming God’s Way, later rebranded Foundations for Farming, as a 
vehicle both to take Oldreive’s vision forward and to give themselves a new role; that of 
agricultural missionaries to smallholders in Zimbabwe and all over Africa (cf. Hughes 2010: 
112–13). As one such farmer explained to me, “Ours is not just a technical intervention; we 
don’t teach conservation farming and then leave, but what we do is based on the Bible and it 
is a whole change of attitude and lifestyle we try to teach”.299 A large poster in the FfF 
reception illustrates the vision driving this endeavour. The poster shows several full-colour 
maps of Africa: one of land-use potential and another of malnutrition levels. A third map 
illustrating “development” features a satellite image of Africa, Europe and parts of Asia taken 
at night. While Europe and much of Asia is radiant with artificial lights, Africa is largely 
dark, apart from in a few isolated flashes. The continent is presented, once again, as the Dark 
Continent into which FfF seeks to bring light, both in the form of the Christian gospel and in 
terms of modern “development” (cf. Ferguson 2008: 12). Indeed Freeth (2011: 207), whose 
autobiography contains a similar mix of the discourses of modernity and charismatic 
Christianity, calls FfF “a bright light for the future”. Production and profitability are a core 
feature of FfF’s message, putting a neoliberal spin on the Biblical parable of the talents.300 
FfF valorises the uptake of the following principles in those it trains, encouraging them to 
ensure that “everything” they do is:           
1. On Time: Plan ahead. Prepare well. Start early. Never be late! 
                                                          
298 Foundations for Farming. n.d. About Us: The Foundation. 
http://www.foundationsforfarming.org/index.php/about-us (accessed 18 November 2014).  
299 Personal communication with Darrly Edwards. Resthaven, 11 June 2013.  
300 See The Gospel According to Matthew, Chapter 25, verses 14–30.  
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2. At a High Standard: Do every operation and detail as well as you can with no 
shortcuts. Be honest and honourable in all you do. 
3. Without Wasting: Don’t waste time, soil, water, sunlight, seed, nutrients, labour, 
energy, opportunity etc. 
4. With Joy: If you do these first three things faithfully without self-pity, complaining, 
blaming others, making excuses, but with thankfulness, there will be no need for fear 
and hopelessness and you will have hope and joy which gives you strength. 
They conclude: “If Foundations for Farming is applied faithfully, Africa can feed itself”.301 
Trainees such as the former farmworkers I sat with are taken through a few days of 
practical training (by a number of black trainers) in how to grow a “well-watered garden” on 
FfF principles.302 This involves learning a technical and precise method of how to select the 
site for a six-by-six metre plot, mark it out, measure precisely where each hole will be dug, 
how to dig correctly, how to plant the seeds and apply the fertiliser, and how to control weeds 
and ensure sufficient water and mulch, and so on. In the selection of the plot and cultivation 
of the garden, trainees are encouraged to make it look “aesthetically beautiful” and to align 
the plot with “the access road or the nearest [square] building … so that it looks pleasing”.303 
When the field is dug to specification it resembles a checkers board, with parallel and 
diagonal lines of small holes flowing neatly whichever way it is observed. The intended 
result, as described in a recent article, reflects the modernist aesthetics espoused by FfF, 
which contradict the “natural”, Edenic rhetoric it also promotes: “The maize stalks, perfectly 
spaced at 60 centimeters apart, created an impeccably straight line of golden brown, awaiting 
the impending harvest” (Johnson, 29 December 2014). In addition to being pleasing to the 
modernist human eye, and God, aesthetics are linked here to production: “Evenly spaced 
holes of even size and depth are the foundation for a beautiful even crop, which makes it 
possible to achieve the highest possible potential yield”.304 Quality is preferred over quantity, 
but the method can be replicated on a larger scale by those with more land and labour.  
 This “improvement” formula has allowed the white farmers involved with FfF to 
carve out a role for themselves in post-FTLRP Zimbabwe, a role which still draws on their 
                                                          
301 Foundations for Farming (n.d.). Our Message: Foundations for a Profit. 
http://www.foundationsforfarming.org/index.php/about-us/our-message (accessed 18 November 2014). 
302 FfF training workshop notes, Resthaven, 11 June 2013.  
303 Foundations for Farming (n.d.). Planting a Well Gardened Garden (Maize). 
http://www.foundationsforfarming.org/images/A-Well-Watered-Garden.pdf (accessed 18 November 2014).  
304 Ibid.: 2.  
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“modern” technical expertise, but has depoliticised this by de-linking it to land ownership and 
crucially, by rendering this technical formula into religious terms. While Li (2007: 7) 
critiques many development programmes for “rendering technical” issues which should 
instead be dealt with in the political realm, former white farmers involved with FfF have 
made the further move of taking a technical project which had become politically dangerous 
(see Chapter Three) and attempting to depoliticise it by rendering spiritual the technical.305 
This move allows these white farmers to continue to feel they authentically belong in 
contemporary Zimbabwe as developmental evangelists, conveying a unique technical 
modernity, and maintaining a God-given trusteeship over “deficient subjects”, in whom 
“numerous deficiencies” can be detected (Li 2007: 24). Such moralism can be summed up in 
a quote from a recent article about FfF (Johnson, 29 December 2014), which states: “you can 
tell the condition of a man’s heart by looking at the condition of his field”. The four key 
principles listed above thus seek to address many of the “deficiencies” long believed by 
colonial settlers and missionaries to plague African traditional life: failure to plan ahead or 
manage time properly (Kiegwin 1923 and NADA 1927 in MacLean 1974: 181 and 209 
respectively); lack of honesty and self-discipline (MacLean 1974: 175); the myth of 
profligacy in relation to other resources such as money, water, soil, seeds and fertiliser (see Li 
2007: 21; Moore 2005: 81); and, in the words of Oldreive, “a lack of farming enterprise” 
which requires teaching black African farmers “to make a profit” (Johnson, 29 December 
2014). 
 This endeavour thus has many parallels with an earlier array of evangelical 
“improvement” or “civilising” attempts in Zimbabwe’s colonial history. Yet the route to 
sustainability, modernity, civilisation and, presumably, heaven offered by FfF makes one 
major departure from those earlier blueprints, all of which strongly advocated the “gospel of 
the plough” (Moore 2005: 125). One of the first such endeavours, for example, was the 
Keigwin Plan, named after the Native Commissioner for Sinoia (Chinoyi) who, just after 
World War One, strove to set up training schools for African farmers. Keigwin “believed it 
was necessary to demonstrate, practically, European methods of agriculture, such as proper 
ploughing, to the Africans in the reserves so that they might advance beyond the primitive 
                                                          
305 But note that not all traces of politics are erased in the process. Speaking to a journalist on the background of 
FfF, current Chief Executive Officer Craig Deall described how farmers such as himself were faced with three 
options: “We could flee, we could fight, or we could forgive. And forgiveness [was] the hardest option”. Deall 
explained how they had chosen to “turn the other cheek”, and went on: “And the one verse that says if a man 
steals your tunic, you must give him your coat as well … so if a man steals your farm, you must teach him how 
to farm” (Johnson, 29 December 2014). 
172 
stage of soil scratching and shifting agriculture, with the consequent destruction of the natural 
resources” (MacLean 1974: 202; see also Moore and Vaughan 1994). Keigwin set up a 
training school to this end at Domboshawa – coincidentally very close to the current 
headquarters and training facilities of FfF. Likewise, later agricultural missionaries such as 
E.D. Alvord, the architect of colonial land-use planning in the 1940s, emphasised the plough 
as a major part of his “technical spatial fix”, which sought to enforce “permanent 
cultivation”, linear settlement and fields, and market orientation in the reserves (Moore 2005: 
80–1).306 By the late 1970s, however, even government officials were questioning the plough 
and “continuous depletive cropping” (Harvey 1977: 176), and suggesting that “soil 
scratching” was, after all, much better for the fragile environment.  
 While FfF embraces this later environmental “enlightenment”, and preaches minimum 
tillage and crop rotation, its missionary zeal in bringing the light of “development” to the 
Dark Continent and “cultivating crops and souls in the Lord’s fields” (Moore 2005: 81); its 
encouragement of straight lines, right angles, hard work, market orientation, Christian values 
and environmental conservation all make it decidedly Alvordist in orientation.307 Yet this is a 
neo-Alvordism being implemented by a small group of displaced white farmers looking for 
ways to remain in farming and in Africa, rather than the confident social engineering mission 
of officials in colonial Africa. The example of FfF shows, however, that for some former 
white farmers, modernist discourses and narratives – many resembling and building on 
colonial-era civilising missions – are still a major tool in their efforts to find ways of 
belonging in contemporary Africa. For those white farmers linked to FfF, their mission is still 
very much about cultivating crops and people in an Africa still on the frontiers of modernity.  
 
Conclusion 
Rutherford (2014: 236) points out that if NGOs, post-FTLRP, are to be successful in 
mobilising farmworkers and dwellers for the improvement of their working and living 
conditions, they will have to understand and adapt to the complex new social, economic and 
political dynamics governing labour relations and the often competing new “modes of 
                                                          
306 See Alexander (2006), Moore (2005), Phimister (1993), Wolmer and Scoones (2000) and Worby (2000) on 
colonial technical land-use planning; the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA); colonial extension services; and 
their consequences and implications in independent Zimbabwe. 
307 My critique of some aspects of FfF’s ethos and rhetoric is in no way meant to detract from the value of its 
work in terms of promoting environmentally sound farming practices and improving food security and income-
generation possibilities for poor households. 
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belonging” in resettlement areas. As I have shown in this chapter, also crucial is the ability to 
adapt to broader political and economic factors which threaten the survival of such NGOs 
themselves. While some farm-focussed NGOs struggled to acclimatise to the radical changes 
happening around them after 2000, others, such as FOST, KWA and FCTZ, did initially 
adapt and grow as a result of their strategic choices, aided by donors still interested in playing 
a role in Zimbabwe’s humanitarian crisis. Such choices, however, invariably led them 
gradually away from their original mandate which focussed exclusively on a population – 
commercial farmworkers – who in the 1990s were seen as particularly vulnerable and in need 
of assistance. Driven subsequently by changing funding regimes and donor priorities, 
difficulties in adapting to the unpredictable political and economic environment and complex 
new dynamics in former commercial farming areas, these NGOs reframed their conceptions 
of vulnerability away from farmworkers and farm orphans to rural people in general. In other 
words, the political-economic situation after 2000 necessitated a reframing of vulnerability 
which has largely left farmworkers and dwellers, as well as particularly vulnerable members 
of this population such as orphans, out of NGO humanitarian and developmental responses. 
Even those NGOs who still do have a (limited) presence on former commercial farms such as 
KWA tend to include land-reform beneficiaries ahead of former workers, given that their 
current valorisation of “rural entrepreneurship” inevitably brings them to work with the most 
resilient members of those communities, rather than the most vulnerable.           
 In place of what were once fairly significant welfare interventions for farmworkers on 
the highveld, low-key “grassroots” initiatives, championed by local activists, have arisen in 
some places. While their reach is not significant, they provide examples of continuing 
activism, “care” and “improvement” efforts which have been influenced and draw on some of 
the notions of the previous generation of welfare programmes, especially trusteeship. Of 
importance is the way in which these attempts are all strongly connected to the church and 
charismatic or Pentecostal Christianity in particular. Such interventions still specifically 
target farmworkers and dwellers as the most vulnerable members of the new rural order, but 
they are small and struggle to attract meaningful financial support from donors or larger 
NGOs. The combination of Christianity and trusteeship has, however, offered some former 
white farmers an opportunity to continue playing a role in which they can use their skills as 
modernist agriculturalists seeking to “improve” rural Africans. Not specifically aimed at 
former farmworkers, this initiative now has a wide reach and is being used by a growing 
number of rural development organisations in Zimbabwe and across Africa to train rural 
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farmers in conservation agriculture. Former farmworkers, who used to be the targets of 
“edification” from white farmers and “improvement” from various NGOs now largely have 
to fend for themselves or seek alternative forms of incorporation in order to secure their 













Personhood, (Inter)dependence and Agency in Crooked Times: Multiple and Flexible 
Subjectivities in Rural and Urban Zimbabwe 
 
[People] themselves, even under conditions of domination, manage subtle tactics that transform their 
physical life into a political instrument or a moral resource or an affective expression. (Fassin 2010: 
93–4)  
A “strategy” … is the equivalent of “taking a trick” in a card game: it depends on the deal (having a 
good hand) and on the way one plays the card (being a good cardplayer). (de Certeau 1984: 53)  
 
Introduction: Semi-social Beings in the In-between Times   
In the preceding chapters I have examined institutions – commercial farms and NGOs in 
particular – and changing forms and relations of power associated with these, which have 
affected the lives of commercial farmworkers and dwellers at specific historical moments, 
and at present. I turn now to the histories, actions and narratives of farmworkers themselves 
and how they negotiated life under these institutions and forms of power. Several authors 
have already provided valuable historical and ethnographic insight into the position and 
actions of farmworkers (e.g. Amanor-Wilks 1995; Grier 2006; Hartnack 2009b; McIvor 
1995; Rubert 1998; Rutherford 1996, 2001a, 2004a, 2008). Yet it is important to revisit 
questions of farmworker agency, dependence, personhood and subjectivity in light of the 
forms of power I have been outlining, and especially to examine how these have changed and 
adapted as these institutions and power relations have been displaced or radically 
reformulated over the last 15 years. In this endeavour, I privilege the biographies of my 
interlocutors and their daily social, political and economic struggles, over theoretical 
formulations which reduce life to merely its biological, “bare” aspects, thus erasing 
complexity and fostering the disappearance of subjects (see Fassin 2010: 88, 93). I contend 
that while conditions on some (former) farms may indeed be “bare”, individual biographies 
reveal the extent to which even in the most dire circumstances, people endeavour to live more 
than biological, “bare life” (Agamben 1998).     
In this chapter I explore such questions through the theoretical lens provided by 
ethnographic work on African personhood and migrant labour (Comaroff and Comaroff 
1987, 1991) and a recent debate sparked by James Ferguson’s (2013a) article entitled 
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“Declarations of Dependence: Labour, Personhood and Welfare in Southern Africa”. By way 
of a number of ethnographic examples from the life histories, current situations and actions of 
my interlocutors, I engage critically with this debate to show that Zimbabwean (former) 
farmworkers, in the past and at present, strive (not always successfully) to develop multiple 
and flexible subjectivities which include deliberate forms of dependence-seeking, 
incorporation or interdependence, but which aim not only to help them to negotiate “crooked” 
socio-economic times (see below), but also to construct meaningful and fulfilling forms of 
personhood and sociality for themselves and their families, despite the hardships they face.   
In their article on conceptions of personhood among the people who came to be 
known as “the Tswana” in the nineteenth century, Comaroff and Comaroff (2001) stress that 
personhood was an intrinsically social construction involving relational aspects and 
interdependence, and also a cumulative process by which individuals forged their identity 
through an “ongoing series of practical activities” (ibid.: 268). The “Tswana world” was thus 
both highly communal and highly individuated, with men in particular engaging in a constant 
“praxis of self-construction” (ibid.: 271); personhood being a work in progress, with a stress 
on “becoming rather than being” and “on persons and relations as an unfolding product of 
quotidian social construction” (ibid.). Particularly important in this process were ideas about 
labour and production around activities such as cultivation, cooking, creating a family, 
pastoralism, politics and ritual (ibid.: 273). Such conceptions and ways of being were 
radically challenged and changed during the nineteenth century by the incursion of European 
settlers, missionaries and the capitalist economy. This complex process, detailed by the 
Comaroffs in a number of works (1987, 1991, 1997, 2001), saw the growth of migrant labour 
and new ideas about work in the industrial workplace.  
 Comaroff and Comaroff (1987, 2001) argue that these new forms of labour – 
particularly work for others in the colonial economy – along with other features of 
commodity production such as money and the measurement of human labour time, were not 
understood to contribute positively in the process of constructing personhood (through the 
production of things and people for yourself). Slaves and servants were looked upon as 
“semi-social beings … [who] lacked the right to own property or possessions – indeed, to be 
self-possessed” (2001: 270). This worldview obviously had gender implications, since 
women were jural minors whose personhood was constructed away from the public sphere 
and within the constraints of patriarchy. Working for someone more powerful was seen as an 
arrest on the process of becoming – something which happened when a person was 
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bewitched, when their “capacity for productive activity was negated” and, losing all self-
determination, they were reduced to dependency on their masters and patrons (ibid.: 272). 
Migrant labour in the capitalist economy therefore, far from being valorised, implied 
feminisation, the work depleting rather than enhancing the self (1987: 200). Such workers 
saw themselves “as less than fully social beings; they were ‘women’ or ‘children,’ ‘draught 
oxen,’ ‘donkeys,’ or even ‘tinned fish’ … they were socially dead, the vehicles of someone 
else’s profit” (ibid.).               
 The above work resonates with the experience and outlook of African peoples in 
Zimbabwe’s colonial history. As discussed in Chapter Two, Africans living on alienated land 
were reluctant to work at mines or on white-owned farms and, from the early part of the 
twentieth century, systems were set up to supply labour from what are today Malawi, Zambia 
and Mozambique. As Vambe (1972: 219) notes, Shona peasant farmers in the early twentieth 
century “felt both sorry for and contemptuous of our fellow Africans from Nyasaland and 
Mozambique who were almost exclusively the farmers’ source of labour and suffered 
conditions we regarded as only fit for cattle”. While growing poverty and landlessness slowly 
pushed more indigenous Africans into migrant labour, they considered farm labour in 
particular beneath them and to be the desperate last resort of the most marginalised elements 
of rural society (Phimister 1988: 85; Rubert 1998). Such was the stigma attached to farm 
labour – and the narrowness of the ZANU-PF government’s nationalistic formulation of 
citizenship after 1980 (Muzondidya 2004) – that farmworkers continued to be constructed in 
the new state’s official imagination as “‘foreigners’ who should not only be denied land 
rights in the country … but who [were] also said to lack the proper development ‘ethos’, 
being accustomed to work only for a ‘boss’” (Moyo et al. 2000: 190). Adapting Mamdani’s 
(1996) distinction between “citizen” and “subject” in postcolonial Africa, Muzondidya (2004: 
221) identifies farmworkers (among others) as “subject minorities” who continued to be seen 
as outsiders living under the care of their white masters. Hence, to the Zimbabwean state and 
many ordinary citizens, people who continued to live and work on commercial farms were 
seen in similar terms to the Tswana migrant-worker: as “semi-social beings”, if not “socially 
dead” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1987, 2001). Unable to reach full personhood and prevented 
from “developing the attitude of productively working for self and for the broader nation at 
large” (Moyo et al. 2000: 190), they were “configured as deficient moral citizens” 
(Rutherford 2004c: 1), despite the fact that people from farmworker backgrounds made a 
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significant impact on Zimbabwe’s cultural and economic life.308 Within the Zimbabwean 
nation-state, farmworkers could thus be said more than any other population group, to occupy 
the “state of exception” (Agamben 1998), although as I have argued in previous chapters, the 
“bareness” of their existence varied considerably both across and within farms and over time.               
 While academic literature on farmworkers often did recognise their personhood, 
agency and forms of resistance (Phimister 1988: 85–90; Rubert 1998; Rutherford 2001a; 
Vambe 1972: 215), the studies conducted by NGOs (which were often more influential), and 
subsequent campaigns, tended to focus on their victimhood (e.g. McIvor 1995; Mugwetsi and 
Balleis 1994), inadvertently presenting them as passive and agency-less sufferers of their 
circumstances (cf. Fassin 2010: 88). What these discourses have in common, and share with 
the paternalistic discourses of white farmers (see Chapter Two), is that they all present people 
living on white farmland as semi-social beings, albeit to different extents and in different 
ways. Such representations by the ZANU-PF state and their supporters were a significant 
contributory factor in the violence and displacement farmworkers experienced during the 
Jambanja period after 2000 (Hartnack 2009b). Furthermore, the notion that former 
farmworkers were semi-social beings, unable to engage in meaningful or successful strategies 
of self-construction (cf. Fassin 2010: 83), also contributed significantly to understandings 
about what became of them after white farmers had been removed from the farms. One 
(foreign) commentator went so far as to suggest that former farmworkers were incapable of 
surviving without the “protective umbrella” provided by their bosses, and consequently 
suffered death of “virtual holocaust” proportions:  
It was very difficult to understand their plight fully. Their death rate had been extraordinarily high - 
they were suddenly deprived of food, all their support services and of any idea what to do … many 
seemed to die of sheer exhaustion and despair: they simply had no idea of how to fend for themselves 
in this hostile new environment. One often heard of people who just laid [sic] down and refused to 
move, bereft of any reason to live.309 
Not to detract from the real hardships those living on farms suffered during the Jambanja 
period and thereafter (see Chapter Four), such sensationalist, selective and infantalising 
                                                          
308 Aside from the important labours of ordinary farmworkers, Zimbabwe’s former Finance Minister, Bernard 
Chidzero was born on a farm, while the soccer star Moses Chunga’s parents were Malawian migrant workers 
and hugely popular musicians Alick Macheso and Nicholas Zacharia were born and raised on commercial 
farms.  
309 R.W. Johnson, “Finding the ‘Golden Lining’ in the Zimbabwean Genocide”, Politicsweb, 29 July 2012. See 




representations ignore the fact that former farmworkers, displaced or remaining on the farms, 
strove to use their skills and ingenuity both to survive physically and to continue (re)building 
their personhood and social lives, albeit in much tougher circumstances (Hartnack 2005, 
2009b, 2012; Magaramombe 2010). Those working and living on farms – or displaced from 
farms – have always been purposive actors negotiating their “room for manoeuvre at the 
bottom” (Rossi 2004: 4).  
 The case studies presented in this chapter will explore in some detail the dynamics of 
these manoeuvrings in an environment characterised by Jones (2010: 285) as the “kukiya-kiya 
economy” – a “new logic of economic action” involving multiple forms of “making do”, 
which he argues prevailed and infused all aspects of the economy for much of the first decade 
of this century. Despite some economic stabilisation brought about by the transitional 
government (2009–2013), economic insecurity has continued and recently worsened, 
suggesting that many elements of the kukiya-kiya way of life still characterise the ways in 
which poor people survive today. Jones (2010: 286) describes the concept of kukiya-kiya – a 
colloquial urban phrase of the chiShona-speaking youth – as more than merely the “informal 
economy”, but as activities and ways of being involving “cleverness, dodging, and the 
exploitation of whatever resources are at hand, all with an eye to self-sustenance”. A 
multitude of different activities fall under the rubric of kukiya-kiya, including many which 
former farmworkers have relied on for survival: kutenga nokutengesa (buying and selling of 
goods); kuhoda (storing and selling of bulk goods); kukorokoza (gold panning); and a number 
of other illegal activities such as poaching, pilfering, cattle rustling, prostitution and deals of 
various kinds (ibid.: 290; see Hartnack 2006: 138; 2009b: 368–9).  
 Kukiya-kiya is thus a way of life in which “‘Straight’ transactions carried out in 
accordance with enduring, jointly-held rules and morals have given way to ‘zigzag’ ‘deals’ 
seen to be limited to a particular time and place and directed at individual ‘survival’” (Jones 
2010: 286). Implying also the cutting of corners, this crooked order was said to involve 
“everyone”, especially at the height of the social and economic crisis which reached its peak 
in 2008. While the 2009 Global Political Agreement brought stability and an end to black-
market dealings, through the adoption of the US dollar and the return of basic goods to shops, 
many of the poorest Zimbabweans continued to rely on aspects of kukiya-kiya to get by, and 
the logic of kukiya-kiya is now “deeply ingrained in the structure of the economy” (ibid.: 
299). Another aspect of kukiya-kiya is important here, namely that it is a way of life geared 
towards surviving in a morally uncertain in-between time, where people feel that the old 
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“straight” order has been suspended, “historical paralysis” has taken hold, “personal and 
national development has come to a standstill” and “a slow disintegration is taking place, a 
dissolution of the very idea of a ‘proper solution’” (ibid.: 289–90). As such, kukiya-kiya is a 
way of life “that undermines the practice and telos of personal and national development”, 
ideas which as Jones (2010: 289, 296) shows, continue to hold sway among ordinary 
Zimbabweans, who continue to valorise and mourn the “disrupted” “straight” path to a 
particular vision of modernity (cf. Ferguson 2008). People come to see that their life is “on 
pause”, but in the process of “surviving” they nevertheless continue to construct their social 
and economic lives, and their personhood, despite the general malaise around them (Jones 
2010: 289; 2009). The implications this kukiya-kiya environment has for forms of personhood 
and subjectivity among former farmworkers and dwellers will be explored below through a 
number of case studies.   
 
Dependence, Interdependence and Independence: Personhood and (Former) 
Farmworkers in Contemporary Zimbabwe 
In a provocative recent article, Ferguson (2013a) attempts to explain why it is that in the new, 
seemingly “free”, South Africa so many poor people appear to be desperately seeking to 
incorporate themselves into relations of dependence with those they perceive to be potential 
employers, regardless of the conditions offered. This, he argues, is highly discomforting to 
Western visitors and observers with an “emancipatory liberal mind” (ibid.: 224), for whom 
ideas of dignity and freedom are tied to the seeking of autonomy and independence rather 
than the “disturbing spectacle of people openly pursuing a subordinate and dependent status” 
(ibid.). Ferguson uses the example of the Ngoni state – an offshoot of the militaristic Zulu 
state, which in the nineteenth century moved northwards from today’s KwaZulu-Natal into 
parts of present-day Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia, raiding and subduing the peoples they 
encountered – to make the point that in precolonial southern Africa, dependence-seeking was 
common and that members of neighbouring groups would often “voluntarily” submit to the 
Ngoni. He points out (ibid.: 225–26) that as fearsome as the Ngoni state was, it operated 
more on the logic of incorporating its enemies than killing them; becoming powerful by 
bringing followers and dependents into it; a kind of “snowball state” which valued “wealth in 
people”. Those who did submit were incorporated on subordinate terms, but could work their 
way up the hierarchy in various ways, and the presence of similar polities vying for followers 
meant that dependents who became unhappy had some choice and could shift their allegiance 
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if their patrons did not provide adequately for them (ibid.: 226). Thus, the “freedom in such a 
social world … came not from independence, but from a plurality of opportunities for 
dependence” (ibid.).         
 Ferguson argues that much as colonial conquest and the introduction of industrial 
capitalism produced a comprehensive transformation of southern African society, a major 
continuity persisted, namely that the new world of wage labour and commoditisation was still 
“hungry for people” and that the region’s “labour-scarcity economy” meant that capitalists 
took over from precolonial states as the new powerful patrons competing with each other for 
people to incorporate (ibid.: 227). He argues that it is impossible to ignore the fact that large 
numbers of people voluntarily travelled long distances “in order to submit themselves to a 
notoriously violent and oppressive socio-economic system” (ibid.), and that employers such 
as capitalist farmers used some of the same devices that kings and chiefs had used to capture 
human wealth, namely “paternalistic and quasi-kinship-based social inclusion” (ibid.: 228). 
Furthermore, he points out that the scarcity of labour and the resultant competition for 
followers allowed those who submitted to this system some choice, room for manoeuvre and 
“recourse via exit”, and thus some limits to domination (ibid.: 229). Contrary to the ways in 
which Comaroff and Comaroff (1987, 2001) position Tswana understandings of wage work 
under colonialism/apartheid, Ferguson (2013a: 228) indicates that there is much literature 
showing that wage labour became an important foundation of male identity, allowing young 
employed men to achieve “full social personhood”, marry more easily, and make something 
of themselves through establishing relations of dependence: “being someone continued to 
imply belonging to someone” (ibid., original emphasis). Ferguson goes on to explore how, in 
the last two decades, changes in the political-economy has led southern Africa into an era of 
labour surplus as industries which formerly relied on raw manual labour no longer require, or 
cannot afford to employ, large numbers of workers. Where men once found incorporation 
through what he calls “work membership”, they are now seen as surplus to requirements, 
cast-off into an environment of mass unemployment. It is this context which he sees as the 
cause for the desperate desire of young people today to subordinate themselves into 
dependence relationships.      
 To what extent does Ferguson’s (2013a) argument apply to (former) Zimbabwean 
farmworkers negotiating a kukiya-kiya economy? Furthermore, how relevant are Ferguson’s 
notions of the changing dynamics of “declarations of dependence” over the longue durée of 
southern Africa’s history for understanding earlier generations of migrant workers coming to 
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Southern Rhodesia in the twentieth century, and their descendants working and living on 
farms up to the year 2000? I will explore such questions with reference to several thoughtful 
reflections on Ferguson’s article in the same volume by, among others, Maxim Bolt, Otara 
Bonilla, Tania Murray Li and Hylton White. Further questions arising from these reflections 
also have relevance to the story of farmworkers at different junctures of Zimbabwe’s history. 
Li (2013: 252), for example, calls for a focus on the ways in which social incorporation has 
been “sought, legitimated and denied”, as well as attention to what the contemporary 
precariousness of working options in many parts of the world means “for livelihoods, 
identities, relationships, and practices of claiming” (ibid.: 253). Similarly, Bolt (2013: 244) 
complicates Ferguson’s claims by pointing to his own ethnography with migrant farmworkers 
in northern South Africa. Acknowledging that the idea of “declarations of dependence” is a 
starting point, he asks: “how far are people incorporated? How far do they want to be, or are 
they allowed to be? What different kinds of membership intersect in the process?” I explore 
such questions below with reference also to Rutherford’s (2008) concept of shifting “modes 
of belonging”, a concept I have already detailed and illustrated in Chapter Four.                
 
Farmworkers and Declarations of Dependence before 2000          
In response to the reflections, Ferguson (2013b: 258) concedes that his analysis is a “broad-
brush account” which could not address the many forms of dependence and membership in 
the region, both historically and in the present day, nor account for their precarious nature. 
The personal stories and histories of migrant Zimbabwean farmworkers assist us to obtain a 
more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of dependence and incorporation in the labour-
scarce era of colonial capitalism. Indeed, life history interviews I conducted with old migrant 
farmworkers (all born in the 1930s) in 2004/5 for my masters research (see Hartnack 2006) 
somewhat complicate the idea that people came completely “voluntarily” to submit 
themselves to capitalist masters. As I have shown above, Zimbabwean peasant farmers by no 
means sought to declare their dependence on the new white farm and mine owners whose 
activities rapidly encroached on their territory. Instead, labourers from outside the colony 
came to service the urban, rural and industrial needs of the settlers. Even though many came 
to Southern Rhodesia of their own accord – “barefooted” as my interlocutors were fond of 
telling me, indicating both that they walked all the way and that their footwear was 
inadequate – there were strong and complex push and pull factors involved with their 
decisions to leave home and travel south.  
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 Many of them were very young when they came. Emanuel Bokelo, for example, was 
14 years old when, in October 1945, his older brother persuaded him to accompany him to 
Southern Rhodesia to look for wage work (see Hartnack 2006: 58). They were the sons of 
peasant farmers in the northern part of what is today Mozambique. The Portuguese colonial 
authorities at that time operated a system of forced labour known as contrato: six-month 
stints in which able-bodied men were required, as a form of tax, to undertake gruelling and 
poorly paid work for the settlers (Guthrie 2014: 1). Many young men found ways to avoid 
conscription into labour gangs by fleeing to Southern Rhodesia, where wages and conditions 
were better (ibid.). Emanuel worked for 22 years as a cook/cleaner for a white family in 
Salisbury, returning home when his employer died in 1967. He was soon forced to work at a 
mine, however, and returned to Salisbury after six months, where he found another job as a 
cook. Thus, tough conditions in the colonial political economy of one part of the region 
pushed people to seek slightly better conditions in other areas. For Emanuel, putting up with 
a “madam” who was “too cheeky” (bossy, short-tempered) was preferable to the violence, 
abuse and physical hardship of the Portuguese labour gangs. For others, climatic factors such 
as local droughts were what pushed them into wage work in Southern Rhodesia. James 
Kavalo, born in 1932 in southern Malawi, was a fisherman on Lake Chilwa. When he was 33 
years old was he forced to leave his wife and children to seek work on the tobacco farms of 
Southern Rhodesia because “the lake dried up” (Hartnack 2006: 62). Once sucked into farm 
labour, he never returned to Malawi.  
 It is true, however, that many others decided to make the journey from the peripheries 
of the regional economy to the centres of industry because of the attractions associated with 
wage work. Another informant called John Chalwe, from the Barotseland region of Zambia, 
came from a relatively well-off farming family. John’s father was an evangelist at the nearby 
mission station and wanted John to become a priest. To escape this unwelcome calling, John 
decided to leave his home at the age of 17 to seek his living in Southern Rhodesia. “I could 
see that others who had gone [to Southern Rhodesia] were secure and owned bicycles, so I 
decided to go”, John told me (ibid.: 57). Also true is the fact that once in Southern Rhodesia, 
migrants who came of their own accord were able to be fairly mobile and exercise their 
ability to move around until they found an employment situation which they felt was 
satisfactory (Ferguson 2013a: 229). Because of labour scarcity some white farmers did, as 
with farmers in colonial Natal (Atkins 1993: 72), try to set themselves up as benevolent 
patrons or quasi-chiefs, seeking to attract workers to their farms to live under their “care”. 
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Such farms would get a good reputation among job seekers who would in turn recruit kin and 
others from their home villages. Such attractive conditions were by no means universal, 
however. James Kavalo, the former fisherman I introduced above, worked on no less than 
seven farms over a twelve year period until he found the farm where he finally settled down 
in 1977, living there until 2002. He told me that he moved farms because farmers were 
violent or he did not like the working and living conditions at those farms; but his final 
position was preferable because the housing was good, there was a school and the way the 
workers lived together was “like a village” (Hartnack 2006: 62).   
 Migrant workers from surrounding countries came looking for employment with 
specific ambitions and goals in mind. They were often prepared to make sacrifices and 
subordinate themselves in pursuit of these, but I agree with Li (2013: 252) when she suggests 
that seeing such actions as a “declaration of dependence” – a “verbal performance of a 
demand to be accepted as a social subordinate” – might be putting it too strongly. Indeed, 
migrant farmworkers I have interviewed all valued their autonomy and viewed dependence 
not as an end in itself but as a necessary step towards meeting their various personal goals. As 
Li further suggests, migrants sought “social incorporation” (ibid.) into situations and relations 
which could enhance their chances of realising their goals, rather than mere dependence. 
While James Kavalo was narrating his story of moving from farm to farm, his old friend (my 
research assistant) joked that he had not stayed put because he “was too stubborn”. This 
quality of “stubbornness” suggests a refusal to submit regardless of the conditions, and a 
fierce attachment to personal goals and expectations. Despite being pushed into farm work by 
the desperation of a severe drought, James was not prepared to settle for just any paid 
position, but chose to keep looking for better options for incorporation. Far from being a 
“semi-social being”, James and others like him exercised their agency within the limits 
imposed by the colonial political economy and were able to negotiate, to some extent, the 
terms of their incorporation (cf. Li 2013).   
 Incidents in the 1930s described by a Southern Rhodesian farmer illustrate further that 
migrant workers could be anything but subordinate when it suited them. Jeannie Boggie 
(1959: 333) describes how Northern Rhodesian workers at the brickworks neighbouring her 
farm tried to attack her in her farmhouse one evening after she had reported them to the 
police for stealing wood from her farm. They also severely assaulted the farm foreman when 
he tried to stop them from cutting down her trees and told another worker that since they had 
been fined £36, they would poach more wood to that value and kill anyone who tried to 
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interfere. Similarly, an employee whom Boggie dismissed vowed to take revenge on her and 
that “same evening he walked through my 300-acre grazing paddock and fired it in four 
places. Next he set fire to several stacks of hay belonging to a neighbour”. On another 
occasion Boggie describes “gazing in amazement at the sun glinting on hundreds of cycles 
stacked during an immense beer drink at the brickworks” (ibid.: 334). When she asked the 
revellers to keep the noise of their “tom-toms” (drums) down, she was told: “We are Northern 
Rhodesian natives. We tom-tom whenever we like in Northern Rhodesia, and we are going to 
tom-tom here. And we don’t care a d— for your Southern Rhodesia laws” (ibid.) Apart from 
anything else, this example shows that migrant workers had alternative, very powerful, forms 
of identity and incorporation (ethnic, ritual, age-based etc.) which they valued just as much as 
incorporation into a workplace and identification as a worker.310 Such examples of resistance 
and capacity to push back against the seemingly powerful members of colonial society were 
by no means isolated. As Shutt (2007) shows, colonial authorities were highly concerned 
with the conduct of “natives”, and sought to control what they saw as “insolence” and 
“contemptuous behaviour” through various pieces of legislation during this period. The 
relationship between dependence and independence, subordination and resistance was thus a 
complex and dynamic one.  
 However, many farmworkers were also prepared to be pragmatic once they had 
secured a position of incorporation which they found acceptable, slotting themselves into the 
relations of “domestic government” (Rutherford 2001a) as subordinates and dependents of 
their employer. Once a reasonable position had been secured, where stability and movement 
up the racialised farm hierarchy was possible (for male workers), workers tended to accept 
the fact that they “belonged to the farmer” (see Rutherford 2003) and try to negotiate the best 
deal possible within the “mode of belonging” called domestic government (Rutherford 2008; 
see Chapter Four). In other words, they acknowledged that “domestic government” provided 
a platform, however limited, for them to gain access to various resources, statuses and ways 
of providing for themselves and their families, as well as access to a relationship that allowed 
                                                          
310 Male farmworkers of Malawian and Zambian origin are renowned for their secretive Nyau societies and 
associated drumming, dancing and rituals. The role of Nyau societies among chiChewa-speakers in Malawi has 
been debated (see Morris 1999), but on farms and mines in Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe they performed an 
important social, economic and religious function, and a source of ethnic identification for their members. These 
closed-membership societies were found on many farms and offered members “a world in which all normal 
rules of behaviour [were] reversed, a relative autonomy, financial benefits and an alternative structure in which 
to rise in social status” (Schoffeleers and Linden 1972: 53). More than simply a self-help initiative, Nyau 
societies were a form of resistance, and the consequent disapproval of them by the colonial authorities drove 
them underground to some extent (Parry 2001). Many farmers, however, tolerated Nyau societies not only as a 
form of cheap entertainment for the workers, but also because of the disciplinary function they served over 
young men working in junior positions, since Nyau leaders were often also senior workers at the farm.  
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them to make various claims on the employer within the logic of paternalism. One important 
aspect of successfully negotiating this mode of belonging was for workers to ensure that they 
successfully “[performed] being a farm worker to farmers” through perfecting “bodily 
postures, language strategies, and interactions that [communicated] their obedience and 
subservience” (ibid.: 205). This performance of loyalty could form but one of a number of 
aspects of a worker’s personhood, with other aspects deliberately reserved for family, church, 
Nyau society or social companions. Farmworkers, like Tswana men, therefore also carefully 
chose which aspects of their personality to show to which audience and practiced becoming 
“fractal human subjects” in the construction of their personhood (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2001b: 276).  
 Some workers became so comfortable with negotiating this mode of belonging that 
even when other opportunities came up, they preferred to remain working on the farm. Henry 
Mbwando, already discussed in Chapters Four and Five, recounted that his father was a case 
in point. Henry’s uncles secured what they considered to be better jobs at the Salisbury post 
office in the 1960s and subsequently found a similar position for Henry’s father. But he 
refused to leave the farm, telling them that he was very happy working with the farmer, with 
whom he had cultivated a good relationship over many years. When he retired in the 1980s, 
his original employer’s son paid for the family’s train trip to Zambia, where they intended to 
settle in Henry’s mother’s village. The move did not work out, however, and after three years 
the family returned to the farm and were allowed to occupy the brick house where Henry’s 
mother still lives. Henry’s father continued to perform odd-jobs at the farm, for which he was 
paid a small salary and the farmer allowed him to stay on after retirement in recognition of 
his long service to successive generations of the farmer’s family. Henry describes this 
arrangement in the language of the classic paternalism which underlay domestic government: 
“It was like a bond … [where the farmer said] … ‘OK, you are old, I am old. You die, I bury 
you here; I die you bury me also. Because we have been boys together and we grew up 
together!’”311 The close paternalistic “bond” was thus a very important form of social and 
economic incorporation for some migrant workers.  
 The case of Daisy Tom and her husband Timycen Tom demonstrates that these 
pragmatic strategies of cultivating a “bond” often had to involve the whole family. Daisy was 
                                                          
311 Interviews with Henry Mbwando, Harare, 14 June 2013, 19 March 2014. Although I have come across many 
other farmers who allowed similar arrangements for retired workers, there were just as many who evicted retired 
workers as soon as they were no longer useful to them, whether they had somewhere else to go or not (see 
Chadya and Mayavo 2002; McIvor 1995: 20–2).   
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born in 1945 near Rusape and was able to obtain better education than many rural women of 
her generation through the nearby mission school. She, however, dropped out of a nursing 
course when she eloped with her boyfriend at the age of 15. She had two children with this 
man but he never married her and she was subsequently taken back home by her family. In 
order to support her children she worked casually on nearby farms, where she met and fell in 
love with a Malawian foreman, Timycen, whom she later married. Over the next decades 
they worked for several farmers and because Timycen was a senior worker and she spoke 
English, she was taken to work in the houses of their employers as a cook and child-minder. 
Such a position within the domestic space of the farm house and “close to the farmer” (see 
Rutherford 2001a) was highly sought after and as senior as a female employee could get on a 
farm. When their employer went back to England in 1973, Timycen and Daisy were 
employed at a nearby farm, and in 1977 they moved to the employers who Timycen still 
works for as a cook, cleaner and gardener. While Timycen adjusted well to the new 
employers, Daisy found that she clashed with the farmer: “That man was too cheeky”, she 
told me. “So I said if I work here my husband will be chased because I am also too cheeky, so 
better I don’t work for them!”312 Thus, while Timycen was willing and able to put up with a 
“cheeky” employer for almost four decades, Daisy strategically decided that she must remove 
herself in the interests of preserving her husband’s good position. She ran a number of small 
entrepreneurial businesses and, in the 1990s, became involved in the women’s clubs started 
by Kunzwana Women’s Association in her area, for whom she trained other members in 
sewing and baking. In other words, Daisy built her own independent options and rather 
sought incorporation with an NGO in order to preserve another crucial aspect of her 
household’s livelihood strategy – her husband’s incorporation into a position of dependence 
on his employer.    
 Another important factor when considering dependence/incorporation and 
Zimbabwean farmworkers is intergenerational and gendered differences in hopes, 
expectations and possibilities, and how these changed over time in the course of Zimbabwe’s 
history. The original migrants had limited choices besides hard manual labour as they sought 
incorporation into wage work. They sought the best possible deal within this limitation and 
might aspire to work their way up the hierarchy of jobs into the more senior and skilled 
positions offered to foremen, drivers and mechanics. This was a profoundly gendered 
hierarchy in which women were seldom employed permanently, let alone given many 
                                                          
312 Interview with Daisy Tom, Zvimba, 21 November 2013.  
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chances for promotion (Rutherford 2001a). Full social and economic incorporation was thus 
largely denied to women on farms, and they consequently had to seek such incorporation 
through forming relationships with male farmworkers. In the first half of the twentieth 
century, being born into a farmworker family meant initiation into unpaid child labour from 
an early age, since the “old colonial construction of African childhood [was] as a time for 
early and regular wage work” (Grier 2006: 195), where the patriarch often appropriated 
payment in both tenant farming arrangements and for task work (ibid.: 125). While young 
people, especially boys, often ran away to work independently on other farms, or even went 
to urban centres (ibid.: 125, 197 ff.), for most, a life of farm labour was the best they could 
aspire to. For young girls, getting married by their mid-teens was commonplace. However, 
with some improvements in primary schooling, often designed to attract families and keep 
young people on farms after World War Two, young people growing up on farms 
increasingly aspired to escape farm labour, though alternative options were decidedly limited 
and the vast majority thus continued to live and work on the farms.    
 Born in 1955 on a farm near Harare, Fanuel Chirwa is one of eight children, and an 
example of a thwarted desire to escape dependence on menial work. He attended junior 
school only and commenced work at the age of 14. Despite not obtaining any secondary 
education, Fanuel did not aspire to be a farmworker: “No, no, no”, he told me, “To be a 
farmworker is a hard job. I learnt that when I saw how my father was working. If he had a 
mugwazo [task work] he would come home late at night”.313 Fanuel hoped to become a 
teacher, but never managed to obtain enough schooling to realise this dream. Not wanting to 
incorporate himself into farm work he thus sought a slightly better option, becoming a 
domestic worker for white families in Harare, an occupation he still performs today. 
Although he says his employers have treated him well and he has been in the same job for 30 
years, he tells me that “it is not ok to work in this job: I am doing it because there is nothing 
else I can do in my life”. Now almost 60, Fanuel nevertheless still fosters ambitions of 
becoming a lorry driver, but has been unable to complete his commercial driving licence test 
because corrupt officials demand large bribes in return for a pass. The subordinate and 
dependent position he has had to endure, however, did allow Fanuel to support his family and 
                                                          
313 Interview with Fanuel Chirwa, Harare, 7 July 2013. Mugwazo was, and still is, a common system on 
commercial farms where individual workers would be paid according to a predetermined task, for example 
weeding a particular area or harvesting a set amount in a day. According to many farmworkers I interviewed, 
including Chirwa, farmers or their senior staff could set task-work targets which were unreasonably difficult to 
meet within normal working hours, especially at peak periods in the agricultural cycle. Family members, 
including children, were thus commonly called upon by farmworkers to assist with task work, enhancing the 
exploitative nature of this arrangement.     
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send his two daughters to government schools in independent Zimbabwe. They are now 
married and have managed to study further and obtain clerical jobs for themselves.  
 Some of my other interlocutors have also had to shelve dreams of escaping farm 
labour for occupations such as nursing or teaching, remaining as farmworkers or settling 
instead for domestic service in urban centres. Indeed, despite nationwide improvements in 
access to education after 1980, access on farms remained poor, with only 15 per cent of farms 
having junior schools by 1998 and as few as 3 per cent of farm children attending senior 
school (SCF 2001a: 89–111; 2001b: 6). Beside the lack of schools in farming districts, a 
number of other problems kept children, especially girls, out of school. These included large 
families; low salaries of parents, which meant that there was limited money for uniforms and 
stationery (even if schooling was free); lack of interest among parents towards schooling; 
lack of birth certificates (required to enter secondary school); frequent moves between farms 
and the insecurity of life, especially for casual/seasonal workers; and early marriages and teen 
pregnancy (SCF 2001a). While the school-going children of farmworkers after independence 
aspired to obtain enough education to become teachers, drivers, pilots, doctors, bank tellers, 
police officers and nurses (see SCF 2001a: 107–11), for most the obstacles in their way were 
too great. However, especially for boys born into the families of more senior workers in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, on farms where the owners took an active interest in education 
and training, the prospect of upward social and occupational mobility was more of a 
possibility. Some of my male interlocutors managed to obtain a decent high-school education 
and, with further assistance from the farm owners, study further, with the result that today 
they are employed in good urban jobs and live middle-class lifestyles.314 For many other 
young farmworkers and dwellers in the independence era, there was little choice but to 
continue to submit themselves to the unsatisfactory world of the commercial farm in order to 
maintain some form of incorporation in an increasingly hostile socio-economic environment 
where educational opportunities diminished and urban employment opportunities decreased 
under ESAP in the 1990s (see Chapter Three). This was despite their hopes of escaping 
dependence on the farms, becoming independent or incorporating themselves into better 
working situations in urban areas.  
 
 
                                                          
314 See interviews with Aswell Kaunda, Harare, 9 June 2013; Simba Chakanyuka, Harare, 21 June 2013.  
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Jambanja: Re-incorporation and the Importance of Multiple Dependencies   
As outlined in Chapter Four, the Jambanja period, the farm takeovers and the prolonged 
effects of the FTLRP had a profound impact on those living and working on commercial 
farms. Incorporation into the “mode of belonging” offered by domestic government 
(Rutherford 2008), which many farmworkers had tried hard to maintain as the wider 
economy faltered in the late 1990s, was suddenly and drastically threatened. The hostile 
nationalistic discourses of the ZANU-PF state and its supporters, discussed above, meant that 
farmworkers were largely denied allocations of land, especially during the first few years of 
the FTLRP (Moyo et al. 2000; Sachikonye 2003). Those not physically displaced from the 
farms (see Hartnack 2005, 2009b; Zimbizi 2000) saw the displacement of the system they 
relied upon and the mode of belonging known as domestic government (Rutherford 2014: 
230). In Chapter Four I drew attention to the precarious nature of the forms of incorporation 
and modes of belonging now available to such farm dwellers. I shall now focus on the story 
of a family of interlocutors whom I have known for over a decade, and their strategies, 
subjectivities and challenges as they negotiated physical displacement, near destitution and 
the struggle to re-incorporate themselves into the kinds of relationships and working 
situations which could offer them a chance to survive in the tough conditions which have 
characterised Zimbabwe since 2000.             
 I have written about some aspects of Ringson Mahachi’s life previously (Hartnack 
2005: 185–6; 2006: 170–1), but here I provide a much fuller account of his family’s travails 
over the course of more than a decade. Ringson’s father, a chiShona-speaker from Chihota 
Communal Area, came to Brylee Farm, near Harare, in 1941, where he worked as a carpenter 
and builder for over four decades. Ringson, who was one of four children, was born in 1963 
at Brylee Farm and, due to his father’s senior position, was able to complete primary and two 
years of secondary school. Having done well at school, Ringson was then sponsored by the 
farm owner to undertake vocational courses in mechanics and agricultural machinery. It was 
common for the sons of senior workers who showed promise to be trained to perform the 
more technical roles on the farm and for relationships between successive generations of farm 
owners and senior workers to be perpetuated in this way. However, as a 17-year-old in 1980, 
Ringson hoped to join the army of the newly independent Zimbabwe and forge a different 
career, but his father would not allow him to leave the farm after so much had been invested 
in his education. Held to ransom by the expectations of the black and white patriarchs of 
Brylee Farm, Ringson commenced work as a mechanic, a job he performed up until the farm 
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was taken over by ZANU-PF militants in April 2002.315 In 1981, Ringson married Blessing, a 
15-year-old from a family of farmworkers of Mozambican origin, and together they have 
raised five children. Being a skilled worker, Ringson was allocated a four-roomed brick 
house, with electricity, in the workers’ compound and was paid at one of the highest wage 
levels. Blessing worked as a seasonal worker and, later on, as a flower sprayer when the farm 
began producing cut flowers for export in the 1990s.   
 An important aspect of Ringson’s identity is his understanding of himself as a skilled 
and senior worker, just like his father, and as someone who also enjoys a very close 
relationship with the farm-owning family. Ringson was born around the same time as the 
oldest son of the farmer who originally employed his father – the son who went on to become 
the main farm operator in the 1980s. Of this man, Keith Wilde, Ringson told me: “That was 
my boss! First our fathers worked together; then we sons worked together. We are like 
brothers!” As if to prove it he rattled off the birth-dates of each of the old farmer’s four 
children. Ringson then recounted how Keith had taken him to Kariba on numerous fishing 
expeditions when they were young. While Keith and his friends were out fishing, Ringson 
looked after the camp and cooked sadza for them.316 Although he was there in a subordinate 
role, Ringson insisted that Keith was “very social” to him and during thunderstorms “would 
even get into my blankets if the rain came to his tent”. For Ringson, these recollections of 
intimacy, closeness and shared history with his employer, the claim of kinship with him, were 
an important aspect of his social incorporation at the farm (cf. Bonilla 2013: 247). 
Incorporation as a respected worker was also very important. As his current employer – 
Keith’s younger brother Greg – testifies, Ringson has always been very conscious of his 
status as a senior worker. Indeed, Ringson told me of several occasions where his status had 
not been properly respected, including one where a new young white farm manager had 
ordered him to climb up a pole to retrieve some wire that was stuck, “as if I was not a senior 
worker!” Ringson fumed.  
 The idea that he was participating in a project of modernity was also very important to 
Ringson. For him the farm was not merely a family business but a modern enterprise 
contributing to the feeding and development of the nation. Ringson’s narrative in this regard 
is very close to that of many former white farmers, who saw “modern” Zimbabwean 
                                                          
315 Some information for this case study is taken from Hartnack (2005, 2006), but most comes from recent 
interviews with Ringson Mahachi on 22 June 2012, 19 March 2013 and 24 November 2013, and with Edward 
Mahachi on 22 June 2012, Clover Farm, Eastern Highlands. Where I use specific pieces of information drawn 
from my previous work, I indicate as such with a reference.   
316 Sadza, the staple meal of Zimbabweans, is a stiff white porridge made from maize meal.   
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commercial agriculture in teleological terms and see the FTRLP as a reversion to “backward” 
practices and an arrest on modernity (see Freeth 2011; Tracey 2009). Now, as he surveys the 
aftermath of the FTLRP, Ringson peppers his conversation with references to that lost 
production and modernity: “We had 14 boreholes on Brylee Farm”, he recalled in November 
2013. “I went there last time when I visited Norton but now not even one is working since 
they have all been looted. The Chinese are using the land to make bricks there now.” 
Similarly, while reminiscing about the old days he shakes his head and says: “We had 48 
grain silos in this country, but now we can’t even fill one of them! We are not going forward; 
we are being retarded”.317 Like most of my former farmworker interlocutors, Ringson uses 
the chiShona expression “mapurazi yakaparara” – literally “the farm was destroyed” – when 
referring to its takeover. This language captures the sense that to them, the farm takeovers 
represented more than simply the redistribution of land, but that in the process crucial 
(modern) attributes of the farm were destroyed. These included not only its physical attributes 
such as houses, workshops, boreholes, machinery and spaces of work and leisure, but also the 
hierarchies, disciplines, daily and seasonal routines of the farm, as well as the various 
relationships and shared histories of the people tied to the farm. The expression thus refers to 
the destruction of the physical, spatial, temporal and relational attributes of the farm.          
 Ringson links his family history directly to this story of lost modernity and stalled 
progress (cf. Ferguson 1999, 2008). He tells me with evident pride about 12 schools which 
his father was involved in building, listing from memory the names and locations of each and 
the years in which they were built. These were mostly farm and mine schools built during the 
1960s and 1970s with support from the Presbyterian Church. The farmer had converted to 
Christianity in the 1960s and offered the Presbytery his support in its school-building 
endeavours by lending them his builder and carpenter, who was Ringson’s father. Ringson 
felt he continued this tradition by performing an important role at the farm as a mechanic 
working on and maintaining important machinery such as tractors and combine harvesters. 
His personhood and his identity as a worker was therefore about much more than simply 
having a job and being paid, or about simply being incorporated and becoming dependent on 
the farm system. It also involved his position of seniority, his close relationship with his 
employers and what he considered his crucial contribution to an enterprise that was about 
developing the nation. In other words, Ringson’s conception of himself and his personhood is 
                                                          
317 Notice Ringson’s repeated use of discourses of modernity, which valorise machinery, irrigation and storage, 
and measure progress or the lack thereof through quantifications and linear temporal comparisons.    
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in direct contradiction of the popular and official construction of farmworkers as “deficient 
moral citizens” quoted earlier.   
 In April 2002, Brylee Farm was violently taken over by ZANU-PF militants, and the 
workers were evicted from their houses and told to leave the farm. I have described this 
period and what subsequently happened to this community over the next few years elsewhere 
(Hartnack 2005, 2006, 2009b). When I first met Ringson in an informal settlement close to 
the farm in June 2004, he looked very despondent, stressed and unwell. Like most other 
former Brylee farmworkers, he had taken refuge in this nearby settlement and was renting a 
single wooden three-by-three metre cabin for his family. Having lost his personal tool set 
during the violent eviction, Ringson was unable to earn money through his own endeavours 
and had had to find a new patron on whom he could depend for a livelihood. A powerful man 
in the settlement, a war veteran who was in charge of the nearby housing cooperative, hired 
Ringson to drive his tractor, which gave Ringson some income and a sense of incorporation. 
At the time, he described this man as his sahwira, a ritual relationship enjoyed by close 
friends. Blessing, Ringson’s wife, also managed to secure some casual work as a sprayer at a 
nearby flower business (Hartnack 2005: 185). Despite being able to scratch out a living, 
Ringson was particularly vocal about his lost position and livelihood at the farm. But his 
situation was soon to become even worse when his relationship with his sahwira broke down 
over the man’s refusal to pay Ringson for several months of work. Ringson’s idea of his 
proper place in the world had taken a severe knock on his move into the slum, something his 
precarious incorporation under his new patron could only partially compensate for (cf. Bolt 
2013: 244). When even this failed to last, rather than try to negotiate the kukiya-kiya 
economy of the urban slums, Ringson made a genuine declaration of dependence on one of 
the former operators of Brylee, his old employer’s younger brother, Greg.  
 Greg and his sister had recently rented a small farm in the Eastern Highlands called 
Clover Farm, on which they grew fruit, vegetables and flowers for local supermarkets. 
Ringson met with them and persuaded them to take him on, even though they already had a 
full complement of workers, most of whom had also worked at Brylee. They eventually 
agreed but said they could only offer him a position as a general hand, an offer he accepted 
immediately. Within weeks he had repaired the old tractor and made himself so useful that 
Greg was obliged to appoint him as a full-time mechanic and driver. Blessing and his two 
sons joined him a few months later and, when I met him in early 2005, his demeanour, 
outlook and physical appearance had changed radically. He was back “in his element”, as 
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Greg put it, among friends from Brylee and working for the family he had grown up with. All 
of the ex-Brylee workers I met at Clover Farm were happy to have had the chance of being 
re-incorporated into a working and living environment they were familiar with, describing 
Clover Farm in terms which portrayed it as Brylee-in-miniature (see Hartnack 2006: 174–6; 
cf. White 2013: 257). Having suffered for over two years in the peri-urban slum – which 
many described as a “bus terminus”, or place of never-ending limbo and insecurity (cf. Jones 
2010: 289) – these few workers who had the opportunity were only too happy to slot 
themselves back into a mode of belonging in which they were subordinates, rather than 
negotiate the “independence” of making it on their own.                                                                               
 However, perhaps no longer trusting that their re-employment on a farm represented a 
secure long-term option, the Clover workers increasingly used their incorporation there 
largely as a base on which to build other options for themselves. As I outlined in Chapter 
Four, the farm is currently kept running more for lifestyle reasons than as a profitable 
enterprise and the physically disabled bachelor farm operator – whose sister left several years 
ago for Mozambique – relies heavily on workers such as Ringson to transport him and the 
produce, maintain the buildings, irrigation equipment and machinery and perform the 
physical work of running the farm. Trust is an important aspect of this relationship because 
Greg is not able to monitor every aspect of the production and marketing of the farm’s 
produce.318 Knowing that he cannot pay the workers much more than the minimum wage, 
Greg tacitly allows them the freedom to engage in side-projects on their off-days and is not 
interested in controlling every aspect of their lives. As previously discussed, several workers 
participate together in monthly savings clubs which have allowed them to find additional 
income-generating options for their long-term needs and goals. While the workers are 
dependent on the farm for housing, water, electricity, land on which to grow vegetables and 
maize, firewood and a monthly wage, Greg is also profoundly dependent on the workers to 
maintain his independent lifestyle, without which he would probably be unemployed and 
dependent on his extended family. The workers know this and it gives them an unusual 
amount of power in the relationship, which is one of interdependence more than anything 
else.   
                                                          
318 Two of the most senior workers were dismissed in early 2008, having been accused of pilfering potatoes and 
fertiliser by another senior worker, who was then promoted to the position of foreman. This man then 
disappeared a few weeks later with several hundred US dollars worth of seeds and it transpired that he had also 
been responsible for the previous losses, rather than the two who had been blamed. Ringson and Blessing were 
lucky that they were not drawn into this incident given how small the workforce is.  
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 Ringson and Blessing continue to rely on Clover Farm as a crucial base, supporting 
their third child, who is at high school in distant Norton, where their oldest daughter lives and 
their twins, born at Clover in 2006, who attend school a few kilometres away. Blessing now 
works in the farmhouse as the cleaner and maker of jams and preserves for the farm stall, 
while Ringson keeps the old pickup truck roadworthy, repairs the tractor and other farm 
equipment and drives the produce to market once a week. He performs other crucial roles too: 
keeping Greg on the right side of the surrounding plot-holders, many of whom are land-
reform beneficiaries. Greg allows Ringson to drive people who live in the district to the 
nearest mission hospital, 20 kilometres away, and he also rents out his tractor at a cheap rate 
to neighbouring farmers, with Ringson as the driver. If a football pitch needs mowing, he 
sends Ringson to do it. This is a crucial strategy of neighbourliness through which Greg tries 
to ward off any trouble which could arise due to his position as a white farmer. On his leave 
days Ringson also performs casual work for a neighbouring land-reform farmer who is an 
official in the influential Central Intelligence Organisation. Ringson has cultivated a 
relationship with him not only with a view to having multiple dependencies and income 
streams, but also so that this man can act as “a shield” for Clover farm, making “sure nobody 
can cause trouble here”, and protecting the important base offered by Clover. Thus, just as 
Ringson performs his role as a loyal worker to Greg, he also performs other roles to 
important patrons or protectors in the district, fragmenting his personhood to meet a number 
of needs (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 2001b: 275). This important extra work by Ringson is a 
reminder that Clover Farm is as vulnerable politically as it is economically (see Chapter 
Four).       
 As with Ringson’s colleagues who operate cross-border trading enterprises, or rent 
out chainsaws to local loggers (see Chapter Four), Ringson uses multiple relationships and 
income-earning opportunities to invest in his children’s future and sponsor long-term projects 
for his family. Blessing and he have just finished building a brick house at their rural home in 
Chihota, where they will retire and farm when they no longer have dependents at school. The 
recently completed roof, he proudly told me, was paid for out of money Blessing saved 
through her participation in the mukando. They have thus been able to use their relationship 
of dependence on Greg, and on Ringson’s other connections, to build something for 
themselves which will give them more independence in the future. This is a common strategy 
with several of my farmworker interlocutors. Increasing numbers of farm, domestic and hotel 
workers in that district have been allocated A1 land-reform plots in the past few years. Those 
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I interviewed told me that the local authorities were making plots on former commercial 
farms available to anyone who was a proven member of ZANU-PF. Such beneficiaries 
continued working in their formal jobs, often for white employers, but also incorporated 
themselves into very different systems of dependence – and performances of loyalty – in 
order to broaden their household livelihood options.  
 One woman who works as a domestic helper for a white ex-farming couple, for 
example, showed me potatoes she had grown on her plot as we chatted while she ironed her 
employer’s shirts in the kitchen of his retirement cottage. She goes to her plot in the valley 
most nights to guard her crops against baboons, returning to perform her formal working role 
during the day. Her employers, whose own farm was taken in the FTLRP, are often given 
gifts of produce from the plot.319 Even more striking is the example of Vitalis Gundani, who 
works as a farm manager at a horticulture enterprise near Harare. Like Ringson, he grew up 
as the son of a senior worker on a farm in Mvurwi, forming a close relationship with the farm 
owner’s son (now one of the bosses at the horticulture farm), and obtaining tertiary-level 
training in agriculture. Trusted black farm managers like Vitalis, whose histories are 
intertwined with those of the white farm owners, often perform the role of negotiators 
whenever there are threats made by local war veterans to take over the farm. At the same time 
as he works closely with white farmers, and defends their enterprise, Vitalis is also a ZANU-
PF supporter who sees the land-reform programme in positive terms and has secured an A1 
land-reform plot on the neighbouring farm to the one he grew up on. He was previously 
employed by an A2 farmer as a manager, but he was neither paid well nor timeously, so 
Vitalis prefers to maintain, and defend, his relationship with a white farming enterprise, 
despite his political views. He uses his earnings from his formal job to invest in constructing 
a house and accumulating a herd of cattle at this plot, and he helps his neighbouring fast-track 
farmers with technical advice on a regular basis. Meanwhile, his ageing parents still live in 
the compound of the farm he grew up on, which he visits often, describing it as his musha 
(rural home) since his family are originally from Mozambique.320  
 Vitalis thus performs several roles simultaneously and is incorporated in a number of 
different, seemingly contradictory, contexts through which he builds his personhood and his 
family’s livelihood options, despite the difficult situation in the country. This way of being in 
which actors manage multiple dependencies or are socially incorporated into different 
                                                          
319 Interview with Tendai Mapuranga, Eastern Highlands, 19 March 2013.   
320 Interview with Vitalis Gundani, Derby Estates, 24 March 2014.  
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contexts – which are precarious and may shift unexpectedly – is reminiscent of Michael 
Welker’s concept of “autoplexy”, a mode of personhood which involves “‘playing with’ a 
multiplicity of shifting roles and identities [both ascribed and assumed] to secure freedom of 
action and social position” in a “fluid, intricate field of relations” (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2001b: 277). Perhaps Welker’s framing of autoplexy and the idea that “freedom of action” 
can be attained is too optimistic where most (former) farm dwellers and workers are 
concerned, despite the fact that it does capture the complex ways in which personhood is 
negotiated and dependencies are managed. The ability to “play with” different roles and 
opportunities for incorporation successfully is dependent on having been dealt a reasonable 
hand (e.g. being born the son of a senior worker), as the quote by de Certeau (1984) used in 
this chapter’s epigraph suggests. While the examples above are of those who have had a 
reasonably good hand and played it often skilfully, as illustrated in Chapter Four (and 
Hartnack 2005), for many the choice is rather between subjection to relations and 
dependencies which are by no means preferable but allow hand-to-mouth survival, and total 
abjection (Ferguson 2013a: 231).      
 
Interdependence and Flexible Subjectivities    
“Agency”, writes Michael Lambek (2002: 37), “is a tricky concept. Leave it out and you have 
a determinist or abstract model, put it in and you risk instrumentalism, the bourgeois subject, 
the idealised idealistic individual”. Agency is a particularly tricky concept in the case of 
current and former farmworkers and dwellers, given that it is something they have often been 
said to be lacking. Yet despite the obvious limits on their agency considering their position of 
subordination and marginalisation, it is nevertheless still apparent that they, like other agents, 
“are always partly constructed through their acts – constituted through acts of 
acknowledgement, witnessing, engagement, commitment, refusal and consent” (Lambek 
2002: 37). As Lambek (2002: 38) points out, it is important to think of agency in contexts 
such as postcolonial Africa not so much in terms of the “lone, heroic individual”, but rather in 
its more relational aspects in which people “choose to subject themselves, to perform and 
conform accordingly, to accept responsibility, and to acknowledge their commitments”. This 
is agency as a more intimate, interdependent, ongoing project of constructing personhood and 
social and economic life rather than as defiant acts against domination or an individualistic 
quest for “freedom”.   
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 Intimate relational dynamics, however, can also come to place a severe burden even 
on those who have seemingly obtained some level of independence. Henry Mbwando, whose 
community activism and welfare work I have discussed in previous chapters, at first glance 
might appear to be very close to a “lone, heroic individual”, shaping his own personhood and 
exercising agency in courageous ways. Indeed, Henry’s story has parallels with Fassin’s 
(2010) HIV-positive interlocutors who overcame their own personal misfortunes to use their 
disease as a social, political and economic resource, defying abjection and death in the 
process. However, many ordinary things continue to constrain Henry and ensure that his life 
is lived more in interdependence with people than independently. Henry got married in the 
late 1990s, while he was still a full-time pastor, to Nyasha, whose family were originally 
from Mozambique, but who lived in an old (1980s) resettlement area near Chegutu. Their 
first child, a son, was born in 1999 while their second was born in early 2012. The reason for 
the large gap between the children was that both Henry and Nyasha became ill in the early 
2000s, with Henry consequently losing his church position in 2003, returning to Albany 
Farm, and being diagnosed with HIV in 2004 (see Chapter Five). Henry was forthright about 
the high HIV prevalence among the community, including several family members, telling 
me: “Yeah, you know, the sexual networks on farms is the reason”.321 Nyasha was diagnosed 
shortly after Henry and they both commenced Antiretroviral Therapy in 2005. Living with 
HIV, they did not plan to have another child, but Nyasha fell pregnant and, with the help of 
preventive drugs,322 she gave birth to a healthy girl in February 2012. Unfortunately, Nyasha 
was then diagnosed with tuberculosis, which had taken advantage of her weakened immune 
system. Despite medical intervention, she died on 1 April 2013.     
 On 1 April 2014, I sat with Henry in central Harare while he told me about the 
difficult dilemma he now faced, a year after Nyasha’s death. Since the July 2013 election win 
by ZANU-PF, his freelance HIV-awareness work had receded and, apart from one small 
project, he had struggled to earn enough to cover food, transport and school fees for his son. 
After Nyasha’s funeral, his parents-in-law had taken his daughter to Chegutu and he was also 
obliged to send them money periodically for her upkeep. To make matters worse, since 
Nyasha’s death he had nobody to help him cultivate and weed the small patch of land on 
which he grew maize, threatening his harvest and the household’s food security. But despite 
his hardships, because it was a year after Nyasha’s death and approaching winter, Henry was 
                                                          
321 Interview with Henry Mbwando, Albany Farm, 19 March 2014.  
322 Prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV drugs became more widely available during the 
tenure of the Global Political Agreement (2009–2013) due to increased funding from international donors.     
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obliged to organise a ceremony at which her gravestone would be erected and her possessions 
distributed amongst her relatives. Henry’s dilemma was that the responsibility of organising 
and paying for this ritual was to be borne by him and he would have to raise several hundred 
US dollars to pay for transport, food, the gravestone, hire of crockery and cutlery and related 
expenses.323 This was money he could not easily raise, especially since two of his brothers – 
who would normally have helped – were themselves dead, and his remaining brother was just 
as financially hard-up as Henry. Other relatives were making excuses and Henry suggested 
that the hard times had diminished the extended family’s ability to support one another: “It 
becomes about me supporting only my wife and children and not caring about my brothers 
and their children”, he said (cf. Hartnack 2005: 182).   
 Such rituals can be postponed in cases of drought or poverty, but Henry was under 
intense pressure to conduct the ceremony, both from his in-laws and on his own account. For 
one thing, Nyasha’s possessions were being stored at his small room on the farm. While they 
were still there, his house was considered impure; his in-laws would not let his young 
daughter live with him until the house had been cleansed by the ceremony and he would also 
be unable to remarry until the redistribution took place. “Darkness hangs over the house”, he 
explained, “it’s like she is still there even though she is dead”.324 Moreover, Henry was 
expected to ensure that Nyasha’s possessions were kept safe and he would suffer 
consequences if anything befell them: “As long as those possessions are at my house, I have 
to remain here looking after them. If anything happens to them, I would have to pay all sorts 
of traditional fines to her family and could even be cursed by them”, he told me. This placed 
a severe restriction on what kinds of work Henry could undertake. Any opportunities or 
campaigns which required him to travel away from Harare could not be considered as he did 
not dare to leave Nyasha’s possessions in the care of his teenaged son. This made raising 
money for the ritual particularly difficult. Yet Henry had a profound sense that he was living 
in a kind of limbo which was not healthy and had to try by all means to organise the 
ceremony so that he could move on with his life and widen his potential income-generating 
opportunities. Nyasha’s family shared this sentiment, his sister-in-law telling him: “Listen 
[Henry], until you do this ceremony, things won’t go well for you”.  
                                                          
323 Although the Shona rituals to settle or “bring home” the spirit of the deceased (kurova guva) and distribute 
his possessions (nhaka) were not generally practiced for women (see Bourdillon 1976: 209–16), in 
contemporary Zimbabwe family rituals (heavily influenced by Christianity) to erect and unveil gravestones, 
including those of women, are conducted, and a woman’s household and personal possessions must also be 
distributed among her female relatives at some point after her death.   
324 Interview with Henry Mbwando, Harare, 1 April 2014.  
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 Indeed, Henry’s daughter had recently been ill, which may also have prompted the 
urgency for the ceremony since the illness might have been interpreted as a sign that 
Nyasha’s spirit was unhappy (cf. Bourdillon 1976: 210). When asked how his position as a 
Christian pastor influenced his understanding of the situation, Henry shook his head and 
replied: “They will tell you that you must take care of these traditional things first, and you 
can go back to your church afterwards!” As much of an “independent” actor as Henry was, 
then, with his service on high-level HIV committees and his freelance campaigning and 
grassroots activism, he was still constrained, not only by the tough economic environment 
and his own health status, but also by the expectations placed on him by his late wife’s 
family, and even her own spirit. His life was lived in interdependence with others whom he 
relied on, and who relied on him. Failure to meet their expectations could have serious 
consequences for him, whether in the form of never having custody of his daughter again, 
traditional fines or even curses. Happily, Henry managed to raise enough money to hold the 
ceremony in late April. On 30 June I received an email in which he wrote: “Sure brother, we 
finally managed to have the ceremony, though it was not easy but am happy that the estate of 
my wife according to culture and traditions of us was done. And sure what a big load it was 
for me over the year”. He wrote this email from Bulawayo, where he had gone to pursue an 
income-generating opportunity.     
 In a final example, I return to the young men with whose story I introduced the first 
chapter: Evidence Chinyanga and his brothers Alois, Spencer and Edmore, the original farm 
orphans whose plight precipitated the foundation of FOST. Their case illustrates, among 
other things, that in the building of personhood and livelihoods in contexts such as 
contemporary Zimbabwe, there is a delicate balance between interdependence and reliance on 
close significant others on one hand, and personal ambition and the quest for upward mobility 
and independence on the other. Furthermore, it illustrates the importance of flexibility and the 
ability to back-track in the construction of personhood and livelihood options. The brothers 
have no knowledge of their blood-kin or village of origin: even the surname they now use 
was merely a name thought to have been used by their mother before she disappeared. They 
were fostered by the health worker on the farm and schooled and provided for by the farm 
owner and his wife, as well as FOST. When asked about the possibility of finding his 
biological relatives, Evidence shrugged and said: “They did not look for us when we were 
abandoned, so we do not care about them”.325 However, he proudly shows me photographs of 
                                                          
325 Interview with Evidence Chinyanga, Harare, 7 March 2013.  
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his foster mother, who he calls “mom”, and her daughter, who he calls “sister”. 
Notwithstanding these fictive kin relationships, Evidence feels that he and his brothers are 
building their lives from scratch: “We don’t know anything except us four guys”, he told me, 
“There is no grandmother or anybody else. So it’s like a new life, ja, a new life for us”.326   
 Evidence’s high schooling came to an abrupt end at the age of 15 when the farm was 
taken over in 2004. The displaced farmer then arranged for all four brothers to attend a two-
week farming course with Foundations for Farming in the hope that it would help them to 
grow their own food on a land-reform plot. The oldest brother, Edmore, is the only one who 
has remained in the rural areas, where he has managed to secure a plot, while the three 
younger brothers slowly drifted to the capital city over the next few years. Evidence worked 
for two years as a general hand for a communal-areas farmer before escaping poorly paid 
rural drudgery for the world of trading. He found a position as an assistant at a general store 
in a small business centre outside Harare. Here he was mentored by the owner, learning the 
skills of marketing, stock control and butchery. He worked in this role for five years and 
during that time got married to a young woman he met there, making a modest bride-wealth 
payment to his parents-in-law out of his savings.327 When in 2010 the shop owner emigrated 
to South Africa, however, Evidence joined the twins Alois and Spencer who by this time 
were informal traders on the streets of downtown Harare, selling mobile telephone 
accessories. All three had by then been thoroughly schooled in the workings of the kukiya-
kiya economy (Jones 2010) on which they now relied for a living. Growing up in an era in 
which access to formal jobs and incorporation into wage work – both rural and urban – 
rapidly faded, the Chinyanga brothers never considered the option of “job-seeking”, choosing 
instead to make their way in the informal economy.   
 The recent expansion of mobile phone networks and the availability of all varieties of 
mobile phones provided the brothers with a fairly good opportunity. Each brother specialised 
in a few different accessories (such as batteries, chargers, earphones, etc.), buying them 
wholesale and selling each at a 200 per cent mark-up. They operated from a small cardboard 
box stall set up on the pavement near a major taxi rank in a crowded part of town. Clubbing 
together allowed them to buy in greater bulk and for one brother to remain at their stall while 
the others conducted other business. Moreover, the fact that Alois is an amputee meant that 
                                                          
326 Interview with Evidence Chinyanga, Highfields, 30 October 2013. Further detail in this case study is taken 
from numerous meetings and participant observation with the Chinyangas over the course of 2013 and in 
February/March 2014. 
327 See Jones (2009) for an excellent discussion of the dynamics of marriage, bride-wealth arrangements and the 
youth in contemporary urban Zimbabwe.  
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they could elicit sympathy from the municipal police who often chased un-licensed street 
vendors like them away. Although when business was going well – such as at month-end – 
they could each make a profit of US$45 per day, the frequent confiscations of their goods, the 
fluctuating nature of sales and the fact that their products were something of a luxury meant 
that, for all their considerable entrepreneurial nous, they had very little control over income. 
One advantage is that they were each able to rent cheap back-yard single rooms in Epworth 
township, which allowed them to save much of their profits. Spencer was thus able to marry 
and buy a couple of cows with his savings, over-and-above providing for his wife and young 
child. Evidence, meanwhile, also harbored ambitions of moving on from street trading. In 
July 2013, his wife gave birth to a son, who Evidence proudly named Providence. This event 
precipitated a move by Evidence which was designed to increase his earnings and provide a 
much more secure base on which to build his household’s future.  
 When I returned to Zimbabwe in October 2013, I was surprised to find that Evidence 
was now located in the township of Highfields and that he had recently set himself up in a 
rented shop within the heart of the chaotic “Gazaland home industries” district. He had saved 
for a number of months to be able to pay the first US$300 installment of monthly rent for a 
spacious formal shop, and to buy stock. “We slept without eating to keep that money”, he 
grinned. He told me that he had abandoned street trading as the time had come to operate a 
proper shop in which he would sell groceries, using the skills he had learnt as a shop 
assistant. He felt that mobile phone accessories were a luxury and that it was better to sell 
things which people needed on a daily basis. He proudly showed me the rows of soap, 
cooking oil, salt, sugar, rice and mealie-meal he was now selling at bargain prices. He had 
given his shop a name – MR CHEAP – and a colourful painted sign hung outside. Evidence 
had also abandoned the casual styles of the street trader – jeans, sneakers and a branded tee-
shirt – for smart trousers, a button-through shirt and black leather shoes. He looked every bit 
the respectable township businessman and he admitted that he had to look the part to win the 
respect of his landlord, fellow shop owners and customers. Indeed, Evidence was by far the 
youngest shopkeeper in the complex and it was apparent that he had to prove that he was a 
serious player.  
 With advertising, astute pricing, special offers and bulk-buying, Evidence did manage 
to attract customers and accrue a small profit for ten months, earning the respect of his fellow 
traders, who called him “Cheap” affectionately. His wife manned the shop when he went into 
Harare to buy wholesale products and they rented a room nearby. However, the cash liquidity 
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crisis and general economic downturn in 2014, coupled with stiff competition from other 
outlets, including a large supermarket, made it increasingly difficult for him to continue 
paying such a large monthly rent. At the beginning of August he sent me a message via the 
WhatsApp messaging service, reading: “Business is closed now [because] everything is not 
moving away, people they dont have money in zim so its hard [and] rents its too much … 
Thief breaks past two weeks they stolen some grocery so I am back to [zero] I am back at 
work now”. Ultimately failing in his quest, Evidence rejoined his brothers on the streets 
where the income may have fluctuated, but the overheads were not so great and together, they 
could find ways to weather the economic storm. Respectability and independence would have 
to wait.                   
 The Chinyanga brothers offer an insight into how young people are attempting to 
build their lives in the “crooked” times of contemporary Zimbabwe. On the whole, they do 
not seek incorporation into relations of economic dependence, although the older farming 
brother must maintain links to important rural political structures and Evidence and Spencer, 
along with their wives, are members of an apostolic church. The brothers draw on patrons 
when necessary – for example they are in contact with the former farmer who occasionally 
helps them out financially when difficulties arise. Yet, they do not wish to work for a “boss”, 
but are more interested in making a living on their own. To do this, however, the brothers are 
interdependent, relying on each other for support, security, trustworthy assistance and the 
pooling of resources. However, Evidence and Spencer in particular are looking to build 
longer-term options for their own families. Spencer continues to invest in cattle, which a 
friend keeps at his rural plot, while Evidence wants to build a business for himself in the 
retail trade at some point when the situation allows. It is important to note that the brothers 
have different strategies. The unmarried and crippled Alois is content for now to spend most 
of his earnings on drinking with his friends at his local tavern, in stark contrast to his devout 
and ambitious brothers. It is equally important to observe how, although the kukiya-kiya 
economy certainly “undermines the practice and telos of personal … development” (Jones 
2010: 290), young people like Evidence still have strong ambitions of personal development, 
and are not afraid to make forays into opportunities which could lead to upward mobility, and 
take risks along the way. Moreover, some – like Evidence – are still committed to doing 
things “straight” and winning respectability, rather than operating in a “zigzag” way (ibid.). 
Those who have not given up on ambition, as Alois and his drinking friends seem to have, do 




Above, I have presented a number of ethnographic examples to show that for former and 
current farmworkers and dwellers the process of exercising agency, constructing personhood, 
and building relationships and livelihoods is a complex and dynamic one, influenced heavily 
by their histories as migrant labourers, of subordination, displacement and survival against 
great odds. Often portrayed as agency-less “semi-social beings” (Comaroff and Comaroff 
2001b: 270) because of their status as agricultural labourers, I argue that while they did make 
“declarations of dependence” (Ferguson 2013a), or at least sought out social incorporation, 
farmworkers often tried to negotiate the terms of their incorporation in various ways. Despite 
seeking a subordinate position, many had goals and ambitions for themselves and their 
families, which they sought strategically to achieve. Granted, such negotiations were mostly 
through the use of various “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985), rather than through “strategic 
games between liberties” (Foucault 1988: 19), given the states of domination which 
characterised many white-owned farms, especially during the colonial era. However, some 
farmworkers clearly built genuine relationships with their employers, and used these as a way 
to lever their families up the farm hierarchy and into a better social and economic position.   
 When such “modes of belonging” (Rutherford 2008) were displaced after the year 
2000, many farmworkers and dwellers sought to find alternative dependencies in which to 
incorporate themselves. Many were not successful and had to settle for incorporation within 
very shallow or precarious relations of dependence, or face the choice between subjection to 
undesirable relations and complete abjection. Those who have been more successful have 
tended to try to build multiple dependencies and subjectivities, skilfully building their 
personhood, livelihoods and future prospects through a number of opportunities in 
combination. For such agents, interdependence is important and can be a valuable asset to 
help them survive and build for the future. Even for those who feel they can attempt to take 
risks and try to become independent, interdependence is an invaluable fallback, and 
flexibility is crucial. As the case of Henry shows, however, interdependence can also come to 
place a burden and restriction on even the most active and connected of agents. Life in 
contemporary Zimbabwe, particularly for former and current farmworkers, is precarious. But 
even those at the very bottom fight to make something of it and to construct various forms of 
personhood in the process.         
205 
Chapter Seven 
Conclusion: Modernity, Civilisation and Power in the Longue Durée 
 
Colonialism was simultaneously, equally, and inseparably a process in political economy and culture. 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: 19)  
 
As an age, the postcolony encloses multiple durées made up of discontinuities, reversals, inertias, and 
swings that overlay one another, interpenetrate one another, and envelope one another. (Mbembe 
2001: 14) 
 
The past is never dead. It’s not even past. (William Faulkner 1951)  
 
Shifting Power, Welfare and the “Mini-colony” 
When I commenced this research project, my initial aim was to understand the dynamics 
of farm welfare initiatives in the first two decades after Zimbabwe’s independence, and 
what impact the FTLRP had on these and their beneficiaries. I was particularly interested 
in the role of white “farmer’s wives” in such endeavours, something often mentioned by 
white Zimbabweans but not explored in any detail in academic literature on farms, white 
farmers and farmworkers. It soon became apparent that a suitably nuanced understanding 
of complexities, processes and contradictions relating to power, welfare and identity on 
postcolonial commercial farms was not possible without first understanding the colonial 
genealogies of ideologies and practices around farm welfare and “improvement” and 
their more recent histories. How, for example, was one to account adequately for the 
disjuncture between white farmers’ earnest narratives of themselves as producers,  
modernisers and caring employers, and those of critics who saw them as exploitative, 
socially disengaged and often racist capitalist elites? I realised, in the words of Mbembe 
(2001: 6), that “recourse to the effects of the longue durée … to account for contradictory 
contemporary phenomena” was necessary, as well as attention to the ways in which 
multiple durées are entangled – in “an interlocking of presents, pasts and futures” (ibid.: 
16, original emphasis) – within postcolonial Zimbabwe. It was also apparent that it was 
necessary to pay attention to both political economy and culture/identity (and the ways 
they were entangled) in order to understand the changing dynamics of farm welfare, and 
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the power relations in which they were enmeshed, over the course of Zimbabwe’s 
colonial and postcolonial history. I have thus taken a multi-sited (spatially, temporally, 
socially) historical-ethnographic approach to gain as nuanced an understanding as 
possible.     
To answer questions about the (changing) nature of power and power relations on 
commercial farms, and how “welfare” initiatives were imbricated in these, I drew on the 
theories of Foucault in particular, as well as Agamben (1998) and Mbembe (2001), and 
on authors such as Rutherford who have previously explored power and labour relations 
on Zimbabwean commercial farms. Following Li (2007) and Moore (2005), I argue that 
(as in other (post)colonial contexts) elements of sovereignty, government and discipline 
worked simultaneously in “practices of rule” (Li 2007: 12) on white-owned farms in 
Zimbabwe, and that these forms of power were always “in motion” (Moore 2005: 7) and 
coexisted in “awkward articulations” (Li 2007: 17), often contradictorily.   
Thus, particularly before 1950, deductive sovereignty and harsh forms of 
discipline involving hard labour routines, surveillance, physical violence, punishments 
and summary expulsions were predominant in power relations which can be best 
described as “states of domination” (Foucault 1988: 12), as described in Chapter Two.  
Yet, as I show, even then sovereign power on the farms manifested its more “pastoral” 
and intimate elements, as was common within traditional paternalism throughout 
southern Africa (Du Toit 1993; Van Onselen 1992). The official, legal delegation of 
power over workers (servants) to farm owners (masters) fostered a localised system of 
“domestic government” (Rutherford 2001a) (a formulation similar to Mbembe’s (2001: 
66–101) notion of “private indirect government”), a system of “coercive domestic 
relations” (Rutherford 1996: 84) in which the rules of the farmer were sovereign but 
paternalistic “edification” (modernisation, civilisation) of workers was also expected of 
the “master”. Again, Mbembe’s (2001: 33) understanding of colonial sovereignty 
(“commandement”) is similar since it includes elements of both raw violence and 
edificatory “taming”, “shaping” and “grooming” of the “animal-like” natives. Of course, 
hard labour, physical violence and disciplined routines qualified as forms of edification, 
but there were also “softer” maternalistic elements often linked to domesticity and the 
role of the “farmers’ wife”, such as nursing and teaching, especially of nutrition, hygiene 
and domestic tasks. As I show, these feminine pastoral practices of edification (and the 
surveillance and disciplining of bodies they allowed), were just as important to 
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maintaining the sovereign power of white farmers as the “the sjambok” (male forms of 
power) were, if not more so.  
Under conditions of labour scarcity, as white agriculture often was, white farmers 
had to temper their sovereign rule with elements of government (in the Foucauldian 
sense), conducting conduct in more subtle and productive ways in order to retain the 
services of workers, who could and did use forms of resistance (desertion, warning others 
away, arson, pilfering) that could have dire economic consequences on a farm, 
particularly if it was already struggling, as was common before the 1950s. Forms of 
rudimentary healthcare, the (less widespread) establishment of farm schools and the 
introduction of African women’s clubs were all governmental techniques in which white 
women were instrumental – aimed at attracting, stabilising, domesticating, 
(self)disciplining and reproducing the African workforce. Just what combinations of 
these forms of power were in place varied from farm to farm, depending on the attitudes 
and practices of each farmer and “farmer’s wife”, shaped by factors such as their 
schooling, military experiences, religious beliefs and class-linked sense of what was 
“proper”. By the 1930s, influential “settler institutions” (Morrell 2001) such as clubs, 
schools and the Women’s Institute (strongly linked to the Anglican Church) were playing 
an important role in shaping these gendered values, ideologies and practices, particularly 
in districts where they enjoyed a strong presence.  
  The combinations of power on farms also differed over time, depending on 
changing political-economic and social factors. Outright sovereign violence was 
predominant in the first two decades of the twentieth century, and was slowly diluted by 
other forms of discipline and government in which white women were central. After 
Zimbabwe’s independence new “scientific” and bureaucratic labour-management 
systems, augmented by new labour regulations and NGO welfare initiatives on the farms 
(external forms of governmentality which challenged the sovereignty of the farmer), led 
to a “revamped domestic government” (Rutherford 2001: 130) which was decidedly 
governmental and made use of more productive biopolitical techniques of control. New 
forms of record-keeping and surveillance by middle-managers combined with what I call 
the biopolitical maternalism of the NGOs, which sought not only to improve living 
conditions but also to inculcate various practices around health, hygiene, sexuality and 
domesticity in farmworkers who, more than at any point previously, became constructed 
and targeted (by NGOs and academics) as a specific population in need of 
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“improvement”. This may have been, for the most part, a “minimalist biopolitics” (aimed 
at survival rather than wider change – see Redfield 2005), and it may not have reached all 
commercial farms to the same extent, but it was certainly an influential form of power on 
farms after 1980, in which hundreds of “farmers’ wives” were involved in various ways, 
as I show in Chapter Three. However, sovereign deductive power could still break 
through, manifesting in physical violence and exclusion (often gendered), at times 
through the “delegated despotism” exercised by senior male farmworkers (Addison 
2014). It is therefore not surprising that farmworker interlocutors of mine talk of a range 
of conditions on white-owned farms before and after 1980, describing some farmers or 
their wives (or particular farm managers) as “mamparas” (idiots) while others are 
remembered more favourably.     
It is in the contradictions evident in this supposedly more benign form of 
biopolitical governmentality where Agamben’s (1998) understanding of sovereignty and 
biopolitics becomes most useful. Agamben sees the sovereign as he who can decide the 
“state of exception” and designate some people to occupy a state of “inclusive 
exclusion”, embodying “bare life” (ibid.: 7). As outlined in Chapter Six, at a national 
level farmworkers, as “alien” migrant workers, were – and continue to be maintained in 
this position – excluded in many ways from the political community but “crucial to 
society and the economy” (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 17). Moreover, on individual 
farms the gendered hierarchies in which men occupied permanent and senior positions 
while women occupied junior and casual/seasonal positions ensured that women were 
structurally vulnerable to abuse and violence, with political-economic factors such as the 
increasing casualisation and feminisation of the labour force under the 1990s structural-
adjustment programme only augmenting such vulnerabilities. At the same time, farm-
focussed NGOs mainly targeted women and children, excluding men from their 
biopolitical endeavours. The state, farmers and NGOs therefore displayed forms of 
sovereign power (as Agamben sees it) which affected farmworkers after 1980 in their 
tendency to exclude or include them, either in whole or in part, in various ways.   
For this reason, Wisborg’s (2013) observation that commercial farms in southern 
Africa can be likened to camps (concentration, refugee, humanitarian) – Agamben’s 
ultimate “zones of exception” – is analytically tempting. And yet, the image of the camp 
is problematic because it tends towards an understanding of power on farms that is too 
totalising and spaces that are too bounded and mono-dimensional. As I have shown, 
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multiple forms of power operated on commercial farms and, as Li (2007: 25–6) argues, 
“Powers that are multiple cannot be totalizing and seamless … The multiplicity of power, 
the many ways that practices position people, the various modes ‘playing across one 
another’ produce gaps and contradictions”. While the concepts of “bare life” and “the 
camp” have some use as heuristic tools for understanding the position of farmworkers 
and the conditions they face, I agree with Fassin’s (2010) point that opposing biological 
and political life sets up a dualistic and reductionist paradigm which is at odds with the 
everyday agency-filled struggles of farmworkers themselves (and the possibilities or 
constraints faced by different kinds of farmworkers and dwellers) in the rich details of 
their biographies. In Chapters Four, Five and Six I show that many (former) farmworkers 
strive (not always successfully) to transcend “bare” conditions by engaging in personal, 
social and even political struggles at a local level aimed at securing their “belonging” 
(Rutherford 2008).     
 
Civilising Missions and White Farmer Identity   
A focus on theories of power alone also carries a risk of missing the importance of 
dynamic identity-linked and cultural factors that influenced power relations on 
commercial farms and the welfare endeavours which were imbricated in these over many 
decades. In Chapters One and Two I outlined factors which shaped the identities, 
ideologies and actions of colonial settlers in Southern Rhodesia. The period of conquest 
was a profoundly masculine phase dominated by the “marauding frontier masculinities” 
(Bush 2004: 87) of the soldiers, adventurers and prospectors who dominated the first 
fifteen years of settlement. As I showed, the conquest and its associated forms of 
violence were already justified by notions of the civilising mission and the “duty” of 
white settlers to impose their “modern” values and systems on the “anachronistic” 
humans they encountered (McClintock 1995: 30). But uncivilised frontier masculinities 
themselves became problematic when after 1900 the BSAC sought to establish a settled, 
middle-class society and the male settler population came to be balanced by the kind of 
white English women considered suitable for the colony. White settler women had a 
crucial role to play in civilising their men and their homes, not only through and in 
accordance with the ideologies of a bourgeois domesticity that developed in Victorian 
Britain, but also in relation to the indigenous African population (the “external frontier” – 
Stoler 1997) and various other populations (“interior frontiers” – poor whites, coloureds), 
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who provided the threat of sexual and domestic degeneration (ibid.). Managing these 
frontiers on the domestic and sexual fronts became key aspects of white identity in 
Southern Rhodesia in which women played the most important role. Settler institutions 
which reproduced strong ideologies of acceptable (genteel) “settler masculinity” and 
robust female domesticity were established by the 1920s. 
Such cultural or class-related factors which valorised ideas of the “white man’s 
burden” (an ideology influenced by earlier British colonial experiences elsewhere) 
combined with the role of trusteeship in setting up and managing hierarchies between 
white settlers and “deficient” indigenous populations (Li 2007: 14; Mbembe 2001: 31), 
setting the scene for various civilising endeavours by white women, many of whom were 
already trained in nursing or teaching. On farms, farmworkers formed another interior 
frontier (Rutherford 2004b) through which white farmers and their wives developed their 
private and public identities, partly through notions of “edification” and trusteeship. 
Black workers were “civilised” through the “gospel of labour” (with its associated 
routines and disciplinary measures) and through various rudimentary health, hygiene and 
educational interventions. Church-linked settler institutions such as schools and the 
FWISR encouraged and actively pursued civilising endeavours (especially the Homecraft 
movement) in which white women took on the role of trustees over black farmworkers 
and peasants. While such activities played a crucial role in power relations, equally 
important was their role in the formation and perpetuation of white settler identities, 
including those of farm owners.  
This colonial phase of the civilising mission was a foundation on which a new, 
equally powerful, phase came to operate after 1980. Zimbabwe’s independence coincided 
with the era in which “civil society” became a core developmental and democratisation 
formula of Western neoliberal globalisation (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001a: 40). Farm 
welfare endeavours, which were taken up and multiplied by a range of global and local 
non-governmental organisations, channelled this new phase of the civilising mission 
towards farmworkers, especially on the highveld. As Rutherford (2004a: 128) writes: 
“Civil society projects have … sought to shape populations into adopting forms of 
association, mental outlooks, and bodily practices deemed to be more rational, 
democratic, and developed; in short, as the name suggests, as civil-ized”. But these NGO 
endeavours did not find a tabula rasa on which to replicate unmediated global ideologies 
and practices.  
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As I have shown in Chapter Three, not only were the foundations of many farm-
focussed NGOs intimately linked to the biographies of “farmers’ wives” and previous 
welfare and “improvement” practices on farms, but factors of white-farmer identity 
politics also continued to influence them. As Rutherford (2004b) shows, the role of 
farmworkers as an interior frontier through which white farmers constituted their private 
and especially public identities became even more important after 1980, and particularly 
in the 1990s, when the position of white farmers became increasingly endangered by the 
state’s threats and legal moves towards expropriating white-owned land. Despite their 
desire to keep outsiders from influencing the way they ran their farms, there was a great 
incentive for farm owners to participate in farm welfare endeavours, as well as new 
forms of pressure (from NGOs, unions, foreign markets, the government, peers) for them 
to improve the living and, to a lesser extent the working conditions, of farmworkers. The 
participation of hundreds of “farmers’ wives” in the NGO-led biopolitical projects can 
thus be explained by both the existing (colonial) heritage of maternalistic “do-gooding” 
(Kirkwood 1984b: 159) and the renewed need to project a positive image through the 
interior frontier role played by farmworkers.    
 
Post-land Reform: Echoes and Entanglements  
The farm takeovers and the FTLRP radically affected the political-economy of farming 
and rural labour and agrarian relations. As I show in Chapters Four, Five and Six, 
farmers, NGOs and individuals had to adapt to these changes and have faced many 
challenges in this struggle. While some authors (e.g. Chambati 2011, 2013a, 2013b; 
Moyo and Chambati 2013) have seen these changes as a long overdue move away from a 
super-exploitative, racially abusive colonial agrarian system to an inherently progressive 
agrarian structure which has not only benefitted the recipients of land, but also 
farmworkers, I find such teleological and often romanticised arguments problematic. As 
Rutherford (2014) points out, it is naïve to assume that massive land redistribution can 
automatically sweep away power relations and dependencies, and that “social patronage 
labour relations” are unproblematic. Rather, power relations on remaining commercially 
run farms continue to be complex, and are influenced by the difficult contemporary 
political-economy of large-scale agriculture. The welfare interventions of NGOs and 
farmers have largely ceased and productive biopolitical maternalism as a form of power 
has receded, but paternalistic – sometimes deductive – labour relations are still present, 
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even on black-owned farms. Moreover, power dynamics and labour relations are still 
largely determined by localised factors and relationships in which farmworkers have 
limited power, rather than by broader laws and policies regulated by the state or unions. 
The same is true on resettled land, where (former) farmworkers often remain 
marginalised and have to negotiate their belonging and access to resources such as 
housing, land, water and fuel-wood on an ongoing basis. Thus, as far as power relations 
are concerned, the dynamic combination of sovereignty, government and discipline 
continues to operate, with elements and echoes of the old power relations entangled in 
new arrangements and relationships.  
New or reformulated forms of welfare and “improvement” in such places also 
continue to be entangled in the ideologies and practices of former eras, and strongly echo 
aspects of the civilising and modernising missions. Not only are elements of trusteeship 
over “deficient subjects” still apparent in contemporary welfare endeavours, as I show in 
Chapter Five, but NGOs continue to draw on notions of modernity and civilisation in 
their work. The new frontier for such a mission is the “zigzag” kukiya-kiya way of life to 
which most Zimbabweans have resorted for survival (Jones 2010).328 Thus, from the 
KWA’s valorisation of certain kinds of income-generation strategies over others which 
they regard as backwards or morally reprehensible (often the most realistic options 
remaining for former farmworkers), to FfF’s missionary zeal to instil “straight” 
agricultural and economic practices and ways of living (“on-time”, “high standard”, 
“without wasting”, “with joy”), such interventions are entangled with colonial missions 
which had a similar aim.  
Fifteen years after the commencement of the farm takeovers and the FTLRP, 
(former) commercial farms and those living on them remain entangled in discourses, 
narratives and practices from Zimbabwe’s past, and in hopes, expectations and visions of 
the future in which the past and the present are similarly entangled. Domestic 
government – as a hierarchical and dynamic system of power relations on farms, and a 
“conditional mode of belonging” (Rutherford 2008) whose nature was influenced both by 
fluid political-economic and gendered socio-cultural factors during the twentieth century 
– has again been reformulated, if not completely displaced, following the FTLRP. It may 
be unclear exactly what the dynamics of new power relations and modes of belonging on 
                                                          
328 Although Jones’ work analyses urban Zimbabwe, it is evident that many activities which fall under the rubric 
of kukiya-kiya, such as gold-panning, cattle-rustling, pilfering, poaching, buying-and-selling, commercial and 
transactional sex, are all very important contemporary livelihood strategies for (former) farmworkers.   
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(former) commercial farms are, and where farmworkers and dwellers are placed in these, 
but it is clear that – rather than represent a complete break from past modes of power, 
belonging and labour – narratives, ideologies and practices of these past modes will 
continue to influence contemporary social, labour and power relations in rural 
Zimbabwe.  
By paying attention to the longue durée and the entanglement of political-
economic and gendered socio-cultural factors in power relations on (former) white-
owned commercial farms, this thesis has contributed to a fuller and more nuanced 
understanding of the (dynamic) nature of labour relations and the role of welfare and 
“improvement” endeavours on such farms over the course of more than a century. 
Analyses of emerging agrarian systems and labour practices in Zimbabwe will need to 
take such histories and their entanglements with the present into account if the complex 
outcomes of the FTLRP are to be understood adequately. Moreover, those who seek to 
assist (former) farmworkers and dwellers need to take into account their past and present 
struggles (including localised political mobilisations), and the ways in which they sought 
to belong (i.e. maintain access to crucial resources) in the context of domestic 
government, and seek again to belong in post-FTLRP Zimbabwe. A focus on the 
multifarious forms of power and various ways in which these manifest in such contexts, 
as well as the political-economic and socio-cultural factors shaping them, may prove 










































1. Published Books, Book Chapters and Journal Articles  
 
Addison, L. 2014. “Delegated Despotism: Frontiers of Agrarian Labour on a South African 
Border Farm”, Journal of Agrarian Change 14(2): 286–304.  
Agamben, G. 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Alexander, J. 1994. “State, Peasantry and Resettlement in Zimbabwe”, Review of African 
Political Economy 61: 325–45. 
Alexander, J. 2006. The Unsettled Land: State-making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe 
1893–2003. Oxford: James Currey.  
Alexander, J., J. McGregor and T.O. Ranger. 2000. Violence and Memory: One Hundred 
Years in the “Dark Forests” of Matabeleland. Harare: Weaver Press.  
Alexander, K. 2004. “Orphans of the Empire: An Analysis of Elements of White Identity and 
Ideology Construction in Zimbabwe”, in B. Raftopoulos and T. Savage (eds), 
Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and 
Reconciliation. 
Amanor-Wilks, D.E. 1995. In Search of Hope for Zimbabwe’s Farm Workers. Harare: 
Dateline Southern Africa.   
Amanor-Wilks, D.E. 1996. “Invisible Hands: Women in Zimbabwe’s Commercial Farm 
Sector”, SAFERE 2(1): 37–57.   
Arnold, W.E. 1980. The Goldbergs of Leigh Ranch. Bulawayo: Books of Zimbabwe. 
Arrighi, G. 1967. The Political Economy of Rhodesia. The Hague: Mouton.  
Arrighi, G. 1970. “Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of the 
Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia”, Journal of Development 
Studies 6(3): 197–234. 
Atkins, K.E. 1993. The Moon Is Dead! Give Us Our Money! The Cultural Origins of an 
African Work Ethic, Natal, South Africa, 1843–1900. Portsmouth: Heinemann.  
216 
Auret, D. 1990. A Decade of Development: Zimbabwe 1980–1990. Gweru: Mambo Press.  
Auret, D. 2000. From Bus Stop to Farm Village: The Farm Worker Programme in 
Zimbabwe. Harare: Save the Children (UK).  
Auret, D. 2002. Participatory Social Auditing of Labour Standards: A Handbook for Code of 
Practice Implementers. Harare: Agricultural Ethics Assurance Association of 
Zimbabwe.   
Barnes, T.A. 1999. “We Women Worked So Hard”: Gender, Urbanisation and Social 
Reproduction in Colonial Harare, Zimbabwe, 1930–1956. Portsmouth: Heinemann.      
Bashford, A. 2004. “Medicine, Gender, and Empire”, in P. Levine (ed.), Gender and Empire. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.    
Berg, E. 1981. Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington: The World 
Bank. 
Bernstein, H. 2004. “‘Changing Before our Very Eyes’: Agrarian Questions and the Politics 
of Land in Capitalism Today”, Journal of Agrarian Change 4(1–2): 190–225.   
Bernstein, H. 2006. “Is There an Agrarian Question in the 21st Century?”, Canadian Journal 
of Development Studies 27(4): 449–60.  
Bhebe, N. and T. Ranger (eds), 1995. Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War. Harare: 
University of Zimbabwe Publications.  
Bhebe, N. and T. Ranger (eds), 1996. Society in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War. Oxford: James 
Currey.  
Boggie, J.M. 1959. A Husband and a Farm in Rhodesia. Self Published.   
Boggie, J.M. [1940] 1962. First Steps in Civilizing Rhodesia. Bulawayo: Kingstons.   
Bolt, M. 2013. “Comment: The Dynamics of Dependence”, Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 19: 243–5.  
Bond, P. and M. Manyanya. 2002. Zimbabwe’s Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, 
Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice. Asmara: Africa World Press.  
Bond-Stewart, K. 1984. Young Women in the Liberation Struggle: Stories from Zimbabwe. 
Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House.  
217 
Bonilla, O. 2013. “Comment: ‘Be my Boss!’ Comments on South African and Amerindian 
Forms of Subjection”, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 19: 246–7.  
Bornstein, E. 2005. The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality, and Economics 
in Zimbabwe. Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
Bourdillon, M.F.C. 1976. The Shona Peoples. Gweru: Mambo Press.  
Bratton, M. 1978. Beyond Community Development: The Political Economy of Rural 
Administration in Zimbabwe. Gweru: Mambo Press.  
Burke, T. 1996. Lifebouy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consumption, and Cleanliness 
in Modern Zimbabwe. London: Leicester University Press.  
Bush, B. 2004. “Gender and Empire: The Twentieth Century”, in P. Levine (ed.), Gender and 
Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press.    
Callan, H. 1984. “Introduction”, in H. Callan and S. Ardener (eds), The Incorporated Wife. 
London: Croom Helm. 
Campbell, H. 2003. Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The Exhaustion of the Patriarchal Model of 
Liberation. Claremont: David Phillip.  
Castañeda, C. 2002. Figurations: Child, Bodies, Worlds. Durham: Duke University Press.  
Chadya, J.M. and P. Mayavo. 2002. “‘The Curse of Old Age’: Elderly Workers on 
Zimbabwe’s Large Scale Commercial Farms, with Particular Reference to ‘Foreign’ 
Farm Labourers up to 2000”, Zambezia 29(1): 12–26.  
Chambati, W. 2003. Land Reform and Agrarian Labour: Case Study Evidence from Mazowe 
and Chikomba Districts. Harare: AIAS.  
Chambati, W. 2011. “Restructuring of Agrarian Labour Relations after Fast Track Land 
Reform in Zimbabwe”, Journal of Peasant Studies 38(5): 1047–68.   
Chambati, W. 2013a. “Changing Agrarian Labour Relations after Land Reform in 
Zimbabwe”, in S. Moyo and W. Chambati (eds), Land and Agrarian Reform in 
Zimbabwe: Beyond White-settler Capitalism. Harare: AIAS.   
Chambati, W. 2013b. “Agrarian Labour Relations in Zimbabwe after over a Decade of Land 
and Agrarian Reform”, Working Paper 056. Future Agricultures and African Institute 
for Agrarian Studies.  
218 
Chambati, W. and G. Magaramombe. 2008. “An Abandoned Question: Farm Workers”, in S. 
Moyo, K. Helliker and T. Murisa (eds), Contested Terrain: Civil Society and Land 
Reform in Contemporary Zimbabwe. Pietermaritzburg: S&S Publishing.   
Chambati, W. and S. Moyo. 2004. “Impact of Fast Track Land Reform and Farm Labour 
Processes”, Monograph Series. Harare: AIAS.  
Chambati, W. and S. Moyo. 2007. “Land Reform and the Political Economy of Agricultural 
Labour in Zimbabwe”, Occasional Research Paper Series No. 4/2007. Harare AIAS. 
Chennells, A. 1985. “Doris Lessing and the Rhodesian Settler Novel”, in E. Bertelsen (ed.), 
Doris Lessing: Southern African Literature Series, No. 5. Johannesburg: McGraw-Hill. 
Chennells, A. 1996. “Rhodesian Discourse, Rhodesian Novels and the Zimbabwe Liberation 
War”, in N. Bhebhe and T. Ranger (eds), Society in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War. 
Oxford: James Currey. 
Chennells, A. 2005. “Self-representation and National Memory: White Autobiographies in 
Zimbabwe”, in R. Muponde and R. Primorac (eds), Versions of Zimbabwe: New 
Approaches to Literature and Culture. Harare: Weaver Press.    
Chikanza, I.C., D. Paxton, R. Loewenson and R. Laing. 1981. “The Health Status of 
Farmworker Communities in Zimbabwe”, The Central African Journal of Medicine 
27(5): 88–92. 
Clarke, D.G. 1977. Agricultural and Plantation Workers in Rhodesia: A Report on 
Conditions of Labour and Subsistence. Gweru: Mambo Press. 
Cliffe, L., J. Alexander, B. Cousins and R. Gaidzanwa (eds). 2011. “Special Issue on Fast 
Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe”, Journal of Peasant Studies 38(5): 907-1166.   
Comaroff, J.L. and J. Comaroff. 1987. “The Madman and the Migrant: Work and Labour in 
the Historical Consciousness of a South African People”, American Ethnologist 14: 
191–209.   
Comaroff, J. and J.L. Comaroff. 1991. Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, 
Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa, Vol. 1. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press.  
219 
Comaroff, J. and J.L. Comaroff. 1992. “Home-made Hegemony: Modernity, Domesticity, 
and Colonialism in South Africa”, in K.L. Hansen (ed.), African Encounters with 
Domesticity. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 
Comaroff, J.L. and J. Comaroff. 1997. Of Revelation and Revolution: The Dialectics of 
Modernity on a South African Frontier, Vol. 2. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Comaroff, J.L. and J. Comaroff. 1999. Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa: 
Critical Perspectives. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.   
Comaroff, J. and J.L. Comaroff. 2001a. “Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second 
Coming”, in J. Comaroff and J.L. Comaroff (eds), Millennial Capitalism and the 
Culture of Neoliberalism. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Comaroff, J.L. and J. Comaroff. 2001b. “On Personhood: An Anthropological Perspective 
from Africa”, Social Identities 7(2): 267–83. 
Crush, J. and D. Tevera (eds). 2010. Zimbabwe’s Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival. 
Kingston: Southern African Migration Programme.   
Dansereau, S. 2005. “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Zimbabwe’s Development 
Impasse”, in S. Dansereau and M. Zamponi (eds), Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of 
Decline. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet Discussion Paper 27. Uppsala: Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet. 
Dashwood, H.S. 2000. Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transformation. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press. 
Davies, R. 2004. “Memories of Underdevelopment: A Personal Interpretation of Zimbabwe’s 
Economic Decline”, in B. Raftopoulos and T. Savage (eds), Zimbabwe: Injustice and 
Political Reconciliation. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.   
De Certeau, M. 1984. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Dekker, M. and B. Kinsey. 2011. “Contextualising Zimbabwe’s Land Reform: Long-term 
Observations from the First Generation”, Journal of Peasant Studies 38(5): 995–1019.  
Derman, B. and R. Kaarhus (eds). 2013. In the Shadow of a Conflict: Crisis in Zimbabwe and 
Its Effects in Mozambique, South African and Zambia. Harare: Weaver Press.    
220 
Drinkwater, M. 1991. The State and Agrarian Change in Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas. 
London: MacMillan.  
Du Toit, A. 1993. “The Micro-politics of Paternalism: The Discourses of Management and 
Resistance on South African Fruit and Wine Farms”, Journal of Southern African 
Studies 19(2): 314–36. 
Du Toit, A. 2004. “‘Social Exclusion’ Discourse and Chronic Poverty: A South African Case 
Study”, Development and Change 35(5): 987–1010.  
Du Toit, F.P. 1977. “Technical Bulletin 17: The Accommodation of Permanent Farm 
Labourers”, Rhodesia Agricultural Journal. Salisbury: Ministry of Agriculture.  
Eppel, S. 2004. “‘Gukurahundi’: The Need for Truth and Reparation”, in B. Raftopoulos and 
T. Savage (eds), Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation. Cape Town: 
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.      
Evans, H. St. John. 1945. The Church in Southern Rhodesia. Westminster: Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts.  
Fabian, J. 1983. Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object. New York: 
Colombia University Press.  
Falzon, M. 2009. “Introduction: Multi-sited Ethnography: Theory, Praxis and Locality in 
Contemporary Research”, in M. Falzon (ed.), Multi-sited Ethnography: Theory, Praxis 
and Locality in Contemporary Research. Farnham: Ashgate.  
Fassin, D. 2009. “Another Politics of Life is Possible”, Theory, Culture and Society 26(5): 
44–60.  
Fassin, D. 2010. “Ethics of Survival: A Democratic Approach to the Politics of Life”, 
Humanity 1(1): 81–95.  
Faulkner, W. [1951] 2012. Requiem for a Nun. New York: Vintage International.    
Feltoe, G. 2004. “The Onslaught against Democracy and the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe in 
2000”, in D. Harold-Barry (ed.), Zimbabwe: The Past Is the Future: Rethinking Land, 
State and Nation in the Context of Crisis. Harare: Weaver Press.  
Ferguson, J. 1990. The Anti-politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and 
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
221 
Ferguson, J. 1999. Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the 
Zambian Copperbelt. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Ferguson, J. 2006. Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
Ferguson, J. 2008. “Global Disconnect: Abjection and the Aftermath of Modernism”, in P. 
Geschiere, B. Meyer and P. Pels (eds), Readings in Modernity in Africa. Oxford: James 
Currey.  
Ferguson, J. 2013a. “Declarations of Dependence: Labour, Personhood, and Welfare in 
Southern Africa”, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 19: 223–42. 
Ferguson, J. 2013b. “Reply to Comments on ‘Declarations of Dependence’”, Journal of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 19: 258–60.  
Ferguson, J. and A. Gupta. 2002. “Spatializing States: Towards an Ethnography of Neoliberal 
Governmentality”, American Ethnologist 29(4): 981–1002.  
Fisher, J.L. 2010. Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens, Exiles: The Decolonisation of White Identity in 
Zimbabwe. Canberra: Australia National University.  
Foucault, M. 1983. “The Subject and Power”, in H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow (eds), Michel 
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd edn. Trans. L. Sawyer. 
Chicago: University of Chicago.    
Foucault, M. 1984a. “Panopticism”, in P. Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader: An 
Introduction to Foucault’s Thought. London: Penguin Books.   
Foucault, M. 1984b. “Right of Death and Power over Life”, in P. Rabinow (ed.), The 
Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault’s Thought. London: Penguin Books.   
Foucault, M. 1988. “The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom”, in J. Bernauer 
and D. Rasmussen (eds), The Final Foucault. Boston: MIT Press. 
Foucault, M. 1997. “17 March 1976”, in M. Bertani and A. Fontana (eds), Society Must Be 
Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975–76, trans. D. Macey. New York: 
Picador. 
Freeth, B. 2011. Mugabe and the White African. Cape Town: Zebra Press. 
Freidberg, S. 2003. “Cleaning up Down South: Supermarkets, Ethical Trade and African 
Horticulture”, Social and Cultural Geography 4(1): 27–43.  
222 
Gaidzanwa, R. 1999. “Indigenisation as Empowerment? Gender and Race in the 
Empowerment Discourse in Zimbabwe”, in A. Cheater (ed.), The Anthropology of 
Power: Empowerment and Disempowerment in Changing Structures. London: 
Routledge. 
Ganiel, G. 2009. “Spiritual Capital and Democratization in Zimbabwe: A Case Study of a 
Progressive Charismatic Congregation”, Democratization 16(6): 1172–93. 
Gartrell, B. 1984. “Colonial Wives: Villains or Victims?” in H. Callan and S. Ardener (eds), 
The Incorporated Wife. London: Croom Helm.  
General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe. 2010. If Something Is 
Wrong: The Invisible Suffering of Farmworkers Due to “Land Reform”. Harare: 
GAPWUZ. 
Geschiere, P. 2009. The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship and Exclusion in 
Africa and Europe. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  
Geschiere, P., B. Meyer and P. Pels. 2008. “Introduction”, in P. Geschiere, B. Meyer and P. 
Pels (eds), Readings in Modernity in Africa. Oxford: James Currey. 
Gibbon, G. 1973. Paget of Rhodesia: A Memoir of Edward, 5th Bishop of Mashonaland. 
Bulawayo: Books of Rhodesia. 
Gibbon, P. 1995. “Introduction: Structural Adjustment and the Working Poor in Zimbabwe”, 
in P. Gibbon (ed.), Structural Adjustment and the Working Poor in Zimbabwe: Studies 
on Labour, Women Informal Sector Workers and Health. Uppsala: Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet. 
Godwin, P. and I. Hancock. 1993. Rhodesians Never Die: The Impact of War and Political 
Change on White Rhodesia c. 1970–1980. Northlands: Pan MacMillan South Africa.   
Goebel, A. 1999. “Here It Is Our Land, the Two of Us”: Women, Men and Land in a 
Zimbabwean Resettlement Area”, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 17(1): 75–
96. 
Gono, G. 2008. Zimbabwe’s Casino Economy: Extraordinary Measures for Extraordinary 
Challenges. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House.  
Goodlad, L.E. 2000. “A Middle Class Cut in Two: Historiography and Victorian National 
Character”, English Literary History 67: 143–78. 
223 
Grier, B.C. 2006. Invisible Hands: Child Labor and the State in Colonial Zimbabwe. 
Portsmouth: Heinemann.  
Grundy, T. and B. Miller. 1979. The Farmer at War. Salisbury: Modern Farming 
Publications.  
Gupta, A. and J. Ferguson (eds). 1997. Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds 
of a Field Science. Berkeley: University of California Press.   
Hamilton, C. 1998. Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the 
Limits of Historical Invention. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Hammar, A. 2003. “The Making and Unma(s)king of Local Government in Zimbabwe”, in 
A. Hammar., B. Raftopoulos and S. Jensen (eds), Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: 
Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis. Harare: Weaver Press.  
Hammar, A. 2012. “Whiteness in Zimbabwe: Race, Landscape, and the Problem of 
Belonging”, Journal of Peasant Studies 39(1): 216–21. 
Hammar, A., J. McGregor and L. Landau (eds). 2010. “Special Issue: The Zimbabwe Crisis 
through the Lens of Displacement”, Journal of Southern African Studies 36(2): 263-
513.   
Hammar, A., B. Raftopoulos and S. Jensen (eds). 2003. Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: 
Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis. Harare: Weaver Press.  
Hanlon, J., J. Manjengwa and T. Smart. 2013. Zimbabwe Takes Back Its Land. Sterling: 
Kumarian Press.  
Hansen, K.T. 1992. “Introduction: Domesticity in Africa”, in K.H. Hansen (ed.), African 
Encounters with Domesticity. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.  
Hansen, K.T. 2005. “Getting Stuck in the Compound: Some Odds against Social Adulthood 
in Lusaka, Zambia”, Africa Today 51(4): 3–18. 
Hansen, T.B. and F. Stepputat. 2005. “Introduction”, in T.B. Hansen and F. Stepputat (eds), 
Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Hardin, G. 1969. “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science (N.S.) 162(3859): 1243–8.  
Harold-Barry, D. (ed.). 2004. Zimbabwe: The Past Is the Future: Rethinking Land, State and 
Nation in the Context of Crisis. Harare: Weaver Press.    
224 
Hartnack, A. 2005. “‘My Life Got Lost’: Farm Workers and Displacement in Zimbabwe”, 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 23(2): 173–92.  
Hartnack, A. 2009a. “An Exposé Ethnography of Zimbabwe’s Internally Displaced Ex-farm 
workers: Practical and Ethical Dilemmas”, Anthropology Southern Africa 32(3–4): 
117–26.  
Hartnack, A. 2009b. “Transcending Global and National (Mis)representations through Local 
Responses to Displacement: The Case of Zimbabwean (ex-)Farm Workers”, Journal of 
Refugee Studies 22(3): 351–77. 
Hartnack, A. 2014. “Whiteness and Shades of Grey: Erasure and Amnesia in the Ethnography 
of Zimbabwe’s Whites”, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Published Online 27 
January. 
Harvey, R.K. 1977. “One Farm, One Man: The Case for Individual Tenure”, The Rhodesia 
Science News 11(6): 176–80. 
Heald, M. 1979. Down Memory Lane with Some Early Rhodesian Women. Bulawayo: Books 
of Rhodesia.  
Heath, D. 2010. Purifying the Empire, Obscenity and the Politics of Moral Regulation in 
Britain, India and Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
Helliker, K.D. 2008. “Dancing on the Same Spot: NGOs”, in S. Moyo, K. Helliker and T. 
Murisa (eds), Contested Terrain: Land Reform and Civil Society in Contemporary 
Zimbabwe. Pietermaritzburg: S&S Publishers. 
Helliker, K.D. 2009. “Dancing around the Same Spot? Land Reform and NGOs in 
Zimbabwe: The Case of SOS Children’s Villages”, African Sociological Review 13(2): 
101–25. 
Helliker, K.D. and T. Murisa (eds). 2011. Land Struggles and Civil Society in Southern 
Africa. Trenton: Africa World Press.  
Herbst, J. 1990. State Politics in Zimbabwe. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications.   
Hifab International and Zimconsult. 1989. Zimbabwe Country Study and Norwegian Aid 
Review. Oslo and Harare: Hifab and Zimconsult.  
Hodder-Williams, R. 1983. White Farmers in Rhodesia, 1890–1965: A History of the 
Marandellas District. London: The MacMillan Press.  
225 
Holderness, H. 1985. Lost Chance: Southern Rhodesia 1945–58. Harare: Zimbabwe 
Publishing House.  
Hughes, D.M. 2010. Whiteness in Zimbabwe: Race, Landscape, and the Problem of 
Belonging. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.  
Jeater, D. 1993. Marriage, Perversion and Power: The Construction of Moral Discourse in 
Southern Rhodesia 1894–1930. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Jefferies, R. [1892] 1981. The Toilers of the Field. London: Macdonald Futura Publishers.  
Jenkins, E. 1997. “The Fall from Grace of Kingsley Fairbridge”, English Academy Review: 
Southern African Journal of English Studies 14(1): 73–86.  
Jones, J.L. 2009. “‘It’s Not Normal But It’s Common’: Marriage, Household and Social 
Order in Accounts of African Youth”, CODESRIA Millennium Working Group on 
African Youth Identity (Dakar, Senegal). Conference presentation published in the 
CODESRIA Bulletin 3–4: 3–14.  
Jones, J.L. 2010. “‘Nothing Is Straight in Zimbabwe’: The Rise of the Kukiya-kiya Economy 
2000–2008”, Journal of Southern African Studies 36(2): 285–99.    
Kader, M.A. 1985. Africa’s Guide to Scientific Socialism. Harare: Nehanda Publishers.  
Kalaora, L. 2011. “Madness, Corruption and Exile: On Zimbabwe’s Remaining White 
Commercial Farmers”, Journal of Southern African Studies 37(4): 747–62.  
Kaler, A. 1999. “Visions of Domesticity in the African Women’s Homecraft Movement in 
Rhodesia”, Social Science History 23(3): 269–308.  
Kasfir, N. (ed.). 1998. Civil Society and Democracy in Africa: Critical Perspectives. London: 
Frank Cass.  
Keatley, P. 1963. The Politics of Partnership. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.  
Kennedy, D. 1987. Islands of White: Settler Society and Culture in Kenya and Southern 
Rhodesia, 1890–1939. Durham: Duke University Press.  
Kibble, S. and P. Vanlerberge. 2000. Land, Power and Poverty: Farm Workers and the Crisis 
in Zimbabwe. Catholic Institute for International Relations Briefing. London: CIIR. 
226 
Kirkwood, D. 1984a. “The Suitable Wife: Preparation for Marriage in London and 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe”, in H. Callan and S. Ardener (eds), The Incorporated Wife. 
London: Croom Helm.  
Kirkwood, D. 1984b. “Settler Wives in Southern Rhodesia: A Case Study”, in H. Callan and 
S. Ardener (eds), The Incorporated Wife. London: Croom Helm.  
Kriger, N.J. 1992. Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kufakurinani, U. 2012. “Negotiating Respectability: White Women in the Public Service of 
Southern Rhodesia”, Online Journal of Social Sciences Research 1(4): 115–24.  
Kufakurinani, U. and E. Masiiwa. 2012. “The Unsung Heroine: Muriel Ena Rosin’s Political 
Experiences in Rhodesia, 1945–1980”, Heritage of Zimbabwe 30: 36-48.  
Laband, J. [2008] 2009. “‘Bloodstained Grandeur:’ Colonial and Imperial Stereotypes 
of Zulu Warriors and Zulu Warfare”, in B. Carton, J. Laband and 
J. Sithole (eds), Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Lambek, M. 2002. “Nuriaty, the Saint, and the Sultan: Virtuous Subject and Subjective 
Virtuoso of the Postmodern Colony”, in R. Werbner (ed.), Postcolonial Subjectivities in 
Africa. London: Zed Books, 25–43. 
Lan, D. 1985. Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe. Harare: 
Zimbabwe Publishing House. 
Lancy, D.F. 2008. The Anthropology of Childhood: Cherubs, Chattel, Changelings. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Law, K. 2011. “‘Even a Labourer Is Worthy of His Hire: How Much More a Wife?’ Gender 
and the Contested Nature of Domesticity in Colonial Zimbabwe, c.1945–1978”, South 
African Historical Journal 63(3): 456–74. 
Lemke, T. 2000. “‘The Birth of Bio-politics’: Michel Foucault’s Lecture at the Collège de 
France on Neo-liberal Governmentality”, Economy and Society 30(2): 190–207.  
Lessing, D. 1950. The Grass is Singing. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 
Lessing, D. [1957] 1968. Going Home. St Albans: Panther Books. 
227 
Lessing, D. 1994. Under My Skin: Volume One of My Autobiography, to 1949. London: 
Harper Collins Publishers. 
Levine, S. 2013. Children of a Bitter Harvest: Child Labour in the Cape Winelands. Cape 
Town: BestRed. 
Li, T.M. 2007. The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of 
Politics. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Li, T.M. 2013. “Comment: Insistently Seeking Social Incorporation”, Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 19: 252–3.  
Lines, T. 2008. Making Poverty: A History. London: Zed Books.  
Loewenson, R. 1992. Modern Plantation Agriculture: Corporate Wealth and Labour 
Squalor. London: ZED Books.  
Logan, E.A. 2000. “An Outline of the History of the Women’s Institutes of Zimbabwe: 75 
Years of Service to Home and Country”, Heritage of Zimbabwe 19: 53–86.  
Loney, M. 1975. “Rhodesia”, White Racism and Imperial Response. Middlesex: Penguin 
Books. 
Lorimer, D.A. 1978. Colour, Class and the Victorians: English Attitudes to the Negro in the 
Mid-nineteenth Century. Leicester: Leicester University Press.    
Lowry, D. 1997. “‘White Woman’s Country’: Ethel Tawse Jollie and the Making of White 
Rhodesia”, Journal of Southern African Studies 1(2): 259–81. 
Lowry, D. 2000. “‘Making Fresh Britains across the Seas’: Imperial Authority and Anti-
feminism in Rhodesia”, in I.C. Fletcher, L.E. Nym Mayhall and P. Levine (eds), 
Woman’s Suffrage in the British Empire: Citizenship, Nation and Race. New York: 
Routledge.   
Mabvurira, V., T. Masuku, R.G. Banda and R. Frank. 2012. “A Situational Analysis of 
Former Commercial Farm Workers in Zimbabwe after the Jambanja”, Journal of 
Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences 3(3): 221–8.  
Macdonald, S. 2003. Winter Cricket: The Spirit of Wedza. Self Published. 
Machingura, F. 2012. “The Pentecostal Churches’ Attitude towards People Living with HIV 
and AIDS in Zimbabwe: Exclusion or Inclusion?”, in J. Pock, B. Hoyer and M. 
228 
Schüßler (eds), Ausgesetzt: Praktisch-theologischen Werkstatt, Vol. 20. Münster: Lit 
Verlag. 
MacLean, J. 1974. The Guardians: A Story of Rhodesia’s Outposts – And of the Men and 
Women Who Served in Them. Bulawayo: Books of Rhodesia. 
Magaramombe, G. 2010. “‘Displaced in Place’: Agrarian Displacements, Replacements and 
Resettlement among Farm Workers in Mazowe District”, Journal of Southern African 
Studies 36(2): 361–75. 
Mamdani, M. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.  
Maposa, I. 1995. Land Reform in Zimbabwe: An Inquiry into the Land Acquisition Act (1992) 
Combined with a Case Study Analysis of the Resettlement Programme. Harare: Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace.   
Marcus, G.E. 1995. “Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-sited 
Ethnography”, Annual Review of Anthropology 24: 95–117.  
Marongwe, N. 2003. “Farm Occupations and Occupiers in the New Politics of Land in 
Zimbabwe”, in A. Hammar, B. Raftopoulos and S. Jensen (eds), Zimbabwe’s 
Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis. 
Harare: Weaver Press.  
Masters, W.A. 1994. Government and Agriculture in Zimbabwe. Westport: Praeger 
Publishers. 
Masuko, L. 2008. “War Veterans and the Re-emergence of Housing Co-operatives”, in S. 
Moyo, K. Helliker and T. Murisa (eds), Contested Terrain: Land Reform and Civil 
Society in Contemporary Zimbabwe. Pietermaritzburg: S&S Publishing. 
Masunungure, E. 2008. “Civil Society and Land Reforms in Zimbabwe: Conceptual 
Considerations”, in S. Moyo, K. Helliker and T. Murisa (eds), Contested Terrain: Civil 
Society and Land Reform in Contemporary Zimbabwe. Pietermaritzburg: S&S 
Publishing. 
Matondi, P. 2012. Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform. London: Zed Books.  
Maxwell, D. 2005. “The Durawall of Faith: Pentecostal Spirituality in Neo-liberal 
Zimbabwe”, Journal of Religion in Africa 35(1): 4–32.   
229 
Mbembe, A. 2000. “At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in 
Africa”, Public Culture 12(1): 259–284.  
Mbembe, A. 2001. On the Postcolony. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Mbembe, A. 2003. “Necropolitics”, Public Culture 15(1): 11–40.  
McCandless, E. 2012. Polarization and Transformation in Zimbabwe: Social Movements, 
Strategy Dilemmas and Change. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.  
McClintock, A. 1995. Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest. 
New York: Routledge.  
McCullough, J. 2004. “Empire and Violence, 1900–1939”, in P. Levine (ed.), Gender and 
Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McIvor, C. 1995. Zimbabwe: The Struggle for Health – A Community Approach for 
Farmworkers. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations.  
McLaughlin, J. 1996. On the Frontline: Catholic Missions in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War. 
Harare: Baobab Books.  
Mellor, G.R. 1951. British Imperial Trusteeship, 1783–1850. London: Faber and Faber.   
Miller, A. 1980. For Your Own Good: Hidden Cruelty in Child-rearing and the Roots of 
Violence. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Mlambo, A.S. 1998. “Building a White Man’s Country: Aspects of White Immigration into 
Rhodesia up to World War II”, Zambezia 25(2): 123–46. 
Moorcroft, P.L. and P. McLaughlin. 1982. Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965–1980. 
Marshalltown: Sygma Books and Collins Vaal. 
Moore, D.S. 2005. Suffering for Territory: Race, Place, and Power in Zimbabwe. Durham: 
Duke University Press. 
Moore, H.L. and H. Vaughan. 1994. Cutting Down Trees: Gender, Nutrition and Agricultural 
Change in the Northern Province of Zambia, 1890–1990. Portsmouth: Heinemann.  
Morrell, R. 1997. “‘Synonymous with Gentlemen’? White Farmers, Schools and Labour in 
Natal, c. 1880–1920”, in A.H. Jeeves and J. Crush (eds), White Farms, Black Labor: 
The State and Agrarian Change in Southern Africa, 1910–1950. Pietermaritzburg: 
University of Natal Press. 
230 
Morrell, R. 2001. From Boys to Men: Settler Masculinity in Colonial Natal 1880–1920. 
Pretoria: University of South Africa.  
Morris, B. 1999. “Context and Interpretation: Reflections on Nyau Rituals in Malawi”, in R. 
Dilley (ed.), The Problem of Context. Oxford: Berghahn Books.  
Moyo, S. 2000. Land Reform Under Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe: Land Use Change 
in the Mashonaland Provinces. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.   
Moyo, S. 2013. “Land Reform and Redistribution in Zimbabwe since 1980”, in S. Moyo and 
W. Chambati (eds), Land and Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe: Beyond White-Settler 
Capitalism. Harare: AIAS.   
Moyo, S. and W. Chambati (eds). 2013. Land and Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe: Beyond 
White-Settler Capitalism. Harare: AIAS.   
Moyo, S., K. Helliker and T. Murisa (eds). 2008. Contested Terrain: Civil Society and Land 
Reform in Contemporary Zimbabwe. Pietermaritzburg: S&S Publishing.   
Moyo, S., B. Rutherford and D. Amanor-Wilks. 2000. “Land Reform and Changing Social 
Relations for Farm Workers in Zimbabwe”, Review of African Political Economy 
27(84): 181–202. 
Moyo, S. and P. Yeros (eds). 2005. Reclaiming the Land: The Resurgence of Rural 
Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America. New York: Zed Books.  
Mpande, E., C. Higson-Smith, R. Chimatira, A. Kadaira, J. Mashonganyika, Q. Ncube, S. 
Ngwenya, G.Vinson, R.Wild and N. Ziwoni. 2013. “Community Intervention during 
Ongoing Political Violence: What Is Possible? What Works?”, Peace and Conflict: 
Journal of Peace Psychology 19(2): 196–208. 
Mtisi, J., M. Nyakudya and T. Barnes. 2009. “Social and Economic Developments during the 
UDI Period”, in B. Raftopolous and A. Mlambo (eds), Becoming Zimbabwe: A History 
from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008. Harare: Weaver Press.   
Mugwetsi, T. and P. Balleis. 1994. The Forgotten People: The Living and Health Conditions 
of Farm Workers and Their Families. Silveira House Social Series No. 6. Gweru: 
Mambo Press.  
231 
Murisa, T. 2011. “Lacuna in Rural Agency: The Case of Zimbabwe’s Agrarian Reforms”, in 
K. Helliker and T. Murisa (eds), Land Struggles and Civil Society in Southern Africa. 
Trenton: African World Press. 
Murithi, T. and A. Mawadza (eds). 2011. Zimbabwe in Transition: A View from Within. 
Aukland Park: Jakana. 
Mutizwa-Mangiza, N.D. 1985. “Community Development in Pre-independence Zimbabwe: 
A Study of Policy with Special Reference to Rural Land”, Supplement to Zambezia. 
Harare: University of Zimbabwe.  
Muzondidya, J. 2004. “‘Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans’: Invisible Subject Minorities and the 
Quest for Justice and Reconciliation in Post-colonial Zimbabwe”, in B. Raftopoulos 
and T. Savage (eds), Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation. Cape Town: 
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.   
Muzondidya, J. 2009. “From Buoyancy to Crisis, 1980–1997”, in B. Raftopolous and A. 
Mlambo (eds), Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008. 
Harare: Weaver Press. 
National Federation of Business and Professional Women of Rhodesia. 1975. Profiles of 
Rhodesia’s Women. Salisbury: NFBPWR.  
National Federation of Women’s Institutes of Rhodesia. 1967. Great Spaces Washed with 
Sun. Salisbury: Collins.  
Ncube, M. 2000. “Employment, Unemployment and the Evolution of Labour Policy in 
Zimbabwe”, Zambezia 27(2): 161–94. 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. 2009. “Mapping Cultural and Colonial Encounters, 1880s–1930”, in B. 
Raftopolous and A. Mlambo (eds), Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-
colonial Period to 2008. Harare: Weaver Press. 
Neocosmos, M. 1993. “The Agrarian Question in Southern Africa and ‘Accumulation from 
Below’: Economics and Politics in the Struggle for Democracy”, Research Report No. 
93. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.   
Nuttal. S. 2009. Entanglement: Literary and Cultural Reflections on Post-apartheid. 
Johannesburg: Wits University Press.   
232 
Nyamnjoh, F.B. 2006. Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary 
Southern Africa. London: Zed Books.  
Nyamnjoh, F.B. 2012. “Blinded by Sight: Divining the Future of Anthropology in Africa”, 
Africa Spectrum 47(2–3): 63–92. 
Oksala, J. 2013. “From Biopower to Governmentality”, in C. Falzon, T. O’Leary and J. 
Sawicki (eds), A Companion to Foucault. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 320–36. 
Oldreive, B. 1993. Conservation Farming: For Communal, Small-scale, Resettlement, and 
Co-operative Farmers of Zimbabwe. Harare: Rio Tinto Foundation.  
Palmer, R. 1977a. “The Agricultural History of Rhodesia”, in R. Palmer and N. Parsons 
(eds), The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa. London: Heinemann.  
Palmer, R. 1977b. Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia. London: Heinemann.   
Pandombiri. 1948. “Priority No. 1”, in The Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department 
Annual. Salisbury: Native Affairs Department.   
Pape, J. 1990. “Black and White: The ‘Perils of Sex’ in Colonial Zimbabwe”, Journal of 
Southern African Studies 16(4): 699–720.  
Parry, R. 2001. “Culture, Organisation and Class: The African Experience in Salisbury, 
1892–1935”, in B. Raftopoulos and T. Yoshikuni (eds), Sites of Struggle: Essays in 
Zimbabwe’s Urban History. Harare: Weaver Press. 
Parsons, R. 2012. One Day This Will All Be Over: Growing up with HIV in an Eastern 
Zimbabwean Town. Harare: Weaver Press. 
Perold, L. 2002. “A Brief History of the City Presbyterian Church”, in Heritage of 
Zimbabwe, No. 21. 
Phimister, I. 1988. An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890–1948: Capital 
Accumulation and Class Struggle. Harlow: Longman.  
Phimister, I. 1993. “Rethinking the Reserves: Southern Rhodesia’s Land Husbandry Act 
Reviewed”, Journal of Southern African Studies 19(2): 225–39.   
Pilossof, R. 2012. The Unbearable Whiteness of Being: Farmers’ Voices from Zimbabwe. 
Harare: Weaver Press. 
233 
Piot, C. 2010. Nostalgia for the Future: West Africa after the Cold War. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.  
Potts, D. and C. Mutambirwa. 1997. “‘The Government Must Not Dictate’: Rural-urban 
Migrants’ Perceptions of Zimbabwe’s Land Resettlement Programme”, Review of 
African Political Economy 74: 549–66. 
Raftopolous, B. 2004. “Unreconciled Differences: The Limits of Reconciliation Politics in 
Zimbabwe”, in B. Raftopoulos and T. Savage (eds), Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political 
Reconciliation. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.   
Raftopolous, B. 2009. “Crisis in Zimbabwe: 1998–2008”, in B. Raftopolous and A. Mlambo 
(eds), Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008. Harare: 
Weaver Press. 
Raftopolous, B. and A. Mlambo (eds). 2009. Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-
colonial Period to 2008. Harare: Weaver Press. 
Raftopolous, B. and L. Sachikonye (eds). 2001. Striking Back: The Labour Movement and the 
Post-colonial State in Zimbabwe 1980–2000. Harare: Weaver Press.   
Raftopoulos, B. and T. Savage (eds). 2004. Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation. 
Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.   
Raftopolous, B. and T. Yoshikuni (eds). 1999. Sites of Struggle: Essays in Zimbabwe’s 
Urban History. Harare: Weaver Press.  
Ranchod-Nilsson, S. 1992. “‘Educating Eve’: The Women’s Club Movement and Political 
Consciousness among Rural African Women in Southern Rhodesia, 1950–1980”, in 
K.L. Hansen (ed.), African Encounters with Domesticity. New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press.  
Randolph, R.H. 1985. Dawn in Zimbabwe. Gweru: Mambo Press.  
Ranger, T.O. 1970. The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia 1898–1930. London: 
Heinemann. 
Ranger, T. 1985. Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe. Harare: Zimbabwe 
Publishing House.  
Ranger, T.O. 1999. Voices from the Rocks: Nature, Culture and History in the Matopos Hills 
of Zimbabwe. Oxford: James Currey.  
234 
Ravenscroft, A. 1983. “Literature and Politics: Two Zimbabwean Novels”, in M. Van Wyk 
Smith and D. Maclennan (eds), Olive Schreiner and After: Essays on Southern African 
Literature in Honour of Guy Butler. Cape Town: David Phillip.  
Redfield, P. 2005. “Doctors, Borders and Life in Crisis”, Cultural Anthropology 20(3): 328–
61.  
Reeler, A.P. 2004. “Sticks and Stones, Skeletons and Ghosts”, in D. Harold-Barry (ed.), 
Zimbabwe: The Past is the Future: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of 
Crisis. Harare: Weaver Press.    
Richards, H.M. 1952. Next Year Will Be Better. London: Hodder and Stoughton.   
Robbins, J. 2004. “The Globalization of Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity”, Annual 
Review of Anthropology 33: 117–43.   
Rose. N. 1999. Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Rossi, B. 2004. “Revisiting Foucauldian Approaches: Power Dynamics in Development 
Projects”, Journal of Development Studies 40(6): 1–29. 
Rowden, R. 2009. The Deadly Ideas of Neoliberalism: How the IMF Has Undermined Public 
Health and the Fight against AIDS. London: Zed Books.  
Rubert, S.C. 1998. A Most Promising Weed: A History of Tobacco Farming and Labour in 
Colonial Zimbabwe, 1890–1945. Athens: Ohio University Center for International 
Studies.  
Ruddick, S. 1989. Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace. Boston: Beacon Press.  
Rutherford, B.A. 2001a. Working on the Margins: Black Workers, White Farmers in 
Postcolonial Zimbabwe. Harare: Weaver Press. 
Rutherford, B.A. 2001b. “Commercial Farm Workers and the Politics of (Dis)placement in 
Zimbabwe: Colonialism, Liberation and Democracy”, Journal of Agrarian Change 
1(4): 626–51.  
Rutherford, B.A. 2001c. “Farm Workers and Trade Unions in Hurungwe District in Post-
colonial Zimbabwe”, in B. Raftopolous and L. Sachikonye (eds), Striking Back: The 
Labour Movement and the Post-colonial State in Zimbabwe 1980–2000. Harare: 
Weaver Press. 
235 
Rutherford, B.A. 2003. “Belonging to the Farm(er): Farm Workers, Farmers, and the Shifting 
Politics of Citizenship”, in A.B. Hammar, B. Raftopoulos and S. Jensen (eds), 
Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of 
Crisis. Harare: Weaver Press.  
Rutherford, B.A. 2004a. “Desired Publics, Domestic Government, and Entangled Fears: On 
the Anthropology of Civil Society, Farm Workers, and White Farmers in Zimbabwe”, 
in Cultural Anthropology 19(1): 122–53. 
Rutherford, B.A. 2004b. “‘Settlers’ and Zimbabwe: Politics, Memory, and the Anthropology 
of Commercial Farms during a Time of Crisis”, Identities: Global Studies in Culture 
and Power 11(4): 543–62. 
Rutherford, B.A. 2008. “Conditional Belonging: Farm Workers and the Cultural Politics of 
Recognition in Zimbabwe”, Development and Change 39(1): 73–99. 
Rutherford, B.A. 2014. “Organization and (De)mobilisation of Farmworkers in Zimbabwe: 
Reflections on Trade Unions, NGOs and Political Parties”, Journal of Agrarian Change 
14(2): 214–39.  
Sachikonye, L. 2011. When a State Turns on Its Citizens: 60 Years of Institutionalised 
Violence in Zimbabwe. Aukland Park: Jacana.     
Sachikonye, L. 2012. Zimbabwe’s Lost Decade: Politics, Development and Society. Harare: 
Weaver Press. 
Sadomba, W. and K. Helliker. 2010. “Transcending Objectifications and Dualisms: Farm 
Workers and Civil Society in Contemporary Zimbabwe”, Journal of Asian and African 
Studies 45(2): 209–25. 
Salverda, T. 2010. “In Defence: Elite Power”, Journal of Power 3(3): 385–404. 
Samkange, S.J.T. 1982. What Rhodes Really Said about Africans. Harare: Harare Publishing 
House. 
Save the Children (UK). 2000a. Children in Our Midst: Voices of Farmworkers’ Children. 
Harare: Weaver Press.  
Save the Children (UK). 2000b. We Learn with Hope: Issues in Education on Commercial 
Farms in Zimbabwe. Harare: Save the Children Fund.  
236 
Schmidt, E. 1992. Peasants, Traders, and Wives: Shona Women in the History of Zimbabwe, 
1870–1939. Portsmouth: Heinemann.     
Schmidt, H.I. 2013. Colonialism and Violence in Zimbabwe: A History of Suffering. 
Woodbridge: James Currey.  
Scoones, I., N. Marongwe, B. Mavedzenge, J. Mahenehene, F. Murimbarimba and C. 
Sukume. 2010. Zimbabwe’s Land Reform: Myths and Realities. Auckland Park: Jacana 
Media. 
Scott, J.C. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: 
Yale University Press.   
Schoffeleers, M. and I. Linden. 1972. “The Resistance of the Nyau Societies to the Roman 
Catholic Missions in Colonial Malawi”, in T.O. Ranger and I.N. Kimambo (eds), The 
Historical Study of African Religion. London: Heinemann. 
Shearer, E. (ed.). 1999. A Harvest of Memories: The Story of the Bromley, Goromonzi, 
Melfort and Ruwa Districts. Harare: History Book Association and Munn Publishing.  
Shopo, T.D. 1987. “The State and Food Policy in Colonial Zimbabwe 1965–80”, in T. 
Mkandawire and N. Bourenane (eds), The State and Agriculture in Africa. London: 
CODESRIA. 
Shutt, A.K. 2007. “‘The Natives Are Getting out of Hand’: Legislating Manners, Insolence 
and Contemptuous Behaviour in Southern Rhodesia, c. 1910–1963”, Journal of 
Southern African Studies 33(3): 653–73.   
Simons, J. 2013. “Power, Resistance, and Freedom”, in C. Falzon, T. O’Leary and J Sawicki 
(eds), A Companion to Foucault. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Spring, W. 1986. The Long Fields: Zimbabwe Since Independence. Basingstoke: Pickering 
and Inglis. 
Steele, M. 1985. “Doris Lessing’s Rhodesia”, in E. Bertelsen (ed.), Doris Lessing: Southern 
African Literature Series, No. 5. Johannesburg: McGraw-Hill. 
Stoler, A.L. 1997. “Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: European Identities and the 
Cultural Politics of Exclusion in Colonial Southeast Asia”, in F. Cooper and A.L. Stoler 
(eds), Tensions of Empire. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
237 
Stoler, A.L. (ed.). 2006a. Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American 
History. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Stoler, A.L. 2006b. “On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty”, Public Culture 18(1): 125–46.  
Stoler, A.L. [2002] 2010. Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in 
Colonial Rule. Berkeley: University of California Press.   
Stoneman, C. 1981a. “Introduction”, in C. Stoneman (ed.), Zimbabwe’s Inheritance. London: 
Macmillan. 
Stoneman, C. 1981b. “Agriculture”, in C. Stoneman (ed.), Zimbabwe’s Inheritance. London: 
Macmillan. 
Stoneman, C. and R. Davies. 1981. “The Economy: An Overview”, in C. Stoneman (ed.), 
Zimbabwe’s Inheritance. London: Macmillan, 95–125.  
Tandon, Y. 2001. “Trade Unions and Labour in the Agricultural Sector in Zimbabwe”, in B. 
Raftopolous and L. Sachikonye (eds), Striking Back: The Labour Movement and the 
Post-colonial State in Zimbabwe 1980–2000. Harare: Weaver Press.   
Taylor, C. 1994. “The Politics of Recognition”, in A. Guttman (ed.), Re-examining the 
Politics of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press.   
Thornton, R. 1995. “The Colonial, the Imperial, and the Creation of the ‘European’ in 
Southern Africa”, in J.G. Carrier (ed.), Occidentalism: Images of the West. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Tracey, C.G. 2009. All for Nothing? My Life Remembered. Harare: Weaver Press.  
Vambe, L. 1972. An Ill-fated People: Zimbabwe Before and After Rhodes. London: 
Heinemann. 
Vambe, L. 1976. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. London: Heinemann.  
Vambe, M. 2008. The Hidden Dimensions of Operation Murambatsvina. Harare: Weaver 
Press. 
Van Onselen, C. 1976. Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia 1900–1933. 
Pluto Press: London.  
238 
Van Onselen, C. 1992. “The Social and Economic Underpinnings of Paternalism and 
Violence on the Maize Farms of the South-Western Transvaal, 1900–1950”, Journal of 
Historical Sociology 5(2): 127-160.  
Van Onselen, C. 1996. The Seed Is Mine: The Life of Kas Maine, South African 
Sharecropper, 1894–1985. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.  
Vaughan, M. 1991. Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Von Blanckenburg, P. 1994. Large Commercial Farms and Land Reform in Africa: The Case 
of Zimbabwe. Aldershot: Avebury.  
Welch, P. 2008. Church and Settler in Colonial Zimbabwe: A Study in the History of the 
Anglican Diocese of Mashonaland/Southern Rhodesia, 1890–1925. Leiden: Brill.  
Werbner, R. 1999. “The Reach of the Postcolonial State: Development, 
Empowerment/Disempowerment and Technology”, in A. Cheater (ed.), The 
Anthropology of Power: Empowerment and Disempowerment in Changing Structures. 
London: Routledge.  
Werbner, R. 2002. “Introduction: Postcolonial Subjectivities: The Personal, the Political and 
the Moral”, in R. Werbner (ed.), Postcolonial Subjectivities in Africa. London: Zed 
Books.  
West, M.O. 2002. The Rise of an African Middle Class: Colonial Zimbabwe, 1898–1965. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
White, H. 2013. “Comment: In the Shadow of Time”, Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute (N.S.) 19: 256–7.  
Willard, G. 2011. The Lilies of the Bishop’s Field: The Story of Bishopslea Preparatory 
School for Girls, Harare, Zimbabwe, 1932–2007. Harare: Bishopslea Preparatory 
School for Girls. 
Willems, W. 2004. “Peasant Demonstrators, Violent Invaders: Representations of Land in the 
Zimbabwean Press”, World Development 32(10): 1767–83. 
Wisborg, P. 2013. “Farms as Camps: Displaced Zimbabweans on Commercial Farms in 
Limpopo Province, South Africa”, in B. Derman and R. Kaarhus (eds), In the Shadow 
239 
of a Conflict: Crisis in Zimbabwe and Its Effects in Mozambique, South Africa and 
Zambia. Harare: Weaver Press. 
Wolmer, W. and I. Scoones. 2000. “The Science of ‘Civilised’ Agriculture: Mixed Farming 
Discourse in Zimbabwe”, African Affairs 99(397): 575–600.     
Worby, E. 1998. “Tyranny, Parody, and Ethnic Polarity: Ritual Engagements with the State 
in Northwestern Zimbabwe”, Journal of Southern African Studies 24(3): 561–78.  
Worby, E. 2000. “‘Discipline without Oppression’: Sequence, Timing and Marginality in 
Southern Rhodesia’s Post-war Development Regime”, Journal of African History 
41(1): 101–25.  
Worby, E. (ed.). 2001. “Special Issue”, Journal of Agrarian Change 1(4): 475-666.   
Worby, E. 2003. “The End of Modernity in Zimbabwe? Passages from Development to 
Sovereignty”, in A. Hammar, B. Raftopoulos and S. Jensen (eds), Zimbabwe’s 
Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis. 
Harare: Weaver Press. 
Wylie, D. 2007. “The Schizophrenias of Truth-telling in Contemporary Zimbabwe”, English 
Studies in Africa 50(2): 151–69. 
Wylie, D. 2012. “Not Quite a Refutation: A Response to David McDermott Hughes’ 
Whiteness in Zimbabwe”, Safundi 13(1–2): 181–94.  
Zimbabwe, Government of. 1981. Growth with Equity: An Economic Policy Statement. 
Harare: Government of Zimbabwe.  
Zimbabwe, Government of. 1982. Transitional National Development Plan 1982/83–
1984/85. Harare: Government of Zimbabwe.  
 
2. Unpublished Theses, Reports, Manuscripts and NGO Documents  
 
Beach, D. 1998. “Zimbabwe: Pre-colonial History, Demographic Disaster and the 
University”, Inaugural Lecture of Professor David Beach, Department of History, 
University of Zimbabwe, 15 October.  
Bourdillon, M.F.C., R. Mate and G. Zimbizi. 1996. “Summary Report on an Investigation 
into the Causes of Shortage of Contract Labour at Tea, Coffee and Cotton 
240 
Estates/Farms in the Eastern Highlands Region”, Report compiled by the University of 
Zimbabwe’s Department of Sociology at the request of Tanganda Tea Company, 
Southdown Holdings, Eastern Highlands Tea Estates and La Confiance Farm.  
Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace. 1999. “Man in the Middle: Torture, Resettlement 
and Eviction” and “Civil War in Rhodesia”, two reports compiled by the Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia and the Catholic Institute for 
International Relations, 1975.  
Commercial Farmers Union. 1991. Proposals for Land Reform for Zimbabwe, 1991. Harare: 
Commercial Farmers Union.  
Farm Orphan Support Trust. 1998. Farm Orphans: Who Is Coping? A Study of Commercial 
Farm Workers and Their Responses to Orphanhood and Fostercare in Mashonaland 
Central Province of Zimbabwe. Harare: CFU-FOST.  
Farm Orphan Support Trust. Annual Report 1998/1999, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005. Harare: 
FOST. 
Farm Orphan Support Trust. 2002. “We Will Bury Ourselves”: A Study of Child-headed 
Households on Commercial Farms in Zimbabwe. Harare: FOST.  
General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ). 1997. 
“Report on the Workshop on Living Conditions of Farm Workers in Zimbabwe 
organised by GAPWUZ and The Parliament of Zimbabwe for Members of Parliament 
from Commercial Farming Constituencies”, 23–25 February, Darwendale.  
Guthrie, Z.K. 2014. “The Privatization of Forced Labour in Central Mozambique, 1959–
1965”, Paper presented at the North-eastern Workshop on Southern Africa (NEWSA), 
Burlington, Vermont, 17–19 October. 
Hartnack, A. 2001. “Carry on Regardless: Economic Hardship and Survival Choices in Urban 
and Rural Zimbabwe”, Unpublished Honours Thesis, Rhodes University. 
Hartnack, A. 2006. “Negotiating Impoverishment: Farm Worker Responses to Displacement 
Following Land Invasions in Zimbabwe’s ‘Fast Track Land Reform Programme’”, 
Unpublished Masters Thesis, Rhodes University.  
Helliker, K.D. 2006. “A Sociological Analysis of Intermediary Non-governmental 
Organisations and Land Reform in Contemporary Zimbabwe”, Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, Rhodes University. 
241 
International Bar Association. 2004. An Analysis of the Zimbabwean Non-governmental 
Organizations Bill, http://www.lexisnexis.com/presscenter/hottopics/analysis.pdf 
(accessed 22 November 2014). 
International Organisation for Migration. 2003. Mobile Populations and HIV/AIDS in the 
Southern African Region, Recommendations for Action: Deskreview and Bibliography 
on HIV/AIDS and Mobile Populations. SIDA/UNAIDS. 
Kufakurinani, U. 2013. “A Necessary Evil: Debating White Women’s Prostitution in Early 
20th Century Salisbury”, Paper presented at the International Conference of the 
International Federation for Research in Women’s History and Women’s History 
Network, 29 August – 1 September, Sheffield Hallam University, United Kingdom.  
Kunzwana Women’s Association. Annual Report 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2011, 
2013. Harare: Kunzwana Women’s Association. 
Logan, E.A. (ed.). 1997. “Shamva: Glimpses of the Past”, Unpublished collection of 
reminiscences.  
Mkodzongi, G. 2014. “Contested Claims of Autochthony and Belonging in Zimbabwe: 
Conflict Resolution and Social Organization in a Changing Agrarian Situation”, Paper 
presented at the UCT Social Anthropology Departmental Seminar, 5 August 2014.   
Morreira, S. 2013. “Transnational Human Rights and Local Moralities: The Circulation of 
Rights Discourses in Zimbabwe and South Africa”, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 
University of Cape Town.    
Mutangi, G. 2010. “The Changing Patterns of Farm Labour after the Fast Track Land Reform 
Programme: The Case of Guruve District”, Livelihoods after Land Reform: Working 
Paper 13. Cape Town: PLAAS. 
Mweleko wa Non-governmental Organisation (MWENGO). 1999. “Sub-regional Reflection 
Forum. NGO Action on Land in Southern Africa: Workshop Report”, 15–18 
November, Windhoek, Namibia.  
Parry, S. 1999. “Farm Orphan Support Trust Report”, Presented at the CFU Annual 
Congress.  
Parry, S. 2000. “Report of the Farm Orphan Support Trust”, Presented at CFU Annual 
Congress, August. 
242 
Sachikonye, L.M. 2003. The Situation of Commercial Farm Workers after Land Reform in 
Zimbabwe. Harare: Unpublished report prepared for the Farm Community Trust of 
Zimbabwe. 
Sachikonye, L.M and O.J. Zishiri. 1999. “Tenure Security for Farm Workers in Zimbabwe”, 
Report prepared for the Farm Workers Action Group (FWAG) and funded by the 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES). Harare: FES.   
Sinclair-Bright, L. 2014. “Zimbabwean Land Reform: The Negotiation of Sympathy and 
Recognition in Farmworkers Claims to Belong”, Paper presented at the African Studies 
Association Conference, 20–23 November, Indianapolis, USA. 
Stoler, A. 1991. “Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: National Identity, ‘Mixed Bloods’ 
and the Cultural Genealogies of Europeans in Colonial Southeast Asia”, CSST 
Working Paper No. 64; CRSO Working Paper No. 454.  
Regional Psycho-social Support Initiative (REPSSI). 2002. A Situational Analysis of the 
Activities of Farm Orphan Support Trust of Zimbabwe. Regional Psycho-social Support 
Initiative.   
Rich Dorman, S. 2001. “Inclusion and Exclusion: NGOs and Politics in Zimbabwe”, 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, St Anthony’s College, Oxford University.  
Rutherford, B.A. 1996. “‘Traditions’ of Domesticity in ‘Modern’ Zimbabwean Politics: Race, 
Gender, and Class in the Government of Commercial Farm Workers in Hurungwe 
District”, Unpublished PhD Thesis, McGill University, Montreal.   
Rutherford, B.A. 1999. Farm Workers and “Civil Society” Organisations in Zimbabwe. 
Paper presented at the North Eastern Workshop on Southern Africa (NEWSA), 
Burlington, Vermont, 30 April – 2 May. 
Rutherford, B.A. 2004c. “Shifting Grounds in Zimbabwe: Citizenship and Farm Workers in 
the New Politics of Land”, Paper presented at “States, Borders and Nations: 
Negotiating Citizenship in Africa”: Annual International Conference, 19–20 May, 
Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh.   
Sachikonye, L. 2003. The Situation of Commercial Farm Workers after Land Reform in 
Zimbabwe. A report prepared for the Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe. Harare: 
FCTZ. 
243 
Selby, A. 2006. “Commercial Farmers and the State: Interest Group Politics and Land 
Reform in Zimbabwe”, Unpublished D.Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford.  
Southern African AIDS Information Dissemination Service (SAfAIDS) and Commercial 
Farmers Union. 1996. Orphans on Farms: Who Cares? An Exploratory Study into 
Fostering Orphaned Children on Commercial Farms in Zimbabwe. Harare: 
SAFAIDS/CFU. 
UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS). 2001. Investing in Our Future: 
UNAIDS Best Practice Collection. UNAIDS.  
USAID (United States Agency for International Development). 2000. Background Paper on 
Children Affected by AIDS in Zimbabwe. USAID.  
Zimbabwe National AIDS Council. n.d. Fact Sheet – HIV Decline in Zimbabwe: Positive 
Behaviour Change Makes a Difference, 
http://countryoffice.unfpa.org/zimbabwe/drive/FACTSheetHIVDeclineinZimbabweFin
al.pdf (accessed 23 January 2015). 
Zimbizi, G. 2000. “Scenario Planning for Farm Worker Displacement”, Report prepared for 
the Zimbabwe Network for Informal Settlement Action (ZINISA).  
 
3. Magazines, Newspaper Articles and Internet Sources   
 
Bell, A. 2014. “Former Farm Worker Attacked by ZANU PF in Eviction Saga”, SW Radio 
Africa, 4 June, http://www.swradioafrica.com/2014/06/04/former-farm-worker-
attacked-by-zanu-pf-in-eviction-saga/ (accessed 4 June 2014). 
Bhebhe. N. 2014. “War Vets Protest Farm Seizure”, Newsday, 19 August, 
https://www.newsday.co.zw/2014/08/19/war-vets-protest-farm-seizure/ (accessed 19 
August 2014). 
Chakaodza, B. 1992. “Land Bill: Farmers Reaction Dangerous”, The Sunday Mail, 15 March.   
Chikwanha, T. 2014. “Land Seizures Leave Farm Workers Destitute”, Daily News Live, 4 
May, http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimsit_w_land-seizures-leave-farm-
workers-destitute-dailynews-live/ (accessed 3 August 2014). 
244 
Cook, I. 2011. “Mange tout”, followthethings.com, 
http://followthethings.com/mangetout.html (accessed 8 November 2014).  
Cross, E. 2014. “Zimbabwe’s Economy: Back on the Precipice”, Politicsweb, 17 November, 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619?oid=806831
&sn=Detail&pid=71616 (accessed 17 November 2014).  
Foundations for Farming. n.d. About Us: The Foundation, 
http://www.foundationsforfarming.org/index.php/about-us (accessed 18 November 
2014). 
Foundations for Farming. n.d. Our Message: Foundations for a Profit, 
http://www.foundationsforfarming.org/index.php/about-us/our-message (accessed 18 
November 2014). 
Foundations for Farming. n.d. Planting a Well Gardened Garden (maize), 
http://www.foundationsforfarming.org/images/A-Well-Watered-Garden.pdf (accessed 
18 November 2014). 
Freeth, B. 2014. “Zimbabwean Farm Workers Convicted of ‘Trespassing’ on Their Farm – 
SADC Tribunal Rights Watch”, Politicsweb.co.za, 20 August, 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71656?oid=690563
&sn=Detail&pid=71616 (accessed 20 August 2014).  
Gumbo, L. 2013. “Govt Speaks on BIPPA Farms”, The Herald, 28 November, 
http://www.herald.co.zw/govt-speaks-on-bippa-farms/ (accessed 27 January 2015).  
Hall, J. 2005. “Society Gains from Tesco”, Daily Telegraph, 16 April, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2005/04/17/cctesco17.xml 
(accessed 8 November 2014).  
Hartnack, A. 2012. “The Fate of Zimbabwean Farm Workers: A Reply to RW Johnson”, 
Politicsweb, 5 August, 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619?oid=317121
&sn=Detail&pid=71616 (accessed 27 January 2015).  
Johnson, R. 2014. “Zimbabwe: If a Man Steals Your Farm, Teach Him How to Farm”, 
Horizons, 29 December, https://horizons.team.org/stories/zimbabwe-if-a-man-steals-
your-farm-teach-him-how-to-farm/ (accessed 11 January 2015).  
245 
Johnson, R.W. 2012. “Finding the ‘Golden Lining’ in the Zimbabwean Genocide”, 
Politicsweb, 29 July, 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619?oid=315605
&sn=Detail&pid=71616 (accessed 27 January 2015).  
Laiton, C. 2014. “Minister, Air Force Boss Clash Over Farm”, Newsday, 12 March, 
https://www.newsday.co.zw/2014/03/12/minister-air-force-boss-clash-farm/ (accessed 
12 March 2014). 
Mbayiwa-Makuvatsine, J. 2014. “Poverty Fuels Environmental Degradation”, Newsday, 19 
August 2014, https://www.newsday.co.zw/2014/08/19/poverty-fuels-environmental-
degradation/ (accessed 19 August 2014).  
Mhlanga, B. 2014a. “Farm Workers Face Eviction”, Newsday, 15 March, 
https://www.newsday.co.zw/2014/03/15/farm-workers-face-eviction/ (accessed 15 
March 2014). 
Mhlanga, B. 2014b. “Crushing Stones for a Living as Job Market Crashes”, Newsday, 11 
June, https://www.newsday.co.zw/2014/06/11/crushing-stones-living-job-market-
crashes/ (accessed 11 June 2014).  
Mhofu, S. 2012. “Dozens of People Face Eviction from Zimbabwe Farms”, VOA News, 21 
February, http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/feb22_2012.html (accessed 23 February 
2012).  
Mpofu, O. 2013. Speech given at National Diamond Conference by Zimbabwean Minister of 
Mines and Mining Development Obert Mpofu. Shown on ZBC Newsnight, 25 February.  
Mutenga, T. 2013. “Farm Workers Grapple with Poor Wages”, Financial Gazette, 7 
November, http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/farm-workers-grapple-with-poor-wages/ 
(accessed 7 Jan 2015).  
Newsday, 17 March 2014. “Is Tobacco Going the Way of Cotton?”, 
https://www.newsday.co.zw/2014/03/17/is-tobacco-going-the-way-of-cotton?/ 
(accessed 17 March 2014).  
Newsday, 21 May 2014. “51 Farm Labourers Fight New Owner”, 
https://www.newsday.co.zw/2014/05/21/51-farm-labourers-fight-new-owner/ (accessed 
21 May 2014).  
246 
Newsday, 24 July 2013. “Caps Boss Evicts ‘Political’ Farm Workers”, 
https://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/07/24/caps-boss-evicts-political-farm-workers/ 
(accessed 26 July 2013).  
SAPA, 7 November 2014. “Zimbabwe’s Economy Doing No Better”, 
http://mg.co.za/article/2014-11-07-zimbabwes-econmony-doing-no-better (accessed 8 
November 2014).  
Scoones, I. 2014. “Tobacco: Driving Growth in Local Economies”, Zimbabweland, 24 
November, https://zimbabweland.wordpress.com/2014/11/24/tobacco-driving-growth-
in-local-economies/ (accessed 27 January 2015).  
Slaughter, B. and S. Nolan. 2000. “Zimbabwe: Referendum Defeat for Mugabe Shakes 
ZANU-PF Government”, World Socialist Website, 22 February, 
http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2000/02/zimb-f22.html (accessed 6 November 2014).  
SW Radio Africa, 17 March 2014. “Hundreds Evicted in Fresh Farm Seizures”, 
http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimsit_hundreds-evicted-in-fresh-mazowe-
farm-seizures/ (accessed 18 March 2014).  
The Farmer, 8 March 1990. “Brown Briefs Defence Students on Agriculture” 60(10).  
The Farmer, 31 May 1990. Letter to the Editor: “Little Woman” 60(22). 
The Farmer, 8 November 1990. “Editorial: Dealing with the Scourge of AIDS” 60(45). 
The Farmer, 15 November 1990. “Funds for AIDS Awareness in Zimbabwe” 60(46). 
The Farm Worker. 1996. “Transforming the Farm Village: A Practical Guide to Improved 
Farm Housing”, 1(1), July. Harare: ZTA Publications. 
The Zimbabwean, 14 September 2013. “Challenging Times for NGOs Ahead as Chikomo’s 
Trial Commences”, http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimsit_challenging-
times-for-ngos-ahead/ (accessed 15 September 2013).  
Whyte, B. 1969. “Boss”, Illustrated Life Rhodesia, 31 July, in All Our Yesterdays 1890–
1970: A Pictorial Review of Rhodesia’s Story from the Best of Illustrated Life 
Rhodesia. Salisbury: The Graham Publishing Company. 
































Details of interviews, focus groups, meetings and surveys conducted 
Full interviews: 
Type of informant Number of interviews Percentage 
Former and current farmworkers/dwellers 44 35% 
White former and current farm owners 30 24% 
NGO staff and members 28 23% 
Grassroots organisation activists 5 4% 
Academics/journalists 4 3.3% 
A1 farmers 4 3.3% 
A2/black commercial farm owners 3 2.5% 
Church-linked individuals 3 2.5% 
Union officials 2 1.6% 
Communal farmers 1 0.8% 
Total: 124 100% 
 
Focus-group discussions: 
Type of informant Number of focus groups Percentage 
Former and current farmworkers/dwellers 10 60% 
Communal farmers 2 11.6% 
Retired farmworkers 1 5.7% 
Gravel poachers 1 5.7% 
Staff at home for retired farmworkers 1 5.7% 
Farm school officials 1 5.7% 
Agribusiness consultants 1 5.7% 
Total: 17 100% 
 
Meetings: 
Type of informant Number of meetings Percentage 
NGO officials 8 40% 
Academics 7 35% 
Church officials 3 15% 
Government officials 1 5% 
Agricultural union officials 1 5% 
Total: 20 100% 
 
Farm youth surveys, peri-urban Harare: 
Number included in survey: 34 (100%) 
Male: 20 (59%) 
Female: 14 (41%) 
 
 
